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authorMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>2013-12-17 15:21:25 +0400
committerJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>2013-12-17 15:47:27 +0400
commit1bc5ad168f441f6f8bfd944288a5f7b4963ac1f6 (patch)
tree2cbf8a686a7d16844a32938ee81a09c3846fb572 /net
parentbd0976dd3379e790b031cef7f477c58b82a65fc2 (diff)
downloadlinux-1bc5ad168f441f6f8bfd944288a5f7b4963ac1f6.tar.xz
Bluetooth: Fix HCI User Channel permission check in hci_sock_sendmsg
The HCI User Channel is an admin operation which enforces CAP_NET_ADMIN when binding the socket. Problem now is that it then requires also CAP_NET_RAW when calling into hci_sock_sendmsg. This is not intended and just an oversight since general HCI sockets (which do not require special permission to bind) and HCI User Channel share the same code path here. Remove the extra CAP_NET_RAW check for HCI User Channel write operation since the permission check has already been enforced when binding the socket. This also makes it possible to open HCI User Channel from a privileged process and then hand the file descriptor to an unprivilged process. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Tested-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c26
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
index 71f0be173080..73bf644c7c74 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
@@ -942,8 +942,22 @@ static int hci_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type = *((unsigned char *) skb->data);
skb_pull(skb, 1);
- if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_RAW &&
- bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type == HCI_COMMAND_PKT) {
+ if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER) {
+ /* No permission check is needed for user channel
+ * since that gets enforced when binding the socket.
+ *
+ * However check that the packet type is valid.
+ */
+ if (bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_COMMAND_PKT &&
+ bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_ACLDATA_PKT &&
+ bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_SCODATA_PKT) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto drop;
+ }
+
+ skb_queue_tail(&hdev->raw_q, skb);
+ queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->tx_work);
+ } else if (bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type == HCI_COMMAND_PKT) {
u16 opcode = get_unaligned_le16(skb->data);
u16 ogf = hci_opcode_ogf(opcode);
u16 ocf = hci_opcode_ocf(opcode);
@@ -974,14 +988,6 @@ static int hci_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
goto drop;
}
- if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER &&
- bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_COMMAND_PKT &&
- bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_ACLDATA_PKT &&
- bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_SCODATA_PKT) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto drop;
- }
-
skb_queue_tail(&hdev->raw_q, skb);
queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->tx_work);
}