ext4: allow ext4_get_group_info() to fail

Previously, ext4_get_group_info() would treat an invalid group number
as BUG(), since in theory it should never happen.  However, if a
malicious attaker (or fuzzer) modifies the superblock via the block
device while it is the file system is mounted, it is possible for
s_first_data_block to get set to a very large number.  In that case,
when calculating the block group of some block number (such as the
starting block of a preallocation region), could result in an
underflow and very large block group number.  Then the BUG_ON check in
ext4_get_group_info() would fire, resutling in a denial of service
attack that can be triggered by root or someone with write access to
the block device.

For a quality of implementation perspective, it's best that even if
the system administrator does something that they shouldn't, that it
will not trigger a BUG.  So instead of BUG'ing, ext4_get_group_info()
will call ext4_error and return NULL.  We also add fallback code in
all of the callers of ext4_get_group_info() that it might NULL.

Also, since ext4_get_group_info() was already borderline to be an
inline function, un-inline it.  The results in a next reduction of the
compiled text size of ext4 by roughly 2k.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230430154311.579720-2-tytso@mit.edu
Reported-by: syzbot+e2efa3efc15a1c9e95c3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=69b28112e098b070f639efb356393af3ffec4220
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
index d39f386e9baf..4037c8611c02 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -1048,6 +1048,8 @@ void ext4_mark_group_bitmap_corrupted(struct super_block *sb,
 	struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, group, NULL);
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!grp || !gdp)
+		return;
 	if (flags & EXT4_GROUP_INFO_BBITMAP_CORRUPT) {
 		ret = ext4_test_and_set_bit(EXT4_GROUP_INFO_BBITMAP_CORRUPT_BIT,
 					    &grp->bb_state);