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| author | KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> | 2023-02-27 09:05:40 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2023-03-11 18:39:59 +0300 |
| commit | abfed855f05863d292de2d0ebab4656791bab9c8 (patch) | |
| tree | 46900edc5054cdd522b0b76e4d197cc096889175 /security | |
| parent | 44a44b57e88f311c1415be1f567c50050913c149 (diff) | |
| download | linux-abfed855f05863d292de2d0ebab4656791bab9c8.tar.xz | |
x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
commit 6921ed9049bc7457f66c1596c5b78aec0dae4a9d upstream.
When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed.
The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target
injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on
returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace
threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which
STIBP protects.
Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for
enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if
selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter).
[ bp: Massage. ]
Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Reported-by: José Oliveira <joseloliveira11@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo@kernelhacking.com>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221184908.2349578-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions