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author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2018-12-18 20:18:34 +0300 |
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committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-01-13 12:05:29 +0300 |
commit | 8286dcc1d7aa46543ea3d11ce84c24965576193b (patch) | |
tree | 6aac8d3e71638509090b4fc05086d4861adb9397 /sound/pci/emu10k1 | |
parent | f8de5a38cc3bb75db98669ffbc243175f32946a3 (diff) | |
download | linux-8286dcc1d7aa46543ea3d11ce84c24965576193b.tar.xz |
ALSA: rme9652: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
commit 0b84304ef5da92add8dc75a1b07879c5374cdb05 upstream.
info->channel is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4100 snd_hdsp_channel_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'hdsp->channel_map' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing info->channel before using it to index hdsp->channel_map
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Also, notice that I refactored the code a bit in order to get rid of the
following checkpatch warning:
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
FILE: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4103:
if ((mapped_channel = hdsp->channel_map[info->channel]) < 0)
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'sound/pci/emu10k1')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions