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authorSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>2023-07-29 03:47:22 +0300
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2023-08-31 20:48:50 +0300
commit52e322eda3d475614210efbc0f2793a1da9d367a (patch)
tree210f3242d4fe9dcdb7ba5131bb32e8a4f3c6d7af /include/linux/kvm_host.h
parent069f30c619792d5202d72fecd842cacbee260561 (diff)
downloadlinux-52e322eda3d475614210efbc0f2793a1da9d367a.tar.xz
KVM: x86/mmu: BUG() in rmap helpers iff CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y
Introduce KVM_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION() and use it in the low-level rmap helpers to convert the existing BUG()s to WARN_ON_ONCE() when the kernel is built with CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=n, i.e. does NOT want to BUG() on corruption of host kernel data structures. Environments that don't have infrastructure to automatically capture crash dumps, i.e. aren't likely to enable CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y, are typically better served overall by WARN-and-continue behavior (for the kernel, the VM is dead regardless), as a BUG() while holding mmu_lock all but guarantees the _best_ case scenario is a panic(). Make the BUG()s conditional instead of removing/replacing them entirely as there's a non-zero chance (though by no means a guarantee) that the damage isn't contained to the target VM, e.g. if no rmap is found for a SPTE then KVM may be double-zapping the SPTE, i.e. has already freed the memory the SPTE pointed at and thus KVM is reading/writing memory that KVM no longer owns. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221129191237.31447-1-mizhang@google.com Suggested-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230729004722.1056172-13-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/kvm_host.h')
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kvm_host.h19
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 1b583f35547e..fb6c6109fdca 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -867,6 +867,25 @@ static inline void kvm_vm_bugged(struct kvm *kvm)
unlikely(__ret); \
})
+/*
+ * Note, "data corruption" refers to corruption of host kernel data structures,
+ * not guest data. Guest data corruption, suspected or confirmed, that is tied
+ * and contained to a single VM should *never* BUG() and potentially panic the
+ * host, i.e. use this variant of KVM_BUG() if and only if a KVM data structure
+ * is corrupted and that corruption can have a cascading effect to other parts
+ * of the hosts and/or to other VMs.
+ */
+#define KVM_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION(cond, kvm) \
+({ \
+ bool __ret = !!(cond); \
+ \
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION)) \
+ BUG_ON(__ret); \
+ else if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__ret && !(kvm)->vm_bugged)) \
+ kvm_vm_bugged(kvm); \
+ unlikely(__ret); \
+})
+
static inline void kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_RCU