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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2016-09-08 13:10:12 +0300
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2016-09-08 13:10:12 +0300
commit248f219cb8bcbfbd7f132752d44afa2df7c241d1 (patch)
tree6961c9529a7fe0e36a9d59805872283308087720 /net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
parent00e907127e6f86d0f9b122d9b4347a8aa09a8b61 (diff)
downloadlinux-248f219cb8bcbfbd7f132752d44afa2df7c241d1.tar.xz
rxrpc: Rewrite the data and ack handling code
Rewrite the data and ack handling code such that: (1) Parsing of received ACK and ABORT packets and the distribution and the filing of DATA packets happens entirely within the data_ready context called from the UDP socket. This allows us to process and discard ACK and ABORT packets much more quickly (they're no longer stashed on a queue for a background thread to process). (2) We avoid calling skb_clone(), pskb_pull() and pskb_trim(). We instead keep track of the offset and length of the content of each packet in the sk_buff metadata. This means we don't do any allocation in the receive path. (3) Jumbo DATA packet parsing is now done in data_ready context. Rather than cloning the packet once for each subpacket and pulling/trimming it, we file the packet multiple times with an annotation for each indicating which subpacket is there. From that we can directly calculate the offset and length. (4) A call's receive queue can be accessed without taking locks (memory barriers do have to be used, though). (5) Incoming calls are set up from preallocated resources and immediately made live. They can than have packets queued upon them and ACKs generated. If insufficient resources exist, DATA packet #1 is given a BUSY reply and other DATA packets are discarded). (6) sk_buffs no longer take a ref on their parent call. To make this work, the following changes are made: (1) Each call's receive buffer is now a circular buffer of sk_buff pointers (rxtx_buffer) rather than a number of sk_buff_heads spread between the call and the socket. This permits each sk_buff to be in the buffer multiple times. The receive buffer is reused for the transmit buffer. (2) A circular buffer of annotations (rxtx_annotations) is kept parallel to the data buffer. Transmission phase annotations indicate whether a buffered packet has been ACK'd or not and whether it needs retransmission. Receive phase annotations indicate whether a slot holds a whole packet or a jumbo subpacket and, if the latter, which subpacket. They also note whether the packet has been decrypted in place. (3) DATA packet window tracking is much simplified. Each phase has just two numbers representing the window (rx_hard_ack/rx_top and tx_hard_ack/tx_top). The hard_ack number is the sequence number before base of the window, representing the last packet the other side says it has consumed. hard_ack starts from 0 and the first packet is sequence number 1. The top number is the sequence number of the highest-numbered packet residing in the buffer. Packets between hard_ack+1 and top are soft-ACK'd to indicate they've been received, but not yet consumed. Four macros, before(), before_eq(), after() and after_eq() are added to compare sequence numbers within the window. This allows for the top of the window to wrap when the hard-ack sequence number gets close to the limit. Two flags, RXRPC_CALL_RX_LAST and RXRPC_CALL_TX_LAST, are added also to indicate when rx_top and tx_top point at the packets with the LAST_PACKET bit set, indicating the end of the phase. (4) Calls are queued on the socket 'receive queue' rather than packets. This means that we don't need have to invent dummy packets to queue to indicate abnormal/terminal states and we don't have to keep metadata packets (such as ABORTs) around (5) The offset and length of a (sub)packet's content are now passed to the verify_packet security op. This is currently expected to decrypt the packet in place and validate it. However, there's now nowhere to store the revised offset and length of the actual data within the decrypted blob (there may be a header and padding to skip) because an sk_buff may represent multiple packets, so a locate_data security op is added to retrieve these details from the sk_buff content when needed. (6) recvmsg() now has to handle jumbo subpackets, where each subpacket is individually secured and needs to be individually decrypted. The code to do this is broken out into rxrpc_recvmsg_data() and shared with the kernel API. It now iterates over the call's receive buffer rather than walking the socket receive queue. Additional changes: (1) The timers are condensed to a single timer that is set for the soonest of three timeouts (delayed ACK generation, DATA retransmission and call lifespan). (2) Transmission of ACK and ABORT packets is effected immediately from process-context socket ops/kernel API calls that cause them instead of them being punted off to a background work item. The data_ready handler still has to defer to the background, though. (3) A shutdown op is added to the AF_RXRPC socket so that the AFS filesystem can shut down the socket and flush its own work items before closing the socket to deal with any in-progress service calls. Future additional changes that will need to be considered: (1) Make sure that a call doesn't hog the front of the queue by receiving data from the network as fast as userspace is consuming it to the exclusion of other calls. (2) Transmit delayed ACKs from within recvmsg() when we've consumed sufficiently more packets to avoid the background work item needing to run. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/rxrpc/rxkad.c')
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/rxkad.c108
1 files changed, 79 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
index 3777432df10b..ae392558829d 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call,
* decrypt partial encryption on a packet (level 1 security)
*/
static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ unsigned int offset, unsigned int len,
rxrpc_seq_t seq)
{
struct rxkad_level1_hdr sechdr;
@@ -330,18 +331,20 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
_enter("");
- if (skb->len < 8) {
+ if (len < 8) {
rxrpc_abort_call("V1H", call, seq, RXKADSEALEDINCON, EPROTO);
goto protocol_error;
}
- /* we want to decrypt the skbuff in-place */
+ /* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
+ * directly into the target buffer.
+ */
nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
if (nsg < 0 || nsg > 16)
goto nomem;
sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
- skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, 8);
+ skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, 8);
/* start the decryption afresh */
memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
@@ -353,12 +356,12 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
skcipher_request_zero(req);
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0) {
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0) {
rxrpc_abort_call("XV1", call, seq, RXKADDATALEN, EPROTO);
goto protocol_error;
}
- if (!skb_pull(skb, sizeof(sechdr)))
- BUG();
+ offset += sizeof(sechdr);
+ len -= sizeof(sechdr);
buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size);
data_size = buf & 0xffff;
@@ -371,18 +374,16 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
goto protocol_error;
}
- /* shorten the packet to remove the padding */
- if (data_size > skb->len) {
+ if (data_size > len) {
rxrpc_abort_call("V1L", call, seq, RXKADDATALEN, EPROTO);
goto protocol_error;
}
- if (data_size < skb->len)
- skb->len = data_size;
_leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size);
return 0;
protocol_error:
+ rxrpc_send_call_packet(call, RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ABORT);
_leave(" = -EPROTO");
return -EPROTO;
@@ -395,6 +396,7 @@ nomem:
* wholly decrypt a packet (level 2 security)
*/
static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ unsigned int offset, unsigned int len,
rxrpc_seq_t seq)
{
const struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
@@ -409,12 +411,14 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
_enter(",{%d}", skb->len);
- if (skb->len < 8) {
+ if (len < 8) {
rxrpc_abort_call("V2H", call, seq, RXKADSEALEDINCON, EPROTO);
goto protocol_error;
}
- /* we want to decrypt the skbuff in-place */
+ /* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
+ * directly into the target buffer.
+ */
nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
if (nsg < 0)
goto nomem;
@@ -427,7 +431,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
}
sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
- skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
+ skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, len);
/* decrypt from the session key */
token = call->conn->params.key->payload.data[0];
@@ -435,19 +439,19 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, skb->len, iv.x);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
if (sg != _sg)
kfree(sg);
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0) {
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0) {
rxrpc_abort_call("XV2", call, seq, RXKADDATALEN, EPROTO);
goto protocol_error;
}
- if (!skb_pull(skb, sizeof(sechdr)))
- BUG();
+ offset += sizeof(sechdr);
+ len -= sizeof(sechdr);
buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size);
data_size = buf & 0xffff;
@@ -460,17 +464,16 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
goto protocol_error;
}
- if (data_size > skb->len) {
+ if (data_size > len) {
rxrpc_abort_call("V2L", call, seq, RXKADDATALEN, EPROTO);
goto protocol_error;
}
- if (data_size < skb->len)
- skb->len = data_size;
_leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size);
return 0;
protocol_error:
+ rxrpc_send_call_packet(call, RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ABORT);
_leave(" = -EPROTO");
return -EPROTO;
@@ -484,6 +487,7 @@ nomem:
* jumbo packet).
*/
static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ unsigned int offset, unsigned int len,
rxrpc_seq_t seq, u16 expected_cksum)
{
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
@@ -521,6 +525,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (cksum != expected_cksum) {
rxrpc_abort_call("VCK", call, seq, RXKADSEALEDINCON, EPROTO);
+ rxrpc_send_call_packet(call, RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ABORT);
_leave(" = -EPROTO [csum failed]");
return -EPROTO;
}
@@ -529,15 +534,61 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN:
return 0;
case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
- return rxkad_verify_packet_1(call, skb, seq);
+ return rxkad_verify_packet_1(call, skb, offset, len, seq);
case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT:
- return rxkad_verify_packet_2(call, skb, seq);
+ return rxkad_verify_packet_2(call, skb, offset, len, seq);
default:
return -ENOANO;
}
}
/*
+ * Locate the data contained in a packet that was partially encrypted.
+ */
+static void rxkad_locate_data_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len)
+{
+ struct rxkad_level1_hdr sechdr;
+
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, *_offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
+ BUG();
+ *_offset += sizeof(sechdr);
+ *_len = ntohl(sechdr.data_size) & 0xffff;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Locate the data contained in a packet that was completely encrypted.
+ */
+static void rxkad_locate_data_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len)
+{
+ struct rxkad_level2_hdr sechdr;
+
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, *_offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
+ BUG();
+ *_offset += sizeof(sechdr);
+ *_len = ntohl(sechdr.data_size) & 0xffff;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Locate the data contained in an already decrypted packet.
+ */
+static void rxkad_locate_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len)
+{
+ switch (call->conn->params.security_level) {
+ case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
+ rxkad_locate_data_1(call, skb, _offset, _len);
+ return;
+ case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT:
+ rxkad_locate_data_2(call, skb, _offset, _len);
+ return;
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* issue a challenge
*/
static int rxkad_issue_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
@@ -704,7 +755,7 @@ static int rxkad_respond_to_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
struct rxkad_challenge challenge;
struct rxkad_response resp
__attribute__((aligned(8))); /* must be aligned for crypto */
- struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
+ struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
u32 version, nonce, min_level, abort_code;
int ret;
@@ -722,8 +773,7 @@ static int rxkad_respond_to_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
}
abort_code = RXKADPACKETSHORT;
- sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, &challenge, sizeof(challenge)) < 0)
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, &challenge, sizeof(challenge)) < 0)
goto protocol_error;
version = ntohl(challenge.version);
@@ -969,7 +1019,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
{
struct rxkad_response response
__attribute__((aligned(8))); /* must be aligned for crypto */
- struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
+ struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
struct rxrpc_crypt session_key;
time_t expiry;
void *ticket;
@@ -980,7 +1030,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
_enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->server_key));
abort_code = RXKADPACKETSHORT;
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, &response, sizeof(response)) < 0)
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, &response, sizeof(response)) < 0)
goto protocol_error;
if (!pskb_pull(skb, sizeof(response)))
BUG();
@@ -988,7 +1038,6 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
version = ntohl(response.version);
ticket_len = ntohl(response.ticket_len);
kvno = ntohl(response.kvno);
- sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
_proto("Rx RESPONSE %%%u { v=%u kv=%u tl=%u }",
sp->hdr.serial, version, kvno, ticket_len);
@@ -1010,7 +1059,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
return -ENOMEM;
abort_code = RXKADPACKETSHORT;
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, ticket, ticket_len) < 0)
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, ticket, ticket_len) < 0)
goto protocol_error_free;
ret = rxkad_decrypt_ticket(conn, ticket, ticket_len, &session_key,
@@ -1135,6 +1184,7 @@ const struct rxrpc_security rxkad = {
.prime_packet_security = rxkad_prime_packet_security,
.secure_packet = rxkad_secure_packet,
.verify_packet = rxkad_verify_packet,
+ .locate_data = rxkad_locate_data,
.issue_challenge = rxkad_issue_challenge,
.respond_to_challenge = rxkad_respond_to_challenge,
.verify_response = rxkad_verify_response,