Merge v5.10-rc3 into drm-next

We need commit f8f6ae5d077a ("mm: always have io_remap_pfn_range() set
pgprot_decrypted()") to be able to merge Jason's cleanup patch.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>

52 files changed, 462 insertions, 294 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/head.S b/arch/arc/kernel/head.S
index 17fd1ed700cc..9152782444b5 100644
--- a/arch/arc/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/arc/kernel/head.S
@@ -67,7 +67,22 @@
 	sr	r5, [ARC_REG_LPB_CTRL]
 1:
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARC_LPB_DISABLE */
-#endif
+
+	/* On HSDK, CCMs need to remapped super early */
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARC_SOC_HSDK
+	mov	r6, 0x60000000
+	lr	r5, [ARC_REG_ICCM_BUILD]
+	breq	r5, 0, 1f
+	sr	r6, [ARC_REG_AUX_ICCM]
+1:
+	lr	r5, [ARC_REG_DCCM_BUILD]
+	breq	r5, 0, 2f
+	sr	r6, [ARC_REG_AUX_DCCM]
+2:
+#endif	/* CONFIG_ARC_SOC_HSDK */
+
+#endif	/* CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2 */
+
 	; Config DSP_CTRL properly, so kernel may use integer multiply,
 	; multiply-accumulate, and divide operations
 	DSP_EARLY_INIT
diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/arc/kernel/stacktrace.c
index feba91c9d969..b23986f98450 100644
--- a/arch/arc/kernel/stacktrace.c
+++ b/arch/arc/kernel/stacktrace.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ arc_unwind_core(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pt_regs *regs,
 		int (*consumer_fn) (unsigned int, void *), void *arg)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARC_DW2_UNWIND
-	int ret = 0;
+	int ret = 0, cnt = 0;
 	unsigned int address;
 	struct unwind_frame_info frame_info;
 
@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ arc_unwind_core(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pt_regs *regs,
 			break;
 
 		frame_info.regs.r63 = frame_info.regs.r31;
+
+		if (cnt++ > 128) {
+			printk("unwinder looping too long, aborting !\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
 	}
 
 	return address;		/* return the last address it saw */
diff --git a/arch/arc/plat-hsdk/platform.c b/arch/arc/plat-hsdk/platform.c
index 0b63fc095b99..b3ea1fa11f87 100644
--- a/arch/arc/plat-hsdk/platform.c
+++ b/arch/arc/plat-hsdk/platform.c
@@ -17,22 +17,6 @@ int arc_hsdk_axi_dmac_coherent __section(".data") = 0;
 
 #define ARC_CCM_UNUSED_ADDR	0x60000000
 
-static void __init hsdk_init_per_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
-{
-	/*
-	 * By default ICCM is mapped to 0x7z while this area is used for
-	 * kernel virtual mappings, so move it to currently unused area.
-	 */
-	if (cpuinfo_arc700[cpu].iccm.sz)
-		write_aux_reg(ARC_REG_AUX_ICCM, ARC_CCM_UNUSED_ADDR);
-
-	/*
-	 * By default DCCM is mapped to 0x8z while this area is used by kernel,
-	 * so move it to currently unused area.
-	 */
-	if (cpuinfo_arc700[cpu].dccm.sz)
-		write_aux_reg(ARC_REG_AUX_DCCM, ARC_CCM_UNUSED_ADDR);
-}
 
 #define ARC_PERIPHERAL_BASE	0xf0000000
 #define CREG_BASE		(ARC_PERIPHERAL_BASE + 0x1000)
@@ -339,5 +323,4 @@ static const char *hsdk_compat[] __initconst = {
 MACHINE_START(SIMULATION, "hsdk")
 	.dt_compat	= hsdk_compat,
 	.init_early     = hsdk_init_early,
-	.init_per_cpu	= hsdk_init_per_cpu,
 MACHINE_END
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/init.c b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
index d57112a276f5..c23dbf8bebee 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
@@ -354,8 +354,8 @@ static void __init free_highpages(void)
 	/* set highmem page free */
 	for_each_free_mem_range(i, NUMA_NO_NODE, MEMBLOCK_NONE,
 				&range_start, &range_end, NULL) {
-		unsigned long start = PHYS_PFN(range_start);
-		unsigned long end = PHYS_PFN(range_end);
+		unsigned long start = PFN_UP(range_start);
+		unsigned long end = PFN_DOWN(range_end);
 
 		/* Ignore complete lowmem entries */
 		if (end <= max_low)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 1d466addb078..1515f6f153a0 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ config NUMA
 config NODES_SHIFT
 	int "Maximum NUMA Nodes (as a power of 2)"
 	range 1 10
-	default "2"
+	default "4"
 	depends on NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES
 	help
 	  Specify the maximum number of NUMA Nodes available on the target
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/brk-imm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/brk-imm.h
index e3d47b52161d..ec7720dbe2c8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/brk-imm.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/brk-imm.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
  * #imm16 values used for BRK instruction generation
  * 0x004: for installing kprobes
  * 0x005: for installing uprobes
+ * 0x006: for kprobe software single-step
  * Allowed values for kgdb are 0x400 - 0x7ff
  * 0x100: for triggering a fault on purpose (reserved)
  * 0x400: for dynamic BRK instruction
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@
  */
 #define KPROBES_BRK_IMM			0x004
 #define UPROBES_BRK_IMM			0x005
+#define KPROBES_BRK_SS_IMM		0x006
 #define FAULT_BRK_IMM			0x100
 #define KGDB_DYN_DBG_BRK_IMM		0x400
 #define KGDB_COMPILED_DBG_BRK_IMM	0x401
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h
index 0b298f48f5bf..657c921fd784 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 
 /* kprobes BRK opcodes with ESR encoding  */
 #define BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES	(AARCH64_BREAK_MON | (KPROBES_BRK_IMM << 5))
+#define BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES_SS	(AARCH64_BREAK_MON | (KPROBES_BRK_SS_IMM << 5))
 /* uprobes BRK opcodes with ESR encoding  */
 #define BRK64_OPCODE_UPROBES	(AARCH64_BREAK_MON | (UPROBES_BRK_IMM << 5))
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kprobes.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kprobes.h
index 97e511d645a2..8699ce30f587 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kprobes.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kprobes.h
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 
 #define __ARCH_WANT_KPROBES_INSN_SLOT
-#define MAX_INSN_SIZE			1
+#define MAX_INSN_SIZE			2
 
 #define flush_insn_slot(p)		do { } while (0)
 #define kretprobe_blacklist_size	0
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
index af9987c154ca..66adee8b5fc8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
 	u64 flags, value;
 	bool be_image, be_kernel;
 	struct kexec_buf kbuf;
-	unsigned long text_offset;
+	unsigned long text_offset, kernel_segment_number;
 	struct kexec_segment *kernel_segment;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -88,11 +88,37 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
 	/* Adjust kernel segment with TEXT_OFFSET */
 	kbuf.memsz += text_offset;
 
-	ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
-	if (ret)
+	kernel_segment_number = image->nr_segments;
+
+	/*
+	 * The location of the kernel segment may make it impossible to satisfy
+	 * the other segment requirements, so we try repeatedly to find a
+	 * location that will work.
+	 */
+	while ((ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf)) == 0) {
+		/* Try to load additional data */
+		kernel_segment = &image->segment[kernel_segment_number];
+		ret = load_other_segments(image, kernel_segment->mem,
+					  kernel_segment->memsz, initrd,
+					  initrd_len, cmdline);
+		if (!ret)
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * We couldn't find space for the other segments; erase the
+		 * kernel segment and try the next available hole.
+		 */
+		image->nr_segments -= 1;
+		kbuf.buf_min = kernel_segment->mem + kernel_segment->memsz;
+		kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("Could not find any suitable kernel location!");
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
 
-	kernel_segment = &image->segment[image->nr_segments - 1];
+	kernel_segment = &image->segment[kernel_segment_number];
 	kernel_segment->mem += text_offset;
 	kernel_segment->memsz -= text_offset;
 	image->start = kernel_segment->mem;
@@ -101,12 +127,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
 				kernel_segment->mem, kbuf.bufsz,
 				kernel_segment->memsz);
 
-	/* Load additional data */
-	ret = load_other_segments(image,
-				kernel_segment->mem, kernel_segment->memsz,
-				initrd, initrd_len, cmdline);
-
-	return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 5b0e67b93cdc..03210f644790 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -240,6 +240,11 @@ static int prepare_elf_headers(void **addr, unsigned long *sz)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Tries to add the initrd and DTB to the image. If it is not possible to find
+ * valid locations, this function will undo changes to the image and return non
+ * zero.
+ */
 int load_other_segments(struct kimage *image,
 			unsigned long kernel_load_addr,
 			unsigned long kernel_size,
@@ -248,7 +253,8 @@ int load_other_segments(struct kimage *image,
 {
 	struct kexec_buf kbuf;
 	void *headers, *dtb = NULL;
-	unsigned long headers_sz, initrd_load_addr = 0, dtb_len;
+	unsigned long headers_sz, initrd_load_addr = 0, dtb_len,
+		      orig_segments = image->nr_segments;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	kbuf.image = image;
@@ -334,6 +340,7 @@ int load_other_segments(struct kimage *image,
 	return 0;
 
 out_err:
+	image->nr_segments = orig_segments;
 	vfree(dtb);
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
index deba738142ed..f11a1a1f7026 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
@@ -36,25 +36,16 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kprobe_ctlblk, kprobe_ctlblk);
 static void __kprobes
 post_kprobe_handler(struct kprobe_ctlblk *, struct pt_regs *);
 
-static int __kprobes patch_text(kprobe_opcode_t *addr, u32 opcode)
-{
-	void *addrs[1];
-	u32 insns[1];
-
-	addrs[0] = addr;
-	insns[0] = opcode;
-
-	return aarch64_insn_patch_text(addrs, insns, 1);
-}
-
 static void __kprobes arch_prepare_ss_slot(struct kprobe *p)
 {
+	kprobe_opcode_t *addr = p->ainsn.api.insn;
+	void *addrs[] = {addr, addr + 1};
+	u32 insns[] = {p->opcode, BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES_SS};
+
 	/* prepare insn slot */
-	patch_text(p->ainsn.api.insn, p->opcode);
+	aarch64_insn_patch_text(addrs, insns, 2);
 
-	flush_icache_range((uintptr_t) (p->ainsn.api.insn),
-			   (uintptr_t) (p->ainsn.api.insn) +
-			   MAX_INSN_SIZE * sizeof(kprobe_opcode_t));
+	flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)addr, (uintptr_t)(addr + MAX_INSN_SIZE));
 
 	/*
 	 * Needs restoring of return address after stepping xol.
@@ -128,13 +119,18 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
 /* arm kprobe: install breakpoint in text */
 void __kprobes arch_arm_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
 {
-	patch_text(p->addr, BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES);
+	void *addr = p->addr;
+	u32 insn = BRK64_OPCODE_KPROBES;
+
+	aarch64_insn_patch_text(&addr, &insn, 1);
 }
 
 /* disarm kprobe: remove breakpoint from text */
 void __kprobes arch_disarm_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
 {
-	patch_text(p->addr, p->opcode);
+	void *addr = p->addr;
+
+	aarch64_insn_patch_text(&addr, &p->opcode, 1);
 }
 
 void __kprobes arch_remove_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
@@ -163,20 +159,15 @@ static void __kprobes set_current_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
 }
 
 /*
- * Interrupts need to be disabled before single-step mode is set, and not
- * reenabled until after single-step mode ends.
- * Without disabling interrupt on local CPU, there is a chance of
- * interrupt occurrence in the period of exception return and  start of
- * out-of-line single-step, that result in wrongly single stepping
- * into the interrupt handler.
+ * Mask all of DAIF while executing the instruction out-of-line, to keep things
+ * simple and avoid nesting exceptions. Interrupts do have to be disabled since
+ * the kprobe state is per-CPU and doesn't get migrated.
  */
 static void __kprobes kprobes_save_local_irqflag(struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb,
 						struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	kcb->saved_irqflag = regs->pstate & DAIF_MASK;
-	regs->pstate |= PSR_I_BIT;
-	/* Unmask PSTATE.D for enabling software step exceptions. */
-	regs->pstate &= ~PSR_D_BIT;
+	regs->pstate |= DAIF_MASK;
 }
 
 static void __kprobes kprobes_restore_local_irqflag(struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb,
@@ -219,10 +210,7 @@ static void __kprobes setup_singlestep(struct kprobe *p,
 		slot = (unsigned long)p->ainsn.api.insn;
 
 		set_ss_context(kcb, slot);	/* mark pending ss */
-
-		/* IRQs and single stepping do not mix well. */
 		kprobes_save_local_irqflag(kcb, regs);
-		kernel_enable_single_step(regs);
 		instruction_pointer_set(regs, slot);
 	} else {
 		/* insn simulation */
@@ -273,12 +261,8 @@ post_kprobe_handler(struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	}
 	/* call post handler */
 	kcb->kprobe_status = KPROBE_HIT_SSDONE;
-	if (cur->post_handler)	{
-		/* post_handler can hit breakpoint and single step
-		 * again, so we enable D-flag for recursive exception.
-		 */
+	if (cur->post_handler)
 		cur->post_handler(cur, regs, 0);
-	}
 
 	reset_current_kprobe();
 }
@@ -302,8 +286,6 @@ int __kprobes kprobe_fault_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int fsr)
 		if (!instruction_pointer(regs))
 			BUG();
 
-		kernel_disable_single_step();
-
 		if (kcb->kprobe_status == KPROBE_REENTER)
 			restore_previous_kprobe(kcb);
 		else
@@ -365,10 +347,6 @@ static void __kprobes kprobe_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
 			 * pre-handler and it returned non-zero, it will
 			 * modify the execution path and no need to single
 			 * stepping. Let's just reset current kprobe and exit.
-			 *
-			 * pre_handler can hit a breakpoint and can step thru
-			 * before return, keep PSTATE D-flag enabled until
-			 * pre_handler return back.
 			 */
 			if (!p->pre_handler || !p->pre_handler(p, regs)) {
 				setup_singlestep(p, regs, kcb, 0);
@@ -399,7 +377,7 @@ kprobe_ss_hit(struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb, unsigned long addr)
 }
 
 static int __kprobes
-kprobe_single_step_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr)
+kprobe_breakpoint_ss_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr)
 {
 	struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb = get_kprobe_ctlblk();
 	int retval;
@@ -409,16 +387,15 @@ kprobe_single_step_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr)
 
 	if (retval == DBG_HOOK_HANDLED) {
 		kprobes_restore_local_irqflag(kcb, regs);
-		kernel_disable_single_step();
-
 		post_kprobe_handler(kcb, regs);
 	}
 
 	return retval;
 }
 
-static struct step_hook kprobes_step_hook = {
-	.fn = kprobe_single_step_handler,
+static struct break_hook kprobes_break_ss_hook = {
+	.imm = KPROBES_BRK_SS_IMM,
+	.fn = kprobe_breakpoint_ss_handler,
 };
 
 static int __kprobes
@@ -486,7 +463,7 @@ int __kprobes arch_trampoline_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
 int __init arch_init_kprobes(void)
 {
 	register_kernel_break_hook(&kprobes_break_hook);
-	register_kernel_step_hook(&kprobes_step_hook);
+	register_kernel_break_hook(&kprobes_break_ss_hook);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/kup-8xx.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/kup-8xx.h
index 85ed2390fb99..567cdc557402 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/kup-8xx.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/kup-8xx.h
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static inline void restore_user_access(unsigned long flags)
 static inline bool
 bad_kuap_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, bool is_write)
 {
-	return WARN(!((regs->kuap ^ MD_APG_KUAP) & 0xf0000000),
+	return WARN(!((regs->kuap ^ MD_APG_KUAP) & 0xff000000),
 		    "Bug: fault blocked by AP register !");
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/mmu-8xx.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/mmu-8xx.h
index 1d9ac0f9c794..0bd1b144eb76 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/mmu-8xx.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/mmu-8xx.h
@@ -33,19 +33,18 @@
  * respectively NA for All or X for Supervisor and no access for User.
  * Then we use the APG to say whether accesses are according to Page rules or
  * "all Supervisor" rules (Access to all)
- * Therefore, we define 2 APG groups. lsb is _PMD_USER
- * 0 => Kernel => 01 (all accesses performed according to page definition)
- * 1 => User => 00 (all accesses performed as supervisor iaw page definition)
- * 2-15 => Not Used
- */
-#define MI_APG_INIT	0x40000000
-
-/*
- * 0 => Kernel => 01 (all accesses performed according to page definition)
- * 1 => User => 10 (all accesses performed according to swaped page definition)
- * 2-15 => Not Used
- */
-#define MI_APG_KUEP	0x60000000
+ * _PAGE_ACCESSED is also managed via APG. When _PAGE_ACCESSED is not set, say
+ * "all User" rules, that will lead to NA for all.
+ * Therefore, we define 4 APG groups. lsb is _PAGE_ACCESSED
+ * 0 => Kernel => 11 (all accesses performed according as user iaw page definition)
+ * 1 => Kernel+Accessed => 01 (all accesses performed according to page definition)
+ * 2 => User => 11 (all accesses performed according as user iaw page definition)
+ * 3 => User+Accessed => 00 (all accesses performed as supervisor iaw page definition) for INIT
+ *                    => 10 (all accesses performed according to swaped page definition) for KUEP
+ * 4-15 => Not Used
+ */
+#define MI_APG_INIT	0xdc000000
+#define MI_APG_KUEP	0xde000000
 
 /* The effective page number register.  When read, contains the information
  * about the last instruction TLB miss.  When MI_RPN is written, bits in
@@ -106,25 +105,9 @@
 #define MD_Ks		0x80000000	/* Should not be set */
 #define MD_Kp		0x40000000	/* Should always be set */
 
-/*
- * All pages' PP data bits are set to either 000 or 011 or 001, which means
- * respectively RW for Supervisor and no access for User, or RO for
- * Supervisor and no access for user and NA for ALL.
- * Then we use the APG to say whether accesses are according to Page rules or
- * "all Supervisor" rules (Access to all)
- * Therefore, we define 2 APG groups. lsb is _PMD_USER
- * 0 => Kernel => 01 (all accesses performed according to page definition)
- * 1 => User => 00 (all accesses performed as supervisor iaw page definition)
- * 2-15 => Not Used
- */
-#define MD_APG_INIT	0x40000000
-
-/*
- * 0 => No user => 01 (all accesses performed according to page definition)
- * 1 => User => 10 (all accesses performed according to swaped page definition)
- * 2-15 => Not Used
- */
-#define MD_APG_KUAP	0x60000000
+/* See explanation above at the definition of MI_APG_INIT */
+#define MD_APG_INIT	0xdc000000
+#define MD_APG_KUAP	0xde000000
 
 /* The effective page number register.  When read, contains the information
  * about the last instruction TLB miss.  When MD_RPN is written, bits in
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pte-8xx.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pte-8xx.h
index 66f403a7da44..1581204467e1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pte-8xx.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pte-8xx.h
@@ -39,9 +39,9 @@
  * into the TLB.
  */
 #define _PAGE_GUARDED	0x0010	/* Copied to L1 G entry in DTLB */
-#define _PAGE_SPECIAL	0x0020	/* SW entry */
+#define _PAGE_ACCESSED	0x0020	/* Copied to L1 APG 1 entry in I/DTLB */
 #define _PAGE_EXEC	0x0040	/* Copied to PP (bit 21) in ITLB */
-#define _PAGE_ACCESSED	0x0080	/* software: page referenced */
+#define _PAGE_SPECIAL	0x0080	/* SW entry */
 
 #define _PAGE_NA	0x0200	/* Supervisor NA, User no access */
 #define _PAGE_RO	0x0600	/* Supervisor RO, User no access */
@@ -59,11 +59,12 @@
 
 #define _PMD_PRESENT	0x0001
 #define _PMD_PRESENT_MASK	_PMD_PRESENT
-#define _PMD_BAD	0x0fd0
+#define _PMD_BAD	0x0f90
 #define _PMD_PAGE_MASK	0x000c
 #define _PMD_PAGE_8M	0x000c
 #define _PMD_PAGE_512K	0x0004
-#define _PMD_USER	0x0020	/* APG 1 */
+#define _PMD_ACCESSED	0x0020	/* APG 1 */
+#define _PMD_USER	0x0040	/* APG 2 */
 
 #define _PTE_NONE_MASK	0
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/topology.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/topology.h
index 8728590f514a..3beeb030cd78 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/topology.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/topology.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 struct device;
 struct device_node;
+struct drmem_lmb;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
 
@@ -61,6 +62,9 @@ static inline int early_cpu_to_node(int cpu)
 	 */
 	return (nid < 0) ? 0 : nid;
 }
+
+int of_drconf_to_nid_single(struct drmem_lmb *lmb);
+
 #else
 
 static inline int early_cpu_to_node(int cpu) { return 0; }
@@ -84,10 +88,12 @@ static inline int cpu_distance(__be32 *cpu1_assoc, __be32 *cpu2_assoc)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */
+static inline int of_drconf_to_nid_single(struct drmem_lmb *lmb)
+{
+	return first_online_node;
+}
 
-struct drmem_lmb;
-int of_drconf_to_nid_single(struct drmem_lmb *lmb);
+#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_NUMA) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_SPLPAR)
 extern int find_and_online_cpu_nid(int cpu);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ef5bbb705c08..501c9a79038c 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ do {								\
  * are no aliasing issues.
  */
 #define __put_user_asm_goto(x, addr, label, op)			\
-	asm volatile goto(					\
+	asm_volatile_goto(					\
 		"1:	" op "%U1%X1 %0,%1	# put_user\n"	\
 		EX_TABLE(1b, %l2)				\
 		:						\
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ do {								\
 	__put_user_asm_goto(x, ptr, label, "std")
 #else /* __powerpc64__ */
 #define __put_user_asm2_goto(x, addr, label)			\
-	asm volatile goto(					\
+	asm_volatile_goto(					\
 		"1:	stw%X1 %0, %1\n"			\
 		"2:	stw%X1 %L0, %L1\n"			\
 		EX_TABLE(1b, %l2)				\
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_cache.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_cache.c
index 6b50bf15d8c1..bf3270426d82 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_cache.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_cache.c
@@ -264,8 +264,9 @@ static int eeh_addr_cache_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
 	struct pci_io_addr_range *piar;
 	struct rb_node *n;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
-	spin_lock(&pci_io_addr_cache_root.piar_lock);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&pci_io_addr_cache_root.piar_lock, flags);
 	for (n = rb_first(&pci_io_addr_cache_root.rb_root); n; n = rb_next(n)) {
 		piar = rb_entry(n, struct pci_io_addr_range, rb_node);
 
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ static int eeh_addr_cache_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 		       (piar->flags & IORESOURCE_IO) ? "i/o" : "mem",
 		       &piar->addr_lo, &piar->addr_hi, pci_name(piar->pcidev));
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&pci_io_addr_cache_root.piar_lock);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pci_io_addr_cache_root.piar_lock, flags);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_40x.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_40x.S
index 44c9018aed1b..a1ae00689e0f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_40x.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_40x.S
@@ -284,11 +284,7 @@ _ENTRY(saved_ksp_limit)
 
 	rlwimi	r11, r10, 22, 20, 29	/* Compute PTE address */
 	lwz	r11, 0(r11)		/* Get Linux PTE */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
 	li	r9, _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED
-#else
-	li	r9, _PAGE_PRESENT
-#endif
 	andc.	r9, r9, r11		/* Check permission */
 	bne	5f
 
@@ -369,11 +365,7 @@ _ENTRY(saved_ksp_limit)
 
 	rlwimi	r11, r10, 22, 20, 29	/* Compute PTE address */
 	lwz	r11, 0(r11)		/* Get Linux PTE */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
 	li	r9, _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_EXEC
-#else
-	li	r9, _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_EXEC
-#endif
 	andc.	r9, r9, r11		/* Check permission */
 	bne	5f
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_8xx.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_8xx.S
index 9f359d3fba74..ee0bfebc375f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_8xx.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_8xx.S
@@ -202,9 +202,7 @@ SystemCall:
 
 InstructionTLBMiss:
 	mtspr	SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH0, r10
-#if defined(ITLB_MISS_KERNEL) || defined(CONFIG_SWAP) || defined(CONFIG_HUGETLBFS)
 	mtspr	SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH1, r11
-#endif
 
 	/* If we are faulting a kernel address, we have to use the
 	 * kernel page tables.
@@ -224,25 +222,13 @@ InstructionTLBMiss:
 3:
 	mtcr	r11
 #endif
-#if defined(CONFIG_HUGETLBFS) || !defined(CONFIG_PIN_TLB_TEXT)
 	lwz	r11, (swapper_pg_dir-PAGE_OFFSET)@l(r10)	/* Get level 1 entry */
 	mtspr	SPRN_MD_TWC, r11
-#else
-	lwz	r10, (swapper_pg_dir-PAGE_OFFSET)@l(r10)	/* Get level 1 entry */
-	mtspr	SPRN_MI_TWC, r10	/* Set segment attributes */
-	mtspr	SPRN_MD_TWC, r10
-#endif
 	mfspr	r10, SPRN_MD_TWC
 	lwz	r10, 0(r10)	/* Get the pte */
-#if defined(CONFIG_HUGETLBFS) || !defined(CONFIG_PIN_TLB_TEXT)
+	rlwimi	r11, r10, 0, _PAGE_GUARDED | _PAGE_ACCESSED
 	rlwimi	r11, r10, 32 - 9, _PMD_PAGE_512K
 	mtspr	SPRN_MI_TWC, r11
-#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
-	rlwinm	r11, r10, 32-5, _PAGE_PRESENT
-	and	r11, r11, r10
-	rlwimi	r10, r11, 0, _PAGE_PRESENT
-#endif
 	/* The Linux PTE won't go exactly into the MMU TLB.
 	 * Software indicator bits 20 and 23 must be clear.
 	 * Software indicator bits 22, 24, 25, 26, and 27 must be
@@ -256,9 +242,7 @@ InstructionTLBMiss:
 
 	/* Restore registers */
 0:	mfspr	r10, SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH0
-#if defined(ITLB_MISS_KERNEL) || defined(CONFIG_SWAP) || defined(CONFIG_HUGETLBFS)
 	mfspr	r11, SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH1
-#endif
 	rfi
 	patch_site	0b, patch__itlbmiss_exit_1
 
@@ -268,9 +252,7 @@ InstructionTLBMiss:
 	addi	r10, r10, 1
 	stw	r10, (itlb_miss_counter - PAGE_OFFSET)@l(0)
 	mfspr	r10, SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH0
-#if defined(ITLB_MISS_KERNEL) || defined(CONFIG_SWAP)
 	mfspr	r11, SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH1
-#endif
 	rfi
 #endif
 
@@ -297,30 +279,16 @@ DataStoreTLBMiss:
 	mfspr	r10, SPRN_MD_TWC
 	lwz	r10, 0(r10)	/* Get the pte */
 
-	/* Insert the Guarded flag into the TWC from the Linux PTE.
+	/* Insert Guarded and Accessed flags into the TWC from the Linux PTE.
 	 * It is bit 27 of both the Linux PTE and the TWC (at least
 	 * I got that right :-).  It will be better when we can put
 	 * this into the Linux pgd/pmd and load it in the operation
 	 * above.
 	 */
-	rlwimi	r11, r10, 0, _PAGE_GUARDED
+	rlwimi	r11, r10, 0, _PAGE_GUARDED | _PAGE_ACCESSED
 	rlwimi	r11, r10, 32 - 9, _PMD_PAGE_512K
 	mtspr	SPRN_MD_TWC, r11
 
-	/* Both _PAGE_ACCESSED and _PAGE_PRESENT has to be set.
-	 * We also need to know if the insn is a load/store, so:
-	 * Clear _PAGE_PRESENT and load that which will
-	 * trap into DTLB Error with store bit set accordinly.
-	 */
-	/* PRESENT=0x1, ACCESSED=0x20
-	 * r11 = ((r10 & PRESENT) & ((r10 & ACCESSED) >> 5));
-	 * r10 = (r10 & ~PRESENT) | r11;
-	 */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
-	rlwinm	r11, r10, 32-5, _PAGE_PRESENT
-	and	r11, r11, r10
-	rlwimi	r10, r11, 0, _PAGE_PRESENT
-#endif
 	/* The Linux PTE won't go exactly into the MMU TLB.
 	 * Software indicator bits 24, 25, 26, and 27 must be
 	 * set.  All other Linux PTE bits control the behavior
@@ -711,7 +679,7 @@ initial_mmu:
 	li	r9, 4				/* up to 4 pages of 8M */
 	mtctr	r9
 	lis	r9, KERNELBASE@h		/* Create vaddr for TLB */
-	li	r10, MI_PS8MEG | MI_SVALID	/* Set 8M byte page */
+	li	r10, MI_PS8MEG | _PMD_ACCESSED | MI_SVALID
 	li	r11, MI_BOOTINIT		/* Create RPN for address 0 */
 1:
 	mtspr	SPRN_MI_CTR, r8	/* Set instruction MMU control */
@@ -775,7 +743,7 @@ _GLOBAL(mmu_pin_tlb)
 #ifdef CONFIG_PIN_TLB_TEXT
 	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r5, 28 << 8)
 	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r6, PAGE_OFFSET)
-	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r7, MI_SVALID | MI_PS8MEG)
+	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r7, MI_SVALID | MI_PS8MEG | _PMD_ACCESSED)
 	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r8, 0xf0 | _PAGE_RO | _PAGE_SPS | _PAGE_SH | _PAGE_PRESENT)
 	LOAD_REG_ADDR(r9, _sinittext)
 	li	r0, 4
@@ -797,7 +765,7 @@ _GLOBAL(mmu_pin_tlb)
 	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r5, 28 << 8 | MD_TWAM)
 #ifdef CONFIG_PIN_TLB_DATA
 	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r6, PAGE_OFFSET)
-	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r7, MI_SVALID | MI_PS8MEG)
+	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r7, MI_SVALID | MI_PS8MEG | _PMD_ACCESSED)
 #ifdef CONFIG_PIN_TLB_IMMR
 	li	r0, 3
 #else
@@ -834,7 +802,7 @@ _GLOBAL(mmu_pin_tlb)
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_PIN_TLB_IMMR
 	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r0, VIRT_IMMR_BASE | MD_EVALID)
-	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r7, MD_SVALID | MD_PS512K | MD_GUARDED)
+	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r7, MD_SVALID | MD_PS512K | MD_GUARDED | _PMD_ACCESSED)
 	mfspr   r8, SPRN_IMMR
 	rlwinm	r8, r8, 0, 0xfff80000
 	ori	r8, r8, 0xf0 | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SPS | _PAGE_SH | \
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S
index 5eb9eedac920..2aa16d5368e1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_book3s_32.S
@@ -457,11 +457,7 @@ InstructionTLBMiss:
 	cmplw	0,r1,r3
 #endif
 	mfspr	r2, SPRN_SPRG_PGDIR
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
 	li	r1,_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_EXEC
-#else
-	li	r1,_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_EXEC
-#endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC)
 	bgt-	112f
 	lis	r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@ha	/* if kernel address, use */
@@ -523,11 +519,7 @@ DataLoadTLBMiss:
 	lis	r1, TASK_SIZE@h		/* check if kernel address */
 	cmplw	0,r1,r3
 	mfspr	r2, SPRN_SPRG_PGDIR
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
 	li	r1, _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED
-#else
-	li	r1, _PAGE_PRESENT
-#endif
 	bgt-	112f
 	lis	r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@ha	/* if kernel address, use */
 	addi	r2, r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@l	/* kernel page table */
@@ -603,11 +595,7 @@ DataStoreTLBMiss:
 	lis	r1, TASK_SIZE@h		/* check if kernel address */
 	cmplw	0,r1,r3
 	mfspr	r2, SPRN_SPRG_PGDIR
-#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
 	li	r1, _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED
-#else
-	li	r1, _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PRESENT
-#endif
 	bgt-	112f
 	lis	r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@ha	/* if kernel address, use */
 	addi	r2, r2, (swapper_pg_dir - PAGE_OFFSET)@l	/* kernel page table */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/smp.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/smp.c
index 3c6b9822f978..8c2857cbd960 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/smp.c
@@ -1393,13 +1393,14 @@ static void add_cpu_to_masks(int cpu)
 /* Activate a secondary processor. */
 void start_secondary(void *unused)
 {
-	unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	unsigned int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
 
 	mmgrab(&init_mm);
 	current->active_mm = &init_mm;
 
 	smp_store_cpu_info(cpu);
 	set_dec(tb_ticks_per_jiffy);
+	rcu_cpu_starting(cpu);
 	preempt_disable();
 	cpu_callin_map[cpu] = 1;
 
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h
index c47e6b35c551..824b2c9da75b 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ do {									\
 do {									\
 	long __kr_err;							\
 									\
-	__put_user_nocheck(*((type *)(dst)), (type *)(src), __kr_err);	\
+	__put_user_nocheck(*((type *)(src)), (type *)(dst), __kr_err);	\
 	if (unlikely(__kr_err))						\
 		goto err_label;						\
 } while (0)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c
index 99e12faa5498..765b62434f30 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 /*
  * Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro Limited
  * Author: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S
index 11e2a4fe66e0..7e849797c9c3 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ ENTRY(_start)
 	.word 0
 #endif
 	.balign 8
+#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_M_MODE
+	/* Image load offset (0MB) from start of RAM for M-mode */
+	.dword 0
+#else
 #if __riscv_xlen == 64
 	/* Image load offset(2MB) from start of RAM */
 	.dword 0x200000
@@ -42,6 +46,7 @@ ENTRY(_start)
 	/* Image load offset(4MB) from start of RAM */
 	.dword 0x400000
 #endif
+#endif
 	/* Effective size of kernel image */
 	.dword _end - _start
 	.dword __HEAD_FLAGS
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/.gitignore b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/.gitignore
index 11ebee9e4c1d..3a19def868ec 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/.gitignore
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/.gitignore
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 vdso.lds
 *.tmp
+vdso-syms.S
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile
index 7d6a94d45ec9..cb8f9e4cfcbf 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile
@@ -43,19 +43,14 @@ $(obj)/vdso.o: $(obj)/vdso.so
 SYSCFLAGS_vdso.so.dbg = $(c_flags)
 $(obj)/vdso.so.dbg: $(src)/vdso.lds $(obj-vdso) FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,vdsold)
+SYSCFLAGS_vdso.so.dbg = -shared -s -Wl,-soname=linux-vdso.so.1 \
+	-Wl,--build-id -Wl,--hash-style=both
 
 # We also create a special relocatable object that should mirror the symbol
 # table and layout of the linked DSO. With ld --just-symbols we can then
 # refer to these symbols in the kernel code rather than hand-coded addresses.
-
-SYSCFLAGS_vdso.so.dbg = -shared -s -Wl,-soname=linux-vdso.so.1 \
-	-Wl,--build-id=sha1 -Wl,--hash-style=both
-$(obj)/vdso-dummy.o: $(src)/vdso.lds $(obj)/rt_sigreturn.o FORCE
-	$(call if_changed,vdsold)
-
-LDFLAGS_vdso-syms.o := -r --just-symbols
-$(obj)/vdso-syms.o: $(obj)/vdso-dummy.o FORCE
-	$(call if_changed,ld)
+$(obj)/vdso-syms.S: $(obj)/vdso.so FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,so2s)
 
 # strip rule for the .so file
 $(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S
@@ -73,6 +68,11 @@ quiet_cmd_vdsold = VDSOLD  $@
                            $(patsubst %, -G __vdso_%, $(vdso-syms)) $@.tmp $@ && \
                    rm $@.tmp
 
+# Extracts symbol offsets from the VDSO, converting them into an assembly file
+# that contains the same symbols at the same offsets.
+quiet_cmd_so2s = SO2S    $@
+      cmd_so2s = $(NM) -D $< | $(srctree)/$(src)/so2s.sh > $@
+
 # install commands for the unstripped file
 quiet_cmd_vdso_install = INSTALL $@
       cmd_vdso_install = cp $(obj)/$@.dbg $(MODLIB)/vdso/$@
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/so2s.sh b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/so2s.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..e64cb6d9440e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/so2s.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+# Copyright 2020 Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
+
+sed 's!\([0-9a-f]*\) T \([a-z0-9_]*\)\(@@LINUX_4.15\)*!.global \2\n.set \2,0x\1!' \
+| grep '^\.'
diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
index 1359e21c0c62..3c8b9e433c67 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static inline void vmalloc_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int code, unsigned long a
 	pmd_t *pmd, *pmd_k;
 	pte_t *pte_k;
 	int index;
+	unsigned long pfn;
 
 	/* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */
 	if (user_mode(regs))
@@ -100,7 +101,8 @@ static inline void vmalloc_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int code, unsigned long a
 	 * of a task switch.
 	 */
 	index = pgd_index(addr);
-	pgd = (pgd_t *)pfn_to_virt(csr_read(CSR_SATP)) + index;
+	pfn = csr_read(CSR_SATP) & SATP_PPN;
+	pgd = (pgd_t *)pfn_to_virt(pfn) + index;
 	pgd_k = init_mm.pgd + index;
 
 	if (!pgd_present(*pgd_k)) {
diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
index ea933b789a88..8e577f14f120 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
@@ -154,9 +154,8 @@ disable:
 
 void __init setup_bootmem(void)
 {
-	phys_addr_t mem_size = 0;
-	phys_addr_t total_mem = 0;
-	phys_addr_t mem_start, start, end = 0;
+	phys_addr_t mem_start = 0;
+	phys_addr_t start, end = 0;
 	phys_addr_t vmlinux_end = __pa_symbol(&_end);
 	phys_addr_t vmlinux_start = __pa_symbol(&_start);
 	u64 i;
@@ -164,21 +163,18 @@ void __init setup_bootmem(void)
 	/* Find the memory region containing the kernel */
 	for_each_mem_range(i, &start, &end) {
 		phys_addr_t size = end - start;
-		if (!total_mem)
+		if (!mem_start)
 			mem_start = start;
 		if (start <= vmlinux_start && vmlinux_end <= end)
 			BUG_ON(size == 0);
-		total_mem = total_mem + size;
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Remove memblock from the end of usable area to the
-	 * end of region
+	 * The maximal physical memory size is -PAGE_OFFSET.
+	 * Make sure that any memory beyond mem_start + (-PAGE_OFFSET) is removed
+	 * as it is unusable by kernel.
 	 */
-	mem_size = min(total_mem, (phys_addr_t)-PAGE_OFFSET);
-	if (mem_start + mem_size < end)
-		memblock_remove(mem_start + mem_size,
-				end - mem_start - mem_size);
+	memblock_enforce_memory_limit(mem_start - PAGE_OFFSET);
 
 	/* Reserve from the start of the kernel to the end of the kernel */
 	memblock_reserve(vmlinux_start, vmlinux_end - vmlinux_start);
@@ -297,6 +293,7 @@ pmd_t fixmap_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD] __page_aligned_bss;
 #define NUM_EARLY_PMDS		(1UL + MAX_EARLY_MAPPING_SIZE / PGDIR_SIZE)
 #endif
 pmd_t early_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD * NUM_EARLY_PMDS] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+pmd_t early_dtb_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 
 static pmd_t *__init get_pmd_virt_early(phys_addr_t pa)
 {
@@ -494,6 +491,18 @@ asmlinkage void __init setup_vm(uintptr_t dtb_pa)
 				   load_pa + (va - PAGE_OFFSET),
 				   map_size, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
 
+#ifndef __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED
+	/* Setup early PMD for DTB */
+	create_pgd_mapping(early_pg_dir, DTB_EARLY_BASE_VA,
+			   (uintptr_t)early_dtb_pmd, PGDIR_SIZE, PAGE_TABLE);
+	/* Create two consecutive PMD mappings for FDT early scan */
+	pa = dtb_pa & ~(PMD_SIZE - 1);
+	create_pmd_mapping(early_dtb_pmd, DTB_EARLY_BASE_VA,
+			   pa, PMD_SIZE, PAGE_KERNEL);
+	create_pmd_mapping(early_dtb_pmd, DTB_EARLY_BASE_VA + PMD_SIZE,
+			   pa + PMD_SIZE, PMD_SIZE, PAGE_KERNEL);
+	dtb_early_va = (void *)DTB_EARLY_BASE_VA + (dtb_pa & (PMD_SIZE - 1));
+#else
 	/* Create two consecutive PGD mappings for FDT early scan */
 	pa = dtb_pa & ~(PGDIR_SIZE - 1);
 	create_pgd_mapping(early_pg_dir, DTB_EARLY_BASE_VA,
@@ -501,6 +510,7 @@ asmlinkage void __init setup_vm(uintptr_t dtb_pa)
 	create_pgd_mapping(early_pg_dir, DTB_EARLY_BASE_VA + PGDIR_SIZE,
 			   pa + PGDIR_SIZE, PGDIR_SIZE, PAGE_KERNEL);
 	dtb_early_va = (void *)DTB_EARLY_BASE_VA + (dtb_pa & (PGDIR_SIZE - 1));
+#endif
 	dtb_early_pa = dtb_pa;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig
index 0784bf3caf43..a4d3c578fbd8 100644
--- a/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig
@@ -93,9 +93,10 @@ CONFIG_CLEANCACHE=y
 CONFIG_FRONTSWAP=y
 CONFIG_CMA_DEBUG=y
 CONFIG_CMA_DEBUGFS=y
+CONFIG_CMA_AREAS=7
 CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY=y
 CONFIG_ZSWAP=y
-CONFIG_ZSMALLOC=m
+CONFIG_ZSMALLOC=y
 CONFIG_ZSMALLOC_STAT=y
 CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT=y
 CONFIG_IDLE_PAGE_TRACKING=y
@@ -378,7 +379,6 @@ CONFIG_NETLINK_DIAG=m
 CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO=y
 CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y
 CONFIG_NET_PKTGEN=m
-# CONFIG_NET_DROP_MONITOR is not set
 CONFIG_PCI=y
 # CONFIG_PCIEASPM is not set
 CONFIG_PCI_DEBUG=y
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI=y
 CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI_S390=y
 CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
 CONFIG_CONNECTOR=y
-CONFIG_ZRAM=m
+CONFIG_ZRAM=y
 CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP=m
 CONFIG_BLK_DEV_CRYPTOLOOP=m
 CONFIG_BLK_DEV_DRBD=m
@@ -689,6 +689,7 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDH=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECRDSA=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_CURVE25519=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM=y
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20POLY1305=m
@@ -709,7 +710,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD160=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD256=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD320=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM3=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_TGR192=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_TI=m
@@ -753,6 +753,7 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_VIRTIO=m
 CONFIG_CORDIC=m
 CONFIG_CRC32_SELFTEST=y
 CONFIG_CRC4=m
@@ -829,6 +830,7 @@ CONFIG_NETDEV_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT=m
 CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION=y
 CONFIG_FAILSLAB=y
 CONFIG_FAIL_PAGE_ALLOC=y
+CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_USERCOPY=y
 CONFIG_FAIL_MAKE_REQUEST=y
 CONFIG_FAIL_IO_TIMEOUT=y
 CONFIG_FAIL_FUTEX=y
diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/defconfig
index 905bc8c4cfaf..17d5df2c1eff 100644
--- a/arch/s390/configs/defconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/configs/defconfig
@@ -87,9 +87,10 @@ CONFIG_KSM=y
 CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE=y
 CONFIG_CLEANCACHE=y
 CONFIG_FRONTSWAP=y
+CONFIG_CMA_AREAS=7
 CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY=y
 CONFIG_ZSWAP=y
-CONFIG_ZSMALLOC=m
+CONFIG_ZSMALLOC=y
 CONFIG_ZSMALLOC_STAT=y
 CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT=y
 CONFIG_IDLE_PAGE_TRACKING=y
@@ -371,7 +372,6 @@ CONFIG_NETLINK_DIAG=m
 CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO=y
 CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y
 CONFIG_NET_PKTGEN=m
-# CONFIG_NET_DROP_MONITOR is not set
 CONFIG_PCI=y
 # CONFIG_PCIEASPM is not set
 CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI=y
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI_S390=y
 CONFIG_UEVENT_HELPER=y
 CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
 CONFIG_CONNECTOR=y
-CONFIG_ZRAM=m
+CONFIG_ZRAM=y
 CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP=m
 CONFIG_BLK_DEV_CRYPTOLOOP=m
 CONFIG_BLK_DEV_DRBD=m
@@ -680,6 +680,7 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDH=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECRDSA=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_CURVE25519=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM=y
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20POLY1305=m
@@ -701,7 +702,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD160=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD256=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD320=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3=m
-CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM3=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_TGR192=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_TI=m
@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_VIRTIO=m
 CONFIG_CORDIC=m
 CONFIG_PRIME_NUMBERS=m
 CONFIG_CRC4=m
diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig
index 8f67c55625f9..a302630341ef 100644
--- a/arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig
@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ CONFIG_HZ_100=y
 # CONFIG_CHSC_SCH is not set
 # CONFIG_SCM_BUS is not set
 CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
-# CONFIG_SECCOMP is not set
 # CONFIG_PFAULT is not set
 # CONFIG_S390_HYPFS_FS is not set
 # CONFIG_VIRTUALIZATION is not set
 # CONFIG_S390_GUEST is not set
+# CONFIG_SECCOMP is not set
 CONFIG_PARTITION_ADVANCED=y
 CONFIG_IBM_PARTITION=y
 # CONFIG_CORE_DUMP_DEFAULT_ELF_HEADERS is not set
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 6b8d8c69b1a1..b5dbae78969b 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -692,16 +692,6 @@ static inline int pud_large(pud_t pud)
 	return !!(pud_val(pud) & _REGION3_ENTRY_LARGE);
 }
 
-static inline unsigned long pud_pfn(pud_t pud)
-{
-	unsigned long origin_mask;
-
-	origin_mask = _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN;
-	if (pud_large(pud))
-		origin_mask = _REGION3_ENTRY_ORIGIN_LARGE;
-	return (pud_val(pud) & origin_mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-}
-
 #define pmd_leaf	pmd_large
 static inline int pmd_large(pmd_t pmd)
 {
@@ -747,16 +737,6 @@ static inline int pmd_none(pmd_t pmd)
 	return pmd_val(pmd) == _SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY;
 }
 
-static inline unsigned long pmd_pfn(pmd_t pmd)
-{
-	unsigned long origin_mask;
-
-	origin_mask = _SEGMENT_ENTRY_ORIGIN;
-	if (pmd_large(pmd))
-		origin_mask = _SEGMENT_ENTRY_ORIGIN_LARGE;
-	return (pmd_val(pmd) & origin_mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-}
-
 #define pmd_write pmd_write
 static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd)
 {
@@ -1238,11 +1218,39 @@ static inline pte_t mk_pte(struct page *page, pgprot_t pgprot)
 #define pud_index(address) (((address) >> PUD_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PUD-1))
 #define pmd_index(address) (((address) >> PMD_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PMD-1))
 
-#define pmd_deref(pmd) (pmd_val(pmd) & _SEGMENT_ENTRY_ORIGIN)
-#define pud_deref(pud) (pud_val(pud) & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN)
 #define p4d_deref(pud) (p4d_val(pud) & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN)
 #define pgd_deref(pgd) (pgd_val(pgd) & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN)
 
+static inline unsigned long pmd_deref(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	unsigned long origin_mask;
+
+	origin_mask = _SEGMENT_ENTRY_ORIGIN;
+	if (pmd_large(pmd))
+		origin_mask = _SEGMENT_ENTRY_ORIGIN_LARGE;
+	return pmd_val(pmd) & origin_mask;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long pmd_pfn(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	return pmd_deref(pmd) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long pud_deref(pud_t pud)
+{
+	unsigned long origin_mask;
+
+	origin_mask = _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN;
+	if (pud_large(pud))
+		origin_mask = _REGION3_ENTRY_ORIGIN_LARGE;
+	return pud_val(pud) & origin_mask;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long pud_pfn(pud_t pud)
+{
+	return pud_deref(pud) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
 /*
  * The pgd_offset function *always* adds the index for the top-level
  * region/segment table. This is done to get a sequence like the
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/vdso/vdso.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/vdso/vdso.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29bb2d1..000000000000
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/vdso/vdso.h
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/s390/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index ece58f2217cb..2012c1cf0853 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -61,14 +61,6 @@ int main(void)
 	BLANK();
 	OFFSET(__VDSO_GETCPU_VAL, vdso_per_cpu_data, getcpu_val);
 	BLANK();
-	/* constants used by the vdso */
-	DEFINE(__CLOCK_REALTIME, CLOCK_REALTIME);
-	DEFINE(__CLOCK_MONOTONIC, CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
-	DEFINE(__CLOCK_REALTIME_COARSE, CLOCK_REALTIME_COARSE);
-	DEFINE(__CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE, CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE);
-	DEFINE(__CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID, CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID);
-	DEFINE(__CLOCK_COARSE_RES, LOW_RES_NSEC);
-	BLANK();
 	/* idle data offsets */
 	OFFSET(__CLOCK_IDLE_ENTER, s390_idle_data, clock_idle_enter);
 	OFFSET(__CLOCK_IDLE_EXIT, s390_idle_data, clock_idle_exit);
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c b/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c
index ebfe86d097f0..390d97daa2b3 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c
@@ -855,13 +855,14 @@ void __init smp_detect_cpus(void)
 
 static void smp_init_secondary(void)
 {
-	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
 
 	S390_lowcore.last_update_clock = get_tod_clock();
 	restore_access_regs(S390_lowcore.access_regs_save_area);
 	set_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY);
 	set_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY);
 	cpu_init();
+	rcu_cpu_starting(cpu);
 	preempt_disable();
 	init_cpu_timer();
 	vtime_init();
diff --git a/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c b/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c
index d33f21545dfd..9a6bae503fe6 100644
--- a/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c
+++ b/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ static void __zpci_event_availability(struct zpci_ccdf_avail *ccdf)
 		if (ret)
 			break;
 
+		/* the PCI function will be scanned once function 0 appears */
+		if (!zdev->zbus->bus)
+			break;
+
 		pdev = pci_scan_single_device(zdev->zbus->bus, zdev->devfn);
 		if (!pdev)
 			break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index a5e5db6ada3c..39b2eded7bc2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ void initialize_identity_maps(void *rmode)
 	add_identity_map(cmdline, cmdline + COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
 
 	/* Load the new page-table. */
+	sev_verify_cbit(top_level_pgt);
 	write_cr3(top_level_pgt);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
index dd07e7b41b11..aa561795efd1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 SYM_FUNC_END(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	.code64
+
+#include "../../kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S"
+
 SYM_FUNC_START(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	push	%rbp
@@ -81,6 +84,19 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 
 	bts	%rax, sme_me_mask(%rip)	/* Create the encryption mask */
 
+	/*
+	 * Read MSR_AMD64_SEV again and store it to sev_status. Can't do this in
+	 * get_sev_encryption_bit() because this function is 32-bit code and
+	 * shared between 64-bit and 32-bit boot path.
+	 */
+	movl	$MSR_AMD64_SEV, %ecx	/* Read the SEV MSR */
+	rdmsr
+
+	/* Store MSR value in sev_status */
+	shlq	$32, %rdx
+	orq	%rdx, %rax
+	movq	%rax, sev_status(%rip)
+
 .Lno_sev_mask:
 	movq	%rbp, %rsp		/* Restore original stack pointer */
 
@@ -96,5 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	.balign	8
-SYM_DATA(sme_me_mask, .quad 0)
+SYM_DATA(sme_me_mask,		.quad 0)
+SYM_DATA(sev_status,		.quad 0)
+SYM_DATA(sev_check_data,	.quad 0)
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 6d31f1b4c4d1..d9a631c5973c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -159,4 +159,6 @@ void boot_page_fault(void);
 void boot_stage1_vc(void);
 void boot_stage2_vc(void);
 
+unsigned long sev_verify_cbit(unsigned long cr3);
+
 #endif /* BOOT_COMPRESSED_MISC_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c
index 40e0e322161d..284e73661a18 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c
@@ -273,11 +273,15 @@ void __init hv_apic_init(void)
 		pr_info("Hyper-V: Using enlightened APIC (%s mode)",
 			x2apic_enabled() ? "x2apic" : "xapic");
 		/*
-		 * With x2apic, architectural x2apic MSRs are equivalent to the
-		 * respective synthetic MSRs, so there's no need to override
-		 * the apic accessors.  The only exception is
-		 * hv_apic_eoi_write, because it benefits from lazy EOI when
-		 * available, but it works for both xapic and x2apic modes.
+		 * When in x2apic mode, don't use the Hyper-V specific APIC
+		 * accessors since the field layout in the ICR register is
+		 * different in x2apic mode. Furthermore, the architectural
+		 * x2apic MSRs function just as well as the Hyper-V
+		 * synthetic APIC MSRs, so there's no benefit in having
+		 * separate Hyper-V accessors for x2apic mode. The only
+		 * exception is hv_apic_eoi_write, because it benefits from
+		 * lazy EOI when available, but the same accessor works for
+		 * both xapic and x2apic because the field layout is the same.
 		 */
 		apic_set_eoi_write(hv_apic_eoi_write);
 		if (!x2apic_enabled()) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c
index 714233cee0b5..3115caa7d7d0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c
@@ -290,6 +290,9 @@ static void __init uv_stringify(int len, char *to, char *from)
 {
 	/* Relies on 'to' being NULL chars so result will be NULL terminated */
 	strncpy(to, from, len-1);
+
+	/* Trim trailing spaces */
+	(void)strim(to);
 }
 
 /* Find UV arch type entry in UVsystab */
@@ -366,7 +369,7 @@ static int __init early_get_arch_type(void)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int __init uv_set_system_type(char *_oem_id)
+static int __init uv_set_system_type(char *_oem_id, char *_oem_table_id)
 {
 	/* Save OEM_ID passed from ACPI MADT */
 	uv_stringify(sizeof(oem_id), oem_id, _oem_id);
@@ -386,13 +389,23 @@ static int __init uv_set_system_type(char *_oem_id)
 			/* (Not hubless), not a UV */
 			return 0;
 
+		/* Is UV hubless system */
+		uv_hubless_system = 0x01;
+
+		/* UV5 Hubless */
+		if (strncmp(uv_archtype, "NSGI5", 5) == 0)
+			uv_hubless_system |= 0x20;
+
 		/* UV4 Hubless: CH */
-		if (strncmp(uv_archtype, "NSGI4", 5) == 0)
-			uv_hubless_system = 0x11;
+		else if (strncmp(uv_archtype, "NSGI4", 5) == 0)
+			uv_hubless_system |= 0x10;
 
 		/* UV3 Hubless: UV300/MC990X w/o hub */
 		else
-			uv_hubless_system = 0x9;
+			uv_hubless_system |= 0x8;
+
+		/* Copy APIC type */
+		uv_stringify(sizeof(oem_table_id), oem_table_id, _oem_table_id);
 
 		pr_info("UV: OEM IDs %s/%s, SystemType %d, HUBLESS ID %x\n",
 			oem_id, oem_table_id, uv_system_type, uv_hubless_system);
@@ -456,7 +469,7 @@ static int __init uv_acpi_madt_oem_check(char *_oem_id, char *_oem_table_id)
 	uv_cpu_info->p_uv_hub_info = &uv_hub_info_node0;
 
 	/* If not UV, return. */
-	if (likely(uv_set_system_type(_oem_id) == 0))
+	if (uv_set_system_type(_oem_id, _oem_table_id) == 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Save and Decode OEM Table ID */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index d3f0db463f96..581fb7223ad0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1254,6 +1254,14 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled(void)
+{
+	return spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+		spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
+		spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+		spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
+}
+
 static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 {
 	switch (ctrl) {
@@ -1261,16 +1269,26 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
 		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
 			return 0;
+
 		/*
-		 * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
-		 * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
-		 * by a  previous prctl call.
+		 * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction
+		 * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead,
+		 * unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB
+		 * are independent and either can be set to conditionally
+		 * enabled regardless of the mode of the other.
+		 *
+		 * If either is set to conditional, allow the task flag to be
+		 * updated, unless it was force-disabled by a previous prctl
+		 * call. Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the
+		 * feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the
+		 * kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then
+		 * spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and
+		 * spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED.
 		 */
-		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+		if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled() ||
 		    task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
 			return -EPERM;
+
 		task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
 		task_update_spec_tif(task);
 		break;
@@ -1283,10 +1301,10 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
 		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
 			return -EPERM;
-		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+
+		if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled())
 			return 0;
+
 		task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
 		if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
 			task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
@@ -1351,20 +1369,17 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
 	if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
 	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
 		return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
-	else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
-		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
-	else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
-	    spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
-	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
-	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP) {
+	else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled()) {
 		if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
 			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
 		if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
 			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
 		return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
-	} else
+	} else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+	else
 		return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 7eb2a1c87969..3c417734790f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -161,6 +161,21 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 
 	/* Setup early boot stage 4-/5-level pagetables. */
 	addq	phys_base(%rip), %rax
+
+	/*
+	 * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
+	 * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
+	 * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
+	 * the next RET instruction.
+	 * %rsi carries pointer to realmode data and is callee-clobbered. Save
+	 * and restore it.
+	 */
+	pushq	%rsi
+	movq	%rax, %rdi
+	call	sev_verify_cbit
+	popq	%rsi
+
+	/* Switch to new page-table */
 	movq	%rax, %cr3
 
 	/* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */
@@ -279,6 +294,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 SYM_CODE_END(secondary_startup_64)
 
 #include "verify_cpu.S"
+#include "sev_verify_cbit.S"
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 5f83ccaab877..7d04b356d44d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -178,6 +178,32 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
 		goto fail;
 	regs->dx = val >> 32;
 
+	/*
+	 * This is a VC handler and the #VC is only raised when SEV-ES is
+	 * active, which means SEV must be active too. Do sanity checks on the
+	 * CPUID results to make sure the hypervisor does not trick the kernel
+	 * into the no-sev path. This could map sensitive data unencrypted and
+	 * make it accessible to the hypervisor.
+	 *
+	 * In particular, check for:
+	 *	- Hypervisor CPUID bit
+	 *	- Availability of CPUID leaf 0x8000001f
+	 *	- SEV CPUID bit.
+	 *
+	 * The hypervisor might still report the wrong C-bit position, but this
+	 * can't be checked here.
+	 */
+
+	if ((fn == 1 && !(regs->cx & BIT(31))))
+		/* Hypervisor bit */
+		goto fail;
+	else if (fn == 0x80000000 && (regs->ax < 0x8000001f))
+		/* SEV leaf check */
+		goto fail;
+	else if ((fn == 0x8000001f && !(regs->ax & BIT(1))))
+		/* SEV bit */
+		goto fail;
+
 	/* Skip over the CPUID two-byte opcode */
 	regs->ip += 2;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 4a96726fbaf8..0bd1a0fc587e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ fault:
 	return ES_EXCEPTION;
 }
 
-static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
-				 unsigned long vaddr, phys_addr_t *paddr)
+static enum es_result vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+					   unsigned long vaddr, phys_addr_t *paddr)
 {
 	unsigned long va = (unsigned long)vaddr;
 	unsigned int level;
@@ -394,15 +394,19 @@ static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 		if (user_mode(ctxt->regs))
 			ctxt->fi.error_code |= X86_PF_USER;
 
-		return false;
+		return ES_EXCEPTION;
 	}
 
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pte_val(*pte) & _PAGE_ENC))
+		/* Emulated MMIO to/from encrypted memory not supported */
+		return ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+
 	pa = (phys_addr_t)pte_pfn(*pte) << PAGE_SHIFT;
 	pa |= va & ~page_level_mask(level);
 
 	*paddr = pa;
 
-	return true;
+	return ES_OK;
 }
 
 /* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
@@ -731,6 +735,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_do_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 {
 	u64 exit_code, exit_info_1, exit_info_2;
 	unsigned long ghcb_pa = __pa(ghcb);
+	enum es_result res;
 	phys_addr_t paddr;
 	void __user *ref;
 
@@ -740,11 +745,12 @@ static enum es_result vc_do_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 
 	exit_code = read ? SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ : SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE;
 
-	if (!vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt, (unsigned long)ref, &paddr)) {
-		if (!read)
+	res = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt, (unsigned long)ref, &paddr);
+	if (res != ES_OK) {
+		if (res == ES_EXCEPTION && !read)
 			ctxt->fi.error_code |= X86_PF_WRITE;
 
-		return ES_EXCEPTION;
+		return res;
 	}
 
 	exit_info_1 = paddr;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S b/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ee04941a6546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ *	sev_verify_cbit.S - Code for verification of the C-bit position reported
+ *			    by the Hypervisor when running with SEV enabled.
+ *
+ *	Copyright (c) 2020  Joerg Roedel (jroedel@suse.de)
+ *
+ * sev_verify_cbit() is called before switching to a new long-mode page-table
+ * at boot.
+ *
+ * Verify that the C-bit position is correct by writing a random value to
+ * an encrypted memory location while on the current page-table. Then it
+ * switches to the new page-table to verify the memory content is still the
+ * same. After that it switches back to the current page-table and when the
+ * check succeeded it returns. If the check failed the code invalidates the
+ * stack pointer and goes into a hlt loop. The stack-pointer is invalidated to
+ * make sure no interrupt or exception can get the CPU out of the hlt loop.
+ *
+ * New page-table pointer is expected in %rdi (first parameter)
+ *
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(sev_verify_cbit)
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	/* First check if a C-bit was detected */
+	movq	sme_me_mask(%rip), %rsi
+	testq	%rsi, %rsi
+	jz	3f
+
+	/* sme_me_mask != 0 could mean SME or SEV - Check also for SEV */
+	movq	sev_status(%rip), %rsi
+	testq	%rsi, %rsi
+	jz	3f
+
+	/* Save CR4 in %rsi */
+	movq	%cr4, %rsi
+
+	/* Disable Global Pages */
+	movq	%rsi, %rdx
+	andq	$(~X86_CR4_PGE), %rdx
+	movq	%rdx, %cr4
+
+	/*
+	 * Verified that running under SEV - now get a random value using
+	 * RDRAND. This instruction is mandatory when running as an SEV guest.
+	 *
+	 * Don't bail out of the loop if RDRAND returns errors. It is better to
+	 * prevent forward progress than to work with a non-random value here.
+	 */
+1:	rdrand	%rdx
+	jnc	1b
+
+	/* Store value to memory and keep it in %rdx */
+	movq	%rdx, sev_check_data(%rip)
+
+	/* Backup current %cr3 value to restore it later */
+	movq	%cr3, %rcx
+
+	/* Switch to new %cr3 - This might unmap the stack */
+	movq	%rdi, %cr3
+
+	/*
+	 * Compare value in %rdx with memory location. If C-bit is incorrect
+	 * this would read the encrypted data and make the check fail.
+	 */
+	cmpq	%rdx, sev_check_data(%rip)
+
+	/* Restore old %cr3 */
+	movq	%rcx, %cr3
+
+	/* Restore previous CR4 */
+	movq	%rsi, %cr4
+
+	/* Check CMPQ result */
+	je	3f
+
+	/*
+	 * The check failed, prevent any forward progress to prevent ROP
+	 * attacks, invalidate the stack and go into a hlt loop.
+	 */
+	xorq	%rsp, %rsp
+	subq	$0x1000, %rsp
+2:	hlt
+	jmp 2b
+3:
+#endif
+	/* Return page-table pointer */
+	movq	%rdi, %rax
+	ret
+SYM_FUNC_END(sev_verify_cbit)
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S
index 037faac46b0c..1e299ac73c86 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@
  * to a jmp to memcpy_erms which does the REP; MOVSB mem copy.
  */
 
-.weak memcpy
-
 /*
  * memcpy - Copy a memory block.
  *
@@ -30,7 +28,7 @@
  * rax original destination
  */
 SYM_FUNC_START_ALIAS(__memcpy)
-SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy)
+SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK(memcpy)
 	ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp memcpy_orig", "", X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD, \
 		      "jmp memcpy_erms", X86_FEATURE_ERMS
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S
index 7ff00ea64e4f..41902fe8b859 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S
@@ -24,9 +24,7 @@
  * Output:
  * rax: dest
  */
-.weak memmove
-
-SYM_FUNC_START_ALIAS(memmove)
+SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK(memmove)
 SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove)
 
 	mov %rdi, %rax
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S
index 9ff15ee404a4..0bfd26e4ca9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S
@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
 #include <asm/export.h>
 
-.weak memset
-
 /*
  * ISO C memset - set a memory block to a byte value. This function uses fast
  * string to get better performance than the original function. The code is
@@ -19,7 +17,7 @@
  *
  * rax   original destination
  */
-SYM_FUNC_START_ALIAS(memset)
+SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK(memset)
 SYM_FUNC_START(__memset)
 	/*
 	 * Some CPUs support enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB feature. It is recommended
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index efbb3de472df..bc0833713be9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
  */
 u64 sme_me_mask __section(".data") = 0;
 u64 sev_status __section(".data") = 0;
+u64 sev_check_data __section(".data") = 0;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key);
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/mm/init.c b/arch/xtensa/mm/init.c
index c6fc83efee0c..8731b7ad9308 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/xtensa/mm/init.c
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ static void __init free_highpages(void)
 	/* set highmem page free */
 	for_each_free_mem_range(i, NUMA_NO_NODE, MEMBLOCK_NONE,
 				&range_start, &range_end, NULL) {
-		unsigned long start = PHYS_PFN(range_start);
-		unsigned long end = PHYS_PFN(range_end);
+		unsigned long start = PFN_UP(range_start);
+		unsigned long end = PFN_DOWN(range_end);
 
 		/* Ignore complete lowmem entries */
 		if (end <= max_low)