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author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2021-04-27 01:13:45 +0300 |
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committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2021-07-14 17:53:21 +0300 |
commit | 4020615bd733c491a51e00b1e5292bfea3184877 (patch) | |
tree | 545199aaa381990b98bc77d31f5bf44acf9915a4 /security | |
parent | 550cf816bb114694e9a184c14b03143853f4a1f5 (diff) | |
download | linux-4020615bd733c491a51e00b1e5292bfea3184877.tar.xz |
evm: fix writing <securityfs>/evm overflow
[ Upstream commit 49219d9b8785ba712575c40e48ce0f7461254626 ]
EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX.
The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling
EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete. Define and read an unsigned
int.
Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index f93b688037b1..d7f12ed19183 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -68,12 +68,13 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - int i, ret; + unsigned int i; + int ret; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) return -EPERM; - ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i); + ret = kstrtouint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i); if (ret) return ret; |