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authorZhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>2023-07-08 18:24:11 +0300
committerHans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>2023-07-19 13:57:50 +0300
commitf4ee84f27625ce1fdf41e8483fa0561a1b837d10 (patch)
treeacbc82cf9ed987b126c98cb07af9853815e93dc5 /drivers/media/usb
parent5ae544d94abc8ff77b1b9bf8774def3fa5689b5b (diff)
downloadlinux-f4ee84f27625ce1fdf41e8483fa0561a1b837d10.tar.xz
media: af9005: Fix null-ptr-deref in af9005_i2c_xfer
In af9005_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be passed. Malicious data finally reach af9005_i2c_xfer. If accessing msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash. Similar commit: commit 0ed554fd769a ("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()") Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/media/usb')
-rw-r--r--drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c5
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c
index 0827bf3d4e8c..13604e6acdb8 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c
@@ -422,6 +422,10 @@ static int af9005_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
if (ret == 0)
ret = 2;
} else {
+ if (msg[0].len < 2) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
/* write one or more registers */
reg = msg[0].buf[0];
addr = msg[0].addr;
@@ -431,6 +435,7 @@ static int af9005_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
ret = 1;
}
+unlock:
mutex_unlock(&d->i2c_mutex);
return ret;
}