diff options
| author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2019-04-10 09:46:32 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-05-22 08:39:46 +0300 |
| commit | 7ea9b157e6884493d18b1d5bc5b98d5251fc1075 (patch) | |
| tree | de45a90c13f7b6f58ebd2d98155ccbaeb83ba24f /arch | |
| parent | ce28ca419e0fe1eabf03eb83d439fc641f413c8d (diff) | |
| download | linux-7ea9b157e6884493d18b1d5bc5b98d5251fc1075.tar.xz | |
crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - don't access already-freed walk.iv
commit 4a8108b70508df0b6c4ffa4a3974dab93dcbe851 upstream.
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
xts-aes-neonbs doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and unconditionally accessing walk.iv has caused a
real problem in other algorithms. Thus, update xts-aes-neonbs to start
checking the return value of skcipher_walk_virt().
Fixes: 1abee99eafab ("crypto: arm64/aes - reimplement bit-sliced ARM/NEON implementation for arm64")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c index e7a95a566462..5cc248967387 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c @@ -304,6 +304,8 @@ static int __xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int err; err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (err) + return err; kernel_neon_begin(); neon_aes_ecb_encrypt(walk.iv, walk.iv, ctx->twkey, ctx->key.rounds, 1); |