summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/apparmor/policy.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>2022-09-20 06:48:48 +0300
committerJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>2023-10-19 01:30:38 +0300
commit90c436a64a6e20482a9a613c47eb4af2e8a5328e (patch)
treeb5df0d74b93bb320f34f5b4a109f46a9128ea0b7 /security/apparmor/policy.c
parentd20f5a1a6e792d22199c9989ec7ab9e95c48d60c (diff)
downloadlinux-90c436a64a6e20482a9a613c47eb4af2e8a5328e.tar.xz
apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.
The cred is needed to properly audit some messages, and will be needed in the future for uid conditional mediation. So pass it through to where the apparmor_audit_data struct gets defined. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/policy.c')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy.c33
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index d78970d4a851..6f80e1207d24 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -762,21 +762,23 @@ static int audit_policy(struct aa_label *subj_label, const char *op,
/* don't call out to other LSMs in the stack for apparmor policy admin
* permissions
*/
-static int policy_ns_capable(struct aa_label *label,
+static int policy_ns_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label,
struct user_namespace *userns, int cap)
{
int err;
/* check for MAC_ADMIN cap in cred */
- err = cap_capable(current_cred(), userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+ err = cap_capable(subj_cred, userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
if (!err)
- err = aa_capable(label, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+ err = aa_capable(subj_cred, label, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
return err;
}
/**
* aa_policy_view_capable - check if viewing policy in at @ns is allowed
+ * @subj_cred: cred of subject
* @label: label that is trying to view policy in ns
* @ns: namespace being viewed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns)
*
@@ -785,9 +787,10 @@ static int policy_ns_capable(struct aa_label *label,
* If @ns is NULL then the namespace being viewed is assumed to be the
* tasks current namespace.
*/
-bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
+bool aa_policy_view_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
{
- struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = subj_cred->user_ns;
struct aa_ns *view_ns = labels_view(label);
bool root_in_user_ns = uid_eq(current_euid(), make_kuid(user_ns, 0)) ||
in_egroup_p(make_kgid(user_ns, 0));
@@ -804,15 +807,17 @@ bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
return response;
}
-bool aa_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
+bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
{
- struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
- bool capable = policy_ns_capable(label, user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) == 0;
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = subj_cred->user_ns;
+ bool capable = policy_ns_capable(subj_cred, label, user_ns,
+ CAP_MAC_ADMIN) == 0;
AA_DEBUG("cap_mac_admin? %d\n", capable);
AA_DEBUG("policy locked? %d\n", aa_g_lock_policy);
- return aa_policy_view_capable(label, ns) && capable &&
+ return aa_policy_view_capable(subj_cred, label, ns) && capable &&
!aa_g_lock_policy;
}
@@ -822,7 +827,7 @@ bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns)
bool res;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
- res = aa_policy_view_capable(label, ns);
+ res = aa_policy_view_capable(current_cred(), label, ns);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return res;
@@ -834,7 +839,7 @@ bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns)
bool res;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
- res = aa_policy_admin_capable(label, ns);
+ res = aa_policy_admin_capable(current_cred(), label, ns);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return res;
@@ -842,13 +847,15 @@ bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns)
/**
* aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy
+ * @subj_cred; subjects cred
* @label: label to check if it can manage policy
* @ns: namespace being managed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns)
* @mask: contains the policy manipulation operation being done
*
* Returns: 0 if the task is allowed to manipulate policy else error
*/
-int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask)
+int aa_may_manage_policy(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+ struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask)
{
const char *op;
@@ -864,7 +871,7 @@ int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask)
return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "policy_locked",
-EACCES);
- if (!aa_policy_admin_capable(label, ns))
+ if (!aa_policy_admin_capable(subj_cred, label, ns))
return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "not policy admin",
-EACCES);