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authorYehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>2018-01-22 13:50:09 +0300
committerMika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>2018-03-09 12:54:11 +0300
commit14862ee308bbcaae0ac9927b6cbccccb51386b6c (patch)
tree5052d4e77b83a46557e61c5e2e6c7af66e72e804 /drivers/thunderbolt/icm.c
parent3080e197e936ab7cdcf66cacec22abe5c6c1007a (diff)
downloadlinux-14862ee308bbcaae0ac9927b6cbccccb51386b6c.tar.xz
thunderbolt: Add 'boot' attribute for devices
In various cases, Thunderbolt device can be connected by ICM on boot without waiting for approval from user. Most cases are related to OEM-specific BIOS configurations. This information is interesting for user-space as if the device isn't in SW ACL, it may create a friction in the user experience where the device is automatically authorized if it's connected on boot but requires an explicit user action if connected after OS is up. User-space can use this information to suggest adding the device to SW ACL for auto-authorization on later connections. Signed-off-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/thunderbolt/icm.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/thunderbolt/icm.c12
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/icm.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/icm.c
index 5d3cd740b71f..bece5540b06b 100644
--- a/drivers/thunderbolt/icm.c
+++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/icm.c
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static int icm_fr_disconnect_xdomain_paths(struct tb *tb, struct tb_xdomain *xd)
static void add_switch(struct tb_switch *parent_sw, u64 route,
const uuid_t *uuid, u8 connection_id, u8 connection_key,
u8 link, u8 depth, enum tb_security_level security_level,
- bool authorized)
+ bool authorized, bool boot)
{
struct tb_switch *sw;
@@ -417,6 +417,7 @@ static void add_switch(struct tb_switch *parent_sw, u64 route,
sw->depth = depth;
sw->authorized = authorized;
sw->security_level = security_level;
+ sw->boot = boot;
/* Link the two switches now */
tb_port_at(route, parent_sw)->remote = tb_upstream_port(sw);
@@ -431,7 +432,7 @@ static void add_switch(struct tb_switch *parent_sw, u64 route,
static void update_switch(struct tb_switch *parent_sw, struct tb_switch *sw,
u64 route, u8 connection_id, u8 connection_key,
- u8 link, u8 depth)
+ u8 link, u8 depth, bool boot)
{
/* Disconnect from parent */
tb_port_at(tb_route(sw), parent_sw)->remote = NULL;
@@ -445,6 +446,7 @@ static void update_switch(struct tb_switch *parent_sw, struct tb_switch *sw,
sw->connection_key = connection_key;
sw->link = link;
sw->depth = depth;
+ sw->boot = boot;
/* This switch still exists */
sw->is_unplugged = false;
@@ -504,6 +506,7 @@ icm_fr_device_connected(struct tb *tb, const struct icm_pkg_header *hdr)
bool authorized = false;
struct tb_xdomain *xd;
u8 link, depth;
+ bool boot;
u64 route;
int ret;
@@ -513,6 +516,7 @@ icm_fr_device_connected(struct tb *tb, const struct icm_pkg_header *hdr)
authorized = pkg->link_info & ICM_LINK_INFO_APPROVED;
security_level = (pkg->hdr.flags & ICM_FLAGS_SLEVEL_MASK) >>
ICM_FLAGS_SLEVEL_SHIFT;
+ boot = pkg->link_info & ICM_LINK_INFO_BOOT;
if (pkg->link_info & ICM_LINK_INFO_REJECTED) {
tb_info(tb, "switch at %u.%u was rejected by ICM firmware because topology limit exceeded\n",
@@ -546,7 +550,7 @@ icm_fr_device_connected(struct tb *tb, const struct icm_pkg_header *hdr)
if (sw->depth == depth && sw_phy_port == phy_port &&
!!sw->authorized == authorized) {
update_switch(parent_sw, sw, route, pkg->connection_id,
- pkg->connection_key, link, depth);
+ pkg->connection_key, link, depth, boot);
tb_switch_put(sw);
return;
}
@@ -595,7 +599,7 @@ icm_fr_device_connected(struct tb *tb, const struct icm_pkg_header *hdr)
add_switch(parent_sw, route, &pkg->ep_uuid, pkg->connection_id,
pkg->connection_key, link, depth, security_level,
- authorized);
+ authorized, boot);
tb_switch_put(parent_sw);
}