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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2015-09-02 02:13:25 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2015-09-02 02:13:25 +0300
commit73b6fa8e49c2d13e04d20186261e5f7855c6d0bf (patch)
tree75c972b9f5284d84db83c6eae63611e96c827c57 /fs/proc
parente713c80a4e49d4bed5324d24755e42bf01c87556 (diff)
parent4b75de8615050c1b0dd8d7794838c42f74ed36ba (diff)
downloadlinux-73b6fa8e49c2d13e04d20186261e5f7855c6d0bf.tar.xz
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start implementing executable files, as the there are application today that are only secure because such files do not exist. It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from /proc/<pid>/ns/*. It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel. Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application, by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted on /sys/fs/cgroup. The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch. and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0. userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing. unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/root.c2
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index 68feb0f70e63..361ab4ee42fc 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -134,6 +134,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
}
sb->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
+ /* User space would break if executables appear on proc */
+ sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC;
}
return dget(sb->s_root);