Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.

No conflicts.

Adjacent changes:

drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/common.h
  38cc3c6dcc09 ("net: stmmac: protect updates of 64-bit statistics counters")
  fd5a6a71313e ("net: stmmac: est: Per Tx-queue error count for HLBF")
  c5c3e1bfc9e0 ("net: stmmac: Offload queueMaxSDU from tc-taprio")

drivers/net/wireless/microchip/wilc1000/netdev.c
  c9013880284d ("wifi: fill in MODULE_DESCRIPTION()s for wilc1000")
  328efda22af8 ("wifi: wilc1000: do not realloc workqueue everytime an interface is added")

net/unix/garbage.c
  11498715f266 ("af_unix: Remove io_uring code for GC.")
  1279f9d9dec2 ("af_unix: Call kfree_skb() for dead unix_(sk)->oob_skb in GC.")

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

22 files changed, 198 insertions, 57 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile
index 47ecc4cff9d2..a88cdf910687 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ vdso_prepare: prepare0
 	include/generated/vdso-offsets.h arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/vdso.so
 ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO
 	$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32 \
-	include/generated/vdso32-offsets.h arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/vdso.so
+	arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/vdso.so
 endif
 endif
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h
index b4ae32109932..4305995c8f82 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h
@@ -17,9 +17,6 @@
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 #include <generated/vdso-offsets.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO
-#include <generated/vdso32-offsets.h>
-#endif
 
 #define VDSO_SYMBOL(base, name)						   \
 ({									   \
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
index e5d03a7039b4..467cb7117273 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS)	+= patch-scs.o
 # We need to prevent the SCS patching code from patching itself. Using
 # -mbranch-protection=none here to avoid the patchable PAC opcodes from being
 # generated triggers an issue with full LTO on Clang, which stops emitting PAC
-# instructions altogether. So instead, omit the unwind tables used by the
-# patching code, so it will not be able to locate its own PAC instructions.
-CFLAGS_patch-scs.o			+= -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -fno-unwind-tables
+# instructions altogether. So disable LTO as well for the compilation unit.
+CFLAGS_patch-scs.o			+= -mbranch-protection=none
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_patch-scs.o		+= $(CC_FLAGS_LTO)
 
 # Force dependency (vdso*-wrap.S includes vdso.so through incbin)
 $(obj)/vdso-wrap.o: $(obj)/vdso/vdso.so
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/Makefile
index 2266fcdff78a..f5f80fdce0fe 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/Makefile
@@ -127,9 +127,6 @@ obj-vdso := $(c-obj-vdso) $(c-obj-vdso-gettimeofday) $(asm-obj-vdso)
 targets += vdso.lds
 CPPFLAGS_vdso.lds += -P -C -U$(ARCH)
 
-include/generated/vdso32-offsets.h: $(obj)/vdso32.so.dbg FORCE
-	$(call if_changed,vdsosym)
-
 # Strip rule for vdso.so
 $(obj)/vdso.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S
 $(obj)/vdso.so: $(obj)/vdso32.so.dbg FORCE
@@ -166,9 +163,3 @@ quiet_cmd_vdsoas = AS32    $@
 
 quiet_cmd_vdsomunge = MUNGE   $@
       cmd_vdsomunge = $(obj)/$(munge) $< $@
-
-# Generate vDSO offsets using helper script (borrowed from the 64-bit vDSO)
-gen-vdsosym := $(srctree)/$(src)/../vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh
-quiet_cmd_vdsosym = VDSOSYM $@
-# The AArch64 nm should be able to read an AArch32 binary
-      cmd_vdsosym = $(NM) $< | $(gen-vdsosym) | LC_ALL=C sort > $@
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
index 10959e6c3583..929f68926b34 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config LOONGARCH
 	select ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
 	select ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
 	select ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE
+	select ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION if TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
 	select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE	if ACPI
 	select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
 	select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ config LOONGARCH
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if PERF_EVENTS
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
+	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
@@ -632,23 +634,6 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET
 
 	  This is limited by the size of the lower address memory, 256MB.
 
-config SECCOMP
-	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
-	depends on PROC_FS
-	default y
-	help
-	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
-	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
-	  execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
-	  the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
-	  syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
-	  their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
-	  enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
-	  and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
-	  defined by each seccomp mode.
-
-	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
-
 endmenu
 
 config ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL
@@ -667,10 +652,6 @@ config ARCH_SPARSEMEM_ENABLE
 	  or have huge holes in the physical address space for other reasons.
 	  See <file:Documentation/mm/numa.rst> for more.
 
-config ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION
-	def_bool y
-	depends on TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
-
 config ARCH_MEMORY_PROBE
 	def_bool y
 	depends on MEMORY_HOTPLUG
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h
index 8de6c4b83a61..49e29b29996f 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h
+++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h
@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ static inline bool acpi_has_cpu_in_madt(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
+#define MAX_CORE_PIC 256
+
 extern struct list_head acpi_wakeup_device_list;
-extern struct acpi_madt_core_pic acpi_core_pic[NR_CPUS];
+extern struct acpi_madt_core_pic acpi_core_pic[MAX_CORE_PIC];
 
 extern int __init parse_acpi_topology(void);
 
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c
index b6b097bbf866..5cf59c617126 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c
@@ -29,11 +29,9 @@ int disabled_cpus;
 
 u64 acpi_saved_sp;
 
-#define MAX_CORE_PIC 256
-
 #define PREFIX			"ACPI: "
 
-struct acpi_madt_core_pic acpi_core_pic[NR_CPUS];
+struct acpi_madt_core_pic acpi_core_pic[MAX_CORE_PIC];
 
 void __init __iomem * __acpi_map_table(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size)
 {
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c b/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c
index cc3e81fe0186..c608adc99845 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ void *kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr)
 		unsigned long xrange = (maddr >> XRANGE_SHIFT) & 0xffff;
 		unsigned long offset = 0;
 
+		if (maddr >= FIXADDR_START)
+			return (void *)(kasan_early_shadow_page);
+
 		maddr &= XRANGE_SHADOW_MASK;
 		switch (xrange) {
 		case XKPRANGE_CC_SEG:
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile b/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile
index c74c9921304f..f597cd08a96b 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 # Objects to go into the VDSO.
 
 KASAN_SANITIZE := n
+UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
 
 # Include the generic Makefile to check the built vdso.
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/iommu.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/iommu.c
index ebe259bdd462..d71eac3b2887 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/iommu.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/iommu.c
@@ -1287,20 +1287,20 @@ spapr_tce_platform_iommu_attach_dev(struct iommu_domain *platform_domain,
 	struct iommu_domain *domain = iommu_get_domain_for_dev(dev);
 	struct iommu_group *grp = iommu_group_get(dev);
 	struct iommu_table_group *table_group;
-	int ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	/* At first attach the ownership is already set */
 	if (!domain)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (!grp)
-		return -ENODEV;
-
 	table_group = iommu_group_get_iommudata(grp);
-	ret = table_group->ops->take_ownership(table_group);
+	/*
+	 * The domain being set to PLATFORM from earlier
+	 * BLOCKED. The table_group ownership has to be released.
+	 */
+	table_group->ops->release_ownership(table_group);
 	iommu_group_put(grp);
 
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct iommu_domain_ops spapr_tce_platform_domain_ops = {
@@ -1312,13 +1312,32 @@ static struct iommu_domain spapr_tce_platform_domain = {
 	.ops = &spapr_tce_platform_domain_ops,
 };
 
-static struct iommu_domain spapr_tce_blocked_domain = {
-	.type = IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED,
+static int
+spapr_tce_blocked_iommu_attach_dev(struct iommu_domain *platform_domain,
+				     struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct iommu_group *grp = iommu_group_get(dev);
+	struct iommu_table_group *table_group;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+
 	/*
 	 * FIXME: SPAPR mixes blocked and platform behaviors, the blocked domain
 	 * also sets the dma_api ops
 	 */
-	.ops = &spapr_tce_platform_domain_ops,
+	table_group = iommu_group_get_iommudata(grp);
+	ret = table_group->ops->take_ownership(table_group);
+	iommu_group_put(grp);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct iommu_domain_ops spapr_tce_blocked_domain_ops = {
+	.attach_dev = spapr_tce_blocked_iommu_attach_dev,
+};
+
+static struct iommu_domain spapr_tce_blocked_domain = {
+	.type = IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED,
+	.ops = &spapr_tce_blocked_domain_ops,
 };
 
 static bool spapr_tce_iommu_capable(struct device *dev, enum iommu_cap cap)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index d6b7a5b95874..7499e88a947c 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -139,6 +139,33 @@ enum KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ID {
 	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZIHPM,
 	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_SMSTATEEN,
 	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICOND,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZBC,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZBKB,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZBKC,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZBKX,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKND,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKNE,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKNH,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKR,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKSED,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKSH,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKT,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVBB,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVBC,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKB,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKG,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKNED,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKNHA,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKNHB,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKSED,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKSH,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKT,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZFH,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZFHMIN,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZIHINTNTL,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVFH,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVFHMIN,
+	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZFA,
 	KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_MAX,
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_onereg.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_onereg.c
index fc34557f5356..5f7355e96008 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_onereg.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_onereg.c
@@ -42,15 +42,42 @@ static const unsigned long kvm_isa_ext_arr[] = {
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(SVPBMT),
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZBA),
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZBB),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZBC),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZBKB),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZBKC),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZBKX),
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZBS),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZFA),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZFH),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZFHMIN),
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZICBOM),
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZICBOZ),
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZICNTR),
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZICOND),
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZICSR),
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZIFENCEI),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZIHINTNTL),
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZIHINTPAUSE),
 	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZIHPM),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZKND),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZKNE),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZKNH),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZKR),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZKSED),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZKSH),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZKT),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVBB),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVBC),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVFH),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVFHMIN),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVKB),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVKG),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVKNED),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVKNHA),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVKNHB),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVKSED),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVKSH),
+	KVM_ISA_EXT_ARR(ZVKT),
 };
 
 static unsigned long kvm_riscv_vcpu_base2isa_ext(unsigned long base_ext)
@@ -92,13 +119,40 @@ static bool kvm_riscv_vcpu_isa_disable_allowed(unsigned long ext)
 	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_SVNAPOT:
 	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZBA:
 	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZBB:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZBC:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZBKB:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZBKC:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZBKX:
 	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZBS:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZFA:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZFH:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZFHMIN:
 	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICNTR:
 	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICOND:
 	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICSR:
 	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZIFENCEI:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZIHINTNTL:
 	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZIHINTPAUSE:
 	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZIHPM:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKND:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKNE:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKNH:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKR:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKSED:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKSH:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKT:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVBB:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVBC:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVFH:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVFHMIN:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKB:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKG:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKNED:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKNHA:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKNHB:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKSED:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKSH:
+	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZVKT:
 		return false;
 	/* Extensions which can be disabled using Smstateen */
 	case KVM_RISCV_ISA_EXT_SSAIA:
diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/tlbflush.c b/arch/riscv/mm/tlbflush.c
index 8d12b26f5ac3..9619965f6501 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/mm/tlbflush.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/mm/tlbflush.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static inline void local_flush_tlb_range_asid(unsigned long start,
 
 void local_flush_tlb_kernel_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
 {
-	local_flush_tlb_range_asid(start, end, PAGE_SIZE, FLUSH_TLB_NO_ASID);
+	local_flush_tlb_range_asid(start, end - start, PAGE_SIZE, FLUSH_TLB_NO_ASID);
 }
 
 static void __ipi_flush_tlb_all(void *info)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c b/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c
index 621a17fd1a1b..f875a404a0a0 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c
@@ -676,8 +676,12 @@ static int handle_pqap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.pqap_hook) {
 		pqap_hook = *vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.pqap_hook;
 		ret = pqap_hook(vcpu);
-		if (!ret && vcpu->run->s.regs.gprs[1] & 0x00ff0000)
-			kvm_s390_set_psw_cc(vcpu, 3);
+		if (!ret) {
+			if (vcpu->run->s.regs.gprs[1] & 0x00ff0000)
+				kvm_s390_set_psw_cc(vcpu, 3);
+			else
+				kvm_s390_set_psw_cc(vcpu, 0);
+		}
 		up_read(&vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.pqap_hook_rwsem);
 		return ret;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
index fef42e2a80a2..3af3bd20ac7b 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
@@ -1235,7 +1235,6 @@ static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat);
 	if (IS_ERR(gmap))
 		return PTR_ERR(gmap);
-	gmap->private = vcpu->kvm;
 	vcpu->kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_create++;
 	WRITE_ONCE(vsie_page->gmap, gmap);
 	return 0;
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
index 6f96b5a71c63..8da39deb56ca 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
@@ -1691,6 +1691,7 @@ struct gmap *gmap_shadow(struct gmap *parent, unsigned long asce,
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	new->mm = parent->mm;
 	new->parent = gmap_get(parent);
+	new->private = parent->private;
 	new->orig_asce = asce;
 	new->edat_level = edat_level;
 	new->initialized = false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
index 6ae2d16a7613..76c310b19b11 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
@@ -10,13 +10,14 @@ enum cc_vendor {
 	CC_VENDOR_INTEL,
 };
 
-extern enum cc_vendor cc_vendor;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
+extern enum cc_vendor cc_vendor;
 void cc_set_mask(u64 mask);
 u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val);
 u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val);
 #else
+#define cc_vendor (CC_VENDOR_NONE)
+
 static inline u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val)
 {
 	return val;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index b5b2d0fde579..d271ba20a0b2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1145,6 +1145,8 @@ struct kvm_hv {
 	unsigned int synic_auto_eoi_used;
 
 	struct kvm_hv_syndbg hv_syndbg;
+
+	bool xsaves_xsavec_checked;
 };
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index dfe9945b9bec..428ee74002e1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -434,7 +434,8 @@ static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
 
-	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+	if (cc_vendor != CC_VENDOR_AMD ||
+	    !cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return;
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
index 4943f6b2bbee..8a47f8541eab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -1322,6 +1322,56 @@ static bool hv_check_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu, u32 msr)
 	return false;
 }
 
+#define KVM_HV_WIN2016_GUEST_ID 0x1040a00003839
+#define KVM_HV_WIN2016_GUEST_ID_MASK (~GENMASK_ULL(23, 16)) /* mask out the service version */
+
+/*
+ * Hyper-V enabled Windows Server 2016 SMP VMs fail to boot in !XSAVES && XSAVEC
+ * configuration.
+ * Such configuration can result from, for example, AMD Erratum 1386 workaround.
+ *
+ * Print a notice so users aren't left wondering what's suddenly gone wrong.
+ */
+static void __kvm_hv_xsaves_xsavec_maybe_warn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+
+	/* Check again under the hv_lock.  */
+	if (hv->xsaves_xsavec_checked)
+		return;
+
+	if ((hv->hv_guest_os_id & KVM_HV_WIN2016_GUEST_ID_MASK) !=
+	    KVM_HV_WIN2016_GUEST_ID)
+		return;
+
+	hv->xsaves_xsavec_checked = true;
+
+	/* UP configurations aren't affected */
+	if (atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus) < 2)
+		return;
+
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) ||
+	    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVEC))
+		return;
+
+	pr_notice_ratelimited("Booting SMP Windows KVM VM with !XSAVES && XSAVEC. "
+			      "If it fails to boot try disabling XSAVEC in the VM config.\n");
+}
+
+void kvm_hv_xsaves_xsavec_maybe_warn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.hyperv_enabled ||
+	    hv->xsaves_xsavec_checked)
+		return;
+
+	mutex_lock(&hv->hv_lock);
+	__kvm_hv_xsaves_xsavec_maybe_warn(vcpu);
+	mutex_unlock(&hv->hv_lock);
+}
+
 static int kvm_hv_set_msr_pw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data,
 			     bool host)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h
index 1dc0b6604526..923e64903da9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h
@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ void kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(struct kvm *kvm,
 			   struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *hv_clock);
 void kvm_hv_request_tsc_page_update(struct kvm *kvm);
 
+void kvm_hv_xsaves_xsavec_maybe_warn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
 void kvm_hv_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
 void kvm_hv_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
 int kvm_hv_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -267,6 +269,7 @@ int kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 static inline void kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(struct kvm *kvm,
 					 struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *hv_clock) {}
 static inline void kvm_hv_request_tsc_page_update(struct kvm *kvm) {}
+static inline void kvm_hv_xsaves_xsavec_maybe_warn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 static inline void kvm_hv_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm) {}
 static inline void kvm_hv_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm) {}
 static inline int kvm_hv_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 363b1c080205..bf10a9073a09 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1782,6 +1782,10 @@ static int set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 	if ((efer ^ old_efer) & KVM_MMU_EFER_ROLE_BITS)
 		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
 
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+	    (efer & EFER_SVME))
+		kvm_hv_xsaves_xsavec_maybe_warn(vcpu);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -7016,6 +7020,9 @@ set_identity_unlock:
 		r = -EEXIST;
 		if (kvm->arch.vpit)
 			goto create_pit_unlock;
+		r = -ENOENT;
+		if (!pic_in_kernel(kvm))
+			goto create_pit_unlock;
 		r = -ENOMEM;
 		kvm->arch.vpit = kvm_create_pit(kvm, u.pit_config.flags);
 		if (kvm->arch.vpit)