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authorJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2017-07-25 03:44:18 +0300
committerJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2017-07-25 03:44:18 +0300
commit53a2ebaaabc1eb8458796fec3bc1e0e80746b642 (patch)
tree9d1f9227b49392cdd2edcc01057517da4f4b09c2 /security
parent3cf29931453215536916d0c4da953fce1911ced3 (diff)
parent520eccdfe187591a51ea9ab4c1a024ae4d0f68d9 (diff)
downloadlinux-53a2ebaaabc1eb8458796fec3bc1e0e80746b642.tar.xz
sync to Linus v4.13-rc2 for subsystem developers to work against
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig7
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/match.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c12
-rw-r--r--security/keys/Kconfig6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/compat_dh.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/dh.c305
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c206
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/gc.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c16
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c16
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c12
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c7
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c52
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c16
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c12
-rw-r--r--security/yama/Kconfig3
24 files changed, 365 insertions, 334 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index d540bfe73190..e8e449444e65 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -163,6 +163,13 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
trying to find such users.
+config FORTIFY_SOURCE
+ bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
+ depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+ help
+ Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
+ where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
+
config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
help
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 960c913381e2..72c604350e80 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref)
* @flags: flags controlling what type of accept tables are acceptable
*
* Unpack a dfa that has been serialized. To find information on the dfa
- * format look in Documentation/security/apparmor.txt
+ * format look in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/apparmor.rst
* Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundary
*
* Returns: an unpacked dfa ready for matching or ERR_PTR on failure
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 6e6f8c1a10a9..c600f4dd1783 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
* License.
*
* AppArmor uses a serialized binary format for loading policy. To find
- * policy format documentation look in Documentation/security/apparmor.txt
+ * policy format documentation see Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/apparmor.rst
* All policy is validated before it is used.
*/
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index d7f282d75cc1..1d32cd20009a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID)
- crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
+ crypto_shash_update(desc, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid.b[0],
sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index f4436626ccb7..95209a5f8595 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
enum ima_hooks func;
int mask;
unsigned long fsmagic;
- u8 fsuuid[16];
+ uuid_t fsuuid;
kuid_t uid;
kuid_t fowner;
bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* Handlers for operators */
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
&& rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
- memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid)))
+ !uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid))
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
return false;
@@ -743,14 +743,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
case Opt_fsuuid:
ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
- if (memchr_inv(entry->fsuuid, 0x00,
- sizeof(entry->fsuuid))) {
+ if (uuid_is_null(&entry->fsuuid)) {
result = -EINVAL;
break;
}
- result = blk_part_pack_uuid(args[0].from,
- entry->fsuuid);
+ result = uuid_parse(args[0].from, &entry->fsuuid);
if (!result)
entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
break;
@@ -1073,7 +1071,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
}
if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) {
- seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", entry->fsuuid);
+ seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", &entry->fsuuid);
seq_puts(m, " ");
}
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index 6fd95f76bfae..a7a23b5541f8 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ config KEYS
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+config KEYS_COMPAT
+ def_bool y
+ depends on COMPAT && KEYS
+
config PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
bool "Enable register of persistent per-UID keyrings"
depends on KEYS
@@ -89,9 +93,9 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
depends on KEYS
- select MPILIB
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_HASH
+ select CRYPTO_DH
help
This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
public keys and shared secrets using values stored as keys
diff --git a/security/keys/compat_dh.c b/security/keys/compat_dh.c
index a6a659b6bcb6..aa6b34cafe5f 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat_dh.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat_dh.c
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
kdfcopy.hashname = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.hashname);
kdfcopy.otherinfo = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.otherinfo);
kdfcopy.otherinfolen = compat_kdfcopy.otherinfolen;
+ memcpy(kdfcopy.__spare, compat_kdfcopy.__spare,
+ sizeof(kdfcopy.__spare));
return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
index e603bd912e4c..d1ea9f325f94 100644
--- a/security/keys/dh.c
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -8,34 +8,17 @@
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
-#include <linux/mpi.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/kpp.h>
+#include <crypto/dh.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include "internal.h"
-/*
- * Public key or shared secret generation function [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
- *
- * ya = g^xa mod p;
- * or
- * ZZ = yb^xa mod p;
- *
- * where xa is the local private key, ya is the local public key, g is
- * the generator, p is the prime, yb is the remote public key, and ZZ
- * is the shared secret.
- *
- * Both are the same calculation, so g or yb are the "base" and ya or
- * ZZ are the "result".
- */
-static int do_dh(MPI result, MPI base, MPI xa, MPI p)
-{
- return mpi_powm(result, base, xa, p);
-}
-
-static ssize_t mpi_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, size_t maxlen, MPI *mpi)
+static ssize_t dh_data_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, void **data)
{
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -56,19 +39,17 @@ static ssize_t mpi_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, size_t maxlen, MPI *mpi)
status = key_validate(key);
if (status == 0) {
const struct user_key_payload *payload;
+ uint8_t *duplicate;
payload = user_key_payload_locked(key);
- if (maxlen == 0) {
- *mpi = NULL;
+ duplicate = kmemdup(payload->data, payload->datalen,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (duplicate) {
+ *data = duplicate;
ret = payload->datalen;
- } else if (payload->datalen <= maxlen) {
- *mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(payload->data,
- payload->datalen);
- if (*mpi)
- ret = payload->datalen;
} else {
- ret = -EINVAL;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
}
}
up_read(&key->sem);
@@ -79,6 +60,29 @@ error:
return ret;
}
+static void dh_free_data(struct dh *dh)
+{
+ kzfree(dh->key);
+ kzfree(dh->p);
+ kzfree(dh->g);
+}
+
+struct dh_completion {
+ struct completion completion;
+ int err;
+};
+
+static void dh_crypto_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
+{
+ struct dh_completion *compl = req->data;
+
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return;
+
+ compl->err = err;
+ complete(&compl->completion);
+}
+
struct kdf_sdesc {
struct shash_desc shash;
char ctx[];
@@ -89,6 +93,7 @@ static int kdf_alloc(struct kdf_sdesc **sdesc_ret, char *hashname)
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc;
int size;
+ int err;
/* allocate synchronous hash */
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hashname, 0, 0);
@@ -97,16 +102,25 @@ static int kdf_alloc(struct kdf_sdesc **sdesc_ret, char *hashname)
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm) == 0)
+ goto out_free_tfm;
+
+ err = -ENOMEM;
size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm);
sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sdesc)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_tfm;
sdesc->shash.tfm = tfm;
sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0;
*sdesc_ret = sdesc;
return 0;
+
+out_free_tfm:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return err;
}
static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc)
@@ -120,14 +134,6 @@ static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc)
kzfree(sdesc);
}
-/* convert 32 bit integer into its string representation */
-static inline void crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(u32 val, u8 *buf)
-{
- __be32 *a = (__be32 *)buf;
-
- *a = cpu_to_be32(val);
-}
-
/*
* Implementation of the KDF in counter mode according to SP800-108 section 5.1
* as well as SP800-56A section 5.8.1 (Single-step KDF).
@@ -138,25 +144,39 @@ static inline void crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(u32 val, u8 *buf)
* 5.8.1.2).
*/
static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
- u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen)
+ u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen, unsigned int zlen)
{
struct shash_desc *desc = &sdesc->shash;
unsigned int h = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
int err = 0;
u8 *dst_orig = dst;
- u32 i = 1;
- u8 iteration[sizeof(u32)];
+ __be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
while (dlen) {
err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (err)
goto err;
- crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(i, iteration);
- err = crypto_shash_update(desc, iteration, sizeof(u32));
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&counter, sizeof(__be32));
if (err)
goto err;
+ if (zlen && h) {
+ u8 tmpbuffer[h];
+ size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, h);
+ memset(tmpbuffer, 0, chunk);
+
+ do {
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, tmpbuffer,
+ chunk);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+
+ zlen -= chunk;
+ chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, h);
+ } while (zlen);
+ }
+
if (src && slen) {
err = crypto_shash_update(desc, src, slen);
if (err)
@@ -179,7 +199,7 @@ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
dlen -= h;
dst += h;
- i++;
+ counter = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(counter) + 1);
}
}
@@ -192,7 +212,7 @@ err:
static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
- uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen)
+ uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen, size_t lzero)
{
uint8_t *outbuf = NULL;
int ret;
@@ -203,7 +223,7 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
goto err;
}
- ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, buflen);
+ ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, buflen, lzero);
if (ret)
goto err;
@@ -221,127 +241,180 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdfcopy)
{
long ret;
- MPI base, private, prime, result;
- unsigned nbytes;
+ ssize_t dlen;
+ int secretlen;
+ int outlen;
struct keyctl_dh_params pcopy;
- uint8_t *kbuf;
- ssize_t keylen;
- size_t resultlen;
+ struct dh dh_inputs;
+ struct scatterlist outsg;
+ struct dh_completion compl;
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm;
+ struct kpp_request *req;
+ uint8_t *secret;
+ uint8_t *outbuf;
struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc = NULL;
if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
+ goto out1;
}
if (copy_from_user(&pcopy, params, sizeof(pcopy)) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
+ goto out1;
}
if (kdfcopy) {
char *hashname;
+ if (memchr_inv(kdfcopy->__spare, 0, sizeof(kdfcopy->__spare))) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out1;
+ }
+
if (buflen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN ||
kdfcopy->otherinfolen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OI_LEN) {
ret = -EMSGSIZE;
- goto out;
+ goto out1;
}
/* get KDF name string */
hashname = strndup_user(kdfcopy->hashname, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
if (IS_ERR(hashname)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(hashname);
- goto out;
+ goto out1;
}
/* allocate KDF from the kernel crypto API */
ret = kdf_alloc(&sdesc, hashname);
kfree(hashname);
if (ret)
- goto out;
+ goto out1;
}
- /*
- * If the caller requests postprocessing with a KDF, allow an
- * arbitrary output buffer size since the KDF ensures proper truncation.
- */
- keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, kdfcopy ? SIZE_MAX : buflen, &prime);
- if (keylen < 0 || !prime) {
- /* buflen == 0 may be used to query the required buffer size,
- * which is the prime key length.
- */
- ret = keylen;
- goto out;
+ memset(&dh_inputs, 0, sizeof(dh_inputs));
+
+ dlen = dh_data_from_key(pcopy.prime, &dh_inputs.p);
+ if (dlen < 0) {
+ ret = dlen;
+ goto out1;
+ }
+ dh_inputs.p_size = dlen;
+
+ dlen = dh_data_from_key(pcopy.base, &dh_inputs.g);
+ if (dlen < 0) {
+ ret = dlen;
+ goto out2;
+ }
+ dh_inputs.g_size = dlen;
+
+ dlen = dh_data_from_key(pcopy.private, &dh_inputs.key);
+ if (dlen < 0) {
+ ret = dlen;
+ goto out2;
}
+ dh_inputs.key_size = dlen;
- /* The result is never longer than the prime */
- resultlen = keylen;
+ secretlen = crypto_dh_key_len(&dh_inputs);
+ secret = kmalloc(secretlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!secret) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out2;
+ }
+ ret = crypto_dh_encode_key(secret, secretlen, &dh_inputs);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out3;
- keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.base, SIZE_MAX, &base);
- if (keylen < 0 || !base) {
- ret = keylen;
- goto error1;
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp("dh", CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ goto out3;
}
- keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.private, SIZE_MAX, &private);
- if (keylen < 0 || !private) {
- ret = keylen;
- goto error2;
+ ret = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, secret, secretlen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out4;
+
+ outlen = crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm);
+
+ if (!kdfcopy) {
+ /*
+ * When not using a KDF, buflen 0 is used to read the
+ * required buffer length
+ */
+ if (buflen == 0) {
+ ret = outlen;
+ goto out4;
+ } else if (outlen > buflen) {
+ ret = -EOVERFLOW;
+ goto out4;
+ }
}
- result = mpi_alloc(0);
- if (!result) {
+ outbuf = kzalloc(kdfcopy ? (outlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen) : outlen,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!outbuf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto error3;
+ goto out4;
}
- /* allocate space for DH shared secret and SP800-56A otherinfo */
- kbuf = kmalloc(kdfcopy ? (resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen) : resultlen,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!kbuf) {
+ sg_init_one(&outsg, outbuf, outlen);
+
+ req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto error4;
+ goto out5;
}
+ kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
+ kpp_request_set_output(req, &outsg, outlen);
+ init_completion(&compl.completion);
+ kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ dh_crypto_done, &compl);
+
/*
- * Concatenate SP800-56A otherinfo past DH shared secret -- the
- * input to the KDF is (DH shared secret || otherinfo)
+ * For DH, generate_public_key and generate_shared_secret are
+ * the same calculation
*/
- if (kdfcopy && kdfcopy->otherinfo &&
- copy_from_user(kbuf + resultlen, kdfcopy->otherinfo,
- kdfcopy->otherinfolen) != 0) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto error5;
+ ret = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
+ if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
+ wait_for_completion(&compl.completion);
+ ret = compl.err;
+ if (ret)
+ goto out6;
}
- ret = do_dh(result, base, private, prime);
- if (ret)
- goto error5;
-
- ret = mpi_read_buffer(result, kbuf, resultlen, &nbytes, NULL);
- if (ret != 0)
- goto error5;
-
if (kdfcopy) {
- ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(sdesc, buffer, buflen, kbuf,
- resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen);
- } else {
- ret = nbytes;
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
+ /*
+ * Concatenate SP800-56A otherinfo past DH shared secret -- the
+ * input to the KDF is (DH shared secret || otherinfo)
+ */
+ if (copy_from_user(outbuf + req->dst_len, kdfcopy->otherinfo,
+ kdfcopy->otherinfolen) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out6;
+ }
+
+ ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(sdesc, buffer, buflen, outbuf,
+ req->dst_len + kdfcopy->otherinfolen,
+ outlen - req->dst_len);
+ } else if (copy_to_user(buffer, outbuf, req->dst_len) == 0) {
+ ret = req->dst_len;
+ } else {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
}
-error5:
- kzfree(kbuf);
-error4:
- mpi_free(result);
-error3:
- mpi_free(private);
-error2:
- mpi_free(base);
-error1:
- mpi_free(prime);
-out:
+out6:
+ kpp_request_free(req);
+out5:
+ kzfree(outbuf);
+out4:
+ crypto_free_kpp(tfm);
+out3:
+ kzfree(secret);
+out2:
+ dh_free_data(&dh_inputs);
+out1:
kdf_dealloc(sdesc);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 0010955d7876..69855ba0d3b3 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
- * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
*/
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
@@ -54,13 +55,7 @@ static int blksize;
#define MAX_DATA_SIZE 4096
#define MIN_DATA_SIZE 20
-struct sdesc {
- struct shash_desc shash;
- char ctx[];
-};
-
-static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
-static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
+static struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
enum {
Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update
@@ -141,23 +136,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc)
*/
static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
{
- if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
- if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)
- goto out;
- if (orig_desc)
- if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
- goto out;
- } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
- if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)
- goto out;
- if (orig_desc)
- if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
- goto out;
- } else
- goto out;
+ int prefix_len;
+
+ if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
+ prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
+ else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
+ prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!new_desc[prefix_len])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return 0;
-out:
- return -EINVAL;
}
/*
@@ -321,53 +315,38 @@ error:
return ukey;
}
-static struct sdesc *alloc_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg)
-{
- struct sdesc *sdesc;
- int size;
-
- size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg);
- sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sdesc)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
- sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0;
- return sdesc;
-}
-
-static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
+static int calc_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, u8 *digest,
const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
{
- struct sdesc *sdesc;
- int ret;
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
+ int err;
- sdesc = alloc_sdesc(hmacalg);
- if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
- return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
- }
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ desc->flags = 0;
- ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen);
- if (!ret)
- ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, buf, buflen, digest);
- kfree(sdesc);
- return ret;
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, buf, buflen, digest);
+ shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ return err;
}
-static int calc_hash(u8 *digest, const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
+static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
+ const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
{
- struct sdesc *sdesc;
- int ret;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ int err;
- sdesc = alloc_sdesc(hashalg);
- if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
- return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s transform: %ld\n",
+ hmac_alg, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
- ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, buf, buflen, digest);
- kfree(sdesc);
- return ret;
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
+ if (!err)
+ err = calc_hash(tfm, digest, buf, buflen);
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return err;
}
enum derived_key_type { ENC_KEY, AUTH_KEY };
@@ -385,10 +364,9 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
derived_buf_len = HASH_SIZE;
derived_buf = kzalloc(derived_buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!derived_buf) {
- pr_err("encrypted_key: out of memory\n");
+ if (!derived_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
- }
+
if (key_type)
strcpy(derived_buf, "AUTH_KEY");
else
@@ -396,8 +374,8 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
master_keylen);
- ret = calc_hash(derived_key, derived_buf, derived_buf_len);
- kfree(derived_buf);
+ ret = calc_hash(hash_tfm, derived_key, derived_buf, derived_buf_len);
+ kzfree(derived_buf);
return ret;
}
@@ -480,12 +458,9 @@ static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
struct skcipher_request *req;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- unsigned int padlen;
- char pad[16];
int ret;
encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
- padlen = encrypted_datalen - epayload->decrypted_datalen;
req = init_skcipher_req(derived_key, derived_keylen);
ret = PTR_ERR(req);
@@ -493,11 +468,10 @@ static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
goto out;
dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
- memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
sg_init_table(sg_in, 2);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen);
- sg_set_buf(&sg_in[1], pad, padlen);
+ sg_set_page(&sg_in[1], ZERO_PAGE(0), AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
sg_set_buf(sg_out, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
@@ -533,6 +507,7 @@ static int datablob_hmac_append(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
if (!ret)
dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE);
out:
+ memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
return ret;
}
@@ -561,8 +536,8 @@ static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key, p, len);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- ret = memcmp(digest, epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len,
- sizeof digest);
+ ret = crypto_memneq(digest, epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len,
+ sizeof(digest));
if (ret) {
ret = -EINVAL;
dump_hmac("datablob",
@@ -571,6 +546,7 @@ static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
dump_hmac("calc", digest, HASH_SIZE);
}
out:
+ memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
return ret;
}
@@ -584,9 +560,14 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
struct skcipher_request *req;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- char pad[16];
+ u8 *pad;
int ret;
+ /* Throwaway buffer to hold the unused zero padding at the end */
+ pad = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pad)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
req = init_skcipher_req(derived_key, derived_keylen);
ret = PTR_ERR(req);
@@ -594,13 +575,12 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
goto out;
dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
- memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 2);
sg_set_buf(sg_in, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen);
- sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, sizeof pad);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
memcpy(iv, epayload->iv, sizeof(iv));
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, encrypted_datalen, iv);
@@ -612,6 +592,7 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
goto out;
dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
out:
+ kfree(pad);
return ret;
}
@@ -722,6 +703,7 @@ static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
out:
up_read(&mkey->sem);
key_put(mkey);
+ memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
return ret;
}
@@ -828,13 +810,13 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
ret = encrypted_init(epayload, key->description, format, master_desc,
decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0) {
- kfree(epayload);
+ kzfree(epayload);
goto out;
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, epayload);
out:
- kfree(datablob);
+ kzfree(datablob);
return ret;
}
@@ -843,8 +825,7 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
epayload = container_of(rcu, struct encrypted_key_payload, rcu);
- memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
- kfree(epayload);
+ kzfree(epayload);
}
/*
@@ -902,7 +883,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_epayload);
call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
out:
- kfree(buf);
+ kzfree(buf);
return ret;
}
@@ -960,33 +941,26 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
up_read(&mkey->sem);
key_put(mkey);
+ memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
- kfree(ascii_buf);
+ kzfree(ascii_buf);
return asciiblob_len;
out:
up_read(&mkey->sem);
key_put(mkey);
+ memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
return ret;
}
/*
- * encrypted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
- *
- * Before freeing the key, clear the memory containing the decrypted
- * key data.
+ * encrypted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
*/
static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data[0];
-
- if (!epayload)
- return;
-
- memzero_explicit(epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
- kfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+ kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
}
struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
@@ -999,47 +973,17 @@ struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_encrypted);
-static void encrypted_shash_release(void)
-{
- if (hashalg)
- crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
- if (hmacalg)
- crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
-}
-
-static int __init encrypted_shash_alloc(void)
+static int __init init_encrypted(void)
{
int ret;
- hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
- pr_info("encrypted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
- hmac_alg);
- return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
- }
-
- hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
- pr_info("encrypted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
- hash_alg);
- ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
- goto hashalg_fail;
+ hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: can't allocate %s transform: %ld\n",
+ hash_alg, PTR_ERR(hash_tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
}
- return 0;
-
-hashalg_fail:
- crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int __init init_encrypted(void)
-{
- int ret;
-
- ret = encrypted_shash_alloc();
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
ret = aes_get_sizes();
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
@@ -1048,14 +992,14 @@ static int __init init_encrypted(void)
goto out;
return 0;
out:
- encrypted_shash_release();
+ crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
return ret;
}
static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void)
{
- encrypted_shash_release();
+ crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
unregister_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
index b5b4812dbc87..cbf0bc127a73 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
- * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
*/
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 595becc6d0d2..87cb260e4890 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -158,9 +158,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
kfree(key->description);
-#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
- key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X;
-#endif
+ memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(*key));
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
}
}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index c0f8682eba69..1c02c6547038 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#define _INTERNAL_H
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/wait_bit.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/task_work.h>
@@ -197,7 +198,7 @@ struct request_key_auth {
void *callout_info;
size_t callout_len;
pid_t pid;
-};
+} __randomize_layout;
extern struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth;
extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target,
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 455c04d80bbb..83da68d98b40 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -660,14 +660,11 @@ not_found:
goto error;
found:
- /* pretend it doesn't exist if it is awaiting deletion */
- if (refcount_read(&key->usage) == 0)
- goto not_found;
-
- /* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
- * doesn't actually change the key
+ /* A key is allowed to be looked up only if someone still owns a
+ * reference to it - otherwise it's awaiting the gc.
*/
- __key_get(key);
+ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&key->usage))
+ goto not_found;
error:
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
@@ -966,12 +963,11 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
/* the key must be writable */
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
+ return ret;
/* attempt to update it if supported */
- ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!key->type->update)
- goto error;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
prep.data = payload;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 447a7d5cee0f..ab0b337c84b4 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
- if (_payload) {
+ if (plen) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
@@ -132,7 +132,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
error3:
- kvfree(payload);
+ if (payload) {
+ memzero_explicit(payload, plen);
+ kvfree(payload);
+ }
error2:
kfree(description);
error:
@@ -324,7 +327,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
- if (_payload) {
+ if (plen) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
@@ -347,7 +350,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
key_ref_put(key_ref);
error2:
- kfree(payload);
+ kzfree(payload);
error:
return ret;
}
@@ -1093,7 +1096,10 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
error2:
- kvfree(payload);
+ if (payload) {
+ memzero_explicit(payload, plen);
+ kvfree(payload);
+ }
error:
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 4d1678e4586f..de81793f9920 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ descend_to_keyring:
* Non-keyrings avoid the leftmost branch of the root entirely (root
* slots 1-15).
*/
- ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(keyring->keys.root);
+ ptr = READ_ONCE(keyring->keys.root);
if (!ptr)
goto not_this_keyring;
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ descend_to_keyring:
if ((shortcut->index_key[0] & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) != 0)
goto not_this_keyring;
- ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
+ ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
goto begin_node;
}
@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ descend_to_node:
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
smp_read_barrier_depends();
- ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
+ ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr));
}
node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ begin_node:
ascend_to_node:
/* Go through the slots in a node */
for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
- ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
+ ptr = READ_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr) && node->back_pointer)
goto descend_to_node;
@@ -790,13 +790,13 @@ ascend_to_node:
/* We've dealt with all the slots in the current node, so now we need
* to ascend to the parent and continue processing there.
*/
- ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->back_pointer);
+ ptr = READ_ONCE(node->back_pointer);
slot = node->parent_slot;
if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
smp_read_barrier_depends();
- ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer);
+ ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer);
slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
}
if (!ptr)
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 2217dfec7996..86bced9fdbdf 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -809,15 +809,14 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
- key_put(keyring);
ret = 0;
- goto error2;
+ goto error3;
}
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
if (ret < 0)
- goto error2;
+ goto error3;
commit_creds(new);
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
@@ -827,6 +826,8 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
okay:
return ret;
+error3:
+ key_put(keyring);
error2:
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
error:
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 9822e500d50d..63e63a42db3c 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
- * See Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 0f062156dfb2..afe9d22ab361 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
- * See Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 2ae31c5a87de..ddfaebf60fc8 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
- * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
*/
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen,
}
ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
- kfree(sdesc);
+ kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
if (!ret)
ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
out:
- kfree(sdesc);
+ kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
out:
- kfree(sdesc);
+ kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
- kfree(sdesc);
+ kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
- kfree(sdesc);
+ kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
*bloblen = storedsize;
}
out:
- kfree(td);
+ kzfree(td);
return ret;
}
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- kfree(tb);
+ kzfree(tb);
return ret;
}
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
/* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
- kfree(tb);
+ kzfree(tb);
return ret;
}
@@ -1037,12 +1037,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
out:
- kfree(datablob);
- kfree(options);
+ kzfree(datablob);
+ kzfree(options);
if (!ret)
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
else
- kfree(payload);
+ kzfree(payload);
return ret;
}
@@ -1051,8 +1051,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
struct trusted_key_payload *p;
p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
- memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
- kfree(p);
+ kzfree(p);
}
/*
@@ -1094,13 +1093,13 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
if (ret != Opt_update) {
ret = -EINVAL;
- kfree(new_p);
+ kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (!new_o->keyhandle) {
ret = -EINVAL;
- kfree(new_p);
+ kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
@@ -1114,22 +1113,22 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- kfree(new_p);
+ kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (new_o->pcrlock) {
ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
- kfree(new_p);
+ kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
out:
- kfree(datablob);
- kfree(new_o);
+ kzfree(datablob);
+ kzfree(new_o);
return ret;
}
@@ -1158,24 +1157,19 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
- kfree(ascii_buf);
+ kzfree(ascii_buf);
return -EFAULT;
}
- kfree(ascii_buf);
+ kzfree(ascii_buf);
return 2 * p->blob_len;
}
/*
- * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
+ * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
*/
static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0];
-
- if (!p)
- return;
- memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
- kfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+ kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
}
struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 26605134f17a..3d8c68eba516 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -86,10 +86,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse);
*/
void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- kfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
+ kzfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
+static void user_free_payload_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct user_key_payload *payload;
+
+ payload = container_of(head, struct user_key_payload, rcu);
+ kzfree(payload);
+}
+
/*
* update a user defined key
* - the key's semaphore is write-locked
@@ -112,7 +120,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
if (zap)
- kfree_rcu(zap, rcu);
+ call_rcu(&zap->rcu, user_free_payload_rcu);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_update);
@@ -130,7 +138,7 @@ void user_revoke(struct key *key)
if (upayload) {
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
- kfree_rcu(upayload, rcu);
+ call_rcu(&upayload->rcu, user_free_payload_rcu);
}
}
@@ -143,7 +151,7 @@ void user_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0];
- kfree(upayload);
+ kzfree(upayload);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3a06afbd2f6f..33fd061305c4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1134,10 +1134,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
- kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
+ if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
goto out_err;
- }
if (fscontext) {
opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
@@ -1160,6 +1158,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
return 0;
out_err:
+ security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
kfree(context);
kfree(defcontext);
kfree(fscontext);
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 5aeaf30b7a13..7b7433a1a34c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
{ RTM_GETNSID, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ RTM_NEWSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ RTM_GETSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
};
static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
switch (sclass) {
case SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET:
/* RTM_MAX always point to RTM_SETxxxx, ie RTM_NEWxxx + 3 */
- BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWSTATS + 3));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT + 3));
err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_route_perms,
sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms));
break;
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 9010a3632d6f..00eed842c491 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -649,14 +649,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
if (*ppos != 0)
goto out;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- req = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req)
- goto out;
-
- rc = -EFAULT;
- if (copy_from_user(req, buf, count))
+ req = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(req)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(req);
+ req = NULL;
goto out;
+ }
rc = -ENOMEM;
oldcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
index 90c605eea892..96b27405558a 100644
--- a/security/yama/Kconfig
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ config SECURITY_YAMA
system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
access controls. Currently available is ptrace scope restriction.
Like capabilities, this security module stacks with other LSMs.
- Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt.
+ Further information can be found in
+ Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.