| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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Sam Page (sam4k) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported
a UAF in the tipc_buf_append() error path:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0
linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804d2a7c80 by task poc/8034
CPU: 1 PID: 8034 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.8.2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:377
print_report+0xc4/0x620 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0xda/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:601
kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183
skb_release_data+0x5af/0x880 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1026
skb_release_all linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1094
__kfree_skb linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1108
kfree_skb_reason+0x12d/0x210 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1144
kfree_skb linux/./include/linux/skbuff.h:1244
tipc_buf_append+0x425/0xb50 linux/net/tipc/msg.c:186
tipc_link_input+0x224/0x7c0 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1324
tipc_link_rcv+0x76e/0x2d70 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1824
tipc_rcv+0x45f/0x10f0 linux/net/tipc/node.c:2159
tipc_udp_recv+0x73b/0x8f0 linux/net/tipc/udp_media.c:390
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xad2/0x1850 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2108
udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x131/0xb00 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2186
udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x165/0x3b0 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2346
__udp4_lib_rcv+0x2594/0x3400 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2422
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x30c/0x4e0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e4/0x520 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314
NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308
ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
dst_input linux/./include/net/dst.h:461
ip_rcv_finish linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449
NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314
NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308
ip_rcv+0x2c5/0x5d0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5534
__netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5648
process_backlog+0x101/0x6b0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5976
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 linux/net/core/dev.c:6576
napi_poll linux/net/core/dev.c:6645
net_rx_action+0x95a/0xe90 linux/net/core/dev.c:6781
__do_softirq+0x21f/0x8e7 linux/kernel/softirq.c:553
do_softirq linux/kernel/softirq.c:454
do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 linux/kernel/softirq.c:441
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 linux/kernel/softirq.c:381
local_bh_enable linux/./include/linux/bottom_half.h:33
rcu_read_unlock_bh linux/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:851
__dev_queue_xmit+0x871/0x3ee0 linux/net/core/dev.c:4378
dev_queue_xmit linux/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3169
neigh_hh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:526
neigh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:540
ip_finish_output2+0x169f/0x2550 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235
__ip_finish_output linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:313
__ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295
ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323
NF_HOOK_COND linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:303
ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433
dst_output linux/./include/net/dst.h:451
ip_local_out linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129
ip_send_skb+0x3e5/0x560 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492
udp_send_skb+0x73f/0x1530 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:963
udp_sendmsg+0x1a36/0x2b40 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:1250
inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x140 linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850
sock_sendmsg_nosec linux/net/socket.c:730
__sock_sendmsg linux/net/socket.c:745
__sys_sendto+0x42c/0x4e0 linux/net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2203
__se_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2199
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 linux/net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:52
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
RIP: 0033:0x7f3434974f29
Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d
01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 37 8f 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff9154f2b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3434974f29
RDX: 00000000000032c8 RSI: 00007fff9154f300 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fff915532e0 R08: 00007fff91553360 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 000055ed86d261d0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
In the critical scenario, either the relevant skb is freed or its
ownership is transferred into a frag_lists. In both cases, the cleanup
code must not free it again: we need to clear the skb reference earlier.
Fixes: 1149557d64c9 ("tipc: eliminate unnecessary linearization of incoming buffers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-23852
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/752f1ccf762223d109845365d07f55414058e5a3.1714484273.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The find connection logic of Transarc's Rx was modified in the mid-1990s
to support multi-homed servers which might send a response packet from
an address other than the destination address in the received packet.
The rules for accepting a packet by an Rx initiator (RX_CLIENT_CONNECTION)
were altered to permit acceptance of a packet from any address provided
that the port number was unchanged and all of the connection identifiers
matched (Epoch, CID, SecurityClass, ...).
This change applies the same rules to the Linux implementation which makes
it consistent with IBM AFS 3.6, Arla, OpenAFS and AuriStorFS.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240419163057.4141728-1-marc.dionne@auristor.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs must not be linearized, otherwise they become
invalid. Return NULL if such an skb is passed to skb_copy or
skb_copy_expand, in order to prevent a crash on a potential later
call to skb_gso_segment.
Fixes: 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.")
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Calling skb_copy on a SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skb is not valid, since it returns
an invalid linearized skb. This code only needs to change the ethernet
header, so pskb_copy is the right function to call here.
Fixes: 6db6f0eae605 ("bridge: multicast to unicast")
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Christoph reported a splat hinting at a corrupted snd_una:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 38 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005 __mptcp_clean_una+0x4b3/0x620 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 38 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-gbbeac67456c9 #59
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events mptcp_worker
RIP: 0010:__mptcp_clean_una+0x4b3/0x620 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005
Code: be 06 01 00 00 bf 06 01 00 00 e8 a8 12 e7 fe e9 00 fe ff ff e8
8e 1a e7 fe 0f b7 ab 3e 02 00 00 e9 d3 fd ff ff e8 7d 1a e7 fe
<0f> 0b 4c 8b bb e0 05 00 00 e9 74 fc ff ff e8 6a 1a e7 fe 0f 0b e9
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000013fd48 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881029bd280 RCX: ffffffff82382fe4
RDX: ffff8881003cbd00 RSI: ffffffff823833c3 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888138ba8000
R13: 0000000000000106 R14: ffff8881029bd908 R15: ffff888126560000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f604a5dae38 CR3: 0000000101dac002 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__mptcp_clean_una_wakeup net/mptcp/protocol.c:1055 [inline]
mptcp_clean_una_wakeup net/mptcp/protocol.c:1062 [inline]
__mptcp_retrans+0x7f/0x7e0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2615
mptcp_worker+0x434/0x740 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2767
process_one_work+0x1e0/0x560 kernel/workqueue.c:3254
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3335 [inline]
worker_thread+0x3c7/0x640 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x121/0x170 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x44/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
</TASK>
When fallback to TCP happens early on a client socket, snd_nxt
is not yet initialized and any incoming ack will copy such value
into snd_una. If the mptcp worker (dumbly) tries mptcp-level
re-injection after such ack, that would unconditionally trigger a send
buffer cleanup using 'bad' snd_una values.
We could easily disable re-injection for fallback sockets, but such
dumb behavior already helped catching a few subtle issues and a very
low to zero impact in practice.
Instead address the issue always initializing snd_nxt (and write_seq,
for consistency) at connect time.
Fixes: 8fd738049ac3 ("mptcp: fallback in case of simultaneous connect")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/485
Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429-upstream-net-20240429-mptcp-snd_nxt-init-connect-v1-1-59ceac0a7dcb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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This is a partial revert of commit 6dbdd4de0362 ("e1000e: Workaround
for sporadic MDI error on Meteor Lake systems"). The referenced commit
used usleep_range inside the PHY access routines, which are sometimes
called from an atomic context. This can lead to a kernel panic in some
scenarios, such as cable disconnection and reconnection on vPro systems.
Solve this by changing the usleep_range calls back to udelay.
Fixes: 6dbdd4de0362 ("e1000e: Workaround for sporadic MDI error on Meteor Lake systems")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jérôme Carretero <cJ@zougloub.eu>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218740
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a7eb665c74b5efb5140e6979759ed243072cb24a.camel@zougloub.eu/
Co-developed-by: Sasha Neftin <sasha.neftin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Neftin <sasha.neftin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Lifshits <vitaly.lifshits@intel.com>
Tested-by: Dima Ruinskiy <dima.ruinskiy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429171040.1152516-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The Topaz family (88E6141 and 88E6341) only support 256 Forwarding
Information Tables.
Fixes: a75961d0ebfd ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Add support for ethernet switch 88E6341")
Fixes: 1558727a1c1b ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Add support for ethernet switch 88E6141")
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <kabel@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429133832.9547-1-kabel@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The selftest for the driver sends a dummy packet and checks if the
packet will be received properly as it should be. The regular TX path
and the selftest can use the same network queue so locking is required
and was missing in the selftest path. This was addressed in the commit
cited below.
Unfortunately locking the TX queue requires BH to be disabled which is
not the case in selftest path which is invoked in process context.
Lockdep should be complaining about this.
Use __netif_tx_lock_bh() for TX queue locking.
Fixes: c650e04898072 ("cxgb4: Fix race between loopback and normal Tx path")
Reported-by: "John B. Wyatt IV" <jwyatt@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zic0ot5aGgR-V4Ks@thinkpad2021/
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429091147.YWAaal4v@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf() may be called with data_align being
zero in none_alloc_txbuf() and rxkad_alloc_txbuf(), data_align
is supposed to be an order-based alignment value, but zero is
not a valid order-based alignment value, and '~(data_align - 1)'
doesn't result in a valid mask-based alignment value for
__page_frag_alloc_align().
Fix it by passing a valid order-based alignment value in
none_alloc_txbuf() and rxkad_alloc_txbuf().
Also use page_frag_alloc_align() expecting an order-based
alignment value in rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf() to avoid doing the
alignment converting operation and to catch possible invalid
alignment value in the future. Remove the 'if (data_align)'
checking too, as it is always true for a valid order-based
alignment value.
Fixes: 6b2536462fd4 ("rxrpc: Fix use of changed alignment param to page_frag_alloc_align()")
Fixes: 49489bb03a50 ("rxrpc: Do zerocopy using MSG_SPLICE_PAGES and page frags")
CC: Alexander Duyck <alexander.duyck@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240428111640.27306-1-linyunsheng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Guillaume Nault says:
====================
vxlan: Fix vxlan counters.
Like most virtual devices, vxlan needs special care when updating its
netdevice counters. This is done in patch 1. Patch 2 just adds a
missing VNI counter update (found while working on patch 1).
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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VXLAN stores per-VNI statistics using vxlan_vnifilter_count().
These statistics were not updated when arp_reduce() failed its
pskb_may_pull() call.
Use vxlan_vnifilter_count() to update the VNI counter when that
happens.
Fixes: 4095e0e1328a ("drivers: vxlan: vnifilter: per vni stats")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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VXLAN devices update their stats locklessly. Therefore these counters
should either be stored in per-cpu data structures or the updates
should be done using atomic increments.
Since the net_device_core_stats infrastructure is already used in
vxlan_rcv(), use it for the other rx_dropped and tx_dropped counter
updates. Update the other counters atomically using DEV_STATS_INC().
Fixes: d342894c5d2f ("vxlan: virtual extensible lan")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Asbjørn Sloth Tønnesen says:
====================
net: qede: avoid overruling error codes
This series fixes the qede driver, so that
qede_parse_flow_attr() and it's subfunctions
doesn't get their error codes overruled
(ie. turning -EOPNOTSUPP into -EINVAL).
---
I have two more patches along the same lines,
but they are not yet causing any issues,
so I have them destined for net-next.
(those are for qede_flow_spec_validate_unused()
and qede_flow_parse_ports().)
After that I have a series for converting to
extack + the final one for validating control
flags.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When calling qede_parse_actions() then the
return code was only used for a non-zero check,
and then -EINVAL was returned.
qede_parse_actions() can currently fail with:
* -EINVAL
* -EOPNOTSUPP
This patch changes the code to use the actual
return code, not just return -EINVAL.
The blaimed commit broke the implicit assumption
that only -EINVAL would ever be returned.
Only compile tested.
Fixes: 319a1d19471e ("flow_offload: check for basic action hw stats type")
Signed-off-by: Asbjørn Sloth Tønnesen <ast@fiberby.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In qede_flow_spec_to_rule(), when calling
qede_parse_flow_attr() then the return code
was only used for a non-zero check, and then
-EINVAL was returned.
qede_parse_flow_attr() can currently fail with:
* -EINVAL
* -EOPNOTSUPP
* -EPROTONOSUPPORT
This patch changes the code to use the actual
return code, not just return -EINVAL.
The blaimed commit introduced qede_flow_spec_to_rule(),
and this call to qede_parse_flow_attr(), it looks
like it just duplicated how it was already used.
Only compile tested.
Fixes: 37c5d3efd7f8 ("qede: use ethtool_rx_flow_rule() to remove duplicated parser code")
Signed-off-by: Asbjørn Sloth Tønnesen <ast@fiberby.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In qede_add_tc_flower_fltr(), when calling
qede_parse_flow_attr() then the return code
was only used for a non-zero check, and then
-EINVAL was returned.
qede_parse_flow_attr() can currently fail with:
* -EINVAL
* -EOPNOTSUPP
* -EPROTONOSUPPORT
This patch changes the code to use the actual
return code, not just return -EINVAL.
The blaimed commit introduced these functions.
Only compile tested.
Fixes: 2ce9c93eaca6 ("qede: Ingress tc flower offload (drop action) support.")
Signed-off-by: Asbjørn Sloth Tønnesen <ast@fiberby.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Explicitly set 'rc' (return code), before jumping to the
unlock and return path.
By not having any code depend on that 'rc' remains at
it's initial value of -EINVAL, then we can re-use 'rc' for
the return code of function calls in subsequent patches.
Only compile tested.
Signed-off-by: Asbjørn Sloth Tønnesen <ast@fiberby.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Donald has been contributing to YNL a lot. Let's create a dedicated
MAINTAINERS entry and add make his involvement official :)
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Donald Hunter <donald.hunter@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Doug Berger says:
====================
net: bcmgenet: protect contended accesses
Some registers may be modified by parallel execution contexts and
require protections to prevent corruption.
A review of the driver revealed the need for these additional
protections.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The UMAC_CMD register is written from different execution
contexts and has insufficient synchronization protections to
prevent possible corruption. Of particular concern are the
acceses from the phy_device delayed work context used by the
adjust_link call and the BH context that may be used by the
ndo_set_rx_mode call.
A spinlock is added to the driver to protect contended register
accesses (i.e. reg_lock) and it is used to synchronize accesses
to UMAC_CMD.
Fixes: 1c1008c793fa ("net: bcmgenet: add main driver file")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Berger <opendmb@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The ndo_set_rx_mode function is synchronized with the
netif_addr_lock spinlock and BHs disabled. Since this
function is also invoked directly from the driver the
same synchronization should be applied.
Fixes: 72f96347628e ("net: bcmgenet: set Rx mode before starting netif")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Berger <opendmb@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The EXT_RGMII_OOB_CTRL register can be written from different
contexts. It is predominantly written from the adjust_link
handler which is synchronized by the phydev->lock, but can
also be written from a different context when configuring the
mii in bcmgenet_mii_config().
The chances of contention are quite low, but it is conceivable
that adjust_link could occur during resume when WoL is enabled
so use the phydev->lock synchronizer in bcmgenet_mii_config()
to be sure.
Fixes: afe3f907d20f ("net: bcmgenet: power on MII block for all MII modes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Berger <opendmb@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2024-04-26
We've added 12 non-merge commits during the last 22 day(s) which contain
a total of 14 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Fix BPF_PROBE_MEM in verifier and JIT to skip loads from vsyscall page,
from Puranjay Mohan.
2) Fix a crash in XDP with devmap broadcast redirect when the latter map
is in process of being torn down, from Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.
3) Fix arm64 and riscv64 BPF JITs to properly clear start time for BPF
program runtime stats, from Xu Kuohai.
4) Fix a sockmap KCSAN-reported data race in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue,
from Jason Xing.
5) Fix BPF verifier error message in resolve_pseudo_ldimm64,
from Anton Protopopov.
6) Fix missing DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES Kconfig menu item,
from Andrii Nakryiko.
* tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf:
selftests/bpf: Test PROBE_MEM of VSYSCALL_ADDR on x86-64
bpf, x86: Fix PROBE_MEM runtime load check
bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access
xdp: use flags field to disambiguate broadcast redirect
arm32, bpf: Reimplement sign-extension mov instruction
riscv, bpf: Fix incorrect runtime stats
bpf, arm64: Fix incorrect runtime stats
bpf: Fix a verifier verbose message
bpf, skmsg: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
MAINTAINERS: bpf: Add Lehui and Puranjay as riscv64 reviewers
MAINTAINERS: Update email address for Puranjay Mohan
bpf, kconfig: Fix DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES Kconfig definition
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240426224248.26197-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Fix extract_user_to_sg() so that it will break out of the loop if
iov_iter_extract_pages() returns 0 rather than looping around forever.
[Note that I've included two fixes lines as the function got moved to a
different file and renamed]
Fixes: 85dd2c8ff368 ("netfs: Add a function to extract a UBUF or IOVEC into a BVEC iterator")
Fixes: f5f82cd18732 ("Move netfs_extract_iter_to_sg() to lib/scatterlist.c")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1967121.1714034372@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Puranjay Mohan says:
====================
bpf: prevent userspace memory access
V5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240324185356.59111-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
Changes in V6:
- Disable the verifier's instrumentation in x86-64 and update the JIT to
take care of vsyscall page in addition to userspace addresses.
- Update bpf_testmod to test for vsyscall addresses.
V4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240321124640.8870-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
Changes in V5:
- Use TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE, VSYSCALL_ADDR as userspace boundary in
x86-64 JIT.
- Added Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
V3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240321120842.78983-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
Changes in V4:
- Disable this feature on architectures that don't define
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE.
- By doing the above, we don't need anything explicitly for s390x.
V2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240321101058.68530-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
Changes in V3:
- Return 0 from bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() in disabled case because it
returns u64.
- Modify the check in verifier to no do instrumentation when uaddress_limit
is 0.
V1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240320105436.4781-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
Changes in V2:
- Disable this feature on s390x.
With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To
thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry for
all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace address,
the BPF program might read that memory if the user has mapped it.
x86-64 JIT already instruments the BPF_PROBE_MEM based loads with checks to
skip loads from userspace addresses, but is doesn't check for vsyscall page
because it falls in the kernel address space but is considered a userspace
page. The second patch in this series fixes the x86-64 JIT to also skip
loads from the vsyscall page. The last patch updates the bpf_testmod so
this address can be checked as part of the selftests.
Other architectures don't have the complexity of the vsyscall address and
just need to skip loads from the userspace. To make this more scalable and
robust, the verifier is updated in the first patch to instrument
BPF_PROBE_MEM to skip loads from the userspace addresses.
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-1-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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|
The vsyscall is a legacy API for fast execution of system calls. It maps
a page at address VSYSCALL_ADDR into the userspace program. This address
is in the top 10MB of the address space:
ffffffffff600000 - ffffffffff600fff | 4 kB | legacy vsyscall ABI
The last commit fixes the x86-64 BPF JIT to skip accessing addresses in
this memory region. Add this address to bpf_testmod_return_ptr() so we
can make sure that it is fixed.
After this change and without the previous commit, subprogs_extable
selftest will crash the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-4-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
When a load is marked PROBE_MEM - e.g. due to PTR_UNTRUSTED access - the
address being loaded from is not necessarily valid. The BPF jit sets up
exception handlers for each such load which catch page faults and 0 out
the destination register.
If the address for the load is outside kernel address space, the load
will escape the exception handling and crash the kernel. To prevent this
from happening, the emits some instruction to verify that addr is > end
of userspace addresses.
x86 has a legacy vsyscall ABI where a page at address 0xffffffffff600000
is mapped with user accessible permissions. The addresses in this page
are considered userspace addresses by the fault handler. Therefore, a
BPF program accessing this page will crash the kernel.
This patch fixes the runtime checks to also check that the PROBE_MEM
address is below VSYSCALL_ADDR.
Example BPF program:
SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect")
int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk)
{
*(volatile unsigned long *)&sk->sk_tsq_flags;
return 0;
}
BPF Assembly:
0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +344)
2: (b7) r0 = 0
3: (95) exit
x86-64 JIT
==========
BEFORE AFTER
------ -----
0: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 0: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
5: xchg %ax,%ax 5: xchg %ax,%ax
7: push %rbp 7: push %rbp
8: mov %rsp,%rbp 8: mov %rsp,%rbp
b: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi b: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
f: movabs $0x100000000000000,%r11 f: movabs $0xffffffffff600000,%r10
19: add $0x2a0,%rdi 19: mov %rdi,%r11
20: cmp %r11,%rdi 1c: add $0x2a0,%r11
23: jae 0x0000000000000029 23: sub %r10,%r11
25: xor %edi,%edi 26: movabs $0x100000000a00000,%r10
27: jmp 0x000000000000002d 30: cmp %r10,%r11
29: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi 33: ja 0x0000000000000039
--------------------------------\ 35: xor %edi,%edi
2d: xor %eax,%eax \ 37: jmp 0x0000000000000040
2f: leave \ 39: mov 0x2a0(%rdi),%rdi
30: ret \--------------------------------------------
40: xor %eax,%eax
42: leave
43: ret
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-3-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To
thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry
for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace
address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has
mapped it.
Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and
skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region.
The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where
the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken
as default.
The implementation is as follows:
REG_AX = SRC_REG
if(offset)
REG_AX += offset;
REG_AX >>= 32;
if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32))
DST_REG = 0;
else
DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset);
Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper
32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down
to a 4GB boundary before comparison.
The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are
skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger
than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a
correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory
above the userspace.
Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program
dereferencing an untrusted pointer:
SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect")
int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk)
{
*(volatile long *)sk;
return 0;
}
BPF Program before | BPF Program after
------------------ | -----------------
0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\ 1: (bf) r11 = r1
----------------------------\ \ 2: (77) r11 >>= 32
2: (b7) r0 = 0 \ \ 3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2
3: (95) exit \ \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
\ 5: (05) goto pc+1
\ 6: (b7) r1 = 0
\--------------------------------------
7: (b7) r0 = 0
8: (95) exit
As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions
are emitted.
Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of
ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction
that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been
added around it.
x86-64 JIT
==========
JIT's Instrumentation
(upstream)
---------------------
0: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
5: xchg %ax,%ax
7: push %rbp
8: mov %rsp,%rbp
b: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi
---------------------------------
f: movabs $0x800000000000,%r11
19: cmp %r11,%rdi
1c: jb 0x000000000000002a
1e: mov %rdi,%r11
21: add $0x0,%r11
28: jae 0x000000000000002e
2a: xor %edi,%edi
2c: jmp 0x0000000000000032
2e: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi
---------------------------------
32: xor %eax,%eax
34: leave
35: ret
The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user
memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT.
ARM64 JIT
=========
No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation
(upstream) (This patch)
----------------- --------------------------
0: add x9, x30, #0x0 0: add x9, x30, #0x0
4: nop 4: nop
8: paciasp 8: paciasp
c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
10: mov x29, sp 10: mov x29, sp
14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!
24: mov x25, sp 24: mov x25, sp
28: mov x26, #0x0 28: mov x26, #0x0
2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0
30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0
34: ldr x0, [x0] 34: ldr x0, [x0]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
38: ldr x0, [x0] ----------\ 38: add x9, x0, #0x0
-----------------------------------\\ 3c: lsr x9, x9, #32
3c: mov x7, #0x0 \\ 40: cmp x9, #0x10, lsl #12
40: mov sp, sp \\ 44: b.ls 0x0000000000000050
44: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 \\--> 48: ldr x0, [x0]
48: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 \ 4c: b 0x0000000000000054
4c: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 \ 50: mov x0, #0x0
50: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 \---------------------------------------
54: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 54: mov x7, #0x0
58: add x0, x7, #0x0 58: mov sp, sp
5c: autiasp 5c: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16
60: ret 60: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16
64: nop 64: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16
68: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000070 68: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16
6c: br x10 6c: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
70: add x0, x7, #0x0
74: autiasp
78: ret
7c: nop
80: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000088
84: br x10
There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will
become 7 in the worst case (off != 0).
RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled)
==========
No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation
(upstream) (This patch)
----------------- --------------------------
0: nop 0: nop
4: nop 4: nop
8: li a6, 33 8: li a6, 33
c: addi sp, sp, -16 c: addi sp, sp, -16
10: sd s0, 8(sp) 10: sd s0, 8(sp)
14: addi s0, sp, 16 14: addi s0, sp, 16
18: ld a0, 0(a0) 18: ld a0, 0(a0)
---------------------------------------------------------------
1c: ld a0, 0(a0) --\ 1c: mv t0, a0
--------------------------\ \ 20: srli t0, t0, 32
20: li a5, 0 \ \ 24: lui t1, 4096
24: ld s0, 8(sp) \ \ 28: sext.w t1, t1
28: addi sp, sp, 16 \ \ 2c: bgeu t1, t0, 12
2c: sext.w a0, a5 \ \--> 30: ld a0, 0(a0)
30: ret \ 34: j 8
\ 38: li a0, 0
\------------------------------
3c: li a5, 0
40: ld s0, 8(sp)
44: addi sp, sp, 16
48: sext.w a0, a5
4c: ret
There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V.
Fixes: 800834285361 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables")
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-2-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Drop the flow-hash of the skb when forwarding to the L2TP netdev.
This avoids the L2TP qdisc from using the flow-hash from the outer
packet, which is identical for every flow within the tunnel.
This does not affect every platform but is specific for the ethernet
driver. It depends on the platform including L4 information in the
flow-hash.
One such example is the Mediatek Filogic MT798x family of networking
processors.
Fixes: d9e31d17ceba ("l2tp: Add L2TP ethernet pseudowire support")
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424171110.13701-1-mail@david-bauer.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
nsh_gso_segment().
syzbot triggered various splats (see [0] and links) by a crafted GSO
packet of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP layering the following protocols:
ETH_P_8021AD + ETH_P_NSH + ETH_P_IPV6 + IPPROTO_UDP
NSH can encapsulate IPv4, IPv6, Ethernet, NSH, and MPLS. As the inner
protocol can be Ethernet, NSH GSO handler, nsh_gso_segment(), calls
skb_mac_gso_segment() to invoke inner protocol GSO handlers.
nsh_gso_segment() does the following for the original skb before
calling skb_mac_gso_segment()
1. reset skb->network_header
2. save the original skb->{mac_heaeder,mac_len} in a local variable
3. pull the NSH header
4. resets skb->mac_header
5. set up skb->mac_len and skb->protocol for the inner protocol.
and does the following for the segmented skb
6. set ntohs(ETH_P_NSH) to skb->protocol
7. push the NSH header
8. restore skb->mac_header
9. set skb->mac_header + mac_len to skb->network_header
10. restore skb->mac_len
There are two problems in 6-7 and 8-9.
(a)
After 6 & 7, skb->data points to the NSH header, so the outer header
(ETH_P_8021AD in this case) is stripped when skb is sent out of netdev.
Also, if NSH is encapsulated by NSH + Ethernet (so NSH-Ethernet-NSH),
skb_pull() in the first nsh_gso_segment() will make skb->data point
to the middle of the outer NSH or Ethernet header because the Ethernet
header is not pulled by the second nsh_gso_segment().
(b)
While restoring skb->{mac_header,network_header} in 8 & 9,
nsh_gso_segment() does not assume that the data in the linear
buffer is shifted.
However, udp6_ufo_fragment() could shift the data and change
skb->mac_header accordingly as demonstrated by syzbot.
If this happens, even the restored skb->mac_header points to
the middle of the outer header.
It seems nsh_gso_segment() has never worked with outer headers so far.
At the end of nsh_gso_segment(), the outer header must be restored for
the segmented skb, instead of the NSH header.
To do that, let's calculate the outer header position relatively from
the inner header and set skb->{data,mac_header,protocol} properly.
[0]:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668
ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline]
ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline]
ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668
ipvlan_start_xmit+0x5c/0x1a0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:222
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4989 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5003 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3547 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x244/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3563
__dev_queue_xmit+0x33ed/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4351
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x705/0x1000 mm/slub.c:4001
kmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582
__alloc_skb+0x352/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:651
skb_segment+0x20aa/0x7080 net/core/skbuff.c:4647
udp6_ufo_fragment+0xcab/0x1150 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109
ipv6_gso_segment+0x14be/0x2ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:152
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53
nsh_gso_segment+0x6f4/0xf70 net/nsh/nsh.c:108
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53
__skb_gso_segment+0x4b0/0x730 net/core/gso.c:124
skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
validate_xmit_skb+0x107f/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:3628
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1f28/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4343
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
CPU: 1 PID: 5101 Comm: syz-executor421 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-00297-gf2e367d6ad3b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+42a0dc856239de4de60e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=42a0dc856239de4de60e
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c298c9f0e46a3c86332b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c298c9f0e46a3c86332b
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240415222041.18537-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424023549.21862-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
Bui Quang Minh says:
====================
Ensure the copied buf is NUL terminated (part)
I found that some drivers contains an out-of-bound read pattern like this
kern_buf = memdup_user(user_buf, count);
...
sscanf(kern_buf, ...);
The sscanf can be replaced by some other string-related functions. This
pattern can lead to out-of-bound read of kern_buf in string-related
functions.
This series fix the above issue by replacing memdup_user with
memdup_user_nul.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240422-fix-oob-read-v1-0-e02854c30174@gmail.com
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424-fix-oob-read-v2-0-f1f1b53a10f4@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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We try to access count + 1 byte from userspace with memdup_user(buffer,
count + 1). However, the userspace only provides buffer of count bytes and
only these count bytes are verified to be okay to access. To ensure the
copied buffer is NUL terminated, we use memdup_user_nul instead.
Fixes: 3a2eb515d136 ("octeontx2-af: Fix an off by one in rvu_dbg_qsize_write()")
Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424-fix-oob-read-v2-6-f1f1b53a10f4@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Currently, we allocate a nbytes-sized kernel buffer and copy nbytes from
userspace to that buffer. Later, we use sscanf on this buffer but we don't
ensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can lead to
OOB read when using sscanf. Fix this issue by using memdup_user_nul
instead of memdup_user.
Fixes: 7afc5dbde091 ("bna: Add debugfs interface.")
Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424-fix-oob-read-v2-2-f1f1b53a10f4@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Currently, we allocate a count-sized kernel buffer and copy count bytes
from userspace to that buffer. Later, we use sscanf on this buffer but we
don't ensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can lead
to OOB read when using sscanf. Fix this issue by using memdup_user_nul
instead of memdup_user.
Fixes: 96a9a9341cda ("ice: configure FW logging")
Fixes: 73671c3162c8 ("ice: enable FW logging")
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424-fix-oob-read-v2-1-f1f1b53a10f4@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski:
"Including fixes from netfilter, wireless and bluetooth.
Nothing major, regression fixes are mostly in drivers, two more of
those are flowing towards us thru various trees. I wish some of the
changes went into -rc5, we'll try to keep an eye on frequency of PRs
from sub-trees.
Also disproportional number of fixes for bugs added in v6.4, strange
coincidence.
Current release - regressions:
- igc: fix LED-related deadlock on driver unbind
- wifi: mac80211: small fixes to recent clean up of the connection
process
- Revert "wifi: iwlwifi: bump FW API to 90 for BZ/SC devices", kernel
doesn't have all the code to deal with that version, yet
- Bluetooth:
- set power_ctrl_enabled on NULL returned by gpiod_get_optional()
- qca: fix invalid device address check, again
- eth: ravb: fix registered interrupt names
Current release - new code bugs:
- wifi: mac80211: check EHT/TTLM action frame length
Previous releases - regressions:
- fix sk_memory_allocated_{add|sub} for architectures where
__this_cpu_{add|sub}* are not IRQ-safe
- dsa: mv88e6xx: fix link setup for 88E6250
Previous releases - always broken:
- ip: validate dev returned from __in_dev_get_rcu(), prevent possible
null-derefs in a few places
- switch number of for_each_rcu() loops using call_rcu() on the
iterator to for_each_safe()
- macsec: fix isolation of broadcast traffic in presence of offload
- vxlan: drop packets from invalid source address
- eth: mlxsw: trap and ACL programming fixes
- eth: bnxt: PCIe error recovery fixes, fix counting dropped packets
- Bluetooth:
- lots of fixes for the command submission rework from v6.4
- qca: fix NULL-deref on non-serdev suspend
Misc:
- tools: ynl: don't ignore errors in NLMSG_DONE messages"
* tag 'net-6.9-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (88 commits)
af_unix: Suppress false-positive lockdep splat for spin_lock() in __unix_gc().
net: b44: set pause params only when interface is up
tls: fix lockless read of strp->msg_ready in ->poll
dpll: fix dpll_pin_on_pin_register() for multiple parent pins
net: ravb: Fix registered interrupt names
octeontx2-af: fix the double free in rvu_npc_freemem()
net: ethernet: ti: am65-cpts: Fix PTPv1 message type on TX packets
ice: fix LAG and VF lock dependency in ice_reset_vf()
iavf: Fix TC config comparison with existing adapter TC config
i40e: Report MFS in decimal base instead of hex
i40e: Do not use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag for workqueue
net: ti: icssg-prueth: Fix signedness bug in prueth_init_rx_chns()
net/mlx5e: Advertise mlx5 ethernet driver updates sk_buff md_dst for MACsec
macsec: Detect if Rx skb is macsec-related for offloading devices that update md_dst
ethernet: Add helper for assigning packet type when dest address does not match device address
macsec: Enable devices to advertise whether they update sk_buff md_dst during offloads
net: phy: dp83869: Fix MII mode failure
netfilter: nf_tables: honor table dormant flag from netdev release event path
eth: bnxt: fix counting packets discarded due to OOM and netpoll
igc: Fix LED-related deadlock on driver unbind
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux
Pull nfsd fixes from Chuck Lever:
- Revert some backchannel fixes that went into v6.9-rc
* tag 'nfsd-6.9-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux:
Revert "NFSD: Convert the callback workqueue to use delayed_work"
Revert "NFSD: Reschedule CB operations when backchannel rpc_clnt is shut down"
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hid/hid
Pull HID fixes from Benjamin Tissoires:
- A couple of i2c-hid fixes (Kenny Levinsen & Nam Cao)
- A config issue with mcp-2221 when CONFIG_IIO is not enabled
(Abdelrahman Morsy)
- A dev_err fix in intel-ish-hid (Zhang Lixu)
- A couple of mouse fixes for both nintendo and Logitech-dj (Nuno
Pereira and Yaraslau Furman)
- I'm changing my main kernel email address as it's way simpler for me
than the Red Hat one (Benjamin Tissoires)
* tag 'for-linus-2024042501' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hid/hid:
HID: mcp-2221: cancel delayed_work only when CONFIG_IIO is enabled
HID: logitech-dj: allow mice to use all types of reports
HID: i2c-hid: Revert to await reset ACK before reading report descriptor
HID: nintendo: Fix N64 controller being identified as mouse
MAINTAINERS: update Benjamin's email address
HID: intel-ish-hid: ipc: Fix dev_err usage with uninitialized dev->devc
HID: i2c-hid: remove I2C_HID_READ_PENDING flag to prevent lock-up
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf
Pablo Neira Ayuso says:
====================
Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net
The following patchset contains two Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net:
Patch #1 fixes SCTP checksumming for IPVS with gso packets,
from Ismael Luceno.
Patch #2 honor dormant flag from netdev event path to fix a possible
double hook unregistration.
* tag 'nf-24-04-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
netfilter: nf_tables: honor table dormant flag from netdev release event path
ipvs: Fix checksumming on GSO of SCTP packets
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240425090149.1359547-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and
unix_state_lock().
One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another
is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket.
So, the splat is false-positive.
Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat.
Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue
is only applied to the old GC impl.
[0]:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------------------------------
kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140
unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline]
unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876
skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188
skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline]
__kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline]
kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252
kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline]
manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline]
unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749
unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981
do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline]
splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295
do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379
__do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline]
__do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline]
__se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
__unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(unix_gc_lock);
lock(&u->lock);
lock(unix_gc_lock);
lock(&u->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11:
#0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
#0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
#1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
#2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
__unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Fixes: 47d8ac011fe1 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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b44_free_rings() accesses b44::rx_buffers (and ::tx_buffers)
unconditionally, but b44::rx_buffers is only valid when the
device is up (they get allocated in b44_open(), and deallocated
again in b44_close()), any other time these are just a NULL pointers.
So if you try to change the pause params while the network interface
is disabled/administratively down, everything explodes (which likely
netifd tries to do).
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/issues/13789
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 (Linux-2.6.12-rc2)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Peter Münster <pm@a16n.net>
Suggested-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vaclav Svoboda <svoboda@neng.cz>
Tested-by: Peter Münster <pm@a16n.net>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: Peter Münster <pm@a16n.net>
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87y192oolj.fsf@a16n.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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tls_sk_poll is called without locking the socket, and needs to read
strp->msg_ready (via tls_strp_msg_ready). Convert msg_ready to a bool
and use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE where needed. The remaining reads are
only performed when the socket is locked.
Fixes: 121dca784fc0 ("tls: suppress wakeups unless we have a full record")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0b7ee062319037cf86af6b317b3d72f7bfcd2e97.1713797701.git.sd@queasysnail.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In scenario where pin is registered with multiple parent pins via
dpll_pin_on_pin_register(..), all belonging to the same dpll device.
A second call to dpll_pin_on_pin_unregister(..) would cause a call trace,
as it tries to use already released registration resources (due to fix
introduced in b446631f355e). In this scenario pin was registered twice,
so resources are not yet expected to be release until each registered
pin/pin pair is unregistered.
Currently, the following crash/call trace is produced when ice driver is
removed on the system with installed E810T NIC which includes dpll device:
WARNING: CPU: 51 PID: 9155 at drivers/dpll/dpll_core.c:809 dpll_pin_ops+0x20/0x30
RIP: 0010:dpll_pin_ops+0x20/0x30
Call Trace:
? __warn+0x7f/0x130
? dpll_pin_ops+0x20/0x30
dpll_msg_add_pin_freq+0x37/0x1d0
dpll_cmd_pin_get_one+0x1c0/0x400
? __nlmsg_put+0x63/0x80
dpll_pin_event_send+0x93/0x140
dpll_pin_on_pin_unregister+0x3f/0x100
ice_dpll_deinit_pins+0xa1/0x230 [ice]
ice_remove+0xf1/0x210 [ice]
Fix by adding a parent pointer as a cookie when creating a registration,
also when searching for it. For the regular pins pass NULL, this allows to
create separated registration for each parent the pin is registered with.
Fixes: b446631f355e ("dpll: fix dpll_xa_ref_*_del() for multiple registrations")
Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424101636.1491424-1-arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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As interrupts are now requested from ravb_probe(), before calling
register_netdev(), ndev->name still contains the template "eth%d",
leading to funny names in /proc/interrupts. E.g. on R-Car E3:
89: 0 0 GICv2 93 Level eth%d:ch22:multi
90: 0 3 GICv2 95 Level eth%d:ch24:emac
91: 0 23484 GICv2 71 Level eth%d:ch0:rx_be
92: 0 0 GICv2 72 Level eth%d:ch1:rx_nc
93: 0 13735 GICv2 89 Level eth%d:ch18:tx_be
94: 0 0 GICv2 90 Level eth%d:ch19:tx_nc
Worse, on platforms with multiple RAVB instances (e.g. R-Car V4H), all
interrupts have similar names.
Fix this by using the device name instead, like is done in several other
drivers:
89: 0 0 GICv2 93 Level e6800000.ethernet:ch22:multi
90: 0 1 GICv2 95 Level e6800000.ethernet:ch24:emac
91: 0 28578 GICv2 71 Level e6800000.ethernet:ch0:rx_be
92: 0 0 GICv2 72 Level e6800000.ethernet:ch1:rx_nc
93: 0 14044 GICv2 89 Level e6800000.ethernet:ch18:tx_be
94: 0 0 GICv2 90 Level e6800000.ethernet:ch19:tx_nc
Rename the local variable dev_name, as it shadows the dev_name()
function, and pre-initialize it, to simplify the code.
Fixes: 32f012b8c01ca9fd ("net: ravb: Move getting/requesting IRQs in the probe() method")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj@bp.renesas.com>
Tested-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj@bp.renesas.com> # on RZ/G3S
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cde67b68adf115b3cf0b44c32334ae00b2fbb321.1713944647.git.geert+renesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Clang static checker(scan-build) warning：
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_npc.c:line 2184, column 2
Attempt to free released memory.
npc_mcam_rsrcs_deinit() has released 'mcam->counters.bmap'. Deleted this
redundant kfree() to fix this double free problem.
Fixes: dd7842878633 ("octeontx2-af: Add new devlink param to configure maximum usable NIX block LFs")
Signed-off-by: Su Hui <suhui@nfschina.com>
Reviewed-by: Geetha sowjanya <gakula@marvell.com>
Reviewed-by: Kalesh AP <kalesh-anakkur.purayil@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Hariprasad Kelam <hkelam@marvell.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424022724.144587-1-suhui@nfschina.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
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The CPTS, by design, captures the messageType (Sync, Delay_Req, etc.)
field from the second nibble of the PTP header which is defined in the
PTPv2 (1588-2008) specification. In the PTPv1 (1588-2002) specification
the first two bytes of the PTP header are defined as the versionType
which is always 0x0001. This means that any PTPv1 packets that are
tagged for TX timestamping by the CPTS will have their messageType set
to 0x0 which corresponds to a Sync message type. This causes issues
when a PTPv1 stack is expecting a Delay_Req (messageType: 0x1)
timestamp that never appears.
Fix this by checking if the ptp_class of the timestamped TX packet is
PTP_CLASS_V1 and then matching the PTP sequence ID to the stored
sequence ID in the skb->cb data structure. If the sequence IDs match
and the packet is of type PTPv1 then there is a chance that the
messageType has been incorrectly stored by the CPTS so overwrite the
messageType stored by the CPTS with the messageType from the skb->cb
data structure. This allows the PTPv1 stack to receive TX timestamps
for Delay_Req packets which are necessary to lock onto a PTP Leader.
Signed-off-by: Jason Reeder <jreeder@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Gunasekaran <r-gunasekaran@ti.com>
Tested-by: Ed Trexel <ed.trexel@hp.com>
Fixes: f6bd59526ca5 ("net: ethernet: ti: introduce am654 common platform time sync driver")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424071626.32558-1-r-gunasekaran@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
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Tony Nguyen says:
====================
Intel Wired LAN Driver Updates 2024-04-23 (i40e, iavf, ice)
This series contains updates to i40e, iavf, and ice drivers.
Sindhu removes WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag from workqueue for i40e.
Erwan Velu adjusts message to avoid confusion on base being reported on
i40e.
Sudheer corrects insufficient check for TC equality on iavf.
Jake corrects ordering of locks to avoid possible deadlock on ice.
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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'fix-isolation-of-broadcast-traffic-and-unmatched-unicast-traffic-with-macsec-offload'
Rahul Rameshbabu says:
====================
Fix isolation of broadcast traffic and unmatched unicast traffic with MACsec offload
Some device drivers support devices that enable them to annotate whether a
Rx skb refers to a packet that was processed by the MACsec offloading
functionality of the device. Logic in the Rx handling for MACsec offload
does not utilize this information to preemptively avoid forwarding to the
macsec netdev currently. Because of this, things like multicast messages or
unicast messages with an unmatched destination address such as ARP requests
are forwarded to the macsec netdev whether the message received was MACsec
encrypted or not. The goal of this patch series is to improve the Rx
handling for MACsec offload for devices capable of annotating skbs received
that were decrypted by the NIC offload for MACsec.
Here is a summary of the issue that occurs with the existing logic today.
* The current design of the MACsec offload handling path tries to use
"best guess" mechanisms for determining whether a packet associated
with the currently handled skb in the datapath was processed via HW
offload
* The best guess mechanism uses the following heuristic logic (in order of
precedence)
- Check if header destination MAC address matches MACsec netdev MAC
address -> forward to MACsec port
- Check if packet is multicast traffic -> forward to MACsec port
- MACsec security channel was able to be looked up from skb offload
context (mlx5 only) -> forward to MACsec port
* Problem: plaintext traffic can potentially solicit a MACsec encrypted
response from the offload device
- Core aspect of MACsec is that it identifies unauthorized LAN connections
and excludes them from communication
+ This behavior can be seen when not enabling offload for MACsec
- The offload behavior violates this principle in MACsec
I believe this behavior is a security bug since applications utilizing
MACsec could be exploited using this behavior, and the correct way to
resolve this is by having the hardware correctly indicate whether MACsec
offload occurred for the packet or not. In the patches in this series, I
leave a warning for when the problematic path occurs because I cannot
figure out a secure way to fix the security issue that applies to the core
MACsec offload handling in the Rx path without breaking MACsec offload for
other vendors.
Shown at the bottom is an example use case where plaintext traffic sent to
a physical port of a NIC configured for MACsec offload is unable to be
handled correctly by the software stack when the NIC provides awareness to
the kernel about whether the received packet is MACsec traffic or not. In
this specific example, plaintext ARP requests are being responded with
MACsec encrypted ARP replies (which leads to routing information being
unable to be built for the requester).
Side 1
ip link del macsec0
ip address flush mlx5_1
ip address add 1.1.1.1/24 dev mlx5_1
ip link set dev mlx5_1 up
ip link add link mlx5_1 macsec0 type macsec sci 1 encrypt on
ip link set dev macsec0 address 00:11:22:33:44:66
ip macsec offload macsec0 mac
ip macsec add macsec0 tx sa 0 pn 1 on key 00 dffafc8d7b9a43d5b9a3dfbbf6a30c16
ip macsec add macsec0 rx sci 2 on
ip macsec add macsec0 rx sci 2 sa 0 pn 1 on key 00 ead3664f508eb06c40ac7104cdae4ce5
ip address flush macsec0
ip address add 2.2.2.1/24 dev macsec0
ip link set dev macsec0 up
# macsec0 enters promiscuous mode.
# This enables all traffic received on macsec_vlan to be processed by
# the macsec offload rx datapath. This however means that traffic
# meant to be received by mlx5_1 will be incorrectly steered to
# macsec0 as well.
ip link add link macsec0 name macsec_vlan type vlan id 1
ip link set dev macsec_vlan address 00:11:22:33:44:88
ip address flush macsec_vlan
ip address add 3.3.3.1/24 dev macsec_vlan
ip link set dev macsec_vlan up
Side 2
ip link del macsec0
ip address flush mlx5_1
ip address add 1.1.1.2/24 dev mlx5_1
ip link set dev mlx5_1 up
ip link add link mlx5_1 macsec0 type macsec sci 2 encrypt on
ip link set dev macsec0 address 00:11:22:33:44:77
ip macsec offload macsec0 mac
ip macsec add macsec0 tx sa 0 pn 1 on key 00 ead3664f508eb06c40ac7104cdae4ce5
ip macsec add macsec0 rx sci 1 on
ip macsec add macsec0 rx sci 1 sa 0 pn 1 on key 00 dffafc8d7b9a43d5b9a3dfbbf6a30c16
ip address flush macsec0
ip address add 2.2.2.2/24 dev macsec0
ip link set dev macsec0 up
# macsec0 enters promiscuous mode.
# This enables all traffic received on macsec_vlan to be processed by
# the macsec offload rx datapath. This however means that traffic
# meant to be received by mlx5_1 will be incorrectly steered to
# macsec0 as well.
ip link add link macsec0 name macsec_vlan type vlan id 1
ip link set dev macsec_vlan address 00:11:22:33:44:99
ip address flush macsec_vlan
ip address add 3.3.3.2/24 dev macsec_vlan
ip link set dev macsec_vlan up
Side 1
ping -I mlx5_1 1.1.1.2
PING 1.1.1.2 (1.1.1.2) from 1.1.1.1 mlx5_1: 56(84) bytes of data.
From 1.1.1.1 icmp_seq=1 Destination Host Unreachable
ping: sendmsg: No route to host
From 1.1.1.1 icmp_seq=2 Destination Host Unreachable
From 1.1.1.1 icmp_seq=3 Destination Host Unreachable
Changes:
v2->v3:
* Made dev paramater const for eth_skb_pkt_type helper as suggested by Sabrina
Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
v1->v2:
* Fixed series subject to detail the issue being fixed
* Removed strange characters from cover letter
* Added comment in example that illustrates the impact involving
promiscuous mode
* Added patch for generalizing packet type detection
* Added Fixes: tags and targeting net
* Removed pointless warning in the heuristic Rx path for macsec offload
* Applied small refactor in Rx path offload to minimize scope of rx_sc
local variable
Link: https://github.com/Binary-Eater/macsec-rx-offload/blob/trunk/MACsec_violation_in_core_stack_offload_rx_handling.pdf
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240419213033.400467-5-rrameshbabu@nvidia.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240419011740.333714-1-rrameshbabu@nvidia.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/87r0l25y1c.fsf@nvidia.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20231116182900.46052-1-rrameshbabu@nvidia.com/
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423181319.115860-1-rrameshbabu@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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9f74a3dfcf83 ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over
aggregate"), the ice driver has acquired the LAG mutex in ice_reset_vf().
The commit placed this lock acquisition just prior to the acquisition of
the VF configuration lock.
If ice_reset_vf() acquires the configuration lock via the ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK
flag, this could deadlock with ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg() because it always
acquires the locks in the order of the VF configuration lock and then the
LAG mutex.
Lockdep reports this violation almost immediately on creating and then
removing 2 VF:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc6 #54 Tainted: G W O
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/60:3/6771 is trying to acquire lock:
ff40d43e099380a0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
but task is already holding lock:
ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
__mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg+0x45/0x690 [ice]
ice_vc_process_vf_msg+0x4f5/0x870 [ice]
__ice_clean_ctrlq+0x2b5/0x600 [ice]
ice_service_task+0x2c9/0x480 [ice]
process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
kthread+0x104/0x140
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
-> #0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50
validate_chain+0x558/0x800
__lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
__mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice]
ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice]
process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
kthread+0x104/0x140
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&pf->lag_mutex);
lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
lock(&pf->lag_mutex);
lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by kworker/60:3/6771:
#0: ff40d43e05428b38 ((wq_completion)ice){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
#1: ff50d06e05197e58 ((work_completion)(&pf->serv_task)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
#2: ff40d43ea1960e50 (&pf->vfs.table_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_process_vflr_event+0x48/0xd0 [ice]
#3: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 60 PID: 6771 Comm: kworker/60:3 Tainted: G W O 6.8.0-rc6 #54
Hardware name:
Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80
check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150
check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50
? save_trace+0x59/0x230
? add_chain_cache+0x109/0x450
validate_chain+0x558/0x800
__lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
? lock_is_held_type+0xc7/0x120
__mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50
? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
? process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice]
ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice]
process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x104/0x140
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
To avoid deadlock, we must acquire the LAG mutex only after acquiring the
VF configuration lock. Fix the ice_reset_vf() to acquire the LAG mutex only
after we either acquire or check that the VF configuration lock is held.
Fixes: 9f74a3dfcf83 ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate")
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Ertman <david.m.ertman@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com>
Tested-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-5-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Same number of TCs doesn't imply that underlying TC configs are
same. The config could be different due to difference in number
of queues in each TC. Add utility function to determine if TC
configs are same.
Fixes: d5b33d024496 ("i40evf: add ndo_setup_tc callback to i40evf")
Signed-off-by: Sudheer Mogilappagari <sudheer.mogilappagari@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mineri Bhange <minerix.bhange@intel.com> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-4-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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If the MFS is set below the default (0x2600), a warning message is
reported like the following :
MFS for port 1 has been set below the default: 600
This message is a bit confusing as the number shown here (600) is in
fact an hexa number: 0x600 = 1536
Without any explicit "0x" prefix, this message is read like the MFS is
set to 600 bytes.
MFS, as per MTUs, are usually expressed in decimal base.
This commit reports both current and default MFS values in decimal
so it's less confusing for end-users.
A typical warning message looks like the following :
MFS for port 1 (1536) has been set below the default (9728)
Signed-off-by: Erwan Velu <e.velu@criteo.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tony Brelinski <tony.brelinski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Fixes: 3a2c6ced90e1 ("i40e: Add a check to see if MFS is set")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-3-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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