diff options
| author | Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> | 2023-06-28 12:02:39 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2023-08-08 21:03:50 +0300 |
| commit | ac41e90d8daa8815d8bee774a1975435fbfe1ae7 (patch) | |
| tree | 1d626b79c0a47225d142f9237b94919ac9296ff4 /include | |
| parent | dec3b91f2c4b2c9b24d933e2c3f17493e30149ac (diff) | |
| download | linux-ac41e90d8daa8815d8bee774a1975435fbfe1ae7.tar.xz | |
x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation
Upstream commit: fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855
Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.
The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.
To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.
In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/cpu.h | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index 43b0b7950e33..f98cfe9f188f 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); +extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata, |