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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-08-31 19:23:16 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-08-31 19:23:16 +0300
commit9c9d1896fa92e05e7af5a7a47e335f834aa4248c (patch)
treebbc9f084c4b9d37201243239336c6b85172973e3 /security
parentdcf8e5633e2e69ad60b730ab5905608b756a032f (diff)
parentdd9373402280cf4715fdc8fd5070f7d039e43511 (diff)
downloadlinux-9c9d1896fa92e05e7af5a7a47e335f834aa4248c.tar.xz
Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20220829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM support for IORING_OP_URING_CMD from Paul Moore: "Add SELinux and Smack controls to the io_uring IORING_OP_URING_CMD. These are necessary as without them the IORING_OP_URING_CMD remains outside the purview of the LSMs (Luis' LSM patch, Casey's Smack patch, and my SELinux patch). They have been discussed at length with the io_uring folks, and Jens has given his thumbs-up on the relevant patches (see the commit descriptions). There is one patch that is not strictly necessary, but it makes testing much easier and is very trivial: the /dev/null IORING_OP_URING_CMD patch." * tag 'lsm-pr-20220829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: Smack: Provide read control for io_uring_cmd /dev/null: add IORING_OP_URING_CMD support selinux: implement the security_uring_cmd() LSM hook lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/security.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c24
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c32
4 files changed, 61 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 14d30fec8a00..4b95de24bc8d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2660,4 +2660,8 @@ int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
{
return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0);
}
+int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 79573504783b..03bca97c8b29 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/fanotify.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -6987,6 +6988,28 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
+ * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
+ * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
/*
@@ -7231,6 +7254,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
#endif
/*
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index ff757ae5f253..1c2f41ff4e55 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "anon_inode",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "io_uring",
- { "override_creds", "sqpoll", NULL } },
+ { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", NULL } },
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 001831458fa2..bffccdc494cb 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/watch_queue.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include "smack.h"
#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
@@ -4732,6 +4733,36 @@ static int smack_uring_sqpoll(void)
return -EPERM;
}
+/**
+ * smack_uring_cmd - check on file operations for io_uring
+ * @ioucmd: the command in question
+ *
+ * Make a best guess about whether a io_uring "command" should
+ * be allowed. Use the same logic used for determining if the
+ * file could be opened for read in the absence of better criteria.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!file)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
+ inode = file_inode(file);
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+ rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4889,6 +4920,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, smack_uring_override_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, smack_uring_cmd),
#endif
};