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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-06-23 22:00:49 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-06-23 22:00:49 +0300 |
| commit | ba461afbef604f58e05676ca38c2a599f073f296 (patch) | |
| tree | ecaf48b678e90a4e6a8264580e28793f44ac16f4 /drivers | |
| parent | fa1796a835fc24eb8fb5d794512ec299dcd9f3fd (diff) | |
| parent | 63b8ea5e4f1a87dea4d3114293fc8e96a8f193d7 (diff) | |
| download | linux-ba461afbef604f58e05676ca38c2a599f073f296.tar.xz | |
Merge tag 'random-5.19-rc4-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull random number generator fixes from Jason Donenfeld:
- A change to schedule the interrupt randomness mixing less often, yet
credit a little more each time, to reduce overhead during interrupt
storms.
- Squelch an undesired pr_warn() from __ratelimit(), which was causing
problems in the reporters' CI.
- A trivial comment fix.
* tag 'random-5.19-rc4-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
random: update comment from copy_to_user() -> copy_to_iter()
random: quiet urandom warning ratelimit suppression message
random: schedule mix_interrupt_randomness() less often
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 655e327d425e..e3dd1dd3dd22 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static struct fasync_struct *fasync; /* Control how we warn userspace. */ static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning = - RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3); + RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT_FLAGS("urandom_warning", HZ, 3, RATELIMIT_MSG_ON_RELEASE); static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM); module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644); @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter) /* * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random - * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep + * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_iter() below to sleep * forever, so that we still retain forward secrecy in that case. */ crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); @@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT) return; - if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ)) + if (new_count < 1024 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ)) return; if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func)) |