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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-11-22 07:46:00 +0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-11-22 07:46:00 +0400
commit78dc53c422172a317adb0776dfb687057ffa28b7 (patch)
tree7c5d15da75d769d01f6a992c24c3490b3867d5b2 /security/apparmor
parent3eaded86ac3e7f00fb3eeb8162d89e9a34e42fb0 (diff)
parent62fe318256befbd1b4a6765e71d9c997f768fe79 (diff)
downloadlinux-78dc53c422172a317adb0776dfb687057ffa28b7.tar.xz
Merge branch 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "In this patchset, we finally get an SELinux update, with Paul Moore taking over as maintainer of that code. Also a significant update for the Keys subsystem, as well as maintenance updates to Smack, IMA, TPM, and Apparmor" and since I wanted to know more about the updates to key handling, here's the explanation from David Howells on that: "Okay. There are a number of separate bits. I'll go over the big bits and the odd important other bit, most of the smaller bits are just fixes and cleanups. If you want the small bits accounting for, I can do that too. (1) Keyring capacity expansion. KEYS: Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for key access KEYS: Introduce a search context structure KEYS: Search for auth-key by name rather than target key ID Add a generic associative array implementation. KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring Several of the patches are providing an expansion of the capacity of a keyring. Currently, the maximum size of a keyring payload is one page. Subtract a small header and then divide up into pointers, that only gives you ~500 pointers on an x86_64 box. However, since the NFS idmapper uses a keyring to store ID mapping data, that has proven to be insufficient to the cause. Whatever data structure I use to handle the keyring payload, it can only store pointers to keys, not the keys themselves because several keyrings may point to a single key. This precludes inserting, say, and rb_node struct into the key struct for this purpose. I could make an rbtree of records such that each record has an rb_node and a key pointer, but that would use four words of space per key stored in the keyring. It would, however, be able to use much existing code. I selected instead a non-rebalancing radix-tree type approach as that could have a better space-used/key-pointer ratio. I could have used the radix tree implementation that we already have and insert keys into it by their serial numbers, but that means any sort of search must iterate over the whole radix tree. Further, its nodes are a bit on the capacious side for what I want - especially given that key serial numbers are randomly allocated, thus leaving a lot of empty space in the tree. So what I have is an associative array that internally is a radix-tree with 16 pointers per node where the index key is constructed from the key type pointer and the key description. This means that an exact lookup by type+description is very fast as this tells us how to navigate directly to the target key. I made the data structure general in lib/assoc_array.c as far as it is concerned, its index key is just a sequence of bits that leads to a pointer. It's possible that someone else will be able to make use of it also. FS-Cache might, for example. (2) Mark keys as 'trusted' and keyrings as 'trusted only'. KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key KEYS: Make the system 'trusted' keyring viewable by userspace KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing These patches allow keys carrying asymmetric public keys to be marked as being 'trusted' and allow keyrings to be marked as only permitting the addition or linkage of trusted keys. Keys loaded from hardware during kernel boot or compiled into the kernel during build are marked as being trusted automatically. New keys can be loaded at runtime with add_key(). They are checked against the system keyring contents and if their signatures can be validated with keys that are already marked trusted, then they are marked trusted also and can thus be added into the master keyring. Patches from Mimi Zohar make this usable with the IMA keyrings also. (3) Remove the date checks on the key used to validate a module signature. X.509: Remove certificate date checks It's not reasonable to reject a signature just because the key that it was generated with is no longer valid datewise - especially if the kernel hasn't yet managed to set the system clock when the first module is loaded - so just remove those checks. (4) Make it simpler to deal with additional X.509 being loaded into the kernel. KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring KEYS: Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certs better to deduplicate The builder of the kernel now just places files with the extension ".x509" into the kernel source or build trees and they're concatenated by the kernel build and stuffed into the appropriate section. (5) Add support for userspace kerberos to use keyrings. KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfs Fedora went to, by default, storing kerberos tickets and tokens in tmpfs. We looked at storing it in keyrings instead as that confers certain advantages such as tickets being automatically deleted after a certain amount of time and the ability for the kernel to get at these tokens more easily. To make this work, two things were needed: (a) A way for the tickets to persist beyond the lifetime of all a user's sessions so that cron-driven processes can still use them. The problem is that a user's session keyrings are deleted when the session that spawned them logs out and the user's user keyring is deleted when the UID is deleted (typically when the last log out happens), so neither of these places is suitable. I've added a system keyring into which a 'persistent' keyring is created for each UID on request. Each time a user requests their persistent keyring, the expiry time on it is set anew. If the user doesn't ask for it for, say, three days, the keyring is automatically expired and garbage collected using the existing gc. All the kerberos tokens it held are then also gc'd. (b) A key type that can hold really big tickets (up to 1MB in size). The problem is that Active Directory can return huge tickets with lots of auxiliary data attached. We don't, however, want to eat up huge tracts of unswappable kernel space for this, so if the ticket is greater than a certain size, we create a swappable shmem file and dump the contents in there and just live with the fact we then have an inode and a dentry overhead. If the ticket is smaller than that, we slap it in a kmalloc()'d buffer" * 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (121 commits) KEYS: Fix keyring content gc scanner KEYS: Fix error handling in big_key instantiation KEYS: Fix UID check in keyctl_get_persistent() KEYS: The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB ima: define '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring ima: extend the measurement list to include the file signature kernel/system_certificate.S: use real contents instead of macro GLOBAL() KEYS: fix error return code in big_key_instantiate() KEYS: Fix keyring quota misaccounting on key replacement and unlink KEYS: Fix a race between negating a key and reading the error set KEYS: Make BIG_KEYS boolean apparmor: remove the "task" arg from may_change_ptraced_domain() apparmor: remove parent task info from audit logging apparmor: remove tsk field from the apparmor_audit_struct apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during reporting Smack: Ptrace access check mode ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms ima: define kernel parameter 'ima_template=' to change configured default ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/audit.c14
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/capability.c15
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c16
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/audit.h1
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/capability.h5
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/ipc.h4
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/ipc.c9
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c2
8 files changed, 22 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 031d2d9dd695..89c78658031f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = ca;
- struct task_struct *tsk = sa->aad->tsk ? sa->aad->tsk : current;
if (aa_g_audit_header) {
audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=");
@@ -132,11 +131,6 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
if (sa->aad->profile) {
struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad->profile;
- pid_t pid;
- rcu_read_lock();
- pid = rcu_dereference(tsk->real_parent)->pid;
- rcu_read_unlock();
- audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%d", pid);
if (profile->ns != root_ns) {
audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->base.hname);
@@ -149,12 +143,6 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name);
}
-
- if (sa->aad->tsk) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
- }
-
}
/**
@@ -212,7 +200,7 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
- sa->aad->tsk ? sa->aad->tsk : current);
+ sa->u.tsk ? sa->u.tsk : current);
if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
return complain_error(sa->aad->error);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 84d1f5f53877..1101c6f64bb7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -53,8 +53,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
/**
* audit_caps - audit a capability
- * @profile: profile confining task (NOT NULL)
- * @task: task capability test was performed against (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL)
* @cap: capability tested
* @error: error code returned by test
*
@@ -63,8 +62,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
*
* Returns: 0 or sa->error on success, error code on failure
*/
-static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
- int cap, int error)
+static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error)
{
struct audit_cache *ent;
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
@@ -73,7 +71,6 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
sa.aad = &aad;
sa.u.cap = cap;
- sa.aad->tsk = task;
sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE;
sa.aad->error = error;
@@ -124,8 +121,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap)
/**
* aa_capable - test permission to use capability
- * @task: task doing capability test against (NOT NULL)
- * @profile: profile confining @task (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: profile being tested against (NOT NULL)
* @cap: capability to be tested
* @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
*
@@ -133,8 +129,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap)
*
* Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
*/
-int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
- int audit)
+int aa_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit)
{
int error = profile_capable(profile, cap);
@@ -144,5 +139,5 @@ int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
return error;
}
- return audit_caps(profile, task, cap, error);
+ return audit_caps(profile, cap, error);
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 26c607c971f5..452567d3a08e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -50,23 +50,21 @@ void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
/**
* may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
- * @task: task we want to change profile of (NOT NULL)
* @to_profile: profile to change to (NOT NULL)
*
- * Check if the task is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
+ * Check if current is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
* to trace the new domain
*
* Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
*/
-static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
- struct aa_profile *to_profile)
+static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_profile *to_profile)
{
struct task_struct *tracer;
struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
int error = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
- tracer = ptrace_parent(task);
+ tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
if (tracer)
/* released below */
tracerp = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
@@ -75,7 +73,7 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp))
goto out;
- error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -477,7 +475,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
- error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, new_profile);
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new_profile);
if (error) {
aa_put_profile(new_profile);
goto audit;
@@ -690,7 +688,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
}
}
- error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, hat);
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(hat);
if (error) {
info = "ptraced";
error = -EPERM;
@@ -829,7 +827,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
}
/* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
- error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, target);
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(target);
if (error) {
info = "ptrace prevents transition";
goto audit;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 30e8d7687259..ba3dfd17f23f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -109,7 +109,6 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
void *profile;
const char *name;
const char *info;
- struct task_struct *tsk;
union {
void *target;
struct {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
index 2e7c9d6a2f3b..fc3fa381d850 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* This file contains AppArmor capability mediation definitions.
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2009-2013 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
@@ -38,8 +38,7 @@ struct aa_caps {
extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_caps[];
-int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
- int audit);
+int aa_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit);
static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
{
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
index aeda0fbc8b2f..288ca76e2fb1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
struct aa_profile;
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
- struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode);
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_profile *tracer, struct aa_profile *tracee,
+ unsigned int mode);
int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
unsigned int mode);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index c51d2266587e..777ac1c47253 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -54,15 +54,14 @@ static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
/**
* aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
- * @tracer_task: task who will do the tracing (NOT NULL)
* @tracer: profile of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
* @tracee: task to be traced
* @mode: whether PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
*/
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
- struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode)
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_profile *tracer, struct aa_profile *tracee,
+ unsigned int mode)
{
/* TODO: currently only based on capability, not extended ptrace
* rules,
@@ -72,7 +71,7 @@ int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
if (unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
return 0;
/* log this capability request */
- return aa_capable(tracer_task, tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
+ return aa_capable(tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
}
/**
@@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracee);
- error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);
aa_put_profile(tracee_p);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index fb99e18123b4..4257b7e2796b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
if (!error) {
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
if (!unconfined(profile))
- error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit);
+ error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
}
return error;
}