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| author | Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> | 2020-07-09 09:19:05 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2020-08-19 09:26:37 +0300 |
| commit | 263875d7b6065bf789da2a46753d06822873ce2b (patch) | |
| tree | 07bfefeb8ac839deaccfd1b7ef9ce479b5bb99b3 /security | |
| parent | c7e3b96d12290aad2a8392111d2739806f32845a (diff) | |
| download | linux-263875d7b6065bf789da2a46753d06822873ce2b.tar.xz | |
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond
[ Upstream commit eb624fe214a2e156ddafd9868377cf91499f789d ]
The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings
conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors
don't assume that other conditionals are supported.
Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index a77e0b34e72f..3e3e568c8130 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -1023,6 +1023,13 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) return false; + if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR | + IMA_KEYRINGS)) + return false; + + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) + return false; + break; default: return false; |