summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/sound/pci/emu10k1
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>2018-12-18 20:18:34 +0300
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2019-01-13 12:05:29 +0300
commit8286dcc1d7aa46543ea3d11ce84c24965576193b (patch)
tree6aac8d3e71638509090b4fc05086d4861adb9397 /sound/pci/emu10k1
parentf8de5a38cc3bb75db98669ffbc243175f32946a3 (diff)
downloadlinux-8286dcc1d7aa46543ea3d11ce84c24965576193b.tar.xz
ALSA: rme9652: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
commit 0b84304ef5da92add8dc75a1b07879c5374cdb05 upstream. info->channel is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4100 snd_hdsp_channel_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'hdsp->channel_map' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing info->channel before using it to index hdsp->channel_map Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. Also, notice that I refactored the code a bit in order to get rid of the following checkpatch warning: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition FILE: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4103: if ((mapped_channel = hdsp->channel_map[info->channel]) < 0) [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'sound/pci/emu10k1')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions