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commit da34a8484d162585e22ed8c1e4114aa2f60e3567 upstream.
Charge moving mode in cgroup1 allows memory to follow tasks as they
migrate between cgroups. This is, and always has been, a questionable
thing to do - for several reasons.
First, it's expensive. Pages need to be identified, locked and isolated
from various MM operations, and reassigned, one by one.
Second, it's unreliable. Once pages are charged to a cgroup, there isn't
always a clear owner task anymore. Cache isn't moved at all, for example.
Mapped memory is moved - but if trylocking or isolating a page fails,
it's arbitrarily left behind. Frequent moving between domains may leave a
task's memory scattered all over the place.
Third, it isn't really needed. Launcher tasks can kick off workload tasks
directly in their target cgroup. Using dedicated per-workload groups
allows fine-grained policy adjustments - no need to move tasks and their
physical pages between control domains. The feature was never
forward-ported to cgroup2, and it hasn't been missed.
Despite it being a niche usecase, the maintenance overhead of supporting
it is enormous. Because pages are moved while they are live and subject
to various MM operations, the synchronization rules are complicated.
There are lock_page_memcg() in MM and FS code, which non-cgroup people
don't understand. In some cases we've been able to shift code and cgroup
API calls around such that we can rely on native locking as much as
possible. But that's fragile, and sometimes we need to hold MM locks for
longer than we otherwise would (pte lock e.g.).
Mark the feature deprecated. Hopefully we can remove it soon.
And backport into -stable kernels so that people who develop against
earlier kernels are warned about this deprecation as early as possible.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix memory.rst underlining]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Y5COd+qXwk/S+n8N@cmpxchg.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f2e4cca2f670c8e52fbb551a295f2afc9aa2bd72 upstream.
@head_id points to the newest record, but the printing loop
exits when it increments to this value (before printing).
Exit the printing loop after the newest record has been printed.
The python-based function in scripts/gdb/linux/dmesg.py already
does this correctly.
Fixes: e60768311af8 ("scripts/gdb: update for lockless printk ringbuffer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221229134339.197627-1-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e02b50ca442e88122e1302d4dbc1b71a4808c13f upstream.
Explain why STIBP is needed with legacy IBRS as currently implemented
(KERNEL_IBRS) and why STIBP is not needed when enhanced IBRS is enabled.
Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230227060541.1939092-2-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f2d3155e2a6bac44d16f04415a321e8707d895c6 upstream.
Migration mode is a VM attribute which enables tracking of changes in
storage attributes (PGSTE). It assumes dirty tracking is enabled on all
memslots to keep a dirty bitmap of pages with changed storage attributes.
When enabling migration mode, we currently check that dirty tracking is
enabled for all memslots. However, userspace can disable dirty tracking
without disabling migration mode.
Since migration mode is pointless with dirty tracking disabled, disable
migration mode whenever userspace disables dirty tracking on any slot.
Also update the documentation to clarify that dirty tracking must be
enabled when enabling migration mode, which is already enforced by the
code in kvm_s390_vm_start_migration().
Also highlight in the documentation for KVM_S390_GET_CMMA_BITS that it
can now fail with -EINVAL when dirty tracking is disabled while
migration mode is on. Move all the error codes to a table so this stays
readable.
To disable migration mode, slots_lock should be held, which is taken
in kvm_set_memory_region() and thus held in
kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region().
Restructure the prepare code a bit so all the sanity checking is done
before disabling migration mode. This ensures migration mode isn't
disabled when some sanity check fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 190df4a212a7 ("KVM: s390: CMMA tracking, ESSA emulation, migration mode")
Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230127140532.230651-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20230127140532.230651-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com>
[frankja@linux.ibm.com: fixed commit message typo, moved api.rst error table upwards]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6b219431037bf98c9efd49716aea9b68440477a3 ]
In order to debug the kernel successfully with gdb you need to run
'make scripts_gdb' nowadays.
This was changed with the following commit:
Commit 67274c083438340ad16c ("scripts/gdb: delay generation of gdb
constants.py")
In order to have a complete guide for beginners this remark
should be added to the offial documentation.
Signed-off-by: Jakob Koschel <jkl820.git@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112-documentation-gdb-v2-1-292785c43dc9@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 480b26226873c88e482575ceb0d0a38d76e1be57 ]
'codec' is a valid node name when there is a single codec
in the link. Fix the node regular expression to apply this.
Fixes: fd00366b8e41 ("ASoC: meson: gx: add sound card dt-binding documentation")
Signed-off-by: Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230202183653.486216-3-jbrunet@baylibre.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 00dd027f721e0458418f7750d8a5a664ed3e5994 upstream.
Running "make htmldocs" shows that "/sys/kernel/oops_count" was
duplicated. This should have been "warn_count":
Warning: /sys/kernel/oops_count is defined 2 times:
./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count:0
./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count:0
Fix the typo.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/202212110529.A3Qav8aR-lkp@intel.com
Fixes: 8b05aa263361 ("panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs")
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 8b05aa26336113c4cea25f1c333ee8cd4fc212a6 upstream.
Since Warn count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/warn_count to expose it to userspace.
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-6-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 9fc9e278a5c0b708eeffaf47d6eb0c82aa74ed78 upstream.
Like oops_limit, add warn_limit for limiting the number of warnings when
panic_on_warn is not set.
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-5-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit de92f65719cd672f4b48397540b9f9eff67eca40 upstream.
In preparation for keeping oops_limit logic in sync with warn_limit,
have oops_limit == 0 disable checking the Oops counter.
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 9db89b41117024f80b38b15954017fb293133364 upstream.
Since Oops count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/oops_count to expose it to userspace.
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit d4ccd54d28d3c8598e2354acc13e28c060961dbb upstream.
Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an
attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look
completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if
each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and
this causes a counter to eventually overflow.
The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded
refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit
platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms
that much nowadays.)
So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.
The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like
how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically
important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or
a text console that oopses will be printed to.
In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork()
child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run
when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that
oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per
run.
(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing
happens under &die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor
of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock
contention.)
It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter
with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical
environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on
normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.
12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much
longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical
desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and
violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders
of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI
pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221107201317.324457-1-jannh@google.com
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit e181119046a0ec16126b682163040e8e33f310c1 upstream.
The compatible string in the driver doesn't have the meson prefix.
Fix this in the documentation and rename the file accordingly.
Fixes: 87a55485f2fc ("dt-bindings: phy: meson-g12a-usb3-pcie-phy: convert to yaml")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0a82be92-ce85-da34-9d6f-4b33034473e5@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c63835bf1c750c9b3aec1d5c23d811d6375fc23d upstream.
The compatible strings in the driver don't have the meson prefix.
Fix this in the documentation and rename the file accordingly.
Fixes: da86d286cce8 ("dt-bindings: phy: meson-g12a-usb2-phy: convert to yaml")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8d960029-e94d-224b-911f-03e5deb47ebc@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 45e966fcca03ecdcccac7cb236e16eea38cc18af ]
Passing the host topology to the guest is almost certainly wrong
and will confuse the scheduler. In addition, several fields of
these CPUID leaves vary on each processor; it is simply impossible to
return the right values from KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID in such a way that
they can be passed to KVM_SET_CPUID2.
The values that will most likely prevent confusion are all zeroes.
Userspace will have to override it anyway if it wishes to present a
specific topology to the guest.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit cde363ab7ca7aea7a853851cd6a6745a9e1aaf5e ]
Add a section to document all the different ways in which the KVM API sucks.
I am sure there are way more, give people a place to vent so that userspace
authors are aware.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220322110712.222449-4-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1198d2316dc4265a97d0e8445a22c7a6d17580a4 ]
Currently, these options cause the following libkmod error:
libkmod: ERROR ../libkmod/libkmod-config.c:489 kcmdline_parse_result: \
Ignoring bad option on kernel command line while parsing module \
name: 'ivrs_xxxx[XX:XX'
Fix by introducing a new parameter format for these options and
throw a warning for the deprecated format.
Users are still allowed to omit the PCI Segment if zero.
Adding a Link: to the reason why we're modding the syntax parsing
in the driver and not in libkmod.
Fixes: ca3bf5d47cec ("iommu/amd: Introduces ivrs_acpihid kernel parameter")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-modules/20200310082308.14318-2-lucas.demarchi@intel.com/
Reported-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220919155638.391481-2-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bbe3a106580c21bc883fb0c9fa3da01534392fe8 ]
By default, PCI segment is zero and can be omitted. To support system
with non-zero PCI segment ID, modify the parsing functions to allow
PCI segment ID.
Co-developed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220706113825.25582-33-vasant.hegde@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Stable-dep-of: 1198d2316dc4 ("iommu/amd: Fix ill-formed ivrs_ioapic, ivrs_hpet and ivrs_acpihid options")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 0283189e8f3d0917e2ac399688df85211f48447b upstream.
Sphinx 6.0 removed the execfile_() function, which we use as part of the
configuration process. They *did* warn us... Just open-code the
functionality as is done in Sphinx itself.
Tested (using SPHINX_CONF, since this code is only executed with an
alternative config file) on various Sphinx versions from 2.5 through 6.0.
Reported-by: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 34cb111f8a7b98b5fec809dd194003bca20ef1b2 ]
When resetting the block, the reset line is being driven low and then
high, which means that the line in DTS should be annotated as "active
low".
Fixes: 1877c9fda1b7 ("ASoC: dt-bindings: add dt bindings for wcd9335 audio codec")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027074652.1044235-2-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bf585ccee22faf469d82727cf375868105b362f7 ]
struct spi_master has been renamed to struct spi_controller. Update the
reference in spi.rst to make it clickable again.
Fixes: 8caab75fd2c2 ("spi: Generalize SPI "master" to "controller"")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221101173252.1069294-1-j.neuschaefer@gmx.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d472cf797c4e268613dbce5ec9b95d0bcae19ecb ]
The simple attribute files do not accept a negative value since the commit
488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in
simple_attr_write()"), so we have to use a 64-bit value to write a
negative value for a debugfs file created by debugfs_create_atomic_t().
This restores the previous behaviour by introducing
DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE_SIGNED for a signed value.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220919172418.45257-4-akinobu.mita@gmail.com
Fixes: 488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in simple_attr_write()")
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi <zhaogongyi@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 005747526d4f3c2ec995891e95cb7625161022f9 ]
Fault injection uses debugfs in a way that the provided values via sysfs
are interpreted as u64. Providing negative numbers results in an error:
/sys/kernel/debug/fail_function# echo -1 > times
sh: write error: Invalid argument
Update the docs and examples to use "printf %#x <val>" in these cases.
For "retval", reword the paragraph a little and fix a typo.
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210603125841.27436-1-wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Stable-dep-of: d472cf797c4e ("debugfs: fix error when writing negative value to atomic_t debugfs file")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 5fddf8962b429b8303c4a654291ecb6e61a7d747 upstream.
Update mediator contact information in CoC interpretation document.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221011171417.34286-1-skhan@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6973091d1b50ab4042f6a2d495f59e9db3662ab8 ]
When running under PV, the guest's TOD clock is under control of the
ultravisor and the hypervisor isn't allowed to change it. Hence, don't
allow userspace to change the guest's TOD clock by returning
-EOPNOTSUPP.
When userspace changes the guest's TOD clock, KVM updates its
kvm.arch.epoch field and, in addition, the epoch field in all state
descriptions of all VCPUs.
But, under PV, the ultravisor will ignore the epoch field in the state
description and simply overwrite it on next SIE exit with the actual
guest epoch. This leads to KVM having an incorrect view of the guest's
TOD clock: it has updated its internal kvm.arch.epoch field, but the
ultravisor ignores the field in the state description.
Whenever a guest is now waiting for a clock comparator, KVM will
incorrectly calculate the time when the guest should wake up, possibly
causing the guest to sleep for much longer than expected.
With this change, kvm_s390_set_tod() will now take the kvm->lock to be
able to call kvm_s390_pv_is_protected(). Since kvm_s390_set_tod_clock()
also takes kvm->lock, use __kvm_s390_set_tod_clock() instead.
The function kvm_s390_set_tod_clock is now unused, hence remove it.
Update the documentation to indicate the TOD clock attr calls can now
return -EOPNOTSUPP.
Fixes: 0f3035047140 ("KVM: s390: protvirt: Do only reset registers that are accessible")
Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221011160712.928239-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20221011160712.928239-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit a635beeacc6d56d2b71c39e6c0103f85b53d108e upstream.
After commit 4f36c2d85ced ("tracing: Increase tracing map KEYS_MAX size"),
'keys' supports up to three fields.
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221017103806.2479139-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 44b3834b2eed595af07021b1c64e6f9bc396398b upstream.
Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 have an erratum where an interrupt that
occurs between a pair of AES instructions in aarch32 mode may corrupt
the ELR. The task will subsequently produce the wrong AES result.
The AES instructions are part of the cryptographic extensions, which are
optional. User-space software will detect the support for these
instructions from the hwcaps. If the platform doesn't support these
instructions a software implementation should be used.
Remove the hwcap bits on affected parts to indicate user-space should
not use the AES instructions.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220714161523.279570-3-james.morse@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
[florian: removed arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps and fixup cpufeature.c]
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1efc41035f1841acf0af2bab153158e27ce94f10 ]
in_ only occurs once in these attributes.
Fixes: 0baf29d658c7 ("staging:iio:documentation Add abi docs for capacitance adcs.")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220626122938.582107-3-jic23@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 02181e68275d28cab3c3f755852770367f1bc229 ]
Driver moxart-mmc.c has .compatible = "moxa,moxart-mmc".
But moxart .dts/.dtsi and the documentation file moxa,moxart-dma.txt
contain compatible = "moxa,moxart-sdhci".
Change moxart .dts/.dtsi files and moxa,moxart-dma.txt to match the driver.
Replace 'sdhci' with 'mmc' in names too, since SDHCI is a different
controller from FTSDC010.
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Sergei Antonov <saproj@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonas Jensen <jonas.jensen@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220907175341.1477383-1-saproj@gmail.com'
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 8bfdfa0d6b929ede7b6189e0e546ceb6a124d05d upstream.
Update mediator information in the CoC interpretation document.
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901212319.56644-1-skhan@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9c9c71168f7979f3798b61c65b4530fbfbcf19d1 ]
Add a new iforce_device entry to support the Boeder Force Feedback Wheel
device.
Signed-off-by: Greg Tulli <greg.iforce@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3256420-c8ac-31b-8499-3c488a9880fd@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit e89d120c4b720e232cc6a94f0fcbd59c15d41489 upstream.
The AMU counter AMEVCNTR01 (constant counter) should increment at the same
rate as the system counter. On affected Cortex-A510 cores, AMEVCNTR01
increments incorrectly giving a significantly higher output value. This
results in inaccurate task scheduler utilization tracking and incorrect
feedback on CPU frequency.
Work around this problem by returning 0 when reading the affected counter
in key locations that results in disabling all users of this counter from
using it either for frequency invariance or as FFH reference counter. This
effect is the same to firmware disabling affected counters.
Details on how the two features are affected by this erratum:
- AMU counters will not be used for frequency invariance for affected
CPUs and CPUs in the same cpufreq policy. AMUs can still be used for
frequency invariance for unaffected CPUs in the system. Although
unlikely, if no alternative method can be found to support frequency
invariance for affected CPUs (cpufreq based or solution based on
platform counters) frequency invariance will be disabled. Please check
the chapter on frequency invariance at
Documentation/scheduler/sched-capacity.rst for details of its effect.
- Given that FFH can be used to fetch either the core or constant counter
values, restrictions are lifted regarding any of these counters
returning a valid (!0) value. Therefore FFH is considered supported
if there is a least one CPU that support AMUs, independent of any
counters being disabled or affected by this erratum. Clarifying
comments are now added to the cpc_ffh_supported(), cpu_read_constcnt()
and cpu_read_corecnt() functions.
The above is achieved through adding a new erratum: ARM64_ERRATUM_2457168.
Signed-off-by: Ionela Voinescu <ionela.voinescu@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220819103050.24211-1-ionela.voinescu@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7df548840c496b0141fb2404b889c346380c2b22 upstream.
Older Intel CPUs that are not in the affected processor list for MMIO
Stale Data vulnerabilities currently report "Not affected" in sysfs,
which may not be correct. Vulnerability status for these older CPUs is
unknown.
Add known-not-affected CPUs to the whitelist. Report "unknown"
mitigation status for CPUs that are not in blacklist, whitelist and also
don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits that reflect hardware
immunity to MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Mitigation is not deployed when the status is unknown.
[ bp: Massage, fixup. ]
Fixes: 8d50cdf8b834 ("x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data")
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a932c154772f2121794a5f2eded1a11013114711.1657846269.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5dcd08cd19912892586c6082d56718333e2d19db ]
While reading netdev_max_backlog, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
While at it, we remove the unnecessary spaces in the doc.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 415d832497098030241605c52ea83d4e2cfa7879 upstream.
These operations are documented as always ordered in
include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h, and producer-consumer
type use cases where one side needs to ensure a flag is left pending
after some shared data was updated rely on this ordering, even in the
failure case.
This is the case with the workqueue code, which currently suffers from a
reproducible ordering violation on Apple M1 platforms (which are
notoriously out-of-order) that ends up causing the TTY layer to fail to
deliver data to userspace properly under the right conditions. This
change fixes that bug.
Change the documentation to restrict the "no order on failure" story to
the _lock() variant (for which it makes sense), and remove the
early-exit from the generic implementation, which is what causes the
missing barrier semantics in that case. Without this, the remaining
atomic op is fully ordered (including on ARM64 LSE, as of recent
versions of the architecture spec).
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e986a0d6cb36 ("locking/atomics, asm-generic/bitops/atomic.h: Rewrite using atomic_*() APIs")
Fixes: 61e02392d3c7 ("locking/atomic/bitops: Document and clarify ordering semantics for failed test_and_{}_bit()")
Signed-off-by: Hector Martin <marcan@marcan.st>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b0de7fa706506bf0591037908376351beda8c5d6 upstream.
The device bindings shouldn't put any constraints on the regulator-name
property specified in the generic bindings. This allows using arbitrary
and descriptive names for the regulators.
Suggested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Fixes: 7ae9e3a6bf3f ("dt-bindings: regulator: add pca9450 regulator yaml")
Signed-off-by: Frieder Schrempf <frieder.schrempf@kontron.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220802064335.8481-1-frieder@fris.de
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2b4e75a7a7c8d3531a40ebb103b92f88ff693f79 upstream.
Add additional GCC clock sources. This includes PCIe and USB PIPE and
UFS symbol clocks.
Fixes: 2a8aa18c1131 ("dt-bindings: clk: qcom: Fix self-validation, split, and clean cruft")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620071936.1558906-2-dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bb35fe1efbae4114bd288fae0f56070f563adcfc upstream.
The order of compatibles for MSM8916 MTP board is different:
msm8916-mtp.dtb: /: compatible: 'oneOf' conditional failed, one must be fixed:
['qcom,msm8916-mtp', 'qcom,msm8916-mtp/1', 'qcom,msm8916'] is too long
Fixes: 9d3ef77fe568 ("dt-bindings: arm: Convert QCom board/soc bindings to json-schema")
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520123252.365762-3-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9066e151c37950af92c3be6a7270daa8e8063db9 upstream.
Since commit 488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in
simple_attr_write()"), the EINJ debugfs interface no longer accepts
negative values as input. Attempt to do so will result in EINVAL.
Fixes: 488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in simple_attr_write()")
Signed-off-by: Qifu Zhang <zhangqifu@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 402c43ea6b34a1b371ffeed9adf907402569eaf5 upstream.
In some use cases[1], the backend is created while the frontend doesn't
support the persistent grants feature, but later the frontend can be
changed to support the feature and reconnect. In the past, 'blkback'
enabled the persistent grants feature since it unconditionally checked
if frontend supports the persistent grants feature for every connect
('connect_ring()') and decided whether it should use persistent grans or
not.
However, commit aac8a70db24b ("xen-blkback: add a parameter for
disabling of persistent grants") has mistakenly changed the behavior.
It made the frontend feature support check to not be repeated once it
shown the 'feature_persistent' as 'false', or the frontend doesn't
support persistent grants.
Similar behavioral change has made on 'blkfront' by commit 74a852479c68
("xen-blkfront: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants").
This commit changes the behavior of the parameter to make effect for
every connect, so that the previous behavior of 'blkfront' can be
restored.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/CAJwUmVB6H3iTs-C+U=v-pwJB7-_ZRHPxHzKRJZ22xEPW7z8a=g@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 74a852479c68 ("xen-blkfront: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715225108.193398-4-sj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e94c6101e151b019b8babc518ac2a6ada644a5a1 upstream.
In some use cases[1], the backend is created while the frontend doesn't
support the persistent grants feature, but later the frontend can be
changed to support the feature and reconnect. In the past, 'blkback'
enabled the persistent grants feature since it unconditionally checked
if frontend supports the persistent grants feature for every connect
('connect_ring()') and decided whether it should use persistent grans or
not.
However, commit aac8a70db24b ("xen-blkback: add a parameter for
disabling of persistent grants") has mistakenly changed the behavior.
It made the frontend feature support check to not be repeated once it
shown the 'feature_persistent' as 'false', or the frontend doesn't
support persistent grants.
This commit changes the behavior of the parameter to make effect for
every connect, so that the previous workflow can work again as expected.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/CAJwUmVB6H3iTs-C+U=v-pwJB7-_ZRHPxHzKRJZ22xEPW7z8a=g@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Andrii Chepurnyi <andrii.chepurnyi82@gmail.com>
Fixes: aac8a70db24b ("xen-blkback: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715225108.193398-3-sj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e6cfcdda8cbe81eaf821c897369a65fec987b404 upstream.
AMD's "Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion,
Rev. 1.0 2022-07-12" whitepaper, under section 6.1.2 "IBPB On
Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety" says:
Similar to the Jmp2Ret mitigation, if the code on the sibling thread
cannot be trusted, software should set STIBP to 1 or disable SMT to
ensure SMT safety when using this mitigation.
So, like already being done for retbleed=unret, and now also for
retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it, and report its SMT
vulnerability status accordingly.
[ bp: Remove the "we" and remove "[AMD]" applicability parameter which
doesn't work here. ]
Fixes: 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10, 5.15, 5.19
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220804192201.439596-1-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0bfc6a4ea63c2adac71a824397ef48f28dbc5e47 ]
This makes the struct vfio_device part of the public interface so it
can be used with container_of and so forth, as is typical for a Linux
subystem.
This is the first step to bring some type-safety to the vfio interface by
allowing the replacement of 'void *' and 'struct device *' inputs with a
simple and clear 'struct vfio_device *'
For now the self-allocating vfio_add_group_dev() interface is kept so each
user can be updated as a separate patch.
The expected usage pattern is
driver core probe() function:
my_device = kzalloc(sizeof(*mydevice));
vfio_init_group_dev(&my_device->vdev, dev, ops, mydevice);
/* other driver specific prep */
vfio_register_group_dev(&my_device->vdev);
dev_set_drvdata(dev, my_device);
driver core remove() function:
my_device = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
vfio_unregister_group_dev(&my_device->vdev);
/* other driver specific tear down */
kfree(my_device);
Allowing the driver to be able to use the drvdata and vfio_device to go
to/from its own data.
The pattern also makes it clear that vfio_register_group_dev() must be
last in the sequence, as once it is called the core code can immediately
start calling ops. The init/register gap is provided to allow for the
driver to do setup before ops can be called and thus avoid races.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Gurtovoy <mgurtovoy@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Message-Id: <3-v3-225de1400dfc+4e074-vfio1_jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8bcedb4ce04750e1ccc9a6b6433387f6a9166a56 ]
When kernel is booted with idle=nomwait do not use MWAIT as the
default idle state.
If the user boots the kernel with idle=nomwait, it is a clear
direction to not use mwait as the default idle state.
However, the current code does not take this into consideration
while selecting the default idle state on x86.
Fix it by checking for the idle=nomwait boot option in
prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt().
Also update the documentation around idle=nomwait appropriately.
[ dhansen: tweak commit message ]
Signed-off-by: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fdc2dc2d0a1bc21c2f53d989ea2d2ee3ccbc0dbe.1654538381.git-series.wyes.karny@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 upstream.
tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as
documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new
one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE.
== Background ==
Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help
mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e.
Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes
from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires
the MSR to be written on every privilege level change.
To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was
introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn
it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change.
When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from
less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests.
== Problem ==
Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM:
void run_kvm_guest(void)
{
// Prepare to run guest
VMRESUME();
// Clean up after guest runs
}
The execution flow for that would look something like this to the
processor:
1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest()
2. Host-side: VMRESUME
3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function"
4. VM exit, host runs again
5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls
6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest()
Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of
post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code:
* on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not
touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing.
* on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host
IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing
the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff
the last RSB entry "by hand".
IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be
influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL
instruction.
However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM
exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the
instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem
since the (untrusted) guest controls this address.
Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected.
== Solution ==
The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which
support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today,
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates
PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e.,
eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly.
However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT
and most of them need a new mitigation.
Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT.
The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is
immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This
steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline
-- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET.
Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an
LFENCE.
In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET
behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions
sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window
with the LFENCE.
There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB.
Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB.
Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO.
[ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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retbleed
commit ea304a8b89fd0d6cf94ee30cb139dc23d9f1a62f upstream.
Updates descriptions for "mitigations=off" and "mitigations=auto,nosmt"
with the respective retbleed= settings.
Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <eiichi.tsukata@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: corbet@lwn.net
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220728043907.165688-1-eiichi.tsukata@nutanix.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit aa709da0e032cee7c202047ecd75f437bb0126ed ]
Since commit 1033990ac5b2 ("sctp: implement memory accounting on tx path"),
SCTP has supported memory accounting on tx path where 'sctp_wmem' is used
by sk_wmem_schedule(). So we should fix the description for this option in
ip-sysctl.rst accordingly.
v1->v2:
- Improve the description as Marcelo suggested.
Fixes: 1033990ac5b2 ("sctp: implement memory accounting on tx path")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 2b446e650b418f9a9e75f99852e2f2560cabfa17 upstream.
Explain the two basic flows of struct net_device's operation.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3ebc170068885b6fc7bedda6c667bb2c4d533159 upstream.
jmp2ret mitigates the easy-to-attack case at relatively low overhead.
It mitigates the long speculation windows after a mispredicted RET, but
it does not mitigate the short speculation window from arbitrary
instruction boundaries.
On Zen2, there is a chicken bit which needs setting, which mitigates
"arbitrary instruction boundaries" down to just "basic block boundaries".
But there is no fix for the short speculation window on basic block
boundaries, other than to flush the entire BTB to evict all attacker
predictions.
On the spectrum of "fast & blurry" -> "safe", there is (on top of STIBP
or no-SMT):
1) Nothing System wide open
2) jmp2ret May stop a script kiddy
3) jmp2ret+chickenbit Raises the bar rather further
4) IBPB Only thing which can count as "safe".
Tentative numbers put IBPB-on-entry at a 2.5x hit on Zen2, and a 10x hit
on Zen1 according to lmbench.
[ bp: Fixup feature bit comments, document option, 32-bit build fix. ]
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
[bwh: Backported to 5.10: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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