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authorOlaf Kirch <okir@suse.de>2006-05-15 20:43:57 +0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org>2006-05-15 22:20:55 +0400
commit3b7c8108273bed41a2fc04533cc9f2026ff38c8e (patch)
treed437254b0cd1b07ecc33631fea13ad79f925353b /fs/smbfs
parenta7b862f663d81858531dfccc0537bc9d8a2a4121 (diff)
downloadlinux-3b7c8108273bed41a2fc04533cc9f2026ff38c8e.tar.xz
[PATCH] smbfs chroot issue (CVE-2006-1864)
Mark Moseley reported that a chroot environment on a SMB share can be left via "cd ..\\". Similar to CVE-2006-1863 issue with cifs, this fix is for smbfs. Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> wrote: Looks fine to me. This should catch the slash on lookup or equivalent, which will be all obvious paths of interest. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/smbfs')
-rw-r--r--fs/smbfs/dir.c5
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/smbfs/dir.c b/fs/smbfs/dir.c
index 34c7a11d91f0..70d9c5a37f5a 100644
--- a/fs/smbfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/smbfs/dir.c
@@ -434,6 +434,11 @@ smb_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
if (dentry->d_name.len > SMB_MAXNAMELEN)
goto out;
+ /* Do not allow lookup of names with backslashes in */
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ if (memchr(dentry->d_name.name, '\\', dentry->d_name.len))
+ goto out;
+
lock_kernel();
error = smb_proc_getattr(dentry, &finfo);
#ifdef SMBFS_PARANOIA