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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-01-08 22:11:51 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-01-08 22:11:51 +0300
commitbb93c5ed457fe76597c14717eb994fc5aef22716 (patch)
tree99774d9b73c3b7900711d88ee1680d51f23f6b32 /include/linux
parent8c9440fea77440772542d6dbcb5c36182495c164 (diff)
parentc39e2ae3943d4ee278af4e1b1dcfd5946da1089b (diff)
downloadlinux-bb93c5ed457fe76597c14717eb994fc5aef22716.tar.xz
Merge tag 'vfs-6.8.rw' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs rw updates from Christian Brauner: "This contains updates from Amir for read-write backing file helpers for stacking filesystems such as overlayfs: - Fanotify is currently in the process of introducing pre content events. Roughly, a new permission event will be added indicating that it is safe to write to the file being accessed. These events are used by hierarchical storage managers to e.g., fill the content of files on first access. During that work we noticed that our current permission checking is inconsistent in rw_verify_area() and remap_verify_area(). Especially in the splice code permission checking is done multiple times. For example, one time for the whole range and then again for partial ranges inside the iterator. In addition, we mostly do permission checking before we call file_start_write() except for a few places where we call it after. For pre-content events we need such permission checking to be done before file_start_write(). So this is a nice reason to clean this all up. After this series, all permission checking is done before file_start_write(). As part of this cleanup we also massaged the splice code a bit. We got rid of a few helpers because we are alredy drowning in special read-write helpers. We also cleaned up the return types for splice helpers. - Introduce generic read-write helpers for backing files. This lifts some overlayfs code to common code so it can be used by the FUSE passthrough work coming in over the next cycles. Make Amir and Miklos the maintainers for this new subsystem of the vfs" * tag 'vfs-6.8.rw' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (30 commits) fs: fix __sb_write_started() kerneldoc formatting fs: factor out backing_file_mmap() helper fs: factor out backing_file_splice_{read,write}() helpers fs: factor out backing_file_{read,write}_iter() helpers fs: prepare for stackable filesystems backing file helpers fsnotify: optionally pass access range in file permission hooks fsnotify: assert that file_start_write() is not held in permission hooks fsnotify: split fsnotify_perm() into two hooks fs: use splice_copy_file_range() inline helper splice: return type ssize_t from all helpers fs: use do_splice_direct() for nfsd/ksmbd server-side-copy fs: move file_start_write() into direct_splice_actor() fs: fork splice_file_range() from do_splice_direct() fs: create {sb,file}_write_not_started() helpers fs: create file_write_started() helper fs: create __sb_write_started() helper fs: move kiocb_start_write() into vfs_iocb_iter_write() fs: move permission hook out of do_iter_read() fs: move permission hook out of do_iter_write() fs: move file_start_write() into vfs_iter_write() ...
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux')
-rw-r--r--include/linux/backing-file.h42
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fs.h71
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fsnotify.h50
-rw-r--r--include/linux/splice.h51
4 files changed, 169 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/backing-file.h b/include/linux/backing-file.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3f1fe1774f1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/backing-file.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Common helpers for stackable filesystems and backing files.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 CTERA Networks.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_BACKING_FILE_H
+#define _LINUX_BACKING_FILE_H
+
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+
+struct backing_file_ctx {
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ struct file *user_file;
+ void (*accessed)(struct file *);
+ void (*end_write)(struct file *);
+};
+
+struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags,
+ const struct path *real_path,
+ const struct cred *cred);
+ssize_t backing_file_read_iter(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *iter,
+ struct kiocb *iocb, int flags,
+ struct backing_file_ctx *ctx);
+ssize_t backing_file_write_iter(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *iter,
+ struct kiocb *iocb, int flags,
+ struct backing_file_ctx *ctx);
+ssize_t backing_file_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
+ struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
+ unsigned int flags,
+ struct backing_file_ctx *ctx);
+ssize_t backing_file_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
+ struct file *out, loff_t *ppos, size_t len,
+ unsigned int flags,
+ struct backing_file_ctx *ctx);
+int backing_file_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ struct backing_file_ctx *ctx);
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_BACKING_FILE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 7e7399bd8bc5..cdbf43a8ea88 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1648,9 +1648,70 @@ static inline bool __sb_start_write_trylock(struct super_block *sb, int level)
#define __sb_writers_release(sb, lev) \
percpu_rwsem_release(&(sb)->s_writers.rw_sem[(lev)-1], 1, _THIS_IP_)
+/**
+ * __sb_write_started - check if sb freeze level is held
+ * @sb: the super we write to
+ * @level: the freeze level
+ *
+ * * > 0 - sb freeze level is held
+ * * 0 - sb freeze level is not held
+ * * < 0 - !CONFIG_LOCKDEP/LOCK_STATE_UNKNOWN
+ */
+static inline int __sb_write_started(const struct super_block *sb, int level)
+{
+ return lockdep_is_held_type(sb->s_writers.rw_sem + level - 1, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sb_write_started - check if SB_FREEZE_WRITE is held
+ * @sb: the super we write to
+ *
+ * May be false positive with !CONFIG_LOCKDEP/LOCK_STATE_UNKNOWN.
+ */
static inline bool sb_write_started(const struct super_block *sb)
{
- return lockdep_is_held_type(sb->s_writers.rw_sem + SB_FREEZE_WRITE - 1, 1);
+ return __sb_write_started(sb, SB_FREEZE_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sb_write_not_started - check if SB_FREEZE_WRITE is not held
+ * @sb: the super we write to
+ *
+ * May be false positive with !CONFIG_LOCKDEP/LOCK_STATE_UNKNOWN.
+ */
+static inline bool sb_write_not_started(const struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return __sb_write_started(sb, SB_FREEZE_WRITE) <= 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * file_write_started - check if SB_FREEZE_WRITE is held
+ * @file: the file we write to
+ *
+ * May be false positive with !CONFIG_LOCKDEP/LOCK_STATE_UNKNOWN.
+ * May be false positive with !S_ISREG, because file_start_write() has
+ * no effect on !S_ISREG.
+ */
+static inline bool file_write_started(const struct file *file)
+{
+ if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+ return true;
+ return sb_write_started(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * file_write_not_started - check if SB_FREEZE_WRITE is not held
+ * @file: the file we write to
+ *
+ * May be false positive with !CONFIG_LOCKDEP/LOCK_STATE_UNKNOWN.
+ * May be false positive with !S_ISREG, because file_start_write() has
+ * no effect on !S_ISREG.
+ */
+static inline bool file_write_not_started(const struct file *file)
+{
+ if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+ return true;
+ return sb_write_not_started(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
}
/**
@@ -2032,9 +2093,6 @@ extern ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t vfs_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t vfs_copy_file_range(struct file *, loff_t , struct file *,
loff_t, size_t, unsigned int);
-extern ssize_t generic_copy_file_range(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
- struct file *file_out, loff_t pos_out,
- size_t len, unsigned int flags);
int __generic_remap_file_range_prep(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
struct file *file_out, loff_t pos_out,
loff_t *len, unsigned int remap_flags,
@@ -2535,9 +2593,6 @@ struct file *dentry_open(const struct path *path, int flags,
const struct cred *creds);
struct file *dentry_create(const struct path *path, int flags, umode_t mode,
const struct cred *cred);
-struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags,
- const struct path *real_path,
- const struct cred *cred);
struct path *backing_file_user_path(struct file *f);
/*
@@ -3017,8 +3072,6 @@ ssize_t copy_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
size_t len, unsigned int flags);
extern ssize_t iter_file_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *,
struct file *, loff_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
-extern long do_splice_direct(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos, struct file *out,
- loff_t *opos, size_t len, unsigned int flags);
extern void
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
index bcb6609b54b3..11e6434b8e71 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
@@ -100,29 +100,49 @@ static inline int fsnotify_file(struct file *file, __u32 mask)
return fsnotify_parent(path->dentry, mask, path, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH);
}
-/* Simple call site for access decisions */
-static inline int fsnotify_perm(struct file *file, int mask)
+/*
+ * fsnotify_file_area_perm - permission hook before access to file range
+ */
+static inline int fsnotify_file_area_perm(struct file *file, int perm_mask,
+ const loff_t *ppos, size_t count)
{
- int ret;
- __u32 fsnotify_mask = 0;
+ __u32 fsnotify_mask = FS_ACCESS_PERM;
+
+ /*
+ * filesystem may be modified in the context of permission events
+ * (e.g. by HSM filling a file on access), so sb freeze protection
+ * must not be held.
+ */
+ lockdep_assert_once(file_write_not_started(file));
- if (!(mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_OPEN)))
+ if (!(perm_mask & MAY_READ))
return 0;
- if (mask & MAY_OPEN) {
- fsnotify_mask = FS_OPEN_PERM;
+ return fsnotify_file(file, fsnotify_mask);
+}
+
+/*
+ * fsnotify_file_perm - permission hook before file access
+ */
+static inline int fsnotify_file_perm(struct file *file, int perm_mask)
+{
+ return fsnotify_file_area_perm(file, perm_mask, NULL, 0);
+}
- if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) {
- ret = fsnotify_file(file, FS_OPEN_EXEC_PERM);
+/*
+ * fsnotify_open_perm - permission hook before file open
+ */
+static inline int fsnotify_open_perm(struct file *file)
+{
+ int ret;
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- }
- } else if (mask & MAY_READ) {
- fsnotify_mask = FS_ACCESS_PERM;
+ if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) {
+ ret = fsnotify_file(file, FS_OPEN_EXEC_PERM);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
}
- return fsnotify_file(file, fsnotify_mask);
+ return fsnotify_file(file, FS_OPEN_PERM);
}
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/splice.h b/include/linux/splice.h
index 6c461573434d..9dec4861d09f 100644
--- a/include/linux/splice.h
+++ b/include/linux/splice.h
@@ -68,28 +68,37 @@ typedef int (splice_actor)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_buffer *,
typedef int (splice_direct_actor)(struct pipe_inode_info *,
struct splice_desc *);
-extern ssize_t splice_from_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct file *,
- loff_t *, size_t, unsigned int,
- splice_actor *);
-extern ssize_t __splice_from_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *,
- struct splice_desc *, splice_actor *);
-extern ssize_t splice_to_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *,
- struct splice_pipe_desc *);
-extern ssize_t add_to_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *,
- struct pipe_buffer *);
-long vfs_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
- struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
- unsigned int flags);
-extern ssize_t splice_direct_to_actor(struct file *, struct splice_desc *,
- splice_direct_actor *);
-extern long do_splice(struct file *in, loff_t *off_in,
- struct file *out, loff_t *off_out,
- size_t len, unsigned int flags);
+ssize_t splice_from_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
+ loff_t *ppos, size_t len, unsigned int flags,
+ splice_actor *actor);
+ssize_t __splice_from_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
+ struct splice_desc *sd, splice_actor *actor);
+ssize_t splice_to_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
+ struct splice_pipe_desc *spd);
+ssize_t add_to_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf);
+ssize_t vfs_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
+ struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
+ unsigned int flags);
+ssize_t splice_direct_to_actor(struct file *file, struct splice_desc *sd,
+ splice_direct_actor *actor);
+ssize_t do_splice(struct file *in, loff_t *off_in, struct file *out,
+ loff_t *off_out, size_t len, unsigned int flags);
+ssize_t do_splice_direct(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos, struct file *out,
+ loff_t *opos, size_t len, unsigned int flags);
+ssize_t splice_file_range(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos, struct file *out,
+ loff_t *opos, size_t len);
-extern long do_tee(struct file *in, struct file *out, size_t len,
- unsigned int flags);
-extern ssize_t splice_to_socket(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
- loff_t *ppos, size_t len, unsigned int flags);
+static inline long splice_copy_file_range(struct file *in, loff_t pos_in,
+ struct file *out, loff_t pos_out,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ return splice_file_range(in, &pos_in, out, &pos_out, len);
+}
+
+ssize_t do_tee(struct file *in, struct file *out, size_t len,
+ unsigned int flags);
+ssize_t splice_to_socket(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
+ loff_t *ppos, size_t len, unsigned int flags);
/*
* for dynamic pipe sizing