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While the main additions from GHCB protocol version 1 to version 2
revolve mostly around SEV-SNP support, there are a number of changes
applicable to SEV-ES guests as well. Pluck a handful patches from the
SNP hypervisor patchset for GHCB-related changes that are also applicable
to SEV-ES. A KVM_SEV_INIT2 field lets userspace can control the maximum
GHCB protocol version advertised to guests and manage compatibility
across kernels/versions.
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A combination of prep work for TDX and SNP, and a clean up of the
page fault path to (hopefully) make it easier to follow the rules for
private memory, noslot faults, writes to read-only slots, etc.
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Allow a non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE,
so that TDX can set the "suppress VE" bit.
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The GHCB protocol version may be different from one guest to the next.
Add a field to track it for each KVM instance and extend KVM_SEV_INIT2
to allow it to be configured by userspace.
Now that all SEV-ES support for GHCB protocol version 2 is in place, go
ahead and default to it when creating SEV-ES guests through the new
KVM_SEV_INIT2 interface. Keep the older KVM_SEV_ES_INIT interface
restricted to GHCB protocol version 1.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-5-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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GHCB version 2 adds support for a GHCB-based termination request that
a guest can issue when it reaches an error state and wishes to inform
the hypervisor that it should be terminated. Implement support for that
similarly to GHCB MSR-based termination requests that are already
available to SEV-ES guests via earlier versions of the GHCB protocol.
See 'Termination Request' in the 'Invoking VMGEXIT' section of the GHCB
specification for more details.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-4-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Version 2 of the GHCB specification introduced advertisement of features
that are supported by the Hypervisor.
Now that KVM supports version 2 of the GHCB specification, bump the
maximum supported protocol version.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-3-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add support for AP Reset Hold being invoked using the GHCB MSR protocol,
available in version 2 of the GHCB specification.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-2-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Zero out all of kvm_caps when loading a new vendor module to ensure that
KVM can't inadvertently rely on global initialization of a field, and add
a comment above the definition of kvm_caps to call out that all fields
needs to be explicitly computed during vendor module load.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240423165328.2853870-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Effectively reset supported_mce_cap on vendor module load to ensure that
capabilities aren't unintentionally preserved across module reload, e.g.
if kvm-intel.ko added a module param to control LMCE support, or if
someone somehow managed to load a vendor module that doesn't support LMCE
after loading and unloading kvm-intel.ko.
Practically speaking, this bug is a non-issue as kvm-intel.ko doesn't have
a module param for LMCE, and there is no system in the world that supports
both kvm-intel.ko and kvm-amd.ko.
Fixes: c45dcc71b794 ("KVM: VMX: enable guest access to LMCE related MSRs")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240423165328.2853870-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Recompute the entire set of supported VM types when a vendor module is
loaded, as preserving supported_vm_types across vendor module unload and
reload can result in VM types being incorrectly treated as supported.
E.g. if a vendor module is loaded with TDP enabled, unloaded, and then
reloaded with TDP disabled, KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM will be incorrectly
retained. Ditto for SEV_VM and SEV_ES_VM and their respective module
params in kvm-amd.ko.
Fixes: 2a955c4db1dd ("KVM: x86: Add supported_vm_types to kvm_caps")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240423165328.2853870-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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KVM/riscv changes for 6.10
- Support guest breakpoints using ebreak
- Introduce per-VCPU mp_state_lock and reset_cntx_lock
- Virtualize SBI PMU snapshot and counter overflow interrupts
- New selftests for SBI PMU and Guest ebreak
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WARN if __kvm_faultin_pfn() generates a "no slot" pfn, and gracefully
handle the unexpected behavior instead of continuing on with dangerous
state, e.g. tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level() _only_ checks fault->slot,
and so could install a bogus PFN into the guest.
The existing code is functionally ok, because kvm_faultin_pfn() pre-checks
all of the cases that result in KVM_PFN_NOSLOT, but it is unnecessarily
unsafe as it relies on __gfn_to_pfn_memslot() getting the _exact_ same
memslot, i.e. not a re-retrieved pointer with KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID set.
And checking only fault->slot would fall apart if KVM ever added a flag or
condition that forced emulation, similar to how KVM handles writes to
read-only memslots.
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-17-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly set "pfn" and "hva" to error values in kvm_mmu_do_page_fault()
to harden KVM against using "uninitialized" values. In quotes because the
fields are actually zero-initialized, and zero is a legal value for both
page frame numbers and virtual addresses. E.g. failure to set "pfn" prior
to creating an SPTE could result in KVM pointing at physical address '0',
which is far less desirable than KVM generating a SPTE with reserved PA
bits set and thus effectively killing the VM.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-16-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly set fault->hva to KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD when handling a "no slot"
fault to ensure that KVM doesn't use a bogus virtual address, e.g. if
there *was* a slot but it's unusable (APIC access page), or if there
really was no slot, in which case fault->hva will be '0' (which is a
legal address for x86).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-15-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Handle the "no memslot" case at the beginning of kvm_faultin_pfn(), just
after the private versus shared check, so that there's no need to
repeatedly query whether or not a slot exists. This also makes it more
obvious that, except for private vs. shared attributes, the process of
faulting in a pfn simply doesn't apply to gfns without a slot.
Opportunistically stuff @fault's metadata in kvm_handle_noslot_fault() so
that it doesn't need to be duplicated in all paths that invoke
kvm_handle_noslot_fault(), and to minimize the probability of not stuffing
the right fields.
Leave the existing handle behind, but convert it to a WARN, to guard
against __kvm_faultin_pfn() unexpectedly nullifying fault->slot.
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-14-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move the checks related to the validity of an access to a memslot from the
inner __kvm_faultin_pfn() to its sole caller, kvm_faultin_pfn(). This
allows emulating accesses to the APIC access page, which don't need to
resolve a pfn, even if there is a relevant in-progress mmu_notifier
invalidation. Ditto for accesses to KVM internal memslots from L2, which
KVM also treats as emulated MMIO.
More importantly, this will allow for future cleanup by having the
"no memslot" case bail from kvm_faultin_pfn() very early on.
Go to rather extreme and gross lengths to make the change a glorified
nop, e.g. call into __kvm_faultin_pfn() even when there is no slot, as the
related code is very subtle. E.g. fault->slot can be nullified if it
points at the APIC access page, some flows in KVM x86 expect fault->pfn
to be KVM_PFN_NOSLOT, while others check only fault->slot, etc.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-13-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly detect and disallow private accesses to emulated MMIO in
kvm_handle_noslot_fault() instead of relying on kvm_faultin_pfn_private()
to perform the check. This will allow the page fault path to go straight
to kvm_handle_noslot_fault() without bouncing through __kvm_faultin_pfn().
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-12-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Allow mapping KVM's internal memslots used for EPT without unrestricted
guest into L2, i.e. allow mapping the hidden TSS and the identity mapped
page tables into L2. Unlike the APIC access page, there is no correctness
issue with letting L2 access the "hidden" memory. Allowing these memslots
to be mapped into L2 fixes a largely theoretical bug where KVM could
incorrectly emulate subsequent _L1_ accesses as MMIO, and also ensures
consistent KVM behavior for L2.
If KVM is using TDP, but L1 is using shadow paging for L2, then routing
through kvm_handle_noslot_fault() will incorrectly cache the gfn as MMIO,
and create an MMIO SPTE. Creating an MMIO SPTE is ok, but only because
kvm_mmu_page_role.guest_mode ensure KVM uses different roots for L1 vs.
L2. But vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn will remain valid, and could cause KVM to
incorrectly treat an L1 access to the hidden TSS or identity mapped page
tables as MMIO.
Furthermore, forcing L2 accesses to be treated as "no slot" faults doesn't
actually prevent exposing KVM's internal memslots to L2, it simply forces
KVM to emulate the access. In most cases, that will trigger MMIO,
amusingly due to filling vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn, but also because
vcpu_is_mmio_gpa() unconditionally treats APIC accesses as MMIO, i.e. APIC
accesses are ok. But the hidden TSS and identity mapped page tables could
go either way (MMIO or access the private memslot's backing memory).
Alternatively, the inconsistent emulator behavior could be addressed by
forcing MMIO emulation for L2 access to all internal memslots, not just to
the APIC. But that's arguably less correct than letting L2 access the
hidden TSS and identity mapped page tables, not to mention that it's
*extremely* unlikely anyone cares what KVM does in this case. From L1's
perspective there is R/W memory at those memslots, the memory just happens
to be initialized with non-zero data. Making the memory disappear when it
is accessed by L2 is far more magical and arbitrary than the memory
existing in the first place.
The APIC access page is special because KVM _must_ emulate the access to
do the right thing (emulate an APIC access instead of reading/writing the
APIC access page). And despite what commit 3a2936dedd20 ("kvm: mmu: Don't
expose private memslots to L2") said, it's not just necessary when L1 is
accelerating L2's virtual APIC, it's just as important (likely *more*
imporant for correctness when L1 is passing through its own APIC to L2.
Fixes: 3a2936dedd20 ("kvm: mmu: Don't expose private memslots to L2")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-11-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Prioritize private vs. shared gfn attribute checks above slot validity
checks to ensure a consistent userspace ABI. E.g. as is, KVM will exit to
userspace if there is no memslot, but emulate accesses to the APIC access
page even if the attributes mismatch.
Fixes: 8dd2eee9d526 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Handle page fault for private memory")
Cc: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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WARN and skip the emulated MMIO fastpath if a private, reserved page fault
is encountered, as private+reserved should be an impossible combination
(KVM should never create an MMIO SPTE for a private access).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-9-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Right now the error code is not used when an async page fault is completed.
This is not a problem in the current code, but it is untidy. For protected
VMs, we will also need to check that the page attributes match the current
state of the page, because asynchronous page faults can only occur on
shared pages (private pages go through kvm_faultin_pfn_private() instead of
__gfn_to_pfn_memslot()).
Start by piping the error code from kvm_arch_setup_async_pf() to
kvm_arch_async_page_ready() via the architecture-specific async page
fault data. For now, it can be used to assert that there are no
async page faults on private memory.
Extracted from a patch by Isaku Yamahata.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add and use a synthetic, KVM-defined page fault error code to indicate
whether a fault is to private vs. shared memory. TDX and SNP have
different mechanisms for reporting private vs. shared, and KVM's
software-protected VMs have no mechanism at all. Usurp an error code
flag to avoid having to plumb another parameter to kvm_mmu_page_fault()
and friends.
Alternatively, KVM could borrow AMD's PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK, i.e. set it
for TDX and software-protected VMs as appropriate, but that would require
*clearing* the flag for SEV and SEV-ES VMs, which support encrypted
memory at the hardware layer, but don't utilize private memory at the
KVM layer.
Opportunistically add a comment to call out that the logic for software-
protected VMs is (and was before this commit) broken for nested MMUs, i.e.
for nested TDP, as the GPA is an L2 GPA. Punt on trying to play nice with
nested MMUs as there is a _lot_ of functionality that simply doesn't work
for software-protected VMs, e.g. all of the paths where KVM accesses guest
memory need to be updated to be aware of private vs. shared memory.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20240228024147.41573-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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WARN if bits 63:32 are non-zero when handling an intercepted legacy #PF,
as the error code for #PF is limited to 32 bits (and in practice, 16 bits
on Intel CPUS). This behavior is architectural, is part of KVM's ABI
(see kvm_vcpu_events.error_code), and is explicitly documented as being
preserved for intecerpted #PF in both the APM:
The error code saved in EXITINFO1 is the same as would be pushed onto
the stack by a non-intercepted #PF exception in protected mode.
and even more explicitly in the SDM as VMCS.VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE is a
32-bit field.
Simply drop the upper bits if hardware provides garbage, as spurious
information should do no harm (though in all likelihood hardware is buggy
and the kernel is doomed).
Handling all upper 32 bits in the #PF path will allow moving the sanity
check on synthetic checks from kvm_mmu_page_fault() to npf_interception(),
which in turn will allow deriving PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS from AMD's
PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK without running afoul of the sanity check.
Note, this is also why Intel uses bit 15 for SGX (highest bit on Intel CPUs)
and AMD uses bit 31 for RMP (highest bit on AMD CPUs); using the highest
bit minimizes the probability of a collision with the "other" vendor,
without needing to plumb more bits through microcode.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Plumb the full 64-bit error code throughout the page fault handling code
so that KVM can use the upper 32 bits, e.g. SNP's PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK
will be used to determine whether or not a fault is private vs. shared.
Note, passing the 64-bit error code to FNAME(walk_addr)() does NOT change
the behavior of permission_fault() when invoked in the page fault path, as
KVM explicitly clears PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS in kvm_mmu_page_fault().
Continue passing '0' from the async #PF worker, as guest_memfd and thus
private memory doesn't support async page faults.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
[mdr: drop references/changes on rebase, update commit message]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
[sean: drop truncation in call to FNAME(walk_addr)(), rewrite changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move the sanity check that hardware never sets bits that collide with KVM-
define synthetic bits from kvm_mmu_page_fault() to npf_interception(),
i.e. make the sanity check #NPF specific. The legacy #PF path already
WARNs if _any_ of bits 63:32 are set, and the error code that comes from
VMX's EPT Violatation and Misconfig is 100% synthesized (KVM morphs VMX's
EXIT_QUALIFICATION into error code flags).
Add a compile-time assert in the legacy #PF handler to make sure that KVM-
define flags are covered by its existing sanity check on the upper bits.
Opportunistically add a description of PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS, since we
are removing the comment that defined it.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Define more #NPF error code flags that are relevant to SEV+ (mostly SNP)
guests, as specified by the APM:
* Bit 31 (RMP): Set to 1 if the fault was caused due to an RMP check or a
VMPL check failure, 0 otherwise.
* Bit 34 (ENC): Set to 1 if the guest’s effective C-bit was 1, 0 otherwise.
* Bit 35 (SIZEM): Set to 1 if the fault was caused by a size mismatch between
PVALIDATE or RMPADJUST and the RMP, 0 otherwise.
* Bit 36 (VMPL): Set to 1 if the fault was caused by a VMPL permission
check failure, 0 otherwise.
Note, the APM is *extremely* misleading, and strongly implies that the
above flags can _only_ be set for #NPF exits from SNP guests. That is a
lie, as bit 34 (C-bit=1, i.e. was encrypted) can be set when running _any_
flavor of SEV guest on SNP capable hardware.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Open code the bit number directly in the PFERR_* masks and drop the
intermediate PFERR_*_BIT defines, as having to bounce through two macros
just to see which flag corresponds to which bit is quite annoying, as is
having to define two macros just to add recognition of a new flag.
Use ternary operator to derive the bit in permission_fault(), the one
function that actually needs the bit number as part of clever shifting
to avoid conditional branches. Generally the compiler is able to turn
it into a conditional move, and if not it's not really a big deal.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Exit to userspace with -EFAULT / KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT if a private fault
triggers emulation of any kind, as KVM doesn't currently support emulating
access to guest private memory. Practically speaking, private faults and
emulation are already mutually exclusive, but there are many flow that
can result in KVM returning RET_PF_EMULATE, and adding one last check
to harden against weird, unexpected combinations and/or KVM bugs is
inexpensive.
Suggested-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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SBI PMU test comprises of multiple tests and user may want to run
only a subset depending on the platform. The most common case would
be to run all to validate all the tests. However, some platform may
not support all events or all ISA extensions.
The commandline option allows user to disable any set of tests if
they want to.
Suggested-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-25-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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Add a test for verifying overflow interrupt. Currently, it relies on
overflow support on cycle/instret events. This test works for cycle/
instret events which support sampling via hpmcounters on the platform.
There are no ISA extensions to detect if a platform supports that. Thus,
this test will fail on platform with virtualization but doesn't
support overflow on these two events.
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-24-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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Verify PMU snapshot functionality by setting up the shared memory
correctly and reading the counter values from the shared memory
instead of the CSR.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-23-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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This test implements basic sanity test and cycle/instret event
counting tests.
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-22-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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The SBI PMU extension definition is required for upcoming SBI PMU
selftests.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-21-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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The KVM RISC-V allows Sscofpmf extension for Guest/VM so let us
add this extension to get-reg-list test.
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-20-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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__vcpu_has_ext can check both SBI and ISA extensions when the first
argument is properly converted to SBI/ISA extension IDs. Introduce
two helper functions to make life easier for developers so they
don't have to worry about the conversions.
Replace the current usages as well with new helpers.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-19-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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The SBI definitions will continue to grow. Move the sbi related
definitions to its own header file from processor.h
Suggested-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-18-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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Rename the function to indicate that it is meant for firmware
counter read. While at it, add a range sanity check for it as
well.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-17-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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The SBI v2.0 introduced a fw_read_hi function to read 64 bit firmware
counters for RV32 based systems.
Add infrastructure to support that.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-16-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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KVM enables perf for guest via counter virtualization. However, the
sampling can not be supported as there is no mechanism to enabled
trap/emulate scountovf in ISA yet. Rely on the SBI PMU snapshot
to provide the counter overflow data via the shared memory.
In case of sampling event, the host first sets the guest's LCOFI
interrupt and injects to the guest via irq filtering mechanism defined
in AIA specification. Thus, ssaia must be enabled in the host in order
to use perf sampling in the guest. No other AIA dependency w.r.t kernel
is required.
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-15-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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PMU Snapshot function allows to minimize the number of traps when the
guest access configures/access the hpmcounters. If the snapshot feature
is enabled, the hypervisor updates the shared memory with counter
data and state of overflown counters. The guest can just read the
shared memory instead of trap & emulate done by the hypervisor.
This patch doesn't implement the counter overflow yet.
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-14-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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Currently, we return a linux error code if creating a perf event failed
in kvm. That shouldn't be necessary as guest can continue to operate
without perf profiling or profiling with firmware counters.
Return appropriate SBI error code to indicate that PMU configuration
failed. An error message in kvm already describes the reason for failure.
Fixes: 0cb74b65d2e5 ("RISC-V: KVM: Implement perf support without sampling")
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-13-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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The virtual counter value is updated during pmu_ctr_read. There is no need
to update it in reset case. Otherwise, it will be counted twice which is
incorrect.
Fixes: 0cb74b65d2e5 ("RISC-V: KVM: Implement perf support without sampling")
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-12-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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The initial sample period value when counter value is not assigned
should be set to maximum value supported by the counter width.
Otherwise, it may result in spurious interrupts.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-11-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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SBI v2.0 SBI introduced PMU snapshot feature which adds the following
features.
1. Read counter values directly from the shared memory instead of
csr read.
2. Start multiple counters with initial values with one SBI call.
These functionalities optimizes the number of traps to the higher
privilege mode. If the kernel is in VS mode while the hypervisor
deploy trap & emulate method, this would minimize all the hpmcounter
CSR read traps. If the kernel is running in S-mode, the benefits
reduced to CSR latency vs DRAM/cache latency as there is no trap
involved while accessing the hpmcounter CSRs.
In both modes, it does saves the number of ecalls while starting
multiple counter together with an initial values. This is a likely
scenario if multiple counters overflow at the same time.
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Reviewed-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-10-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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For RV32, used_hw_ctrs can have more than 1 word if the firmware chooses
to interleave firmware/hardware counters indicies. Even though it's a
unlikely scenario, handle that case by iterating over all the words
instead of just using the first word.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-9-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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As per the SBI specification, minor version is encoded in the
lower 24 bits only. Make sure that the SBI version is computed
with the appropriate mask.
Currently, there is no minor version in use. Thus, it doesn't
change anything functionality but it is good to be compliant with
the specification.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-8-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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SBI_STA_SHMEM_DISABLE is a macro to invoke disable shared memory
commands. As this can be invoked from other SBI extension context
as well, rename it to more generic name as SBI_SHMEM_DISABLE.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-7-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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SBI PMU Snapshot function optimizes the number of traps to
higher privilege mode by leveraging a shared memory between the S/VS-mode
and the M/HS mode. Add the definitions for that extension and new error
codes.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-6-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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It is a good practice to use BIT() instead of (1 << x).
Replace the current usages with BIT().
Take this opportunity to replace few (1UL << x) with BIT() as well
for consistency.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-5-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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SBI v2.0 introduced a explicit function to read the upper 32 bits
for any firmware counter width that is longer than 32bits.
This is only applicable for RV32 where firmware counter can be
64 bit.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420151741.962500-4-atishp@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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