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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-10-15 20:01:51 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-10-15 20:01:51 +0300
commit726eb70e0d34dc4bc4dada71f52bba8ed638431e (patch)
treee49674616f4513c8c6a4746a08e93c9441708d34 /security/integrity
parentc6dbef7307629cce855aa6b482b60cbf7777ed88 (diff)
parentf3277cbfba763cd2826396521b9296de67cf1bbc (diff)
downloadlinux-726eb70e0d34dc4bc4dada71f52bba8ed638431e.tar.xz
Merge tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH: "Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem patches for 5.10-rc1. There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/ directory. Some summaries: - soundwire driver updates - habanalabs driver updates - extcon driver updates - nitro_enclaves new driver - fsl-mc driver and core updates - mhi core and bus updates - nvmem driver updates - eeprom driver updates - binder driver updates and fixes - vbox minor bugfixes - fsi driver updates - w1 driver updates - coresight driver updates - interconnect driver updates - misc driver updates - other minor driver updates All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues" * tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (396 commits) binder: fix UAF when releasing todo list docs: w1: w1_therm: Fix broken xref, mistakes, clarify text misc: Kconfig: fix a HISI_HIKEY_USB dependency LSM: Fix type of id parameter in kernel_post_load_data prototype misc: Kconfig: add a new dependency for HISI_HIKEY_USB firmware_loader: fix a kernel-doc markup w1: w1_therm: make w1_poll_completion static binder: simplify the return expression of binder_mmap test_firmware: Test partial read support firmware: Add request_partial_firmware_into_buf() firmware: Store opt_flags in fw_priv fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads IMA: Add support for file reads without contents LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data() firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data() LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c8
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c73
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c1
4 files changed, 69 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index e9cbadade74b..0f518dcfde05 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/digsig.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -169,17 +170,18 @@ int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
{
- void *data;
- loff_t size;
+ void *data = NULL;
+ size_t size;
int rc;
key_perm_t perm;
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0,
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, 0, &data, INT_MAX, NULL,
READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
}
+ size = rc;
perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index e3fcad871861..ea8ff8a07b36 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
@@ -272,9 +273,9 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
{
- void *data;
+ void *data = NULL;
char *datap;
- loff_t size;
+ size_t size;
int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
char *p;
@@ -283,11 +284,14 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
datap = path;
strsep(&datap, "\n");
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0, READING_POLICY);
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, 0, &data, INT_MAX, NULL,
+ READING_POLICY);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
}
+ size = rc;
+ rc = 0;
datap = data;
while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 8a91711ca79b..82c9d62bcb11 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
* ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
* @read_id: caller identifier
+ * @contents: whether a subsequent call will be made to ima_post_read_file()
*
* Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written
* in terms of the policy identifier. Appraising the integrity of
@@ -608,22 +610,37 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
*
* For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+ bool contents)
{
+ enum ima_hooks func;
+ u32 secid;
+
/*
- * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER
- *
* Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
* firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
* of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
- * buffers?
+ * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address
+ * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check.
*/
- return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * There will be a call made to ima_post_read_file() with
+ * a filled buffer, so we don't need to perform an extra
+ * read early here.
+ */
+ if (contents)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
+ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ 0, MAY_READ, func);
}
const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
- [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
[READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
[READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
@@ -649,15 +666,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
- if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
- if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
- pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
- return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
return 0;
@@ -677,6 +685,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
/**
* ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
* @id: kernel load data caller identifier
+ * @contents: whether the full contents will be available in a later
+ * call to ima_post_load_data().
*
* Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the
* data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requring a file
@@ -684,7 +694,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
*
* For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
{
bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
@@ -705,7 +715,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
}
break;
case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
- if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE)) {
+ if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && !contents) {
pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
@@ -724,6 +734,35 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * ima_post_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
+ * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
+ * @size: size of in memory file contents
+ * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
+ * @description: @id-specific description of contents
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise/audit in memory buffer based on policy. Policy rules
+ * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
+ *
+ * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
+ char *description)
+{
+ if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
* @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index b4de33074b37..3b0b43e18ecf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>