random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init()

commit 2f14062bb14b0fcfcc21e6dc7d5b5c0d25966164 upstream.

Currently, start_kernel() adds latent entropy and the command line to
the entropy bool *after* the RNG has been initialized, deferring when
it's actually used by things like stack canaries until the next time
the pool is seeded. This surely is not intended.

Rather than splitting up which entropy gets added where and when between
start_kernel() and random_init(), just do everything in random_init(),
which should eliminate these kinds of bugs in the future.

While we're at it, rename the awkwardly titled "rand_initialize()" to
the more standard "random_init()" nomenclature.

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 5fd0da8629e5..d8bfe61b5a88 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -957,15 +957,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
 	/*
 	 * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
 	 * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
-	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize()
+	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in random_init()
 	 * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms
-	 * - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND
-	 * - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy
-	 * - adding command line entropy
+	 * - random_init() to initialize the RNG from from early entropy sources
 	 */
-	rand_initialize();
-	add_latent_entropy();
-	add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
+	random_init(command_line);
 	boot_init_stack_canary();
 
 	perf_event_init();