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authorRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>2012-01-13 03:02:20 +0400
committerRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>2012-01-13 03:02:20 +0400
commit90ab5ee94171b3e28de6bb42ee30b527014e0be7 (patch)
treefcf89889f6e881f2b231d3d20287c08174ce4b54 /security
parent476bc0015bf09dad39d36a8b19f76f0c181d1ec9 (diff)
downloadlinux-90ab5ee94171b3e28de6bb42ee30b527014e0be7.tar.xz
module_param: make bool parameters really bool (drivers & misc)
module_param(bool) used to counter-intuitively take an int. In fddd5201 (mid-2009) we allowed bool or int/unsigned int using a messy trick. It's time to remove the int/unsigned int option. For this version it'll simply give a warning, but it'll break next kernel version. Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h10
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c12
2 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 38ccaea08204..df3649560818 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@
/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
-extern int aa_g_audit_header;
-extern int aa_g_debug;
-extern int aa_g_lock_policy;
-extern int aa_g_logsyscall;
-extern int aa_g_paranoid_load;
+extern bool aa_g_audit_header;
+extern bool aa_g_debug;
+extern bool aa_g_lock_policy;
+extern bool aa_g_logsyscall;
+extern bool aa_g_paranoid_load;
extern unsigned int aa_g_path_max;
/*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index d7f06f8b2837..68d50c54e431 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
&aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Debug mode */
-int aa_g_debug;
+bool aa_g_debug;
module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Audit mode */
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
* provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
*/
-int aa_g_audit_header = 1;
+bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
@@ -727,12 +727,12 @@ module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
* TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
* load policy, if lock_policy is set
*/
-int aa_g_lock_policy;
+bool aa_g_lock_policy;
module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Syscall logging mode */
-int aa_g_logsyscall;
+bool aa_g_logsyscall;
module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
@@ -742,12 +742,12 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
* on the loaded policy is done.
*/
-int aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
+bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Boot time disable flag */
-static unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR);
static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)