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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-04-07 21:11:41 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-04-07 21:11:41 +0300
commit3612605a5a5bc3d3ae0ec861328be8a2990f2c7a (patch)
tree6c387085155874bdf15ff9eec539c15801880734 /security/smack
parent62f8e6c5dcb6666e7da402aea28fcf846eea144c (diff)
parentdf0ce17331e2501dbffc060041dfc6c5f85227b5 (diff)
downloadlinux-3612605a5a5bc3d3ae0ec861328be8a2990f2c7a.tar.xz
Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull general security layer updates from James Morris: - Convert security hooks from list to hlist, a nice cleanup, saving about 50% of space, from Sargun Dhillon. - Only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill (as the secid can be determined from the cred), from Stephen Smalley. - Close a potential race in kernel_read_file(), by making the file unwritable before calling the LSM check (vs after), from Kees Cook. * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: convert security hooks to use hlist exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill
Diffstat (limited to 'security/smack')
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c12
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0735b8db158b..57fef8e04658 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2228,15 +2228,13 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
* @p: the task object
* @info: unused
* @sig: unused
- * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
+ * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's
*
* Return 0 if write access is permitted
*
- * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
- * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
*/
static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
+ int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *skp;
@@ -2252,17 +2250,17 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
* Sending a signal requires that the sender
* can write the receiver.
*/
- if (secid == 0) {
+ if (cred == NULL) {
rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
return rc;
}
/*
- * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
+ * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO
* specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
* we can't take privilege into account.
*/
- skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
return rc;