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-rw-r--r--arch/arm/lib/uaccess_with_memcpy.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c32
-rw-r--r--drivers/gpu/host1x/dev.c5
-rw-r--r--drivers/vfio/pci/mlx5/main.c14
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keyring.c23
-rw-r--r--fs/lockd/clnt4xdr.c9
-rw-r--r--fs/lockd/xdr4.c13
-rw-r--r--fs/nfs/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--fs/nfs/dir.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/nfs/read.c3
-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/vfs.c9
-rw-r--r--fs/super.c15
-rw-r--r--fs/verity/enable.c25
-rw-r--r--fs/verity/verify.c12
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lockd/xdr4.h1
-rw-r--r--init/main.c10
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c9
-rwxr-xr-xtools/bootconfig/test-bootconfig.sh12
20 files changed, 124 insertions, 88 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/lib/uaccess_with_memcpy.c b/arch/arm/lib/uaccess_with_memcpy.c
index 14eecaaf295f..e4c2677cc1e9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/lib/uaccess_with_memcpy.c
+++ b/arch/arm/lib/uaccess_with_memcpy.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ __copy_to_user_memcpy(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
tocopy = n;
ua_flags = uaccess_save_and_enable();
- memcpy((void *)to, from, tocopy);
+ __memcpy((void *)to, from, tocopy);
uaccess_restore(ua_flags);
to += tocopy;
from += tocopy;
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ __clear_user_memset(void __user *addr, unsigned long n)
tocopy = n;
ua_flags = uaccess_save_and_enable();
- memset((void *)addr, 0, tocopy);
+ __memset((void *)addr, 0, tocopy);
uaccess_restore(ua_flags);
addr += tocopy;
n -= tocopy;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 4fa769c4bcdb..f0d4ff3c20a8 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -79,16 +79,16 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
}
if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
- pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
- sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
+ sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
ret = -EBADMSG;
goto error;
}
if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
- pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
- sinfo->index);
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
+ sinfo->index);
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
goto error;
}
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
if (pkcs7->data) {
- pr_debug("Data already supplied\n");
+ pr_warn("Data already supplied\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pkcs7->data = data;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index 7553ab18db89..22beaf2213a2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
break;
default:
- pr_debug("Unknown PEOPT magic = %04hx\n", pe32->magic);
+ pr_warn("Unknown PEOPT magic = %04hx\n", pe32->magic);
return -ELIBBAD;
}
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size;
if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) {
- pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n");
+ pr_warn("Unsigned PE binary\n");
return -ENODATA;
}
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf,
unsigned len;
if (ctx->sig_len < sizeof(wrapper)) {
- pr_debug("Signature wrapper too short\n");
+ pr_warn("Signature wrapper too short\n");
return -ELIBBAD;
}
@@ -135,19 +135,23 @@ static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf,
pr_debug("sig wrapper = { %x, %x, %x }\n",
wrapper.length, wrapper.revision, wrapper.cert_type);
- /* Both pesign and sbsign round up the length of certificate table
- * (in optional header data directories) to 8 byte alignment.
+ /* sbsign rounds up the length of certificate table (in optional
+ * header data directories) to 8 byte alignment. However, the PE
+ * specification states that while entries are 8-byte aligned, this is
+ * not included in their length, and as a result, pesign has not
+ * rounded up since 0.110.
*/
- if (round_up(wrapper.length, 8) != ctx->sig_len) {
- pr_debug("Signature wrapper len wrong\n");
+ if (wrapper.length > ctx->sig_len) {
+ pr_warn("Signature wrapper bigger than sig len (%x > %x)\n",
+ ctx->sig_len, wrapper.length);
return -ELIBBAD;
}
if (wrapper.revision != WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0) {
- pr_debug("Signature is not revision 2.0\n");
+ pr_warn("Signature is not revision 2.0\n");
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
if (wrapper.cert_type != WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
- pr_debug("Signature certificate type is not PKCS\n");
+ pr_warn("Signature certificate type is not PKCS\n");
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
@@ -160,7 +164,7 @@ static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf,
ctx->sig_offset += sizeof(wrapper);
ctx->sig_len -= sizeof(wrapper);
if (ctx->sig_len < 4) {
- pr_debug("Signature data missing\n");
+ pr_warn("Signature data missing\n");
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
@@ -194,7 +198,7 @@ check_len:
return 0;
}
not_pkcs7:
- pr_debug("Signature data not PKCS#7\n");
+ pr_warn("Signature data not PKCS#7\n");
return -ELIBBAD;
}
@@ -337,8 +341,8 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
if (digest_size != ctx->digest_len) {
- pr_debug("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n",
- digest_size, ctx->digest_len);
+ pr_warn("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n",
+ digest_size, ctx->digest_len);
ret = -EBADMSG;
goto error_no_desc;
}
@@ -369,7 +373,7 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
* PKCS#7 certificate.
*/
if (memcmp(digest, ctx->digest, ctx->digest_len) != 0) {
- pr_debug("Digest mismatch\n");
+ pr_warn("Digest mismatch\n");
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
} else {
pr_debug("The digests match!\n");
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/host1x/dev.c b/drivers/gpu/host1x/dev.c
index 4872d183d860..aae2efeef503 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/host1x/dev.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/host1x/dev.c
@@ -487,7 +487,6 @@ static int host1x_get_resets(struct host1x *host)
static int host1x_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct host1x *host;
- int syncpt_irq;
int err;
host = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*host), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -517,8 +516,8 @@ static int host1x_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
}
host->syncpt_irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
- if (syncpt_irq < 0)
- return syncpt_irq;
+ if (host->syncpt_irq < 0)
+ return host->syncpt_irq;
mutex_init(&host->devices_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&host->devices);
diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/mlx5/main.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/mlx5/main.c
index e897537a9e8a..d95fd382814c 100644
--- a/drivers/vfio/pci/mlx5/main.c
+++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/mlx5/main.c
@@ -442,16 +442,10 @@ static long mlx5vf_precopy_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
if (migf->pre_copy_initial_bytes > *pos) {
info.initial_bytes = migf->pre_copy_initial_bytes - *pos;
} else {
- buf = mlx5vf_get_data_buff_from_pos(migf, *pos, &end_of_data);
- if (buf) {
- info.dirty_bytes = buf->start_pos + buf->length - *pos;
- } else {
- if (!end_of_data) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto err_migf_unlock;
- }
- info.dirty_bytes = inc_length;
- }
+ info.dirty_bytes = migf->max_pos - *pos;
+ if (!info.dirty_bytes)
+ end_of_data = true;
+ info.dirty_bytes += inc_length;
}
if (!end_of_data || !inc_length) {
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
index 78086f8dbda5..13d336a6cc5d 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ void fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(struct super_block *sb,
* destroying any subkeys embedded in it.
*/
+ if (WARN_ON(!sb->s_master_keys))
+ return;
spin_lock(&sb->s_master_keys->lock);
hlist_del_rcu(&mk->mk_node);
spin_unlock(&sb->s_master_keys->lock);
@@ -207,10 +209,11 @@ static int allocate_filesystem_keyring(struct super_block *sb)
* Release all encryption keys that have been added to the filesystem, along
* with the keyring that contains them.
*
- * This is called at unmount time. The filesystem's underlying block device(s)
- * are still available at this time; this is important because after user file
- * accesses have been allowed, this function may need to evict keys from the
- * keyslots of an inline crypto engine, which requires the block device(s).
+ * This is called at unmount time, after all potentially-encrypted inodes have
+ * been evicted. The filesystem's underlying block device(s) are still
+ * available at this time; this is important because after user file accesses
+ * have been allowed, this function may need to evict keys from the keyslots of
+ * an inline crypto engine, which requires the block device(s).
*/
void fscrypt_destroy_keyring(struct super_block *sb)
{
@@ -227,12 +230,12 @@ void fscrypt_destroy_keyring(struct super_block *sb)
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(mk, tmp, bucket, mk_node) {
/*
- * Since all inodes were already evicted, every key
- * remaining in the keyring should have an empty inode
- * list, and should only still be in the keyring due to
- * the single active ref associated with ->mk_secret.
- * There should be no structural refs beyond the one
- * associated with the active ref.
+ * Since all potentially-encrypted inodes were already
+ * evicted, every key remaining in the keyring should
+ * have an empty inode list, and should only still be in
+ * the keyring due to the single active ref associated
+ * with ->mk_secret. There should be no structural refs
+ * beyond the one associated with the active ref.
*/
WARN_ON(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 1);
WARN_ON(refcount_read(&mk->mk_struct_refs) != 1);
diff --git a/fs/lockd/clnt4xdr.c b/fs/lockd/clnt4xdr.c
index 7df6324ccb8a..8161667c976f 100644
--- a/fs/lockd/clnt4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/lockd/clnt4xdr.c
@@ -261,7 +261,6 @@ static int decode_nlm4_holder(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nlm_res *result)
u32 exclusive;
int error;
__be32 *p;
- s32 end;
memset(lock, 0, sizeof(*lock));
locks_init_lock(fl);
@@ -285,13 +284,7 @@ static int decode_nlm4_holder(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nlm_res *result)
fl->fl_type = exclusive != 0 ? F_WRLCK : F_RDLCK;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &l_offset);
xdr_decode_hyper(p, &l_len);
- end = l_offset + l_len - 1;
-
- fl->fl_start = (loff_t)l_offset;
- if (l_len == 0 || end < 0)
- fl->fl_end = OFFSET_MAX;
- else
- fl->fl_end = (loff_t)end;
+ nlm4svc_set_file_lock_range(fl, l_offset, l_len);
error = 0;
out:
return error;
diff --git a/fs/lockd/xdr4.c b/fs/lockd/xdr4.c
index 712fdfeb8ef0..5fcbf30cd275 100644
--- a/fs/lockd/xdr4.c
+++ b/fs/lockd/xdr4.c
@@ -33,6 +33,17 @@ loff_t_to_s64(loff_t offset)
return res;
}
+void nlm4svc_set_file_lock_range(struct file_lock *fl, u64 off, u64 len)
+{
+ s64 end = off + len - 1;
+
+ fl->fl_start = off;
+ if (len == 0 || end < 0)
+ fl->fl_end = OFFSET_MAX;
+ else
+ fl->fl_end = end;
+}
+
/*
* NLM file handles are defined by specification to be a variable-length
* XDR opaque no longer than 1024 bytes. However, this implementation
@@ -80,7 +91,7 @@ svcxdr_decode_lock(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nlm_lock *lock)
locks_init_lock(fl);
fl->fl_flags = FL_POSIX;
fl->fl_type = F_RDLCK;
-
+ nlm4svc_set_file_lock_range(fl, lock->lock_start, lock->lock_len);
return true;
}
diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
index 14a72224b657..450d6c3bc05e 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ config NFS_V3_ACL
config NFS_V4
tristate "NFS client support for NFS version 4"
depends on NFS_FS
- select SUNRPC_GSS
+ select RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5
select KEYS
help
This option enables support for version 4 of the NFS protocol
diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c
index a41c3ee4549c..6fbcbb8d6587 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
@@ -3089,7 +3089,6 @@ static void nfs_access_add_rbtree(struct inode *inode,
else
goto found;
}
- set->timestamp = ktime_get_ns();
rb_link_node(&set->rb_node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&set->rb_node, root_node);
list_add_tail(&set->lru, &nfsi->access_cache_entry_lru);
@@ -3114,6 +3113,7 @@ void nfs_access_add_cache(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_access_entry *set,
cache->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
cache->group_info = get_group_info(cred->group_info);
cache->mask = set->mask;
+ cache->timestamp = ktime_get_ns();
/* The above field assignments must be visible
* before this item appears on the lru. We cannot easily
diff --git a/fs/nfs/read.c b/fs/nfs/read.c
index c380cff4108e..e90988591df4 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/read.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/read.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
#include <linux/nfs_fs.h>
@@ -337,6 +338,7 @@ int nfs_read_folio(struct file *file, struct folio *folio)
trace_nfs_aop_readpage(inode, folio);
nfs_inc_stats(inode, NFSIOS_VFSREADPAGE);
+ task_io_account_read(folio_size(folio));
/*
* Try to flush any pending writes to the file..
@@ -393,6 +395,7 @@ void nfs_readahead(struct readahead_control *ractl)
trace_nfs_aop_readahead(inode, readahead_pos(ractl), nr_pages);
nfs_inc_stats(inode, NFSIOS_VFSREADPAGES);
+ task_io_account_read(readahead_length(ractl));
ret = -ESTALE;
if (NFS_STALE(inode))
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/Kconfig b/fs/nfsd/Kconfig
index 7c441f2bd444..43b88eaf0673 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/nfsd/Kconfig
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ config NFSD_V4
bool "NFS server support for NFS version 4"
depends on NFSD && PROC_FS
select FS_POSIX_ACL
- select SUNRPC_GSS
+ select RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_MD5
select CRYPTO_SHA256
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 502e1b7742db..5783209f17fc 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -941,8 +941,15 @@ nfsd_splice_actor(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf,
struct page *last_page;
last_page = page + (offset + sd->len - 1) / PAGE_SIZE;
- for (page += offset / PAGE_SIZE; page <= last_page; page++)
+ for (page += offset / PAGE_SIZE; page <= last_page; page++) {
+ /*
+ * Skip page replacement when extending the contents
+ * of the current page.
+ */
+ if (page == *(rqstp->rq_next_page - 1))
+ continue;
svc_rqst_replace_page(rqstp, page);
+ }
if (rqstp->rq_res.page_len == 0) // first call
rqstp->rq_res.page_base = offset % PAGE_SIZE;
rqstp->rq_res.page_len += sd->len;
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index 84332d5cb817..04bc62ab7dfe 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -475,13 +475,22 @@ void generic_shutdown_super(struct super_block *sb)
cgroup_writeback_umount();
- /* evict all inodes with zero refcount */
+ /* Evict all inodes with zero refcount. */
evict_inodes(sb);
- /* only nonzero refcount inodes can have marks */
+
+ /*
+ * Clean up and evict any inodes that still have references due
+ * to fsnotify or the security policy.
+ */
fsnotify_sb_delete(sb);
- fscrypt_destroy_keyring(sb);
security_sb_delete(sb);
+ /*
+ * Now that all potentially-encrypted inodes have been evicted,
+ * the fscrypt keyring can be destroyed.
+ */
+ fscrypt_destroy_keyring(sb);
+
if (sb->s_dio_done_wq) {
destroy_workqueue(sb->s_dio_done_wq);
sb->s_dio_done_wq = NULL;
diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c
index e13db6507b38..7a0e3a84d370 100644
--- a/fs/verity/enable.c
+++ b/fs/verity/enable.c
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -367,25 +366,27 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
goto out_drop_write;
err = enable_verity(filp, &arg);
- if (err)
- goto out_allow_write_access;
/*
- * Some pages of the file may have been evicted from pagecache after
- * being used in the Merkle tree construction, then read into pagecache
- * again by another process reading from the file concurrently. Since
- * these pages didn't undergo verification against the file digest which
- * fs-verity now claims to be enforcing, we have to wipe the pagecache
- * to ensure that all future reads are verified.
+ * We no longer drop the inode's pagecache after enabling verity. This
+ * used to be done to try to avoid a race condition where pages could be
+ * evicted after being used in the Merkle tree construction, then
+ * re-instantiated by a concurrent read. Such pages are unverified, and
+ * the backing storage could have filled them with different content, so
+ * they shouldn't be used to fulfill reads once verity is enabled.
+ *
+ * But, dropping the pagecache has a big performance impact, and it
+ * doesn't fully solve the race condition anyway. So for those reasons,
+ * and also because this race condition isn't very important relatively
+ * speaking (especially for small-ish files, where the chance of a page
+ * being used, evicted, *and* re-instantiated all while enabling verity
+ * is quite small), we no longer drop the inode's pagecache.
*/
- filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
- invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping);
/*
* allow_write_access() is needed to pair with deny_write_access().
* Regardless, the filesystem won't allow writing to verity files.
*/
-out_allow_write_access:
allow_write_access(filp);
out_drop_write:
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
diff --git a/fs/verity/verify.c b/fs/verity/verify.c
index f50e3b5b52c9..e2508222750b 100644
--- a/fs/verity/verify.c
+++ b/fs/verity/verify.c
@@ -387,15 +387,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_enqueue_verify_work);
int __init fsverity_init_workqueue(void)
{
/*
- * Use an unbound workqueue to allow bios to be verified in parallel
- * even when they happen to complete on the same CPU. This sacrifices
- * locality, but it's worthwhile since hashing is CPU-intensive.
+ * Use a high-priority workqueue to prioritize verification work, which
+ * blocks reads from completing, over regular application tasks.
*
- * Also use a high-priority workqueue to prioritize verification work,
- * which blocks reads from completing, over regular application tasks.
+ * For performance reasons, don't use an unbound workqueue. Using an
+ * unbound workqueue for crypto operations causes excessive scheduler
+ * latency on ARM64.
*/
fsverity_read_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("fsverity_read_queue",
- WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_HIGHPRI,
+ WQ_HIGHPRI,
num_online_cpus());
if (!fsverity_read_workqueue)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/include/linux/lockd/xdr4.h b/include/linux/lockd/xdr4.h
index 9a6b55da8fd6..72831e35dca3 100644
--- a/include/linux/lockd/xdr4.h
+++ b/include/linux/lockd/xdr4.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#define nlm4_fbig cpu_to_be32(NLM_FBIG)
#define nlm4_failed cpu_to_be32(NLM_FAILED)
+void nlm4svc_set_file_lock_range(struct file_lock *fl, u64 off, u64 len);
bool nlm4svc_decode_void(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr);
bool nlm4svc_decode_testargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr);
bool nlm4svc_decode_lockargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr);
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 4425d1783d5c..bb87b789c543 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static char *extra_init_args;
#ifdef CONFIG_BOOT_CONFIG
/* Is bootconfig on command line? */
-static bool bootconfig_found = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BOOT_CONFIG_FORCE);
+static bool bootconfig_found;
static size_t initargs_offs;
#else
# define bootconfig_found false
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static void __init setup_boot_config(void)
err = parse_args("bootconfig", tmp_cmdline, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL,
bootconfig_params);
- if (IS_ERR(err) || !bootconfig_found)
+ if (IS_ERR(err) || !(bootconfig_found || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BOOT_CONFIG_FORCE)))
return;
/* parse_args() stops at the next param of '--' and returns an address */
@@ -437,7 +437,11 @@ static void __init setup_boot_config(void)
initargs_offs = err - tmp_cmdline;
if (!data) {
- pr_err("'bootconfig' found on command line, but no bootconfig found\n");
+ /* If user intended to use bootconfig, show an error level message */
+ if (bootconfig_found)
+ pr_err("'bootconfig' found on command line, but no bootconfig found\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("No bootconfig data provided, so skipping bootconfig");
return;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 2da4404276f0..07a0ef2baacd 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -38,9 +38,12 @@ static void cache_requested_key(struct key *key)
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
struct task_struct *t = current;
- key_put(t->cached_requested_key);
- t->cached_requested_key = key_get(key);
- set_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+ /* Do not cache key if it is a kernel thread */
+ if (!(t->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+ key_put(t->cached_requested_key);
+ t->cached_requested_key = key_get(key);
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+ }
#endif
}
diff --git a/tools/bootconfig/test-bootconfig.sh b/tools/bootconfig/test-bootconfig.sh
index f68e2e9eef8b..a2c484c243f5 100755
--- a/tools/bootconfig/test-bootconfig.sh
+++ b/tools/bootconfig/test-bootconfig.sh
@@ -87,10 +87,14 @@ xfail grep -i "error" $OUTFILE
echo "Max node number check"
-echo -n > $TEMPCONF
-for i in `seq 1 1024` ; do
- echo "node$i" >> $TEMPCONF
-done
+awk '
+BEGIN {
+ for (i = 0; i < 26; i += 1)
+ printf("%c\n", 65 + i % 26)
+ for (i = 26; i < 8192; i += 1)
+ printf("%c%c%c\n", 65 + i % 26, 65 + (i / 26) % 26, 65 + (i / 26 / 26))
+}
+' > $TEMPCONF
xpass $BOOTCONF -a $TEMPCONF $INITRD
echo "badnode" >> $TEMPCONF
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-10-11 07:52:27 +0300