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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2014-07-29 04:26:07 +0400
committerEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2014-08-01 04:12:34 +0400
commit9566d6742852c527bf5af38af5cbb878dad75705 (patch)
treecfeb8c54aa4be4ce65ddc8e38963424228d59314 /include/linux/mount.h
parent07b645589dcda8b7a5249e096fece2a67556f0f4 (diff)
downloadlinux-9566d6742852c527bf5af38af5cbb878dad75705.tar.xz
mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..." would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if the mount started off locked I realized that there are several additional mount flags that should be locked and are not. In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND, and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user. The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch. - nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user. - nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user. - noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user. - atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user. The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated), and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set by a more privileged user. The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME mnt flags. Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/mount.h')
-rw-r--r--include/linux/mount.h5
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
index b637a89e1fae..b0c1e6574e7f 100644
--- a/include/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
@@ -45,12 +45,17 @@ struct mnt_namespace;
#define MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK (MNT_NOSUID | MNT_NODEV | MNT_NOEXEC \
| MNT_NOATIME | MNT_NODIRATIME | MNT_RELATIME \
| MNT_READONLY)
+#define MNT_ATIME_MASK (MNT_NOATIME | MNT_NODIRATIME | MNT_RELATIME )
#define MNT_INTERNAL_FLAGS (MNT_SHARED | MNT_WRITE_HOLD | MNT_INTERNAL | \
MNT_DOOMED | MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT | MNT_MARKED)
#define MNT_INTERNAL 0x4000
+#define MNT_LOCK_ATIME 0x040000
+#define MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC 0x080000
+#define MNT_LOCK_NOSUID 0x100000
+#define MNT_LOCK_NODEV 0x200000
#define MNT_LOCK_READONLY 0x400000
#define MNT_LOCKED 0x800000
#define MNT_DOOMED 0x1000000