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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/Kconfig')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig23
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7101ac64bb20..f6946b81f74a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ config X86
select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP if X86_64
select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
select ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE if X86_64
- select ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_MCSAFE if X86_64 && X86_MCE
+ select ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC if X86_64
select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
@@ -215,6 +215,8 @@ config X86
select HAVE_FUNCTION_ARG_ACCESS_API
select HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR if CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR
select HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION if X86_64
+ select HAVE_STATIC_CALL
+ select HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE if HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION
select HAVE_RSEQ
select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
@@ -230,6 +232,7 @@ config X86
select RTC_MC146818_LIB
select SPARSE_IRQ
select SRCU
+ select STACK_VALIDATION if HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION && (HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE || RETPOLINE)
select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE
select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
select USER_STACKTRACE_SUPPORT
@@ -451,7 +454,6 @@ config GOLDFISH
config RETPOLINE
bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
default y
- select STACK_VALIDATION if HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION
help
Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against
kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect
@@ -1521,6 +1523,7 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
+ select INSTRUCTION_DECODER
help
Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
@@ -1968,22 +1971,6 @@ config EFI_MIXED
If unsure, say N.
-config SECCOMP
- def_bool y
- prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
- help
- This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
- that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
- execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
- the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
- syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
- their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
- enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
- and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
- defined by each seccomp mode.
-
- If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
-
source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
config KEXEC