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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-02-22 04:15:44 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-02-22 04:15:44 +0300
commita2b095e0efa7229a1a88602283ba1a8a32004851 (patch)
tree333006d05ce305821ed1abfc20daa4471330f408 /security
parent177626c6d5ab1f73d41c94bf9fb0071149779bff (diff)
parent8c657a0590de585b1115847c17b34a58025f2f4b (diff)
downloadlinux-a2b095e0efa7229a1a88602283ba1a8a32004851.tar.xz
Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.12-rc1-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: "New features: - Cr50 I2C TPM driver - sysfs exports of PCR registers in TPM 2.0 chips Bug fixes: - bug fixes for tpm_tis driver, which had a racy wait for hardware state change to be ready to send a command to the TPM chip. The bug has existed already since 2006, but has only made itself known in recent past. This is the same as the "last time" :-) - Otherwise there's bunch of fixes for not as alarming regressions. I think the list is about the same as last time, except I added fixes for some disjoint bugs in trusted keys that I found some time ago" * tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.12-rc1-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() tpm/ppi: Constify static struct attribute_group ABI: add sysfs description for tpm exports of PCR registers tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers keys: Update comment for restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain tpm: Remove tpm_dev_wq_lock char: tpm: add i2c driver for cr50 tpm: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang tpm_tis: Clean up locality release tpm_tis: Fix check_locality for correct locality acquisition
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c22
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c22
2 files changed, 36 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 74d82093cbaa..493eb91ed017 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -403,9 +403,12 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
int ret;
ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
- if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
+ if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
+ return -EIO;
+
tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
tpm_buf_append_u16(tb, type);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle);
@@ -496,8 +499,12 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
goto out;
ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
- goto out;
+ return -EIO;
+
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
datsize = htonl(datalen);
pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize);
@@ -601,9 +608,12 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
- return ret;
+ return -EIO;
}
ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
@@ -791,7 +801,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
case Opt_migratable:
if (*args[0].from == '0')
pay->migratable = 0;
- else
+ else if (*args[0].from != '1')
return -EINVAL;
break;
case Opt_pcrlock:
@@ -1013,8 +1023,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
case Opt_new:
key_len = payload->key_len;
ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
if (ret != key_len) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (tpm2)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 08ec7f48f01d..e2a0ed5d02f0 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
NULL /* nonce */, 0,
@@ -130,7 +136,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data");
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -157,6 +163,7 @@ out:
rc = -EPERM;
}
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
return rc;
}
@@ -211,7 +218,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob");
if (!rc)
*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
@@ -260,7 +267,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
options->blobauth /* hmac */,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
if (rc > 0)
rc = -EPERM;
@@ -304,12 +311,19 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 blob_handle;
int rc;
- rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+ rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
+out:
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
+
return rc;
}