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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-07-24 05:49:06 +0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-07-24 05:49:06 +0400
commite05644e17e744315bce12b0948cdc36910b9a76e (patch)
tree92d62ff59c57f991ef6b5c3cc2c2dcd205946a11 /security
parent97e7292ab5ccd30a13c3612835535fc3f3e59715 (diff)
parent663728418e3494f8e4a82f5d1b2f23c22d11be35 (diff)
downloadlinux-e05644e17e744315bce12b0948cdc36910b9a76e.tar.xz
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Nothing groundbreaking for this kernel, just cleanups and fixes, and a couple of Smack enhancements." * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (21 commits) Smack: Maintainer Record Smack: don't show empty rules when /smack/load or /smack/load2 is read Smack: user access check bounds Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN Smack: fix smack_new_inode bogosities ima: audit is compiled only when enabled ima: ima_initialized is set only if successful ima: add policy for pseudo fs ima: remove unused cleanup functions ima: free securityfs violations file ima: use full pathnames in measurement list security: Fix nommu build. samples: seccomp: add .gitignore for untracked executables tpm: check the chip reference before using it TPM: fix memleak when register hardware fails TPM: chip disabled state erronously being reported as error MAINTAINERS: TPM maintainers' contacts update Merge branches 'next-queue' and 'next' into next Remove unused code from MPI library Revert "crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - additional sources (part 4)" ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Makefile3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h9
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c11
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c5
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c50
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/compat.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h14
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c9
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c25
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c53
17 files changed, 114 insertions, 87 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 35664fe6daa1..b9c1219924f1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10.
config IMA_AUDIT
- bool
+ bool "Enables auditing support"
depends on IMA
+ depends on AUDIT
default y
help
This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 5690c021de8f..5f740f6971e1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
- ima_policy.o ima_audit.o
+ ima_policy.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 3ccf7acac6df..e7c99fd0d223 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -61,10 +61,19 @@ struct ima_queue_entry {
};
extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
/* declarations */
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
const char *cause, int result, int info);
+#else
+static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *fname,
+ const char *op, const char *cause,
+ int result, int info)
+{
+}
+#endif
/* Internal IMA function definitions */
int ima_init(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 88a2788b981d..032ff03ad907 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -175,7 +175,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
}
memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
- strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
+ strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
+ (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
+ file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index 21e96bf188df..7a57f6769e9c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@
static int ima_audit;
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
-
/* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
{
@@ -29,7 +27,6 @@ static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
-#endif
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index e1aa2b482dd2..38477c9c3415 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -367,20 +367,11 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
return 0;
out:
- securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
- securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
- securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
- securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
- securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
- return -1;
-}
-
-void __exit ima_fs_cleanup(void)
-{
securityfs_remove(violations);
securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+ return -1;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 17f1f060306f..b5dfd534f13d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -90,8 +90,3 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
return ima_fs_init();
}
-
-void __exit ima_cleanup(void)
-{
- ima_fs_cleanup();
-}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index b17be79b9cf2..be8294915cf7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
int rc;
bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
+ unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
return;
@@ -75,12 +76,27 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
out:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
+ return;
+
+ /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
+ pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (pathbuf) {
+ pathname = d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
+ if (IS_ERR(pathname))
+ pathname = NULL;
+ else if (strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
+ pathname = NULL;
+ }
if (send_tomtou)
- ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
- "ToMToU");
+ ima_add_violation(inode,
+ !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname,
+ "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
if (send_writers)
- ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
- "open_writers");
+ ima_add_violation(inode,
+ !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname,
+ "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
+ kfree(pathbuf);
}
static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -123,6 +139,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
int rc = 0;
if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
@@ -147,8 +164,21 @@ retry:
goto out;
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
- if (!rc)
- ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (function != BPRM_CHECK) {
+ /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
+ pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (pathbuf) {
+ pathname =
+ d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
+ if (IS_ERR(pathname))
+ pathname = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ ima_store_measurement(iint, file, !pathname ? filename : pathname);
+ kfree(pathbuf);
out:
mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
return rc;
@@ -228,15 +258,11 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
int error;
error = ima_init();
- ima_initialized = 1;
+ if (!error)
+ ima_initialized = 1;
return error;
}
-static void __exit cleanup_ima(void)
-{
- ima_cleanup();
-}
-
late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index d8edff209bf3..1a9583008aae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index c92d42b021aa..1c261763f479 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
*
* If successful, 0 will be returned.
*/
-long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
key_serial_t id,
const struct compat_iovec __user *_payload_iov,
unsigned ioc,
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
long ret;
- if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+ if (!_payload_iov || !ioc)
goto no_payload;
ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index c246ba5d43ab..22ff05269e3d 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t,
extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t);
extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
- const struct iovec __user *,
+ const struct iovec *,
unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t);
/*
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index f1b59ae39d7e..3364fbf46807 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
long ret;
- if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+ if (!_payload_iov || !ioc)
goto no_payload;
ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 7445875f6818..81e7852d281d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
const char *description, unsigned long *_prealloc)
__acquires(&keyring->sem)
+ __acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
{
struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
unsigned long prealloc;
@@ -960,6 +961,7 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *type,
unsigned long prealloc)
__releases(&keyring->sem)
+ __releases(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
{
BUG_ON(type == NULL);
BUG_ON(type->name == NULL);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index cc361b8f3d13..99b36124f712 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ struct superblock_smack {
char *smk_hat;
char *smk_default;
int smk_initialized;
- spinlock_t smk_sblock; /* for initialization */
};
struct socket_smack {
@@ -284,6 +283,19 @@ static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
}
/*
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by the onlycap rule.
+ */
+static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
+{
+ if (!capable(cap))
+ return 0;
+ if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current())
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* logging functions
*/
#define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 9f3705e92712..db14689a21e0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -220,14 +220,9 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
}
/*
- * Return if a specific label has been designated as the
- * only one that gets privilege and current does not
- * have that label.
+ * Allow for priviliged to override policy.
*/
- if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
- goto out_audit;
-
- if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = 0;
out_audit:
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ee0bb5735f35..8221514cc997 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
int rc = 0;
char *sp = smk_of_current();
- if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
@@ -251,7 +251,6 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
- spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock);
sb->s_security = sbsp;
@@ -332,13 +331,10 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
char *commap;
char *nsp;
- spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock);
- if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) {
- spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
+ if (sp->smk_initialized != 0)
return 0;
- }
+
sp->smk_initialized = 1;
- spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
commap = strchr(op, ',');
@@ -825,7 +821,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
/*
* check label validity here so import wont fail on
@@ -835,7 +831,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
rc = -EINVAL;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
@@ -931,7 +927,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
} else
rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
@@ -1720,7 +1716,8 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
* state into account in the decision as well as
* the smack value.
*/
- if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) ||
+ has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = 0;
/* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
out_log:
@@ -2721,7 +2718,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
if (p != current)
return -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
@@ -2784,7 +2781,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
#endif
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
/*
@@ -2820,7 +2817,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
#endif
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
return rc;
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 1810c9a4ed48..d31e6d957c21 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -215,28 +215,27 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp, struct list_head *rule_list,
* @access: access string
* @rule: Smack rule
* @import: if non-zero, import labels
+ * @len: label length limit
*
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
const char *access, struct smack_rule *rule,
- int import)
+ int import, int len)
{
- int rc = -1;
- int done;
const char *cp;
struct smack_known *skp;
if (import) {
- rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, 0);
+ rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, len);
if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
return -1;
- rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, 0);
+ rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, len);
if (rule->smk_object == NULL)
return -1;
} else {
- cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, 0);
+ cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len);
if (cp == NULL)
return -1;
skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
@@ -245,7 +244,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
return -1;
rule->smk_subject = skp->smk_known;
- cp = smk_parse_smack(object, 0);
+ cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
if (cp == NULL)
return -1;
skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
@@ -257,7 +256,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
rule->smk_access = 0;
- for (cp = access, done = 0; *cp && !done; cp++) {
+ for (cp = access; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
switch (*cp) {
case '-':
break;
@@ -282,13 +281,11 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
rule->smk_access |= MAY_TRANSMUTE;
break;
default:
- done = 1;
- break;
+ return 0;
}
}
- rc = 0;
- return rc;
+ return 0;
}
/**
@@ -304,7 +301,8 @@ static int smk_parse_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule, int import)
int rc;
rc = smk_fill_rule(data, data + SMK_LABELLEN,
- data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, rule, import);
+ data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, rule, import,
+ SMK_LABELLEN);
return rc;
}
@@ -340,7 +338,7 @@ static int smk_parse_long_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule,
goto free_out_o;
if (sscanf(data, "%s %s %s", subject, object, access) == 3)
- rc = smk_fill_rule(subject, object, access, rule, import);
+ rc = smk_fill_rule(subject, object, access, rule, import, 0);
kfree(access);
free_out_o:
@@ -520,6 +518,9 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
if (strlen(srp->smk_subject) >= max || strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
return;
+ if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+ return;
+
seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject, srp->smk_object);
seq_putc(s, ' ');
@@ -534,8 +535,6 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
seq_putc(s, 'a');
if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
seq_putc(s, 't');
- if (srp->smk_access == 0)
- seq_putc(s, '-');
seq_putc(s, '\n');
}
@@ -595,13 +594,12 @@ static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
-
/*
* Must have privilege.
* No partial writes.
* Enough data must be present.
*/
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
@@ -787,7 +785,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* No partial writes.
* Enough data must be present.
*/
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1090,7 +1088,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
* "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
*/
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1267,7 +1265,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[80];
int i;
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1334,7 +1332,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[80];
int i;
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1412,7 +1410,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_mapped(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[80];
int i;
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1503,7 +1501,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char *data;
int rc = count;
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1586,7 +1584,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
int rc = count;
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/*
@@ -1664,7 +1662,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[32];
int i;
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1885,7 +1883,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
/*
* Must have privilege.
*/
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
@@ -2051,7 +2049,6 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
}
root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
- root_inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known);
return 0;
}