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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-05-24 23:16:50 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-05-24 23:16:50 +0300 |
commit | 7cf6a8a17f5b134b7e783c2d45c53298faef82a7 (patch) | |
tree | e5a6346abf5d9efbe49b91e6291349afcacfb7d3 /drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.h | |
parent | a9d1046a846571422a92d2b8fbf8a8b24221b9a3 (diff) | |
parent | 7f3113e3b9f7207f0bd57b5fdae1a1b9c8215e08 (diff) | |
download | linux-7cf6a8a17f5b134b7e783c2d45c53298faef82a7.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
- Tightened validation of key hashes for SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST. An
invalid hash format causes a compilation error. Previously, they got
included to the kernel binary but were silently ignored at run-time.
- Allow root user to append new hashes to the blacklist keyring.
- Trusted keys backed with Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance
Module (CAAM), which part of some of the new NXP's SoC's. Now there
is total three hardware backends for trusted keys: TPM, ARM TEE and
CAAM.
- A scattered set of fixes and small improvements for the TPM driver.
* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM
doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source
KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator
crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap
KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material
KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support
tpm: Add field upgrade mode support for Infineon TPM2 modules
tpm: Fix buffer access in tpm2_get_tpm_pt()
char: tpm: cr50_i2c: Suppress duplicated error message in .remove()
tpm: cr50: Add new device/vendor ID 0x504a6666
tpm: Remove read16/read32/write32 calls from tpm_tis_phy_ops
tpm: ibmvtpm: Correct the return value in tpm_ibmvtpm_probe()
tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: Return true/false (not 1/0) from bool functions
certs: Explain the rationale to call panic()
certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.h')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.h | 4 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.h index bba73979c368..d0f66f6f1931 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.h @@ -31,10 +31,6 @@ extern int tpm_tis_spi_init(struct spi_device *spi, struct tpm_tis_spi_phy *phy, extern int tpm_tis_spi_transfer(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len, u8 *in, const u8 *out); -extern int tpm_tis_spi_read16(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 *result); -extern int tpm_tis_spi_read32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 *result); -extern int tpm_tis_spi_write32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 value); - #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TIS_SPI_CR50 extern int cr50_spi_probe(struct spi_device *spi); #else |