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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-01-29 05:52:09 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-01-29 05:52:09 +0300
commit73a0bff2058f2403c604371c325fec737ac2ac61 (patch)
treeb862ab7ec0b6bf155cc491ec34343ac1df25bfa9 /security/integrity
parent2cf64d7cb20b04cf25e4ebffc37833298f1d4bde (diff)
parentd54e17b4066612d88c4ef3e5fb3115f12733763d (diff)
downloadlinux-73a0bff2058f2403c604371c325fec737ac2ac61.tar.xz
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar: "Two new features - measuring certificates and querying IMA for a file hash - and three bug fixes: - Measuring certificates is like the rest of IMA, based on policy, but requires loading a custom policy. Certificates loaded onto a keyring, for example during early boot, before a custom policy has been loaded, are queued and only processed after loading the custom policy. - IMA calculates and caches files hashes. Other kernel subsystems, and possibly kernel modules, are interested in accessing these cached file hashes. The bug fixes prevent classifying a file short read (e.g. shutdown) as an invalid file signature, add a missing blank when displaying the securityfs policy rules containing LSM labels, and, lastly, fix the handling of the IMA policy information for unknown LSM labels" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: IMA: Defined delayed workqueue to free the queued keys IMA: Call workqueue functions to measure queued keys IMA: Define workqueue for early boot key measurements IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file ima: Add a space after printing LSM rules for readability IMA: fix measuring asymmetric keys Kconfig IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys IMA: Check IMA policy flag ima: avoid appraise error for hash calc interrupt
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig12
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h33
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c8
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c66
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c8
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c61
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c165
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c171
11 files changed, 496 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 838476d780e5..711ff10fa36e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -310,3 +310,15 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
default n
help
This option requires user-space init to be signed.
+
+config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ bool
+ depends on IMA
+ depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y
+ default y
+
+config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS
+ bool
+ depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ default y
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 31d57cdf2421..064a256f8725 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -12,3 +12,5 @@ ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o
ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index df4ca482fb53..64317d95363e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \
hook(POLICY_CHECK) \
hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE) \
+ hook(KEY_CHECK) \
hook(MAX_CHECK)
#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM,
@@ -204,10 +205,35 @@ extern const char *const func_tokens[];
struct modsig;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS
+/*
+ * To track keys that need to be measured.
+ */
+struct ima_key_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ void *payload;
+ size_t payload_len;
+ char *keyring_name;
+};
+void ima_init_key_queue(void);
+bool ima_should_queue_key(void);
+bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload,
+ size_t payload_len);
+void ima_process_queued_keys(void);
+#else
+static inline void ima_init_key_queue(void) {}
+static inline bool ima_should_queue_key(void) { return false; }
+static inline bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring,
+ const void *payload,
+ size_t payload_len) { return false; }
+static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */
+
/* LIM API function definitions */
int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc);
+ struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+ const char *keyring);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -219,7 +245,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
- int pcr);
+ int pcr, const char *keyring);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
@@ -234,7 +260,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc);
+ struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+ const char *keyring);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 610759fe63b8..f6bc00914aa5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -169,12 +169,13 @@ err_out:
* @func: caller identifier
* @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
* @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
+ * @keyring: keyring name used to determine the action
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
* func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
- * | KEXEC_CMDLINE
+ * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
@@ -183,14 +184,15 @@ err_out:
*/
int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc)
+ struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+ const char *keyring)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
- template_desc);
+ template_desc, keyring);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 300c8d2943c5..a9649b04b9f1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
- IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL);
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
process_buffer_measurement(digest, digestsize,
"blacklisted-hash", NONE,
- pcr);
+ pcr, NULL);
}
return rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7678f0e3e84d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com)
+ *
+ * File: ima_asymmetric_keys.c
+ * Defines an IMA hook to measure asymmetric keys on key
+ * create or update.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/**
+ * ima_post_key_create_or_update - measure asymmetric keys
+ * @keyring: keyring to which the key is linked to
+ * @key: created or updated key
+ * @payload: The data used to instantiate or update the key.
+ * @payload_len: The length of @payload.
+ * @flags: key flags
+ * @create: flag indicating whether the key was created or updated
+ *
+ * Keys can only be measured, not appraised.
+ * The payload data used to instantiate or update the key is measured.
+ */
+void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+ const void *payload, size_t payload_len,
+ unsigned long flags, bool create)
+{
+ bool queued = false;
+
+ /* Only asymmetric keys are handled by this hook. */
+ if (key->type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+ return;
+
+ if (!payload || (payload_len == 0))
+ return;
+
+ if (ima_should_queue_key())
+ queued = ima_queue_key(keyring, payload, payload_len);
+
+ if (queued)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * keyring->description points to the name of the keyring
+ * (such as ".builtin_trusted_keys", ".ima", etc.) to
+ * which the given key is linked to.
+ *
+ * The name of the keyring is passed in the "eventname"
+ * parameter to process_buffer_measurement() and is set
+ * in the "eventname" field in ima_event_data for
+ * the key measurement IMA event.
+ *
+ * The name of the keyring is also passed in the "keyring"
+ * parameter to process_buffer_measurement() to check
+ * if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked
+ * to the given keyring.
+ */
+ process_buffer_measurement(payload, payload_len,
+ keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
+ keyring->description);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 73044fc6a952..7967a6904851 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -362,8 +362,10 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
rc = rbuf_len;
break;
}
- if (rbuf_len == 0)
+ if (rbuf_len == 0) { /* unexpected EOF */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
break;
+ }
offset += rbuf_len;
rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, rbuf, rbuf_len);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 5d55ade5f3b9..195cb4079b2b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -131,5 +131,11 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
ima_init_policy();
- return ima_fs_init();
+ rc = ima_fs_init();
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ ima_init_key_queue();
+
+ return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index d7e987baf127..9fe949c6a530 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr,
- &template_desc);
+ &template_desc, NULL);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -446,6 +446,55 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
/**
+ * ima_file_hash - return the stored measurement if a file has been hashed and
+ * is in the iint cache.
+ * @file: pointer to the file
+ * @buf: buffer in which to store the hash
+ * @buf_size: length of the buffer
+ *
+ * On success, return the hash algorithm (as defined in the enum hash_algo).
+ * If buf is not NULL, this function also outputs the hash into buf.
+ * If the hash is larger than buf_size, then only buf_size bytes will be copied.
+ * It generally just makes sense to pass a buffer capable of holding the largest
+ * possible hash: IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE.
+ * The file hash returned is based on the entire file, including the appended
+ * signature.
+ *
+ * If IMA is disabled or if no measurement is available, return -EOPNOTSUPP.
+ * If the parameters are incorrect, return -EINVAL.
+ */
+int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
+{
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ int hash_algo;
+
+ if (!file)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!ima_policy_flag)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ inode = file_inode(file);
+ iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+ if (buf) {
+ size_t copied_size;
+
+ copied_size = min_t(size_t, iint->ima_hash->length, buf_size);
+ memcpy(buf, iint->ima_hash->digest, copied_size);
+ }
+ hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
+ mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+
+ return hash_algo;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash);
+
+/**
* ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new
* @file : newly created tmpfile
*
@@ -632,12 +681,13 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
* @func: IMA hook
* @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
+ * @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed
*
* Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
*/
void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
- int pcr)
+ int pcr, const char *keyring)
{
int ret = 0;
struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
@@ -655,6 +705,9 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
int action = 0;
u32 secid;
+ if (!ima_policy_flag)
+ return;
+
/*
* Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are
* based on policy. To avoid code duplication, differentiate
@@ -665,7 +718,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
if (func) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
- &pcr, &template);
+ &pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
@@ -718,7 +771,7 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
{
if (buf && size != 0)
process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline",
- KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0);
+ KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
}
static int __init init_ima(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index ef8dfd47c7e3..453427048999 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#define IMA_EUID 0x0080
#define IMA_PCR 0x0100
#define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
+#define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
int type; /* audit type */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
char *fsname;
+ char *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
struct ima_template_desc *template;
};
@@ -206,6 +208,10 @@ static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
static struct list_head *ima_rules;
+/* Pre-allocated buffer used for matching keyrings. */
+static char *ima_keyrings;
+static size_t ima_keyrings_len;
+
static int ima_policy __initdata;
static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
@@ -263,7 +269,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
- int i, result;
+ int i;
nentry = kmalloc(sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nentry)
@@ -277,7 +283,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
memset(nentry->lsm, 0, sizeof_field(struct ima_rule_entry, lsm));
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
+ if (!entry->lsm[i].args_p)
continue;
nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
@@ -286,13 +292,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
goto out_err;
- result = security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
- Audit_equal,
- nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
- if (result == -EINVAL)
- pr_warn("ima: rule for LSM \'%d\' is undefined\n",
- entry->lsm[i].type);
+ security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
+ Audit_equal,
+ nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
+ &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+ if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
+ pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
+ (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
return nentry;
@@ -329,7 +335,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
needs_update = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (entry->lsm[i].args_p) {
needs_update = 1;
break;
}
@@ -339,8 +345,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
result = ima_lsm_update_rule(entry);
if (result) {
- pr_err("ima: lsm rule update error %d\n",
- result);
+ pr_err("lsm rule update error %d\n", result);
return;
}
}
@@ -357,25 +362,70 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
}
/**
- * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
+ * ima_match_keyring - determine whether the keyring matches the measure rule
+ * @rule: a pointer to a rule
+ * @keyring: name of the keyring to match against the measure rule
+ * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
+ *
+ * Returns true if keyring matches one in the rule, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
+ const char *keyring, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ char *next_keyring, *keyrings_ptr;
+ bool matched = false;
+
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!rule->keyrings)
+ return true;
+
+ if (!keyring)
+ return false;
+
+ strcpy(ima_keyrings, rule->keyrings);
+
+ /*
+ * "keyrings=" is specified in the policy in the format below:
+ * keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima|.evm
+ */
+ keyrings_ptr = ima_keyrings;
+ while ((next_keyring = strsep(&keyrings_ptr, "|")) != NULL) {
+ if (!strcmp(next_keyring, keyring)) {
+ matched = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return matched;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the policy rule.
* @rule: a pointer to a rule
* @inode: a pointer to an inode
* @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
* @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
* @func: LIM hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ * @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func
*
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+ enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ const char *keyring)
{
int i;
- if (func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) {
- if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func))
+ if ((func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) || (func == KEY_CHECK)) {
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func)) {
+ if (func == KEY_CHECK)
+ return ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
return true;
+ }
return false;
}
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
@@ -415,9 +465,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
- if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
- continue;
-
+ if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
+ continue;
+ else
+ return false;
+ }
switch (i) {
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
@@ -479,6 +532,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
* @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
+ * @keyring: the keyring name, if given, to be used to check in the policy.
+ * keyring can be NULL if func is anything other than KEY_CHECK.
*
* Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
* conditions.
@@ -489,7 +544,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
*/
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc)
+ struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+ const char *keyring)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -503,7 +559,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+ keyring))
continue;
action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
@@ -752,6 +809,9 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
kfree(arch_policy_entry);
}
ima_update_policy_flag();
+
+ /* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */
+ ima_process_queued_keys();
}
/* Keep the enumeration in sync with the policy_tokens! */
@@ -766,7 +826,8 @@ enum {
Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag,
- Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_err
+ Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
+ Opt_err
};
static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -802,6 +863,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
+ {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -823,8 +885,14 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
- kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
- return -EINVAL;
+ pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
+ (char *)entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+
+ if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
+ kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ } else
+ result = 0;
}
return result;
@@ -889,6 +957,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
bool uid_token;
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
int result = 0;
+ size_t keyrings_len;
ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
@@ -997,6 +1066,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0)
entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = KEY_CHECK;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
@@ -1049,6 +1120,44 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
result = 0;
entry->flags |= IMA_FSNAME;
break;
+ case Opt_keyrings:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "keyrings", args[0].from);
+
+ keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1;
+
+ if ((entry->keyrings) ||
+ (entry->action != MEASURE) ||
+ (entry->func != KEY_CHECK) ||
+ (keyrings_len < 2)) {
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (keyrings_len > ima_keyrings_len) {
+ char *tmpbuf;
+
+ tmpbuf = krealloc(ima_keyrings, keyrings_len,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmpbuf) {
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ima_keyrings = tmpbuf;
+ ima_keyrings_len = keyrings_len;
+ }
+
+ entry->keyrings = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entry->keyrings) {
+ kfree(ima_keyrings);
+ ima_keyrings = NULL;
+ ima_keyrings_len = 0;
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ result = 0;
+ entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS;
+ break;
case Opt_fsuuid:
ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
@@ -1424,6 +1533,13 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, " ");
}
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_KEYRINGS) {
+ if (entry->keyrings != NULL)
+ snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", entry->keyrings);
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_keyrings), tbuf);
+ seq_puts(m, " ");
+ }
+
if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
@@ -1496,6 +1612,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
(char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
break;
}
+ seq_puts(m, " ");
}
}
if (entry->template)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c87c72299191
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com)
+ *
+ * File: ima_queue_keys.c
+ * Enables deferred processing of keys
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/*
+ * Flag to indicate whether a key can be processed
+ * right away or should be queued for processing later.
+ */
+static bool ima_process_keys;
+
+/*
+ * To synchronize access to the list of keys that need to be measured
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_keys_lock);
+static LIST_HEAD(ima_keys);
+
+/*
+ * If custom IMA policy is not loaded then keys queued up
+ * for measurement should be freed. This worker is used
+ * for handling this scenario.
+ */
+static long ima_key_queue_timeout = 300000; /* 5 Minutes */
+static void ima_keys_handler(struct work_struct *work);
+static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(ima_keys_delayed_work, ima_keys_handler);
+static bool timer_expired;
+
+/*
+ * This worker function frees keys that may still be
+ * queued up in case custom IMA policy was not loaded.
+ */
+static void ima_keys_handler(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ timer_expired = true;
+ ima_process_queued_keys();
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function sets up a worker to free queued keys in case
+ * custom IMA policy was never loaded.
+ */
+void ima_init_key_queue(void)
+{
+ schedule_delayed_work(&ima_keys_delayed_work,
+ msecs_to_jiffies(ima_key_queue_timeout));
+}
+
+static void ima_free_key_entry(struct ima_key_entry *entry)
+{
+ if (entry) {
+ kfree(entry->payload);
+ kfree(entry->keyring_name);
+ kfree(entry);
+ }
+}
+
+static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
+ const void *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ima_key_entry *entry;
+
+ entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (entry) {
+ entry->payload = kmemdup(payload, payload_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ entry->keyring_name = kstrdup(keyring->description,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ entry->payload_len = payload_len;
+ }
+
+ if ((entry == NULL) || (entry->payload == NULL) ||
+ (entry->keyring_name == NULL)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+
+out:
+ if (rc) {
+ ima_free_key_entry(entry);
+ entry = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
+bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ bool queued = false;
+ struct ima_key_entry *entry;
+
+ entry = ima_alloc_key_entry(keyring, payload, payload_len);
+ if (!entry)
+ return false;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ima_keys_lock);
+ if (!ima_process_keys) {
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_keys);
+ queued = true;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_keys_lock);
+
+ if (!queued)
+ ima_free_key_entry(entry);
+
+ return queued;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_process_queued_keys() - process keys queued for measurement
+ *
+ * This function sets ima_process_keys to true and processes queued keys.
+ * From here on keys will be processed right away (not queued).
+ */
+void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
+{
+ struct ima_key_entry *entry, *tmp;
+ bool process = false;
+
+ if (ima_process_keys)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Since ima_process_keys is set to true, any new key will be
+ * processed immediately and not be queued to ima_keys list.
+ * First one setting the ima_process_keys flag to true will
+ * process the queued keys.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&ima_keys_lock);
+ if (!ima_process_keys) {
+ ima_process_keys = true;
+ process = true;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_keys_lock);
+
+ if (!process)
+ return;
+
+ if (!timer_expired)
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ima_keys_delayed_work);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) {
+ if (!timer_expired)
+ process_buffer_measurement(entry->payload,
+ entry->payload_len,
+ entry->keyring_name,
+ KEY_CHECK, 0,
+ entry->keyring_name);
+ list_del(&entry->list);
+ ima_free_key_entry(entry);
+ }
+}
+
+inline bool ima_should_queue_key(void)
+{
+ return !ima_process_keys;
+}