Merge branch 'random-5.17-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random

Pull random number generator fixes from Jason Donenfeld:

 - Some Kconfig changes resulted in BIG_KEYS being unselectable, which
   Justin sent a patch to fix.

 - Geert pointed out that moving to BLAKE2s bloated vmlinux on little
   machines, like m68k, so we now compensate for this.

 - Numerous style and house cleaning fixes, meant to have a cleaner base
   for future changes.

* 'random-5.17-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
  random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account()
  random: selectively clang-format where it makes sense
  random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer
  random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants
  random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_
  random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants
  random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants
  random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global
  random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument
  random: remove incomplete last_data logic
  random: cleanup integer types
  random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction
  random: fix typo in comments
  lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size
  lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard
  lib/crypto: add prompts back to crypto libraries

2 files changed, 303 insertions, 369 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 227fb7802738..b411182df6f6 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@
  * ===============================
  *
  * There are four exported interfaces; two for use within the kernel,
- * and two or use from userspace.
+ * and two for use from userspace.
  *
  * Exported interfaces ---- userspace output
  * -----------------------------------------
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@
  *
  * The primary kernel interface is
  *
- * 	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+ *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
  *
  * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
  * and place it in the requested buffer.  This is equivalent to a
@@ -132,10 +132,10 @@
  *
  * For less critical applications, there are the functions:
  *
- * 	u32 get_random_u32()
- * 	u64 get_random_u64()
- * 	unsigned int get_random_int()
- * 	unsigned long get_random_long()
+ *	u32 get_random_u32()
+ *	u64 get_random_u64()
+ *	unsigned int get_random_int()
+ *	unsigned long get_random_long()
  *
  * These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes,
  * and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much.  These are recommended
@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@
  * from the devices are:
  *
  *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
- * 	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+ *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
  *                                unsigned int value);
  *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
- * 	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
+ *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
  *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
  *					size_t entropy);
  *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@
  * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
  * by using the commands:
  *
- * 	mknod /dev/random c 1 8
- * 	mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
+ *	mknod /dev/random c 1 8
+ *	mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
  *
  * Acknowledgements:
  * =================
@@ -337,7 +337,6 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
-#include <linux/fips.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/irq.h>
@@ -360,30 +359,11 @@
 /* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */
 
 /*
- * Configuration information
- */
-#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT	12
-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS	(1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
-#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT	10
-#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS	(1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
-#define EXTRACT_SIZE		(BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2)
-
-/*
- * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
- * denominated in units of 1/8th bits.
- *
- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in
- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide.
- */
-#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
-#define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
-
-/*
  * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
  * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
  * access to /dev/random.
  */
-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
+static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * (1 << 5);
 
 /*
  * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords
@@ -430,14 +410,27 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
  * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be
  * irreducible, which we have made here.
  */
-static const struct poolinfo {
-	int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolfracbits;
-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
-	int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
-} poolinfo_table[] = {
-	/* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
+enum poolinfo {
+	POOL_WORDS = 128,
+	POOL_WORDMASK = POOL_WORDS - 1,
+	POOL_BYTES = POOL_WORDS * sizeof(u32),
+	POOL_BITS = POOL_BYTES * 8,
+	POOL_BITSHIFT = ilog2(POOL_BITS),
+
+	/* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
+	 * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. */
+	POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT = 3,
+#define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT)
+	POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT,
+
 	/* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
-	{ S(128),	104,	76,	51,	25,	1 },
+	POOL_TAP1 = 104,
+	POOL_TAP2 = 76,
+	POOL_TAP3 = 51,
+	POOL_TAP4 = 25,
+	POOL_TAP5 = 1,
+
+	EXTRACT_SIZE = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2
 };
 
 /*
@@ -450,9 +443,9 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
 
 struct crng_state {
-	__u32		state[16];
-	unsigned long	init_time;
-	spinlock_t	lock;
+	u32 state[16];
+	unsigned long init_time;
+	spinlock_t lock;
 };
 
 static struct crng_state primary_crng = {
@@ -476,10 +469,10 @@ static bool crng_need_final_init = false;
 #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
 static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
 static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
-#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
+static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
+				    u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
 static void process_random_ready_list(void);
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 
@@ -500,38 +493,23 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
  *
  **********************************************************************/
 
-struct entropy_store;
-struct entropy_store {
-	/* read-only data: */
-	const struct poolinfo *poolinfo;
-	__u32 *pool;
-	const char *name;
+static u32 input_pool_data[POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
 
-	/* read-write data: */
+static struct {
 	spinlock_t lock;
-	unsigned short add_ptr;
-	unsigned short input_rotate;
+	u16 add_ptr;
+	u16 input_rotate;
 	int entropy_count;
-	unsigned int last_data_init:1;
-	__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+} input_pool = {
+	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
 };
 
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
-			       size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
-				size_t nbytes, int fips);
+static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min);
+static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
 
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r);
-static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
-
-static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
-	.poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
-	.name = "input",
-	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
-	.pool = input_pool_data
-};
+static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool);
 
-static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+static const u32 twist_table[8] = {
 	0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
 	0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
 
@@ -545,39 +523,31 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
  * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
  * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
  */
-static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
-			    int nbytes)
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes)
 {
-	unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+	unsigned long i;
 	int input_rotate;
-	int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
-	const unsigned char *bytes = in;
-	__u32 w;
+	const u8 *bytes = in;
+	u32 w;
 
-	tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
-	tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
-	tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
-	tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
-	tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
-
-	input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
-	i = r->add_ptr;
+	input_rotate = input_pool.input_rotate;
+	i = input_pool.add_ptr;
 
 	/* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
 	while (nbytes--) {
 		w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate);
-		i = (i - 1) & wordmask;
+		i = (i - 1) & POOL_WORDMASK;
 
 		/* XOR in the various taps */
-		w ^= r->pool[i];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[i];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK];
 
 		/* Mix the result back in with a twist */
-		r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
+		input_pool_data[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
 
 		/*
 		 * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
@@ -588,33 +558,31 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
 		input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31;
 	}
 
-	r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
-	r->add_ptr = i;
+	input_pool.input_rotate = input_rotate;
+	input_pool.add_ptr = i;
 }
 
-static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
-			     int nbytes)
+static void __mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes)
 {
-	trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
+	trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
 }
 
-static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
-			   int nbytes)
+static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+	trace_mix_pool_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
 
 struct fast_pool {
-	__u32		pool[4];
-	unsigned long	last;
-	unsigned short	reg_idx;
-	unsigned char	count;
+	u32 pool[4];
+	unsigned long last;
+	u16 reg_idx;
+	u8 count;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -624,8 +592,8 @@ struct fast_pool {
  */
 static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f)
 {
-	__u32 a = f->pool[0],	b = f->pool[1];
-	__u32 c = f->pool[2],	d = f->pool[3];
+	u32 a = f->pool[0],	b = f->pool[1];
+	u32 c = f->pool[2],	d = f->pool[3];
 
 	a += b;			c += d;
 	b = rol32(b, 6);	d = rol32(d, 27);
@@ -669,17 +637,19 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void)
  * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace
  * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values.
  */
-static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits)
 {
-	int entropy_count, orig;
-	const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;
-	int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+	int entropy_count, entropy_bits, orig;
+	int nfrac = nbits << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+
+	/* Ensure that the multiplication can avoid being 64 bits wide. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(2 * (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + POOL_BITSHIFT) > 31);
 
 	if (!nbits)
 		return;
 
 retry:
-	entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
+	entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
 	if (nfrac < 0) {
 		/* Debit */
 		entropy_count += nfrac;
@@ -706,50 +676,43 @@ retry:
 		 * turns no matter how large nbits is.
 		 */
 		int pnfrac = nfrac;
-		const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2;
+		const int s = POOL_BITSHIFT + POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2;
 		/* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */
 
 		do {
-			unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
+			unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, POOL_FRACBITS / 2);
 			unsigned int add =
-				((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s;
+				((POOL_FRACBITS - entropy_count) * anfrac * 3) >> s;
 
 			entropy_count += add;
 			pnfrac -= anfrac;
-		} while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac));
+		} while (unlikely(entropy_count < POOL_FRACBITS - 2 && pnfrac));
 	}
 
 	if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) {
-		pr_warn("negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n",
-			r->name, entropy_count);
+		pr_warn("negative entropy/overflow: count %d\n", entropy_count);
 		entropy_count = 0;
-	} else if (entropy_count > pool_size)
-		entropy_count = pool_size;
-	if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+	} else if (entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS)
+		entropy_count = POOL_FRACBITS;
+	if (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
 		goto retry;
 
-	trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits,
-				  entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_);
-
-	if (r == &input_pool) {
-		int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+	trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_);
 
-		if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128)
-			crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r);
-	}
+	entropy_bits = entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+	if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128)
+		crng_reseed(&primary_crng, true);
 }
 
-static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int nbits)
 {
-	const int nbits_max = r->poolinfo->poolwords * 32;
-
 	if (nbits < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
-	nbits = min(nbits,  nbits_max);
+	nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS);
 
-	credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits);
+	credit_entropy_bits(nbits);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -759,7 +722,7 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
  *
  *********************************************************************/
 
-#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ)
+#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
 
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
 
@@ -783,9 +746,9 @@ early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
 
 static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng)
 {
-	int		i;
-	bool		arch_init = true;
-	unsigned long	rv;
+	int i;
+	bool arch_init = true;
+	unsigned long rv;
 
 	for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
@@ -801,9 +764,9 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng)
 
 static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng)
 {
-	int		i;
-	bool		arch_init = true;
-	unsigned long	rv;
+	int i;
+	bool arch_init = true;
+	unsigned long rv;
 
 	for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
@@ -820,14 +783,14 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng)
 static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng)
 {
 	chacha_init_consts(crng->state);
-	_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
+	_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
 	crng_init_try_arch(crng);
 	crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
 }
 
 static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng)
 {
-	_extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0);
+	_extract_entropy(&crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
 	if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) {
 		invalidate_batched_entropy();
 		numa_crng_init();
@@ -873,7 +836,7 @@ static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct crng_state *crng;
 	struct crng_state **pool;
 
-	pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
+	pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
 	for_each_online_node(i) {
 		crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
 				    GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
@@ -917,10 +880,10 @@ static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
  * path.  So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
  * bytes processed from cp.
  */
-static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
+static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
-	char *p;
+	u8 *p;
 	size_t ret = 0;
 
 	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
@@ -929,7 +892,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+	p = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4];
 	while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
 		p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
 		cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
@@ -957,14 +920,14 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
  * like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be
  * unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
  */
-static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
+static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
 {
-	unsigned long		flags;
-	static unsigned char	lfsr = 1;
-	unsigned char		tmp;
-	unsigned		i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE;
-	const char *		src_buf = cp;
-	char *			dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+	unsigned long flags;
+	static u8 lfsr = 1;
+	u8 tmp;
+	unsigned int i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE;
+	const u8 *src_buf = cp;
+	u8 *dest_buf = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4];
 
 	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
 		return 0;
@@ -975,7 +938,7 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
 	if (len > max)
 		max = len;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < max; i++) {
 		tmp = lfsr;
 		lfsr >>= 1;
 		if (tmp & 1)
@@ -988,17 +951,17 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
+static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool)
 {
-	unsigned long	flags;
-	int		i, num;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int i, num;
 	union {
-		__u8	block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
-		__u32	key[8];
+		u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		u32 key[8];
 	} buf;
 
-	if (r) {
-		num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0);
+	if (use_input_pool) {
+		num = extract_entropy(&buf, 32, 16);
 		if (num == 0)
 			return;
 	} else {
@@ -1008,11 +971,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
 	}
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-		unsigned long	rv;
+		unsigned long rv;
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
 		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
 			rv = random_get_entropy();
-		crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
+		crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
 	}
 	memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
 	WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
@@ -1020,8 +983,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
 	crng_finalize_init(crng);
 }
 
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
-			  __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
+static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
 {
 	unsigned long flags, init_time;
 
@@ -1029,8 +991,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
 		init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time);
 		if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||
 		    time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
-			crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ?
-				    &input_pool : NULL);
+			crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng);
 	}
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
 	chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out);
@@ -1039,7 +1000,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
+static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
 {
 	_extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
 }
@@ -1049,26 +1010,26 @@ static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
  * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
  */
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+				    u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
 {
-	unsigned long	flags;
-	__u32		*s, *d;
-	int		i;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	u32 *s, *d;
+	int i;
 
-	used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32));
+	used = round_up(used, sizeof(u32));
 	if (used + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 		extract_crng(tmp);
 		used = 0;
 	}
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
-	s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used];
+	s = (u32 *)&tmp[used];
 	d = &crng->state[4];
-	for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
 		*d++ ^= *s++;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
 {
 	_crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
 }
@@ -1076,7 +1037,7 @@ static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
 static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+	u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
 	int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
 
 	while (nbytes) {
@@ -1108,7 +1069,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-
 /*********************************************************************
  *
  * Entropy input management
@@ -1141,8 +1101,8 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
 
 	trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&time, sizeof(time));
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
@@ -1161,19 +1121,17 @@ static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE;
  */
 static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
 {
-	struct entropy_store	*r;
 	struct {
 		long jiffies;
-		unsigned cycles;
-		unsigned num;
+		unsigned int cycles;
+		unsigned int num;
 	} sample;
 	long delta, delta2, delta3;
 
 	sample.jiffies = jiffies;
 	sample.cycles = random_get_entropy();
 	sample.num = num;
-	r = &input_pool;
-	mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample));
+	mix_pool_bytes(&sample, sizeof(sample));
 
 	/*
 	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
@@ -1205,11 +1163,11 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
 	 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
 	 * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
 	 */
-	credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
+	credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
 }
 
 void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
-				 unsigned int value)
+			  unsigned int value)
 {
 	static unsigned char last_value;
 
@@ -1220,7 +1178,7 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 	last_value = value;
 	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
 			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
-	trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
+	trace_add_input_randomness(POOL_ENTROPY_BITS());
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
 
@@ -1229,33 +1187,33 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness);
 #ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
 static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation;
 
-#define AVG_SHIFT 8     /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
-#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1))
+#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
+#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT - 1))
 
 static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start)
 {
-        long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
+	long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
 
-        /* Use a weighted moving average */
-        delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
-        avg_cycles += delta;
-        /* And average deviation */
-        delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
-        avg_deviation += delta;
+	/* Use a weighted moving average */
+	delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
+	avg_cycles += delta;
+	/* And average deviation */
+	delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
+	avg_deviation += delta;
 }
 #else
 #define add_interrupt_bench(x)
 #endif
 
-static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	__u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs;
+	u32 *ptr = (u32 *)regs;
 	unsigned int idx;
 
 	if (regs == NULL)
 		return 0;
 	idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx);
-	if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32))
+	if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(u32))
 		idx = 0;
 	ptr += idx++;
 	WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx);
@@ -1264,13 +1222,12 @@ static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 {
-	struct entropy_store	*r;
-	struct fast_pool	*fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
-	struct pt_regs		*regs = get_irq_regs();
-	unsigned long		now = jiffies;
-	cycles_t		cycles = random_get_entropy();
-	__u32			c_high, j_high;
-	__u64			ip;
+	struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
+	struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
+	unsigned long now = jiffies;
+	cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
+	u32 c_high, j_high;
+	u64 ip;
 
 	if (cycles == 0)
 		cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
@@ -1280,38 +1237,35 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 	fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high;
 	ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
 	fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip;
-	fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 :
-		get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
+	fast_pool->pool[3] ^=
+		(sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
 
 	fast_mix(fast_pool);
 	add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
 
 	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
 		if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
-		    crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
-				   sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) {
+		    crng_fast_load((u8 *)fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) {
 			fast_pool->count = 0;
 			fast_pool->last = now;
 		}
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if ((fast_pool->count < 64) &&
-	    !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
+	if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
 		return;
 
-	r = &input_pool;
-	if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock))
+	if (!spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock))
 		return;
 
 	fast_pool->last = now;
-	__mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
-	spin_unlock(&r->lock);
+	__mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
+	spin_unlock(&input_pool.lock);
 
 	fast_pool->count = 0;
 
 	/* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */
-	credit_entropy_bits(r, 1);
+	credit_entropy_bits(1);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
 
@@ -1322,7 +1276,7 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
 		return;
 	/* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
 	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
-	trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
+	trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), POOL_ENTROPY_BITS());
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
 #endif
@@ -1337,43 +1291,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
  * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the
  * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly.
  */
-static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
-		      int reserved)
+static size_t account(size_t nbytes, int min)
 {
-	int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;
+	int entropy_count, orig;
 	size_t ibytes, nfrac;
 
-	BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
+	BUG_ON(input_pool.entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS);
 
 	/* Can we pull enough? */
 retry:
-	entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
-	ibytes = nbytes;
-	/* never pull more than available */
-	have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
-
-	if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0)
-		have_bytes = 0;
-	ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);
-	if (ibytes < min)
-		ibytes = 0;
-
+	entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
 	if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) {
-		pr_warn("negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n",
-			r->name, entropy_count);
+		pr_warn("negative entropy count: count %d\n", entropy_count);
 		entropy_count = 0;
 	}
-	nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
-	if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac)
+
+	/* never pull more than available */
+	ibytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, entropy_count >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
+	if (ibytes < min)
+		ibytes = 0;
+	nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
+	if ((size_t)entropy_count > nfrac)
 		entropy_count -= nfrac;
 	else
 		entropy_count = 0;
 
-	if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+	if (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
 		goto retry;
 
-	trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes);
-	if (ibytes && ENTROPY_BITS(r) < random_write_wakeup_bits) {
+	trace_debit_entropy(8 * ibytes);
+	if (ibytes && POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits) {
 		wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
 		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
 	}
@@ -1386,7 +1333,7 @@ retry:
  *
  * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
  */
-static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
+static void extract_buf(u8 *out)
 {
 	struct blake2s_state state __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long));
 	u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
@@ -1408,9 +1355,8 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
 	}
 
 	/* Generate a hash across the pool */
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-	blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)r->pool,
-		       r->poolinfo->poolwords * sizeof(*r->pool));
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool_data, POOL_BYTES);
 	blake2s_final(&state, hash); /* final zeros out state */
 
 	/*
@@ -1422,8 +1368,8 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
 	 * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
 	 * hash.
 	 */
-	__mix_pool_bytes(r, hash, sizeof(hash));
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+	__mix_pool_bytes(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 
 	/* Note that EXTRACT_SIZE is half of hash size here, because above
 	 * we've dumped the full length back into mixer. By reducing the
@@ -1433,23 +1379,13 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
 	memzero_explicit(hash, sizeof(hash));
 }
 
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
-				size_t nbytes, int fips)
+static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	ssize_t ret = 0, i;
-	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
-	unsigned long flags;
+	u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
 
 	while (nbytes) {
-		extract_buf(r, tmp);
-
-		if (fips) {
-			spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-			if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE))
-				panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n");
-			memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-		}
+		extract_buf(tmp);
 		i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
 		memcpy(buf, tmp, i);
 		nbytes -= i;
@@ -1468,42 +1404,19 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
  * returns it in a buffer.
  *
  * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before
- * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the
- * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the
- * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers.
+ * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding.
  */
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
-				 size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
+static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min)
 {
-	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	/* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */
-	if (fips_enabled) {
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-		if (!r->last_data_init) {
-			r->last_data_init = 1;
-			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-			trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE,
-					      ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
-			extract_buf(r, tmp);
-			spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
-			memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-		}
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-	}
-
-	trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
-	nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
-
-	return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled);
+	trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS(), _RET_IP_);
+	nbytes = account(nbytes, min);
+	return _extract_entropy(buf, nbytes);
 }
 
 #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
-	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous))
+	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous))
 
-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
-				      void **previous)
+static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
 	const bool print_once = false;
@@ -1511,8 +1424,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
 	static bool print_once __read_mostly;
 #endif
 
-	if (print_once ||
-	    crng_ready() ||
+	if (print_once || crng_ready() ||
 	    (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
 		return;
 	WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
@@ -1520,9 +1432,8 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
 	print_once = true;
 #endif
 	if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
-		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS "
-				"with crng_init=%d\n", func_name, caller,
-				crng_init);
+		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
+				func_name, caller, crng_init);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1537,7 +1448,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
  */
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+	u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
 
 	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
 
@@ -1565,7 +1476,6 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
-
 /*
  * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
  * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
@@ -1581,7 +1491,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
  */
 static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
 {
-	credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, 1);
+	credit_entropy_bits(1);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1604,15 +1514,15 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
 	timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
 	while (!crng_ready()) {
 		if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
-			mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
-		mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
+			mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1);
+		mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
 		schedule();
 		stack.now = random_get_entropy();
 	}
 
 	del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
 	destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
-	mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
+	mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1731,7 +1641,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
 int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
 	int left = nbytes;
-	char *p = buf;
+	u8 *p = buf;
 
 	trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_);
 	while (left) {
@@ -1753,26 +1663,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 /*
  * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
  *
- * @r: pool to initialize
- *
  * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system
  * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared
  * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool.
  */
-static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
+static void __init init_std_data(void)
 {
 	int i;
 	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
 	unsigned long rv;
 
-	mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
-	for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
+	mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
+	for (i = POOL_BYTES; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
 		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
 			rv = random_get_entropy();
-		mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv));
+		mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv));
 	}
-	mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+	mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1787,7 +1695,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
  */
 int __init rand_initialize(void)
 {
-	init_std_data(&input_pool);
+	init_std_data();
 	if (crng_need_final_init)
 		crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng);
 	crng_initialize_primary(&primary_crng);
@@ -1816,20 +1724,19 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
 }
 #endif
 
-static ssize_t
-urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
-		    loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				   size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
+	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
 	ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes);
-	trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
+	trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS());
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static ssize_t
-urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
+			    loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	static int maxwarn = 10;
 
@@ -1843,8 +1750,8 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
 	return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
 }
 
-static ssize_t
-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
+			   loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int ret;
 
@@ -1854,8 +1761,7 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
 	return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
 }
 
-static __poll_t
-random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
+static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
 	__poll_t mask;
 
@@ -1864,16 +1770,15 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
 	mask = 0;
 	if (crng_ready())
 		mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
-	if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits)
+	if (POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits)
 		mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
 	return mask;
 }
 
-static int
-write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
+static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
 {
 	size_t bytes;
-	__u32 t, buf[16];
+	u32 t, buf[16];
 	const char __user *p = buffer;
 
 	while (count > 0) {
@@ -1883,7 +1788,7 @@ write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
 		if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
 			return -EFAULT;
 
-		for (b = bytes ; b > 0 ; b -= sizeof(__u32), i++) {
+		for (b = bytes; b > 0; b -= sizeof(u32), i++) {
 			if (!arch_get_random_int(&t))
 				break;
 			buf[i] ^= t;
@@ -1892,7 +1797,7 @@ write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
 		count -= bytes;
 		p += bytes;
 
-		mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
+		mix_pool_bytes(buf, bytes);
 		cond_resched();
 	}
 
@@ -1904,7 +1809,7 @@ static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
 {
 	size_t ret;
 
-	ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count);
+	ret = write_pool(buffer, count);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1920,7 +1825,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case RNDGETENTCNT:
 		/* inherently racy, no point locking */
-		ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool);
+		ent_count = POOL_ENTROPY_BITS();
 		if (put_user(ent_count, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		return 0;
@@ -1929,7 +1834,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (get_user(ent_count, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
+		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(ent_count);
 	case RNDADDENTROPY:
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
@@ -1939,11 +1844,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		if (get_user(size, p++))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p,
-				    size);
+		retval = write_pool((const char __user *)p, size);
 		if (retval < 0)
 			return retval;
-		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
+		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(ent_count);
 	case RNDZAPENTCNT:
 	case RNDCLEARPOOL:
 		/*
@@ -1959,7 +1863,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (crng_init < 2)
 			return -ENODATA;
-		crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
+		crng_reseed(&primary_crng, true);
 		WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1);
 		return 0;
 	default:
@@ -1973,9 +1877,9 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
 }
 
 const struct file_operations random_fops = {
-	.read  = random_read,
+	.read = random_read,
 	.write = random_write,
-	.poll  = random_poll,
+	.poll = random_poll,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
 	.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
 	.fasync = random_fasync,
@@ -1983,7 +1887,7 @@ const struct file_operations random_fops = {
 };
 
 const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
-	.read  = urandom_read,
+	.read = urandom_read,
 	.write = random_write,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
 	.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
@@ -1991,19 +1895,19 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
 	.llseek = noop_llseek,
 };
 
-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
-		unsigned int, flags)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
+		flags)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_INSECURE))
+	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/*
 	 * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
 	 * no sense.
 	 */
-	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM))
+	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (count > INT_MAX)
@@ -2030,7 +1934,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 
 static int min_write_thresh;
-static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
+static int max_write_thresh = POOL_BITS;
 static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
 static char sysctl_bootid[16];
 
@@ -2043,8 +1947,8 @@ static char sysctl_bootid[16];
  * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the
  * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data.
  */
-static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
-			void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
+			size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	struct ctl_table fake_table;
 	unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
@@ -2073,13 +1977,13 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 /*
  * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits
  */
-static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
-			   void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
+			   size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	struct ctl_table fake_table;
 	int entropy_count;
 
-	entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+	entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT;
 
 	fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
 	fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
@@ -2087,7 +1991,7 @@ static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 	return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
-static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
+static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
 extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
 struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 	{
@@ -2151,7 +2055,7 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 #endif
 	{ }
 };
-#endif 	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
 
 struct batched_entropy {
 	union {
@@ -2171,7 +2075,7 @@ struct batched_entropy {
  * point prior.
  */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
-	.batch_lock	= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
+	.batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
 };
 
 u64 get_random_u64(void)
@@ -2196,7 +2100,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
-	.batch_lock	= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
+	.batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
 };
 u32 get_random_u32(void)
 {
@@ -2228,7 +2132,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
 	int cpu;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) {
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
 		struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
 
 		batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
@@ -2257,8 +2161,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
  * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
  * @start is returned.
  */
-unsigned long
-randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
 {
 	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
 		range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
@@ -2283,11 +2186,9 @@ randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
 void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
 				size_t entropy)
 {
-	struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
-
 	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
 		size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
-		mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, ret);
+		mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret);
 		count -= ret;
 		buffer += ret;
 		if (!count || crng_init == 0)
@@ -2300,9 +2201,9 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
 	 */
 	wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait,
 			!system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
-			ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits);
-	mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count);
-	credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);
+			POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() <= random_write_wakeup_bits);
+	mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
+	credit_entropy_bits(entropy);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
index c0cfd9b36c0b..720952b92e78 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
@@ -302,6 +302,41 @@ void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(
 		static_identity->static_public, private_key);
 }
 
+static void hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen, const size_t keylen)
+{
+	struct blake2s_state state;
+	u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
+	u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
+	int i;
+
+	if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+		blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
+		blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
+	} else
+		memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
+		x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
+
+	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
+	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
+		x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
+
+	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
+
+	memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+}
+
 /* This is Hugo Krawczyk's HKDF:
  *  - https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf
  *  - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
@@ -322,14 +357,14 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
 		 ((third_len || third_dst) && (!second_len || !second_dst))));
 
 	/* Extract entropy from data into secret */
-	blake2s256_hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+	hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
 
 	if (!first_dst || !first_len)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Expand first key: key = secret, data = 0x1 */
 	output[0] = 1;
-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 	memcpy(first_dst, output, first_len);
 
 	if (!second_dst || !second_len)
@@ -337,8 +372,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
 
 	/* Expand second key: key = secret, data = first-key || 0x2 */
 	output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2;
-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
-			BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 	memcpy(second_dst, output, second_len);
 
 	if (!third_dst || !third_len)
@@ -346,8 +380,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
 
 	/* Expand third key: key = secret, data = second-key || 0x3 */
 	output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3;
-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
-			BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 	memcpy(third_dst, output, third_len);
 
 out: