diff options
author | Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> | 2022-09-22 18:17:15 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> | 2022-10-20 11:13:31 +0300 |
commit | e10796b87e1d1bad593c89c5e8cc2e0992bd1335 (patch) | |
tree | 947366545b6ea20469b8c899e50daa3ad6b3d40d /security/integrity | |
parent | 318e66856ddec05384f32d60b5598128289f4e7b (diff) | |
download | linux-e10796b87e1d1bad593c89c5e8cc2e0992bd1335.tar.xz |
evm: remove evm_xattr_acl_change()
The security and integrity infrastructure has dedicated hooks now so
evm_xattr_acl_change() is dead code. Before this commit the callchain was:
evm_protect_xattr()
-> evm_xattr_change()
-> evm_xattr_acl_change()
where evm_protect_xattr() was hit from evm_inode_setxattr() and
evm_inode_removexattr(). But now we have evm_inode_set_acl() and
evm_inode_remove_acl() and have switched over the vfs to rely on the posix
acl api so the code isn't hit anymore.
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 64 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 64 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index dcc5e704ef70..e074c2b4d499 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -435,66 +435,6 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) } /* - * evm_xattr_acl_change - check if passed ACL changes the inode mode - * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount - * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry - * @xattr_name: requested xattr - * @xattr_value: requested xattr value - * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length - * - * Check if passed ACL changes the inode mode, which is protected by EVM. - * - * Returns 1 if passed ACL causes inode mode change, 0 otherwise. - */ -static int evm_xattr_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL - umode_t mode; - struct posix_acl *acl = NULL, *acl_res; - struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - int rc; - - /* - * An earlier comment here mentioned that the idmappings for - * ACL_{GROUP,USER} don't matter since EVM is only interested in the - * mode stored as part of POSIX ACLs. Nonetheless, if it must translate - * from the uapi POSIX ACL representation to the VFS internal POSIX ACL - * representation it should do so correctly. There's no guarantee that - * we won't change POSIX ACLs in a way that ACL_{GROUP,USER} matters - * for the mode at some point and it's difficult to keep track of all - * the LSM and integrity modules and what they do to POSIX ACLs. - * - * Frankly, EVM shouldn't try to interpret the uapi struct for POSIX - * ACLs it received. It requires knowledge that only the VFS is - * guaranteed to have. - */ - acl = vfs_set_acl_prepare(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode), - xattr_value, xattr_value_len); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl)) - return 1; - - acl_res = acl; - /* - * Passing mnt_userns is necessary to correctly determine the GID in - * an idmapped mount, as the GID is used to clear the setgid bit in - * the inode mode. - */ - rc = posix_acl_update_mode(mnt_userns, inode, &mode, &acl_res); - - posix_acl_release(acl); - - if (rc) - return 1; - - if (inode->i_mode != mode) - return 1; -#endif - return 0; -} - -/* * evm_xattr_change - check if passed xattr value differs from current value * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -513,10 +453,6 @@ static int evm_xattr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, char *xattr_data = NULL; int rc = 0; - if (posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) - return evm_xattr_acl_change(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, - xattr_value, xattr_value_len); - rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS); if (rc < 0) |