Merge tag 'net-6.7-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski:
 "Including fixes from bpf.

  Current release - regressions:

   - Revert "net: r8169: Disable multicast filter for RTL8168H and
     RTL8107E"

   - kselftest: rtnetlink: fix ip route command typo

  Current release - new code bugs:

   - s390/ism: make sure ism driver implies smc protocol in kconfig

   - two build fixes for tools/net

  Previous releases - regressions:

   - rxrpc: couple of ACK/PING/RTT handling fixes

  Previous releases - always broken:

   - bpf: verify bpf_loop() callbacks as if they are called unknown
     number of times

   - improve stability of auto-bonding with Hyper-V

   - account BPF-neigh-redirected traffic in interface statistics

  Misc:

   - net: fill in some more MODULE_DESCRIPTION()s"

* tag 'net-6.7-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (58 commits)
  tools: ynl: fix duplicate op name in devlink
  tools: ynl: fix header path for nfsd
  net: ipa: fix one GSI register field width
  tls: fix NULL deref on tls_sw_splice_eof() with empty record
  net: axienet: Fix check for partial TX checksum
  vsock/test: fix SEQPACKET message bounds test
  i40e: Fix adding unsupported cloud filters
  ice: restore timestamp configuration after device reset
  ice: unify logic for programming PFINT_TSYN_MSK
  ice: remove ptp_tx ring parameter flag
  amd-xgbe: propagate the correct speed and duplex status
  amd-xgbe: handle the corner-case during tx completion
  amd-xgbe: handle corner-case during sfp hotplug
  net: veth: fix ethtool stats reporting
  octeontx2-pf: Fix ntuple rule creation to direct packet to VF with higher Rx queue than its PF
  net: usb: qmi_wwan: claim interface 4 for ZTE MF290
  Revert "net: r8169: Disable multicast filter for RTL8168H and RTL8107E"
  net/smc: avoid data corruption caused by decline
  nfc: virtual_ncidev: Add variable to check if ndev is running
  dpll: Fix potential msg memleak when genlmsg_put_reply failed
  ...

1 files changed, 242 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5905e036e0ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+struct {
+	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+	__uint(max_entries, 8);
+	__type(key, __u32);
+	__type(value, __u64);
+} map SEC(".maps");
+
+struct {
+	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF);
+	__uint(max_entries, 8);
+} ringbuf SEC(".maps");
+
+struct vm_area_struct;
+struct bpf_map;
+
+struct buf_context {
+	char *buf;
+};
+
+struct num_context {
+	__u64 i;
+	__u64 j;
+};
+
+__u8 choice_arr[2] = { 0, 1 };
+
+static int unsafe_on_2nd_iter_cb(__u32 idx, struct buf_context *ctx)
+{
+	if (idx == 0) {
+		ctx->buf = (char *)(0xDEAD);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (bpf_probe_read_user(ctx->buf, 8, (void *)(0xBADC0FFEE)))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__failure __msg("R1 type=scalar expected=fp")
+int unsafe_on_2nd_iter(void *unused)
+{
+	char buf[4];
+	struct buf_context loop_ctx = { .buf = buf };
+
+	bpf_loop(100, unsafe_on_2nd_iter_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->i = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=32 size=1")
+int unsafe_on_zero_iter(void *unused)
+{
+	struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 32 };
+
+	bpf_loop(100, unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
+	return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i];
+}
+
+static int widening_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
+{
+	++ctx->i;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__success
+int widening(void *unused)
+{
+	struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 0, .j = 1 };
+
+	bpf_loop(100, widening_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
+	/* loop_ctx.j is not changed during callback iteration,
+	 * verifier should not apply widening to it.
+	 */
+	return choice_arr[loop_ctx.j];
+}
+
+static int loop_detection_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
+{
+	for (;;) {}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__failure __msg("infinite loop detected")
+int loop_detection(void *unused)
+{
+	struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 0 };
+
+	bpf_loop(100, loop_detection_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __always_inline __u64 oob_state_machine(struct num_context *ctx)
+{
+	switch (ctx->i) {
+	case 0:
+		ctx->i = 1;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		ctx->i = 32;
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __u64 for_each_map_elem_cb(struct bpf_map *map, __u32 *key, __u64 *val, void *data)
+{
+	return oob_state_machine(data);
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=32 size=1")
+int unsafe_for_each_map_elem(void *unused)
+{
+	struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 0 };
+
+	bpf_for_each_map_elem(&map, for_each_map_elem_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
+	return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i];
+}
+
+static __u64 ringbuf_drain_cb(struct bpf_dynptr *dynptr, void *data)
+{
+	return oob_state_machine(data);
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=32 size=1")
+int unsafe_ringbuf_drain(void *unused)
+{
+	struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 0 };
+
+	bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(&ringbuf, ringbuf_drain_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
+	return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i];
+}
+
+static __u64 find_vma_cb(struct task_struct *task, struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *data)
+{
+	return oob_state_machine(data);
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=32 size=1")
+int unsafe_find_vma(void *unused)
+{
+	struct task_struct *task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
+	struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 0 };
+
+	bpf_find_vma(task, 0, find_vma_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
+	return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i];
+}
+
+static int iter_limit_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->i++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__success
+int bpf_loop_iter_limit_ok(void *unused)
+{
+	struct num_context ctx = { .i = 0 };
+
+	bpf_loop(1, iter_limit_cb, &ctx, 0);
+	return choice_arr[ctx.i];
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=2 size=1")
+int bpf_loop_iter_limit_overflow(void *unused)
+{
+	struct num_context ctx = { .i = 0 };
+
+	bpf_loop(2, iter_limit_cb, &ctx, 0);
+	return choice_arr[ctx.i];
+}
+
+static int iter_limit_level2a_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->i += 100;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int iter_limit_level2b_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->i += 10;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int iter_limit_level1_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->i += 1;
+	bpf_loop(1, iter_limit_level2a_cb, ctx, 0);
+	bpf_loop(1, iter_limit_level2b_cb, ctx, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check that path visiting every callback function once had been
+ * reached by verifier. Variables 'ctx{1,2}i' below serve as flags,
+ * with each decimal digit corresponding to a callback visit marker.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__success __retval(111111)
+int bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested(void *unused)
+{
+	struct num_context ctx1 = { .i = 0 };
+	struct num_context ctx2 = { .i = 0 };
+	__u64 a, b, c;
+
+	bpf_loop(1, iter_limit_level1_cb, &ctx1, 0);
+	bpf_loop(1, iter_limit_level1_cb, &ctx2, 0);
+	a = ctx1.i;
+	b = ctx2.i;
+	/* Force 'ctx1.i' and 'ctx2.i' precise. */
+	c = choice_arr[(a + b) % 2];
+	/* This makes 'c' zero, but neither clang nor verifier know it. */
+	c /= 10;
+	/* Make sure that verifier does not visit 'impossible' states:
+	 * enumerate all possible callback visit masks.
+	 */
+	if (a != 0 && a != 1 && a != 11 && a != 101 && a != 111 &&
+	    b != 0 && b != 1 && b != 11 && b != 101 && b != 111)
+		asm volatile ("r0 /= 0;" ::: "r0");
+	return 1000 * a + b + c;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";