summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/fs/namei.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-12-13 06:20:05 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-12-13 06:20:05 +0300
commite1212e9b6f06016c62b1ee6fe7772293b90e695a (patch)
tree04dbb618624e756e88f6931f07e5f94c4ba96a88 /fs/namei.c
parentcf619f891971bfac659ac64968f8c35db605c884 (diff)
parenteb7718cdb73c6b0c93002f8f73f4dd4701f8d2bb (diff)
downloadlinux-e1212e9b6f06016c62b1ee6fe7772293b90e695a.tar.xz
Merge tag 'fs.vfsuid.conversion.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull vfsuid updates from Christian Brauner: "Last cycle we introduced the vfs{g,u}id_t types and associated helpers to gain type safety when dealing with idmapped mounts. That initial work already converted a lot of places over but there were still some left, This converts all remaining places that still make use of non-type safe idmapping helpers to rely on the new type safe vfs{g,u}id based helpers. Afterwards it removes all the old non-type safe helpers" * tag 'fs.vfsuid.conversion.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: fs: remove unused idmapping helpers ovl: port to vfs{g,u}id_t and associated helpers fuse: port to vfs{g,u}id_t and associated helpers ima: use type safe idmapping helpers apparmor: use type safe idmapping helpers caps: use type safe idmapping helpers fs: use type safe idmapping helpers mnt_idmapping: add missing helpers
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/namei.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/namei.c40
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 7bfebfa993ed..720270dc9fe5 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -336,11 +336,11 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
unsigned int mode = inode->i_mode;
- kuid_t i_uid;
+ vfsuid_t vfsuid;
/* Are we the owner? If so, ACL's don't matter */
- i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
- if (likely(uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid))) {
+ vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode);
+ if (likely(vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()))) {
mask &= 7;
mode >>= 6;
return (mask & ~mode) ? -EACCES : 0;
@@ -362,8 +362,8 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
* about? Need to check group ownership if so.
*/
if (mask & (mode ^ (mode >> 3))) {
- kgid_t kgid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
- if (in_group_p(kgid))
+ vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
+ if (vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid))
mode >>= 3;
}
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ struct nameidata {
struct nameidata *saved;
unsigned root_seq;
int dfd;
- kuid_t dir_uid;
+ vfsuid_t dir_vfsuid;
umode_t dir_mode;
} __randomize_layout;
@@ -1095,15 +1095,15 @@ fs_initcall(init_fs_namei_sysctls);
static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inode)
{
struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
- kuid_t i_uid;
+ vfsuid_t vfsuid;
if (!sysctl_protected_symlinks)
return 0;
mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt);
- i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
+ vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode);
/* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
- if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, i_uid))
+ if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()))
return 0;
/* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */
@@ -1111,7 +1111,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod
return 0;
/* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
- if (uid_valid(nd->dir_uid) && uid_eq(nd->dir_uid, i_uid))
+ if (vfsuid_valid(nd->dir_vfsuid) && vfsuid_eq(nd->dir_vfsuid, vfsuid))
return 0;
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
@@ -1183,8 +1183,8 @@ int may_linkat(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, const struct path *link)
struct inode *inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
/* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */
- if (!uid_valid(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) ||
- !gid_valid(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
+ if (!vfsuid_valid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode)) ||
+ !vfsgid_valid(i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)
@@ -1232,13 +1232,13 @@ static int may_create_in_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct nameidata *nd, struct inode *const inode)
{
umode_t dir_mode = nd->dir_mode;
- kuid_t dir_uid = nd->dir_uid;
+ vfsuid_t dir_vfsuid = nd->dir_vfsuid;
if ((!sysctl_protected_fifos && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) ||
(!sysctl_protected_regular && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) ||
likely(!(dir_mode & S_ISVTX)) ||
- uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), dir_uid) ||
- uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
+ vfsuid_eq(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode), dir_vfsuid) ||
+ vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode), current_fsuid()))
return 0;
if (likely(dir_mode & 0002) ||
@@ -2307,7 +2307,7 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
OK:
/* pathname or trailing symlink, done */
if (!depth) {
- nd->dir_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, nd->inode);
+ nd->dir_vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, nd->inode);
nd->dir_mode = nd->inode->i_mode;
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
return 0;
@@ -2885,9 +2885,9 @@ int __check_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
{
kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
- if (uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), fsuid))
+ if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode), fsuid))
return 0;
- if (uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, dir), fsuid))
+ if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, dir), fsuid))
return 0;
return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FOWNER);
}
@@ -2926,8 +2926,8 @@ static int may_delete(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
/* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */
- if (!uid_valid(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) ||
- !gid_valid(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
+ if (!vfsuid_valid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode)) ||
+ !vfsgid_valid(i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
audit_inode_child(dir, victim, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE);