diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/bluetooth/hci.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c | 11 |
2 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h index b8318711135a..7a24acaafeea 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ enum { /* HCI socket flags */ enum { + HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED, HCI_MGMT_INDEX_EVENTS, HCI_MGMT_UNCONF_INDEX_EVENTS, HCI_MGMT_EXT_INDEX_EVENTS, diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c index 00775c4fef83..54118868b3f6 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c @@ -796,6 +796,11 @@ static int hci_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, goto done; } + /* The monitor interface is restricted to CAP_NET_RAW + * capabilities and with that implicitly trusted. + */ + hci_sock_set_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED); + send_monitor_replay(sk); atomic_inc(&monitor_promisc); @@ -817,6 +822,12 @@ static int hci_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, goto done; } + /* Since the access to control channels is currently + * restricted to CAP_NET_ADMIN capabilities, every + * socket is implicitly trusted. + */ + hci_sock_set_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED); + /* At the moment the index and unconfigured index events * are enabled unconditionally. Setting them on each * socket when binding keeps this functionality. They |