diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r-- | net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/batman-adv/main.c | 56 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/batman-adv/network-coding.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/core/dev.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/core/net-sysfs.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/core/skbuff.c | 36 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/core/sock_destructor.h | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c | 48 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/mesh.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/Kconfig | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 139 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/tipc/crypto.c | 32 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/wireless/scan.c | 7 |
18 files changed, 232 insertions, 158 deletions
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c index 1669744304c5..17687848daec 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c @@ -1560,10 +1560,14 @@ int batadv_bla_init(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv) return 0; bat_priv->bla.claim_hash = batadv_hash_new(128); - bat_priv->bla.backbone_hash = batadv_hash_new(32); + if (!bat_priv->bla.claim_hash) + return -ENOMEM; - if (!bat_priv->bla.claim_hash || !bat_priv->bla.backbone_hash) + bat_priv->bla.backbone_hash = batadv_hash_new(32); + if (!bat_priv->bla.backbone_hash) { + batadv_hash_destroy(bat_priv->bla.claim_hash); return -ENOMEM; + } batadv_hash_set_lock_class(bat_priv->bla.claim_hash, &batadv_claim_hash_lock_class_key); diff --git a/net/batman-adv/main.c b/net/batman-adv/main.c index 3ddd66e4c29e..5207cd8d6ad8 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/main.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/main.c @@ -190,29 +190,41 @@ int batadv_mesh_init(struct net_device *soft_iface) bat_priv->gw.generation = 0; - ret = batadv_v_mesh_init(bat_priv); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; - ret = batadv_originator_init(bat_priv); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; + if (ret < 0) { + atomic_set(&bat_priv->mesh_state, BATADV_MESH_DEACTIVATING); + goto err_orig; + } ret = batadv_tt_init(bat_priv); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; + if (ret < 0) { + atomic_set(&bat_priv->mesh_state, BATADV_MESH_DEACTIVATING); + goto err_tt; + } + + ret = batadv_v_mesh_init(bat_priv); + if (ret < 0) { + atomic_set(&bat_priv->mesh_state, BATADV_MESH_DEACTIVATING); + goto err_v; + } ret = batadv_bla_init(bat_priv); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; + if (ret < 0) { + atomic_set(&bat_priv->mesh_state, BATADV_MESH_DEACTIVATING); + goto err_bla; + } ret = batadv_dat_init(bat_priv); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; + if (ret < 0) { + atomic_set(&bat_priv->mesh_state, BATADV_MESH_DEACTIVATING); + goto err_dat; + } ret = batadv_nc_mesh_init(bat_priv); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; + if (ret < 0) { + atomic_set(&bat_priv->mesh_state, BATADV_MESH_DEACTIVATING); + goto err_nc; + } batadv_gw_init(bat_priv); batadv_mcast_init(bat_priv); @@ -222,8 +234,20 @@ int batadv_mesh_init(struct net_device *soft_iface) return 0; -err: - batadv_mesh_free(soft_iface); +err_nc: + batadv_dat_free(bat_priv); +err_dat: + batadv_bla_free(bat_priv); +err_bla: + batadv_v_mesh_free(bat_priv); +err_v: + batadv_tt_free(bat_priv); +err_tt: + batadv_originator_free(bat_priv); +err_orig: + batadv_purge_outstanding_packets(bat_priv, NULL); + atomic_set(&bat_priv->mesh_state, BATADV_MESH_INACTIVE); + return ret; } diff --git a/net/batman-adv/network-coding.c b/net/batman-adv/network-coding.c index 9f06132e007d..0a7f1d36a6a8 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/network-coding.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/network-coding.c @@ -152,8 +152,10 @@ int batadv_nc_mesh_init(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv) &batadv_nc_coding_hash_lock_class_key); bat_priv->nc.decoding_hash = batadv_hash_new(128); - if (!bat_priv->nc.decoding_hash) + if (!bat_priv->nc.decoding_hash) { + batadv_hash_destroy(bat_priv->nc.coding_hash); goto err; + } batadv_hash_set_lock_class(bat_priv->nc.decoding_hash, &batadv_nc_decoding_hash_lock_class_key); diff --git a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c index e0b3dace2020..4b7ad6684bc4 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c @@ -4162,8 +4162,10 @@ int batadv_tt_init(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv) return ret; ret = batadv_tt_global_init(bat_priv); - if (ret < 0) + if (ret < 0) { + batadv_tt_local_table_free(bat_priv); return ret; + } batadv_tvlv_handler_register(bat_priv, batadv_tt_tvlv_ogm_handler_v1, batadv_tt_tvlv_unicast_handler_v1, diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index 83d1798dfbb4..ba045f35114d 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -926,7 +926,9 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *net, const char *name, return -ENOMEM; for_each_possible_cpu(i) { newinfo->chainstack[i] = - vmalloc(array_size(udc_cnt, sizeof(*(newinfo->chainstack[0])))); + vmalloc_node(array_size(udc_cnt, + sizeof(*(newinfo->chainstack[0]))), + cpu_to_node(i)); if (!newinfo->chainstack[i]) { while (i) vfree(newinfo->chainstack[--i]); diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 7ee9fecd3aff..eb3a366bf212 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -3163,6 +3163,12 @@ static u16 skb_tx_hash(const struct net_device *dev, qoffset = sb_dev->tc_to_txq[tc].offset; qcount = sb_dev->tc_to_txq[tc].count; + if (unlikely(!qcount)) { + net_warn_ratelimited("%s: invalid qcount, qoffset %u for tc %u\n", + sb_dev->name, qoffset, tc); + qoffset = 0; + qcount = dev->real_num_tx_queues; + } } if (skb_rx_queue_recorded(skb)) { @@ -3906,7 +3912,8 @@ int dev_loopback_xmit(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) skb_reset_mac_header(skb); __skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb)); skb->pkt_type = PACKET_LOOPBACK; - skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; + if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_NONE) + skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; WARN_ON(!skb_dst(skb)); skb_dst_force(skb); netif_rx_ni(skb); diff --git a/net/core/net-sysfs.c b/net/core/net-sysfs.c index f6197774048b..b2e49eb7001d 100644 --- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c +++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c @@ -1973,9 +1973,9 @@ int netdev_register_kobject(struct net_device *ndev) int netdev_change_owner(struct net_device *ndev, const struct net *net_old, const struct net *net_new) { + kuid_t old_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, new_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; + kgid_t old_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, new_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; struct device *dev = &ndev->dev; - kuid_t old_uid, new_uid; - kgid_t old_gid, new_gid; int error; net_ns_get_ownership(net_old, &old_uid, &old_gid); diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index 2170bea2c7de..fe9358437380 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ #include <linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h> #include "datagram.h" +#include "sock_destructor.h" struct kmem_cache *skbuff_head_cache __ro_after_init; static struct kmem_cache *skbuff_fclone_cache __ro_after_init; @@ -1804,30 +1805,39 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_realloc_headroom); struct sk_buff *skb_expand_head(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int headroom) { int delta = headroom - skb_headroom(skb); + int osize = skb_end_offset(skb); + struct sock *sk = skb->sk; if (WARN_ONCE(delta <= 0, "%s is expecting an increase in the headroom", __func__)) return skb; - /* pskb_expand_head() might crash, if skb is shared */ - if (skb_shared(skb)) { + delta = SKB_DATA_ALIGN(delta); + /* pskb_expand_head() might crash, if skb is shared. */ + if (skb_shared(skb) || !is_skb_wmem(skb)) { struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (likely(nskb)) { - if (skb->sk) - skb_set_owner_w(nskb, skb->sk); - consume_skb(skb); - } else { - kfree_skb(skb); - } + if (unlikely(!nskb)) + goto fail; + + if (sk) + skb_set_owner_w(nskb, sk); + consume_skb(skb); skb = nskb; } - if (skb && - pskb_expand_head(skb, SKB_DATA_ALIGN(delta), 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) { - kfree_skb(skb); - skb = NULL; + if (pskb_expand_head(skb, delta, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) + goto fail; + + if (sk && is_skb_wmem(skb)) { + delta = skb_end_offset(skb) - osize; + refcount_add(delta, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc); + skb->truesize += delta; } return skb; + +fail: + kfree_skb(skb); + return NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_expand_head); diff --git a/net/core/sock_destructor.h b/net/core/sock_destructor.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2f396e6bfba5 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/core/sock_destructor.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +#ifndef _NET_CORE_SOCK_DESTRUCTOR_H +#define _NET_CORE_SOCK_DESTRUCTOR_H +#include <net/tcp.h> + +static inline bool is_skb_wmem(const struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return skb->destructor == sock_wfree || + skb->destructor == __sock_wfree || + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) && skb->destructor == tcp_wfree); +} +#endif diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c index 733c83d38b30..4ad8b2032f1f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c @@ -25,12 +25,7 @@ MODULE_AUTHOR("Andras Kis-Szabo <kisza@sch.bme.hu>"); static inline bool segsleft_match(u_int32_t min, u_int32_t max, u_int32_t id, bool invert) { - bool r; - pr_debug("segsleft_match:%c 0x%x <= 0x%x <= 0x%x\n", - invert ? '!' : ' ', min, id, max); - r = (id >= min && id <= max) ^ invert; - pr_debug(" result %s\n", r ? "PASS" : "FAILED"); - return r; + return (id >= min && id <= max) ^ invert; } static bool rt_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) @@ -65,30 +60,6 @@ static bool rt_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return false; } - pr_debug("IPv6 RT LEN %u %u ", hdrlen, rh->hdrlen); - pr_debug("TYPE %04X ", rh->type); - pr_debug("SGS_LEFT %u %02X\n", rh->segments_left, rh->segments_left); - - pr_debug("IPv6 RT segsleft %02X ", - segsleft_match(rtinfo->segsleft[0], rtinfo->segsleft[1], - rh->segments_left, - !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_SGS))); - pr_debug("type %02X %02X %02X ", - rtinfo->rt_type, rh->type, - (!(rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_TYP) || - ((rtinfo->rt_type == rh->type) ^ - !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_TYP)))); - pr_debug("len %02X %04X %02X ", - rtinfo->hdrlen, hdrlen, - !(rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_LEN) || - ((rtinfo->hdrlen == hdrlen) ^ - !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_LEN))); - pr_debug("res %02X %02X %02X ", - rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_RES, - ((const struct rt0_hdr *)rh)->reserved, - !((rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_RES) && - (((const struct rt0_hdr *)rh)->reserved))); - ret = (segsleft_match(rtinfo->segsleft[0], rtinfo->segsleft[1], rh->segments_left, !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_SGS))) && @@ -107,22 +78,22 @@ static bool rt_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) reserved), sizeof(_reserved), &_reserved); + if (!rp) { + par->hotdrop = true; + return false; + } ret = (*rp == 0); } - pr_debug("#%d ", rtinfo->addrnr); if (!(rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_FST)) { return ret; } else if (rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT) { - pr_debug("Not strict "); if (rtinfo->addrnr > (unsigned int)((hdrlen - 8) / 16)) { - pr_debug("There isn't enough space\n"); return false; } else { unsigned int i = 0; - pr_debug("#%d ", rtinfo->addrnr); for (temp = 0; temp < (unsigned int)((hdrlen - 8) / 16); temp++) { @@ -138,26 +109,20 @@ static bool rt_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return false; } - if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[i])) { - pr_debug("i=%d temp=%d;\n", i, temp); + if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[i])) i++; - } if (i == rtinfo->addrnr) break; } - pr_debug("i=%d #%d\n", i, rtinfo->addrnr); if (i == rtinfo->addrnr) return ret; else return false; } } else { - pr_debug("Strict "); if (rtinfo->addrnr > (unsigned int)((hdrlen - 8) / 16)) { - pr_debug("There isn't enough space\n"); return false; } else { - pr_debug("#%d ", rtinfo->addrnr); for (temp = 0; temp < rtinfo->addrnr; temp++) { ap = skb_header_pointer(skb, ptr @@ -173,7 +138,6 @@ static bool rt_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) if (!ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[temp])) break; } - pr_debug("temp=%d #%d\n", temp, rtinfo->addrnr); if (temp == rtinfo->addrnr && temp == (unsigned int)((hdrlen - 8) / 16)) return ret; diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh.c b/net/mac80211/mesh.c index 97095b7c9c64..5dcfd53a4ab6 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c @@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ ieee80211_mesh_update_bss_params(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, u8 *ie, u8 ie_len) { struct ieee80211_supported_band *sband; - const u8 *cap; + const struct element *cap; const struct ieee80211_he_operation *he_oper = NULL; sband = ieee80211_get_sband(sdata); @@ -687,9 +687,10 @@ ieee80211_mesh_update_bss_params(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, sdata->vif.bss_conf.he_support = true; - cap = cfg80211_find_ext_ie(WLAN_EID_EXT_HE_OPERATION, ie, ie_len); - if (cap && cap[1] >= ieee80211_he_oper_size(&cap[3])) - he_oper = (void *)(cap + 3); + cap = cfg80211_find_ext_elem(WLAN_EID_EXT_HE_OPERATION, ie, ie_len); + if (cap && cap->datalen >= 1 + sizeof(*he_oper) && + cap->datalen >= 1 + ieee80211_he_oper_size(cap->data + 1)) + he_oper = (void *)(cap->data + 1); if (he_oper) sdata->vif.bss_conf.he_oper.params = diff --git a/net/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/netfilter/Kconfig index 54395266339d..92a747896f80 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/Kconfig +++ b/net/netfilter/Kconfig @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ config NF_CONNTRACK_MARK config NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK bool 'Connection tracking security mark support' depends on NETWORK_SECMARK - default m if NETFILTER_ADVANCED=n + default y if NETFILTER_ADVANCED=n help This option enables security markings to be applied to connections. Typically they are copied to connections from diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c index c25097092a06..29ec3ef63edc 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c @@ -4090,6 +4090,11 @@ static int __net_init ip_vs_control_net_init_sysctl(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs) tbl[idx++].data = &ipvs->sysctl_conn_reuse_mode; tbl[idx++].data = &ipvs->sysctl_schedule_icmp; tbl[idx++].data = &ipvs->sysctl_ignore_tunneled; +#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_DEBUG + /* Global sysctls must be ro in non-init netns */ + if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) + tbl[idx++].mode = 0444; +#endif ipvs->sysctl_hdr = register_net_sysctl(net, "net/ipv4/vs", tbl); if (ipvs->sysctl_hdr == NULL) { diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c b/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c index 5b02408a920b..3ced0eb6b7c3 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c @@ -342,12 +342,6 @@ static void nft_netdev_event(unsigned long event, struct net_device *dev, return; } - /* UNREGISTER events are also happening on netns exit. - * - * Although nf_tables core releases all tables/chains, only this event - * handler provides guarantee that hook->ops.dev is still accessible, - * so we cannot skip exiting net namespaces. - */ __nft_release_basechain(ctx); } @@ -366,6 +360,9 @@ static int nf_tables_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *this, event != NETDEV_CHANGENAME) return NOTIFY_DONE; + if (!check_net(ctx.net)) + return NOTIFY_DONE; + nft_net = nft_pernet(ctx.net); mutex_lock(&nft_net->commit_mutex); list_for_each_entry(table, &nft_net->tables, list) { diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c b/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c index 7b2f359bfce4..2f7cf5ecebf4 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int idletimer_tg_create(struct idletimer_tg_info *info) { int ret; - info->timer = kmalloc(sizeof(*info->timer), GFP_KERNEL); + info->timer = kzalloc(sizeof(*info->timer), GFP_KERNEL); if (!info->timer) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 32df65f68c12..fb3da4d8f4a3 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -156,6 +156,12 @@ static enum sctp_disposition __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort( void *arg, struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands); +static enum sctp_disposition +__sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands); + /* Small helper function that checks if the chunk length * is of the appropriate length. The 'required_length' argument * is set to be the size of a specific chunk we are testing. @@ -337,6 +343,14 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, if (!chunk->singleton) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. + * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation + * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll + * just discard the packet. + */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT. */ @@ -351,14 +365,6 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. - * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation - * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll - * just discard the packet. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* If the INIT is coming toward a closing socket, we'll send back * and ABORT. Essentially, this catches the race of INIT being * backloged to the socket at the same time as the user issues close(). @@ -704,6 +710,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, struct sock *sk; int error = 0; + if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT. */ @@ -718,7 +727,8 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, * in sctp_unpack_cookie(). */ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); /* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations * on the TCP-style socket exceed the max backlog, respond with an @@ -1524,20 +1534,16 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init( if (!chunk->singleton) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* 3.1 A packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification * Tag. */ if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. - * In this case, we generate a protocol violation since we have - * an association established. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - if (SCTP_INPUT_CB(chunk->skb)->encap_port != chunk->transport->encap_port) return sctp_sf_new_encap_port(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -1882,9 +1888,9 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a( * its peer. */ if (sctp_state(asoc, SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT)) { - disposition = sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, - SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type), - chunk, commands); + disposition = __sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, + SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type), + chunk, commands); if (SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM == disposition) goto nomem; @@ -2202,9 +2208,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook( * enough for the chunk header. Cookie length verification is * done later. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) { + if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + asoc = NULL; + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + } /* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we * are in good shape. @@ -2341,7 +2349,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shutdown_pending_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2387,7 +2395,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shutdown_sent_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2657,7 +2665,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2970,13 +2978,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_shut_ctsn( * that belong to this association, it should discard the INIT chunk and * retransmit the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk. */ -enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack( - struct net *net, - const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, - const struct sctp_association *asoc, - const union sctp_subtype type, - void *arg, - struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) +static enum sctp_disposition +__sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; struct sctp_chunk *reply; @@ -3010,6 +3016,26 @@ nomem: return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM; } +enum sctp_disposition +sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) +{ + struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + + if (!chunk->singleton) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) + return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + return __sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); +} + /* * sctp_sf_do_ecn_cwr * @@ -3662,6 +3688,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES); + if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + asoc = NULL; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->chunk_hdr; do { /* Report violation if the chunk is less then minimal */ @@ -3777,12 +3806,6 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5( SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS); - /* If the chunk length is invalid, we don't want to process - * the reset of the packet. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent * potential boomming attacks from additional bundled chunks. * This is documented in SCTP Threats ID. @@ -3810,6 +3833,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + asoc = NULL; + /* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk has a valid length. */ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, @@ -3845,6 +3871,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); } + /* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); + /* ADD-IP: Section 4.1.1 * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk @@ -3853,13 +3884,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net, */ if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable || (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !chunk->auth)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - - /* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); hdr = (struct sctp_addiphdr *)chunk->skb->data; serial = ntohl(hdr->serial); @@ -3988,6 +4013,12 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); } + /* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, + sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); + /* ADD-IP, Section 4.1.2: * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk @@ -3996,14 +4027,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net, */ if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable || (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - - /* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, - sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); addip_hdr = (struct sctp_addiphdr *)asconf_ack->skb->data; rcvd_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial); @@ -4575,6 +4599,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_discard_chunk(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. * Since we don't know the chunk type, we use a general * chunkhdr structure to make a comparison. @@ -4642,6 +4669,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_violation(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. */ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, @@ -6348,6 +6378,7 @@ static struct sctp_packet *sctp_ootb_pkt_new( * yet. */ switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) { + case SCTP_CID_INIT: case SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK: { struct sctp_initack_chunk *initack; diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c index c9391d38de85..dc60c32bb70d 100644 --- a/net/tipc/crypto.c +++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c @@ -2285,43 +2285,53 @@ static bool tipc_crypto_key_rcv(struct tipc_crypto *rx, struct tipc_msg *hdr) u16 key_gen = msg_key_gen(hdr); u16 size = msg_data_sz(hdr); u8 *data = msg_data(hdr); + unsigned int keylen; + + /* Verify whether the size can exist in the packet */ + if (unlikely(size < sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key) + TIPC_AEAD_KEYLEN_MIN)) { + pr_debug("%s: message data size is too small\n", rx->name); + goto exit; + } + + keylen = ntohl(*((__be32 *)(data + TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME))); + + /* Verify the supplied size values */ + if (unlikely(size != keylen + sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key) || + keylen > TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX)) { + pr_debug("%s: invalid MSG_CRYPTO key size\n", rx->name); + goto exit; + } spin_lock(&rx->lock); if (unlikely(rx->skey || (key_gen == rx->key_gen && rx->key.keys))) { pr_err("%s: key existed <%p>, gen %d vs %d\n", rx->name, rx->skey, key_gen, rx->key_gen); - goto exit; + goto exit_unlock; } /* Allocate memory for the key */ skey = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(!skey)) { pr_err("%s: unable to allocate memory for skey\n", rx->name); - goto exit; + goto exit_unlock; } /* Copy key from msg data */ - skey->keylen = ntohl(*((__be32 *)(data + TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME))); + skey->keylen = keylen; memcpy(skey->alg_name, data, TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME); memcpy(skey->key, data + TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME + sizeof(__be32), skey->keylen); - /* Sanity check */ - if (unlikely(size != tipc_aead_key_size(skey))) { - kfree(skey); - skey = NULL; - goto exit; - } - rx->key_gen = key_gen; rx->skey_mode = msg_key_mode(hdr); rx->skey = skey; rx->nokey = 0; mb(); /* for nokey flag */ -exit: +exit_unlock: spin_unlock(&rx->lock); +exit: /* Schedule the key attaching on this crypto */ if (likely(skey && queue_delayed_work(tx->wq, &rx->work, 0))) return true; diff --git a/net/wireless/scan.c b/net/wireless/scan.c index 11c68b159324..adc0d14cfd86 100644 --- a/net/wireless/scan.c +++ b/net/wireless/scan.c @@ -418,14 +418,17 @@ cfg80211_add_nontrans_list(struct cfg80211_bss *trans_bss, } ssid_len = ssid[1]; ssid = ssid + 2; - rcu_read_unlock(); /* check if nontrans_bss is in the list */ list_for_each_entry(bss, &trans_bss->nontrans_list, nontrans_list) { - if (is_bss(bss, nontrans_bss->bssid, ssid, ssid_len)) + if (is_bss(bss, nontrans_bss->bssid, ssid, ssid_len)) { + rcu_read_unlock(); return 0; + } } + rcu_read_unlock(); + /* add to the list */ list_add_tail(&nontrans_bss->nontrans_list, &trans_bss->nontrans_list); return 0; |