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2023-01-18iommu/amd: Add PCI segment support for ivrs_[ioapic/hpet/acpihid] commandsSuravee Suthikulpanit1-9/+25
[ Upstream commit bbe3a106580c21bc883fb0c9fa3da01534392fe8 ] By default, PCI segment is zero and can be omitted. To support system with non-zero PCI segment ID, modify the parsing functions to allow PCI segment ID. Co-developed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220706113825.25582-33-vasant.hegde@amd.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Stable-dep-of: 1198d2316dc4 ("iommu/amd: Fix ill-formed ivrs_ioapic, ivrs_hpet and ivrs_acpihid options") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-01-18docs: Fix the docs build with Sphinx 6.0Jonathan Corbet1-2/+4
commit 0283189e8f3d0917e2ac399688df85211f48447b upstream. Sphinx 6.0 removed the execfile_() function, which we use as part of the configuration process. They *did* warn us... Just open-code the functionality as is done in Sphinx itself. Tested (using SPHINX_CONF, since this code is only executed with an alternative config file) on various Sphinx versions from 2.5 through 6.0. Reported-by: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-01-14ASoC: dt-bindings: wcd9335: fix reset line polarity in exampleDmitry Torokhov1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 34cb111f8a7b98b5fec809dd194003bca20ef1b2 ] When resetting the block, the reset line is being driven low and then high, which means that the line in DTS should be annotated as "active low". Fixes: 1877c9fda1b7 ("ASoC: dt-bindings: add dt bindings for wcd9335 audio codec") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027074652.1044235-2-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-01-14spi: Update reference to struct spi_controllerJonathan Neuschäfer1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit bf585ccee22faf469d82727cf375868105b362f7 ] struct spi_master has been renamed to struct spi_controller. Update the reference in spi.rst to make it clickable again. Fixes: 8caab75fd2c2 ("spi: Generalize SPI "master" to "controller"") Signed-off-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221101173252.1069294-1-j.neuschaefer@gmx.net Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-01-14debugfs: fix error when writing negative value to atomic_t debugfs fileAkinobu Mita1-6/+4
[ Upstream commit d472cf797c4e268613dbce5ec9b95d0bcae19ecb ] The simple attribute files do not accept a negative value since the commit 488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in simple_attr_write()"), so we have to use a 64-bit value to write a negative value for a debugfs file created by debugfs_create_atomic_t(). This restores the previous behaviour by introducing DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE_SIGNED for a signed value. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220919172418.45257-4-akinobu.mita@gmail.com Fixes: 488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in simple_attr_write()") Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi <zhaogongyi@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-01-14docs: fault-injection: fix non-working usage of negative valuesWolfram Sang1-10/+14
[ Upstream commit 005747526d4f3c2ec995891e95cb7625161022f9 ] Fault injection uses debugfs in a way that the provided values via sysfs are interpreted as u64. Providing negative numbers results in an error: /sys/kernel/debug/fail_function# echo -1 > times sh: write error: Invalid argument Update the docs and examples to use "printf %#x <val>" in these cases. For "retval", reword the paragraph a little and fix a typo. Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210603125841.27436-1-wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Stable-dep-of: d472cf797c4e ("debugfs: fix error when writing negative value to atomic_t debugfs file") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-11-25docs: update mediator contact information in CoC docShuah Khan1-1/+1
commit 5fddf8962b429b8303c4a654291ecb6e61a7d747 upstream. Update mediator contact information in CoC interpretation document. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221011171417.34286-1-skhan@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-16KVM: s390: pv: don't allow userspace to set the clock under PVNico Boehr1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit 6973091d1b50ab4042f6a2d495f59e9db3662ab8 ] When running under PV, the guest's TOD clock is under control of the ultravisor and the hypervisor isn't allowed to change it. Hence, don't allow userspace to change the guest's TOD clock by returning -EOPNOTSUPP. When userspace changes the guest's TOD clock, KVM updates its kvm.arch.epoch field and, in addition, the epoch field in all state descriptions of all VCPUs. But, under PV, the ultravisor will ignore the epoch field in the state description and simply overwrite it on next SIE exit with the actual guest epoch. This leads to KVM having an incorrect view of the guest's TOD clock: it has updated its internal kvm.arch.epoch field, but the ultravisor ignores the field in the state description. Whenever a guest is now waiting for a clock comparator, KVM will incorrectly calculate the time when the guest should wake up, possibly causing the guest to sleep for much longer than expected. With this change, kvm_s390_set_tod() will now take the kvm->lock to be able to call kvm_s390_pv_is_protected(). Since kvm_s390_set_tod_clock() also takes kvm->lock, use __kvm_s390_set_tod_clock() instead. The function kvm_s390_set_tod_clock is now unused, hence remove it. Update the documentation to indicate the TOD clock attr calls can now return -EOPNOTSUPP. Fixes: 0f3035047140 ("KVM: s390: protvirt: Do only reset registers that are accessible") Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221011160712.928239-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20221011160712.928239-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-11-10tracing/histogram: Update document for KEYS_MAX sizeZheng Yejian1-1/+1
commit a635beeacc6d56d2b71c39e6c0103f85b53d108e upstream. After commit 4f36c2d85ced ("tracing: Increase tracing map KEYS_MAX size"), 'keys' supports up to three fields. Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221017103806.2479139-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-10-30arm64: errata: Remove AES hwcap for COMPAT tasksJames Morse1-0/+4
commit 44b3834b2eed595af07021b1c64e6f9bc396398b upstream. Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 have an erratum where an interrupt that occurs between a pair of AES instructions in aarch32 mode may corrupt the ELR. The task will subsequently produce the wrong AES result. The AES instructions are part of the cryptographic extensions, which are optional. User-space software will detect the support for these instructions from the hwcaps. If the platform doesn't support these instructions a software implementation should be used. Remove the hwcap bits on affected parts to indicate user-space should not use the AES instructions. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220714161523.279570-3-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [florian: removed arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps and fixup cpufeature.c] Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-10-26iio: ABI: Fix wrong format of differential capacitance channel ABI.Jonathan Cameron1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 1efc41035f1841acf0af2bab153158e27ce94f10 ] in_ only occurs once in these attributes. Fixes: 0baf29d658c7 ("staging:iio:documentation Add abi docs for capacitance adcs.") Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220626122938.582107-3-jic23@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-10-15ARM: dts: fix Moxa SDIO 'compatible', remove 'sdhci' misnomerSergei Antonov1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 02181e68275d28cab3c3f755852770367f1bc229 ] Driver moxart-mmc.c has .compatible = "moxa,moxart-mmc". But moxart .dts/.dtsi and the documentation file moxa,moxart-dma.txt contain compatible = "moxa,moxart-sdhci". Change moxart .dts/.dtsi files and moxa,moxart-dma.txt to match the driver. Replace 'sdhci' with 'mmc' in names too, since SDHCI is a different controller from FTSDC010. Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Sergei Antonov <saproj@gmail.com> Cc: Jonas Jensen <jonas.jensen@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220907175341.1477383-1-saproj@gmail.com' Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-10-15docs: update mediator information in CoC docsShuah Khan1-1/+1
commit 8bfdfa0d6b929ede7b6189e0e546ceb6a124d05d upstream. Update mediator information in the CoC interpretation document. Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901212319.56644-1-skhan@linuxfoundation.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-09-20Input: iforce - add support for Boeder Force Feedback WheelGreg Tulli1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 9c9c71168f7979f3798b61c65b4530fbfbcf19d1 ] Add a new iforce_device entry to support the Boeder Force Feedback Wheel device. Signed-off-by: Greg Tulli <greg.iforce@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3256420-c8ac-31b-8499-3c488a9880fd@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-09-15arm64: errata: add detection for AMEVCNTR01 incrementing incorrectlyIonela Voinescu1-0/+2
commit e89d120c4b720e232cc6a94f0fcbd59c15d41489 upstream. The AMU counter AMEVCNTR01 (constant counter) should increment at the same rate as the system counter. On affected Cortex-A510 cores, AMEVCNTR01 increments incorrectly giving a significantly higher output value. This results in inaccurate task scheduler utilization tracking and incorrect feedback on CPU frequency. Work around this problem by returning 0 when reading the affected counter in key locations that results in disabling all users of this counter from using it either for frequency invariance or as FFH reference counter. This effect is the same to firmware disabling affected counters. Details on how the two features are affected by this erratum: - AMU counters will not be used for frequency invariance for affected CPUs and CPUs in the same cpufreq policy. AMUs can still be used for frequency invariance for unaffected CPUs in the system. Although unlikely, if no alternative method can be found to support frequency invariance for affected CPUs (cpufreq based or solution based on platform counters) frequency invariance will be disabled. Please check the chapter on frequency invariance at Documentation/scheduler/sched-capacity.rst for details of its effect. - Given that FFH can be used to fetch either the core or constant counter values, restrictions are lifted regarding any of these counters returning a valid (!0) value. Therefore FFH is considered supported if there is a least one CPU that support AMUs, independent of any counters being disabled or affected by this erratum. Clarifying comments are now added to the cpc_ffh_supported(), cpu_read_constcnt() and cpu_read_corecnt() functions. The above is achieved through adding a new erratum: ARM64_ERRATUM_2457168. Signed-off-by: Ionela Voinescu <ionela.voinescu@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220819103050.24211-1-ionela.voinescu@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-31Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfsSalvatore Bonaccorso1-0/+1
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream. While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that. Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-31x86/bugs: Add "unknown" reporting for MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta1-0/+14
commit 7df548840c496b0141fb2404b889c346380c2b22 upstream. Older Intel CPUs that are not in the affected processor list for MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities currently report "Not affected" in sysfs, which may not be correct. Vulnerability status for these older CPUs is unknown. Add known-not-affected CPUs to the whitelist. Report "unknown" mitigation status for CPUs that are not in blacklist, whitelist and also don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits that reflect hardware immunity to MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. Mitigation is not deployed when the status is unknown. [ bp: Massage, fixup. ] Fixes: 8d50cdf8b834 ("x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data") Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Suggested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a932c154772f2121794a5f2eded1a11013114711.1657846269.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-31net: Fix data-races around netdev_max_backlog.Kuniyuki Iwashima1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 5dcd08cd19912892586c6082d56718333e2d19db ] While reading netdev_max_backlog, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. While at it, we remove the unnecessary spaces in the doc. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-08-25locking/atomic: Make test_and_*_bit() ordered on failureHector Martin1-1/+1
commit 415d832497098030241605c52ea83d4e2cfa7879 upstream. These operations are documented as always ordered in include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h, and producer-consumer type use cases where one side needs to ensure a flag is left pending after some shared data was updated rely on this ordering, even in the failure case. This is the case with the workqueue code, which currently suffers from a reproducible ordering violation on Apple M1 platforms (which are notoriously out-of-order) that ends up causing the TTY layer to fail to deliver data to userspace properly under the right conditions. This change fixes that bug. Change the documentation to restrict the "no order on failure" story to the _lock() variant (for which it makes sense), and remove the early-exit from the generic implementation, which is what causes the missing barrier semantics in that case. Without this, the remaining atomic op is fully ordered (including on ARM64 LSE, as of recent versions of the architecture spec). Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e986a0d6cb36 ("locking/atomics, asm-generic/bitops/atomic.h: Rewrite using atomic_*() APIs") Fixes: 61e02392d3c7 ("locking/atomic/bitops: Document and clarify ordering semantics for failed test_and_{}_bit()") Signed-off-by: Hector Martin <marcan@marcan.st> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-25regulator: pca9450: Remove restrictions for regulator-nameFrieder Schrempf1-11/+0
commit b0de7fa706506bf0591037908376351beda8c5d6 upstream. The device bindings shouldn't put any constraints on the regulator-name property specified in the generic bindings. This allows using arbitrary and descriptive names for the regulators. Suggested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Fixes: 7ae9e3a6bf3f ("dt-bindings: regulator: add pca9450 regulator yaml") Signed-off-by: Frieder Schrempf <frieder.schrempf@kontron.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220802064335.8481-1-frieder@fris.de Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-25dt-bindings: clock: qcom,gcc-msm8996: add more GCC clock sourcesDmitry Baryshkov1-0/+16
commit 2b4e75a7a7c8d3531a40ebb103b92f88ff693f79 upstream. Add additional GCC clock sources. This includes PCIe and USB PIPE and UFS symbol clocks. Fixes: 2a8aa18c1131 ("dt-bindings: clk: qcom: Fix self-validation, split, and clean cruft") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620071936.1558906-2-dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-25dt-bindings: arm: qcom: fix MSM8916 MTP compatiblesKrzysztof Kozlowski1-1/+1
commit bb35fe1efbae4114bd288fae0f56070f563adcfc upstream. The order of compatibles for MSM8916 MTP board is different: msm8916-mtp.dtb: /: compatible: 'oneOf' conditional failed, one must be fixed: ['qcom,msm8916-mtp', 'qcom,msm8916-mtp/1', 'qcom,msm8916'] is too long Fixes: 9d3ef77fe568 ("dt-bindings: arm: Convert QCom board/soc bindings to json-schema") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org> Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520123252.365762-3-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-25Documentation: ACPI: EINJ: Fix obsolete exampleQifu Zhang1-1/+1
commit 9066e151c37950af92c3be6a7270daa8e8063db9 upstream. Since commit 488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in simple_attr_write()"), the EINJ debugfs interface no longer accepts negative values as input. Attempt to do so will result in EINVAL. Fixes: 488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in simple_attr_write()") Signed-off-by: Qifu Zhang <zhangqifu@bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-21xen-blkfront: Apply 'feature_persistent' parameter when connectSeongJae Park1-1/+1
commit 402c43ea6b34a1b371ffeed9adf907402569eaf5 upstream. In some use cases[1], the backend is created while the frontend doesn't support the persistent grants feature, but later the frontend can be changed to support the feature and reconnect. In the past, 'blkback' enabled the persistent grants feature since it unconditionally checked if frontend supports the persistent grants feature for every connect ('connect_ring()') and decided whether it should use persistent grans or not. However, commit aac8a70db24b ("xen-blkback: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants") has mistakenly changed the behavior. It made the frontend feature support check to not be repeated once it shown the 'feature_persistent' as 'false', or the frontend doesn't support persistent grants. Similar behavioral change has made on 'blkfront' by commit 74a852479c68 ("xen-blkfront: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants"). This commit changes the behavior of the parameter to make effect for every connect, so that the previous behavior of 'blkfront' can be restored. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/CAJwUmVB6H3iTs-C+U=v-pwJB7-_ZRHPxHzKRJZ22xEPW7z8a=g@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 74a852479c68 ("xen-blkfront: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715225108.193398-4-sj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-21xen-blkback: Apply 'feature_persistent' parameter when connectMaximilian Heyne1-1/+1
commit e94c6101e151b019b8babc518ac2a6ada644a5a1 upstream. In some use cases[1], the backend is created while the frontend doesn't support the persistent grants feature, but later the frontend can be changed to support the feature and reconnect. In the past, 'blkback' enabled the persistent grants feature since it unconditionally checked if frontend supports the persistent grants feature for every connect ('connect_ring()') and decided whether it should use persistent grans or not. However, commit aac8a70db24b ("xen-blkback: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants") has mistakenly changed the behavior. It made the frontend feature support check to not be repeated once it shown the 'feature_persistent' as 'false', or the frontend doesn't support persistent grants. This commit changes the behavior of the parameter to make effect for every connect, so that the previous workflow can work again as expected. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/CAJwUmVB6H3iTs-C+U=v-pwJB7-_ZRHPxHzKRJZ22xEPW7z8a=g@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Andrii Chepurnyi <andrii.chepurnyi82@gmail.com> Fixes: aac8a70db24b ("xen-blkback: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715225108.193398-3-sj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-21x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for IBPB mitigated RETBleedKim Phillips1-8/+21
commit e6cfcdda8cbe81eaf821c897369a65fec987b404 upstream. AMD's "Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion, Rev. 1.0 2022-07-12" whitepaper, under section 6.1.2 "IBPB On Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety" says: Similar to the Jmp2Ret mitigation, if the code on the sibling thread cannot be trusted, software should set STIBP to 1 or disable SMT to ensure SMT safety when using this mitigation. So, like already being done for retbleed=unret, and now also for retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it, and report its SMT vulnerability status accordingly. [ bp: Remove the "we" and remove "[AMD]" applicability parameter which doesn't work here. ] Fixes: 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb") Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10, 5.15, 5.19 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220804192201.439596-1-kim.phillips@amd.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-21vfio: Split creation of a vfio_device into init and register opsJason Gunthorpe1-13/+18
[ Upstream commit 0bfc6a4ea63c2adac71a824397ef48f28dbc5e47 ] This makes the struct vfio_device part of the public interface so it can be used with container_of and so forth, as is typical for a Linux subystem. This is the first step to bring some type-safety to the vfio interface by allowing the replacement of 'void *' and 'struct device *' inputs with a simple and clear 'struct vfio_device *' For now the self-allocating vfio_add_group_dev() interface is kept so each user can be updated as a separate patch. The expected usage pattern is driver core probe() function: my_device = kzalloc(sizeof(*mydevice)); vfio_init_group_dev(&my_device->vdev, dev, ops, mydevice); /* other driver specific prep */ vfio_register_group_dev(&my_device->vdev); dev_set_drvdata(dev, my_device); driver core remove() function: my_device = dev_get_drvdata(dev); vfio_unregister_group_dev(&my_device->vdev); /* other driver specific tear down */ kfree(my_device); Allowing the driver to be able to use the drvdata and vfio_device to go to/from its own data. The pattern also makes it clear that vfio_register_group_dev() must be last in the sequence, as once it is called the core code can immediately start calling ops. The init/register gap is provided to allow for the driver to do setup before ops can be called and thus avoid races. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Gurtovoy <mgurtovoy@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Message-Id: <3-v3-225de1400dfc+4e074-vfio1_jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-08-21x86: Handle idle=nomwait cmdline properly for x86_idleWyes Karny1-6/+9
[ Upstream commit 8bcedb4ce04750e1ccc9a6b6433387f6a9166a56 ] When kernel is booted with idle=nomwait do not use MWAIT as the default idle state. If the user boots the kernel with idle=nomwait, it is a clear direction to not use mwait as the default idle state. However, the current code does not take this into consideration while selecting the default idle state on x86. Fix it by checking for the idle=nomwait boot option in prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt(). Also update the documentation around idle=nomwait appropriately. [ dhansen: tweak commit message ] Signed-off-by: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fdc2dc2d0a1bc21c2f53d989ea2d2ee3ccbc0dbe.1654538381.git-series.wyes.karny@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-08-11x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protectionsDaniel Sneddon1-0/+8
commit 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 upstream. tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE. == Background == Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e. Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires the MSR to be written on every privilege level change. To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change. When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests. == Problem == Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM: void run_kvm_guest(void) { // Prepare to run guest VMRESUME(); // Clean up after guest runs } The execution flow for that would look something like this to the processor: 1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest() 2. Host-side: VMRESUME 3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function" 4. VM exit, host runs again 5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls 6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest() Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code: * on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing. * on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff the last RSB entry "by hand". IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL instruction. However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem since the (untrusted) guest controls this address. Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected. == Solution == The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e., eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly. However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT and most of them need a new mitigation. Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT. The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline -- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET. Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an LFENCE. In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window with the LFENCE. There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB. Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB. Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO. [ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ] Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-03docs/kernel-parameters: Update descriptions for "mitigations=" param with ↵Eiichi Tsukata1-0/+2
retbleed commit ea304a8b89fd0d6cf94ee30cb139dc23d9f1a62f upstream. Updates descriptions for "mitigations=off" and "mitigations=auto,nosmt" with the respective retbleed= settings. Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <eiichi.tsukata@nutanix.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: corbet@lwn.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220728043907.165688-1-eiichi.tsukata@nutanix.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-03Documentation: fix sctp_wmem in ip-sysctl.rstXin Long1-1/+8
[ Upstream commit aa709da0e032cee7c202047ecd75f437bb0126ed ] Since commit 1033990ac5b2 ("sctp: implement memory accounting on tx path"), SCTP has supported memory accounting on tx path where 'sctp_wmem' is used by sk_wmem_schedule(). So we should fix the description for this option in ip-sysctl.rst accordingly. v1->v2: - Improve the description as Marcelo suggested. Fixes: 1033990ac5b2 ("sctp: implement memory accounting on tx path") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-07-29docs: net: explain struct net_device lifetimeJakub Kicinski1-6/+165
commit 2b446e650b418f9a9e75f99852e2f2560cabfa17 upstream. Explain the two basic flows of struct net_device's operation. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-25x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpbPeter Zijlstra1-0/+3
commit 3ebc170068885b6fc7bedda6c667bb2c4d533159 upstream. jmp2ret mitigates the easy-to-attack case at relatively low overhead. It mitigates the long speculation windows after a mispredicted RET, but it does not mitigate the short speculation window from arbitrary instruction boundaries. On Zen2, there is a chicken bit which needs setting, which mitigates "arbitrary instruction boundaries" down to just "basic block boundaries". But there is no fix for the short speculation window on basic block boundaries, other than to flush the entire BTB to evict all attacker predictions. On the spectrum of "fast & blurry" -> "safe", there is (on top of STIBP or no-SMT): 1) Nothing System wide open 2) jmp2ret May stop a script kiddy 3) jmp2ret+chickenbit Raises the bar rather further 4) IBPB Only thing which can count as "safe". Tentative numbers put IBPB-on-entry at a 2.5x hit on Zen2, and a 10x hit on Zen1 according to lmbench. [ bp: Fixup feature bit comments, document option, 32-bit build fix. ] Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-25x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRSPawan Gupta1-0/+1
commit 7c693f54c873691a4b7da05c7e0f74e67745d144 upstream. Extend spectre_v2= boot option with Kernel IBRS. [jpoimboe: no STIBP with IBRS] Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-25x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RETKim Phillips1-5/+11
commit e8ec1b6e08a2102d8755ccb06fa26d540f26a2fa upstream. For untrained return thunks to be fully effective, STIBP must be enabled or SMT disabled. Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-25x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameterAlexandre Chartre1-0/+15
commit 7fbf47c7ce50b38a64576b150e7011ae73d54669 upstream. Add the "retbleed=<value>" boot parameter to select a mitigation for RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret" (JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto". Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on Intel). [peterz: rebase; add hygon] [jpoimboe: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-21ipv4: Fix data-races around sysctl_ip_dynaddr.Kuniyuki Iwashima1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit e49e4aff7ec19b2d0d0957ee30e93dade57dab9e ] While reading sysctl_ip_dynaddr, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-07-21cipso: Fix data-races around sysctl.Kuniyuki Iwashima1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit dd44f04b9214adb68ef5684ae87a81ba03632250 ] While reading cipso sysctl variables, they can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races. Fixes: 446fda4f2682 ("[NetLabel]: CIPSOv4 engine") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-07-12dt-bindings: dma: allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma: Fix min/max typoSamuel Holland1-1/+1
commit 607a48c78e6b427b0b684d24e61c19e846ad65d6 upstream. The conditional block for variants with a second clock should have set minItems, not maxItems, which was already 2. Since clock-names requires two items, this typo should not have caused any problems. Fixes: edd14218bd66 ("dt-bindings: dmaengine: Convert Allwinner A31 and A64 DMA to a schema") Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org> Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220702031903.21703-1-samuel@sholland.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-29iio: adc: vf610: fix conversion mode sysfs node nameBaruch Siach1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit f1a633b15cd5371a2a83f02c513984e51132dd68 ] The documentation missed the "in_" prefix for this IIO_SHARED_BY_DIR entry. Fixes: bf04c1a367e3 ("iio: adc: vf610: implement configurable conversion modes") Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il> Acked-by: Haibo Chen <haibo.chen@nxp.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/560dc93fafe5ef7e9a409885fd20b6beac3973d8.1653900626.git.baruch@tkos.co.il Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-16x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta1-0/+1
commit 8d50cdf8b8341770bc6367bce40c0c1bb0e1d5b3 upstream Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-16x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta1-0/+36
commit 8cb861e9e3c9a55099ad3d08e1a3b653d29c33ca upstream Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO operation. For details please refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst. These vulnerabilities are broadly categorized as: Device Register Partial Write (DRPW): Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are smaller than the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only copying the correct subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte write), more bytes than specified by the write transaction may be written to the register. On some processors, this may expose stale data from the fill buffers of the core that created the write transaction. Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS): After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied stale data into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS can leak data from the fill buffer. Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR): It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the data is directly read into the architectural software-visible state. An attacker can use these vulnerabilities to extract data from CPU fill buffers using MDS and TAA methods. Mitigate it by clearing the CPU fill buffers using the VERW instruction before returning to a user or a guest. On CPUs not affected by MDS and TAA, user application cannot sample data from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. A guest with MMIO access can still use DRPW or SBDR to extract data architecturally. Mitigate it with VERW instruction to clear fill buffers before VMENTER for MMIO capable guests. Add a kernel parameter mmio_stale_data={off|full|full,nosmt} to control the mitigation. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-16Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta2-0/+247
commit 4419470191386456e0b8ed4eb06a70b0021798a6 upstream Add the admin guide for Processor MMIO stale data vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-14ata: libata-transport: fix {dma|pio|xfer}_mode sysfs filesSergey Shtylyov1-5/+6
commit 72aad489f992871e908ff6d9055b26c6366fb864 upstream. The {dma|pio}_mode sysfs files are incorrectly documented as having a list of the supported DMA/PIO transfer modes, while the corresponding fields of the *struct* ata_device hold the transfer mode IDs, not masks. To match these docs, the {dma|pio}_mode (and even xfer_mode!) sysfs files are handled by the ata_bitfield_name_match() macro which leads to reading such kind of nonsense from them: $ cat /sys/class/ata_device/dev3.0/pio_mode XFER_UDMA_7, XFER_UDMA_6, XFER_UDMA_5, XFER_UDMA_4, XFER_MW_DMA_4, XFER_PIO_6, XFER_PIO_5, XFER_PIO_4, XFER_PIO_3, XFER_PIO_2, XFER_PIO_1, XFER_PIO_0 Using the correct ata_bitfield_name_search() macro fixes that: $ cat /sys/class/ata_device/dev3.0/pio_mode XFER_PIO_4 While fixing the file documentation, somewhat reword the {dma|pio}_mode file doc and add a note about being mostly useful for PATA devices to the xfer_mode file doc... Fixes: d9027470b886 ("[libata] Add ATA transport class") Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-09dt-bindings: gpio: altera: correct interrupt-cellsDinh Nguyen1-2/+3
commit 3a21c3ac93aff7b4522b152399df8f6a041df56d upstream. update documentation to correctly state the interrupt-cells to be 2. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4fd9bbc6e071 ("drivers/gpio: Altera soft IP GPIO driver devicetree binding") Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-09docs/conf.py: Cope with removal of language=None in Sphinx 5.0.0Akira Yokosawa1-1/+1
commit 627f01eab93d8671d4e4afee9b148f9998d20e7c upstream. One of the changes in Sphinx 5.0.0 [1] says [sic]: 5.0.0 final - #10474: language does not accept None as it value. The default value of language becomes to 'en' now. [1]: https://www.sphinx-doc.org/en/master/changes.html#release-5-0-0-released-may-30-2022 It results in a new warning from Sphinx 5.0.0 [sic]: WARNING: Invalid configuration value found: 'language = None'. Update your configuration to a valid langauge code. Falling back to 'en' (English). Silence the warning by using 'en'. It works with all the Sphinx versions required for building kernel documentation (1.7.9 or later). Signed-off-by: Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bd0c2ddc-2401-03cb-4526-79ca664e1cbe@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-09spi: qcom-qspi: Add minItems to interconnect-namesKuldeep Singh1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit e23d86c49a9c78e8dbe3abff20b30812b26ab427 ] Add minItems constraint to interconnect-names as well. The schema currently tries to match 2 names and fail for DTs with single entry. With the change applied, below interconnect-names values are possible: ['qspi-config'], ['qspi-config', 'qspi-memory'] Fixes: 8f9c291558ea ("dt-bindings: spi: Add interconnect binding for QSPI") Signed-off-by: Kuldeep Singh <singh.kuldeep87k@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220328192006.18523-1-singh.kuldeep87k@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-09dt-bindings: display: sitronix, st7735r: Fix backlight in exampleNoralf Trønnes1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 471e201f543559e2cb19b182b680ebf04d80ee31 ] The backlight property was lost during conversion to yaml in commit abdd9e3705c8 ("dt-bindings: display: sitronix,st7735r: Convert to DT schema"). Put it back. Fixes: abdd9e3705c8 ("dt-bindings: display: sitronix,st7735r: Convert to DT schema") Signed-off-by: Noralf Trønnes <noralf@tronnes.org> Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Acked-by: David Lechner <david@lechnology.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20211124150757.17929-2-noralf@tronnes.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-06docs: submitting-patches: Fix crossref to 'The canonical patch format'Akira Yokosawa1-1/+1
commit 6d5aa418b3bd42cdccc36e94ee199af423ef7c84 upstream. The reference to `explicit_in_reply_to` is pointless as when the reference was added in the form of "#15" [1], Section 15) was "The canonical patch format". The reference of "#15" had not been properly updated in a couple of reorganizations during the plain-text SubmittingPatches era. Fix it by using `the_canonical_patch_format`. [1]: 2ae19acaa50a ("Documentation: Add "how to write a good patch summary" to SubmittingPatches") Signed-off-by: Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com> Fixes: 5903019b2a5e ("Documentation/SubmittingPatches: convert it to ReST markup") Fixes: 9b2c76777acc ("Documentation/SubmittingPatches: enrich the Sphinx output") Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64e105a5-50be-23f2-6cae-903a2ea98e18@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-30random: fix sysctl documentation nitsJason A. Donenfeld1-4/+4
commit 069c4ea6871c18bd368f27756e0f91ffb524a788 upstream. A semicolon was missing, and the almost-alphabetical-but-not ordering was confusing, so regroup these by category instead. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-07-19 18:21:10 +0300