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The invalid_host_el2_vect macro is used by EL2{t,h} handlers in nVHE
*host* context, which should never run with a guest context loaded.
Therefore, remove the superfluous vCPU context check and branch
unconditionally to hyp_panic.
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240610063244.2828978-4-ptosi@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Fix typos, most reported by "codespell arch/arm64". Only touches comments,
no code changes.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Reviewed-by: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240103231605.1801364-6-helgaas@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Some bti instructions were missing from
commit b53d4a272349 ("KVM: arm64: Use BTI for nvhe")
1) kvm_host_psci_cpu_entry
kvm_host_psci_cpu_entry is called from __kvm_hyp_init_cpu through "br"
instruction as __kvm_hyp_init_cpu resides in idmap section while
kvm_host_psci_cpu_entry is in hyp .text so the offset is larger than
128MB range covered by "b".
Which means that this function should start with "bti j" instruction.
LLVM which is the only compiler supporting BTI for Linux, adds "bti j"
for jump tables or by when taking the address of the block [1].
Same behaviour is observed with GCC.
As kvm_host_psci_cpu_entry is a C function, this must be done in
assembly.
Another solution is to use X16/X17 with "br", as according to ARM
ARM DDI0487I.a RLJHCL/IGMGRS, PACIASP has an implicit branch
target identification instruction that is compatible with
PSTATE.BTYPE 0b01 which includes "br X16/X17"
And the kvm_host_psci_cpu_entry has PACIASP as it is an external
function.
Although, using explicit "bti" makes it more clear than relying on
which register is used.
A third solution is to clear SCTLR_EL2.BT, which would make PACIASP
compatible PSTATE.BTYPE 0b11 ("br" to other registers).
However this deviates from the kernel behaviour (in bti_enable()).
2) Spectre vector table
"br" instructions are generated at runtime for the vector table
(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs).
These branches would land on vectors in __kvm_hyp_vector at offset 8.
As all the macros are defined with valid_vect/invalid_vect, it is
sufficient to add "bti j" at the correct offset.
[1] https://reviews.llvm.org/D52867
Fixes: b53d4a272349 ("KVM: arm64: Use BTI for nvhe")
Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>
Reported-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230706152240.685684-1-smostafa@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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When the use of pointer authentication is enabled in the kernel it
applies to both the kernel itself as well as KVM's nVHE hypervisor. The
same keys are used for both the kernel and the nVHE hypervisor, which is
less than desirable for pKVM as the host is not trusted at runtime.
Naturally, the fix is to use a different set of keys for the hypervisor
when running in protected mode. Have the host generate a new set of keys
for the hypervisor before deprivileging the kernel. While there might be
other sources of random directly available at EL2, this keeps the
implementation simple, and the host is trusted anyways until it is
deprivileged.
Since the host and hypervisor no longer share a set of pointer
authentication keys, start context switching them on the host entry/exit
path exactly as we do for guest entry/exit. There is no need to handle
CPU migration as the nVHE code is not migratable in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230614122600.2098901-1-smostafa@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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On hyp stack overflow switch to 16-byte aligned secondary stack.
This provides us stack space to better handle overflows; and is
used in a subsequent patch to dump the hypervisor stacktrace.
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220726073750.3219117-8-kaleshsingh@google.com
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* kvm-arm64/misc-5.19:
: .
: Misc fixes and general improvements for KVMM/arm64:
:
: - Better handle out of sequence sysregs in the global tables
:
: - Remove a couple of unnecessary loads from constant pool
:
: - Drop unnecessary pKVM checks
:
: - Add all known M1 implementations to the SEIS workaround
:
: - Cleanup kerneldoc warnings
: .
KVM: arm64: vgic-v3: List M1 Pro/Max as requiring the SEIS workaround
KVM: arm64: pkvm: Don't mask already zeroed FEAT_SVE
KVM: arm64: pkvm: Drop unnecessary FP/SIMD trap handler
KVM: arm64: nvhe: Eliminate kernel-doc warnings
KVM: arm64: Avoid unnecessary absolute addressing via literals
KVM: arm64: Print emulated register table name when it is unsorted
KVM: arm64: Don't BUG_ON() if emulated register table is unsorted
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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There are a few cases in the nVHE code where we take the absolute
address of a symbol via a literal pool entry, and subsequently translate
it to another address space (PA, kimg VA, kernel linear VA, etc).
Originally, this literal was needed because we relied on a different
translation for absolute references, but this is no longer the case, so
we can simply use relative addressing instead. This removes a couple of
RELA entries pointing into the .text segment.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220428140350.3303481-1-ardb@kernel.org
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* kvm-arm64/hyp-stack-guard:
: .
: Harden the EL2 stack by providing stack guards, courtesy of
: Kalesh Singh.
: .
KVM: arm64: Symbolize the nVHE HYP addresses
KVM: arm64: Detect and handle hypervisor stack overflows
KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) hypervisor stack
KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor stack
KVM: arm64: Introduce pkvm_alloc_private_va_range()
KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_alloc_private_va_range()
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The hypervisor stacks (for both nVHE Hyp mode and nVHE protected mode)
are aligned such that any valid stack address has PAGE_SHIFT bit as 1.
This allows us to conveniently check for overflow in the exception entry
without corrupting any GPRs. We won't recover from a stack overflow so
panic the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220420214317.3303360-6-kaleshsingh@google.com
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When pKVM is enabled, host memory accesses are translated by an identity
mapping at stage-2, which is populated lazily in response to synchronous
exceptions from 64-bit EL1 and EL0.
Extend this handling to cover exceptions originating from 32-bit EL0 as
well. Although these are very unlikely to occur in practice, as the
kernel typically ensures that user pages are initialised before mapping
them in, drivers could still map previously untouched device pages into
userspace and expect things to work rather than panic the system.
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427171332.13635-1-will@kernel.org
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Since ARMv8.0 the upper 32 bits of ESR_ELx have been RES0, and recently
some of the upper bits gained a meaning and can be non-zero. For
example, when FEAT_LS64 is implemented, ESR_ELx[36:32] contain ISS2,
which for an ST64BV or ST64BV0 can be non-zero. This can be seen in ARM
DDI 0487G.b, page D13-3145, section D13.2.37.
Generally, we must not rely on RES0 bit remaining zero in future, and
when extracting ESR_ELx.EC we must mask out all other bits.
All C code uses the ESR_ELx_EC() macro, which masks out the irrelevant
bits, and therefore no alterations are required to C code to avoid
consuming irrelevant bits.
In a couple of places the KVM assembly extracts ESR_ELx.EC using LSR on
an X register, and so could in theory consume previously RES0 bits. In
both cases this is for comparison with EC values ESR_ELx_EC_HVC32 and
ESR_ELx_EC_HVC64, for which the upper bits of ESR_ELx must currently be
zero, but this could change in future.
This patch adjusts the KVM vectors to use UBFX rather than LSR to
extract ESR_ELx.EC, ensuring these are robust to future additions to
ESR_ELx.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211103110545.4613-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
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The stub hypercalls provide mechanisms to reset and replace the EL2 code,
so uninstall them once pKVM has been initialised in order to ensure the
integrity of the hypervisor code.
To ensure pKVM initialisation remains functional, split cpu_hyp_reinit()
into two helper functions to separate usage of the stub from usage of
pkvm hypercalls either side of __pkvm_init on the boot CPU.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008135839.1193-4-will@kernel.org
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When protected mode is enabled, the host is unable to access most parts
of the EL2 hypervisor image, including 'hyp_physvirt_offset' and the
contents of the hypervisor's '.rodata.str' section. Unfortunately,
nvhe_hyp_panic_handler() tries to read from both of these locations when
handling a BUG() triggered at EL2; the former for converting the ELR to
a physical address and the latter for displaying the name of the source
file where the BUG() occurred.
Hack the EL2 panic asm to pass both physical and virtual ELR values to
the host and utilise the newly introduced CONFIG_NVHE_EL2_DEBUG so that
we disable stage-2 protection for the host before returning to the EL1
panic handler. If the debug option is not enabled, display the address
instead of the source file:line information.
Cc: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210813130336.8139-1-will@kernel.org
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To aid with debugging, add details of the source of a panic from nVHE
hyp. This is done by having nVHE hyp exit to nvhe_hyp_panic_handler()
rather than directly to panic(). The handler will then add the extra
details for debugging before panicking the kernel.
If the panic was due to a BUG(), look up the metadata to log the file
and line, if available, otherwise log an address that can be looked up
in vmlinux. The hyp offset is also logged to allow other hyp VAs to be
converted, similar to how the kernel offset is logged during a panic.
__hyp_panic_string is now inlined since it no longer needs to be
referenced as a symbol and the message is free to diverge between VHE
and nVHE.
The following is an example of the logs generated by a BUG in nVHE hyp.
[ 46.754840] kvm [307]: nVHE hyp BUG at: arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c:242!
[ 46.755357] kvm [307]: Hyp Offset: 0xfffea6c58e1e0000
[ 46.755824] Kernel panic - not syncing: HYP panic:
[ 46.755824] PS:400003c9 PC:0000d93a82c705ac ESR:f2000800
[ 46.755824] FAR:0000000080080000 HPFAR:0000000000800800 PAR:0000000000000000
[ 46.755824] VCPU:0000d93a880d0000
[ 46.756960] CPU: 3 PID: 307 Comm: kvm-vcpu-0 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc3-00005-gc572b99cf65b-dirty #133
[ 46.757459] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[ 46.758366] Call trace:
[ 46.758601] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b0
[ 46.758856] show_stack+0x18/0x70
[ 46.759057] dump_stack+0xd0/0x12c
[ 46.759236] panic+0x16c/0x334
[ 46.759426] arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0+0x0/0x30
[ 46.759661] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x134/0x750
[ 46.759936] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2f0/0x970
[ 46.760156] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec
[ 46.760379] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x60/0x120
[ 46.760627] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x90
[ 46.760766] el0_svc+0x2c/0x54
[ 46.760915] el0_sync_handler+0x1a4/0x1b0
[ 46.761146] el0_sync+0x170/0x180
[ 46.761889] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 46.762786] Kernel Offset: 0x3e1cd2820000 from 0xffff800010000000
[ 46.763142] PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffffa9f680000000
[ 46.763359] CPU features: 0x00240022,61806008
[ 46.763651] Memory Limit: none
[ 46.813867] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: HYP panic:
[ 46.813867] PS:400003c9 PC:0000d93a82c705ac ESR:f2000800
[ 46.813867] FAR:0000000080080000 HPFAR:0000000000800800 PAR:0000000000000000
[ 46.813867] VCPU:0000d93a880d0000 ]---
Signed-off-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210318143311.839894-6-ascull@google.com
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When panicking from the nVHE hyp and restoring the host context, x29 is
expected to hold a pointer to the host context. This wasn't being done
so fix it to make sure there's a valid pointer the host context being
used.
Rather than passing a boolean indicating whether or not the host context
should be restored, instead pass the pointer to the host context. NULL
is passed to indicate that no context should be restored.
Fixes: a2e102e20fd6 ("KVM: arm64: nVHE: Handle hyp panics")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
[maz: partial rewrite to fit 5.12-rc1]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210219122406.1337626-1-ascull@google.com
Message-Id: <20210305185254.3730990-4-maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Hyp code uses absolute addressing to obtain a kimg VA of a small number
of kernel symbols. Since the kernel now converts constant pool addresses
to hyp VAs, this trick does not work anymore.
Change the helpers to convert from hyp VA back to kimg VA or PA, as
needed and rework the callers accordingly.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105180541.65031-7-dbrazdil@google.com
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All nVHE hyp code is currently executed as handlers of host's HVCs. This
will change as nVHE starts intercepting host's PSCI CPU_ON SMCs. The
newly booted CPU will need to initialize EL2 state and then enter the
host. Add __host_enter function that branches into the existing
host state-restoring code after the trap handler would have returned.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-21-dbrazdil@google.com
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Add handler of host SMCs in KVM nVHE trap handler. Forward all SMCs to
EL3 and propagate the result back to EL1. This is done in preparation
for validating host SMCs in KVM protected mode.
The implementation assumes that firmware uses SMCCC v1.2 or older. That
means x0-x17 can be used both for arguments and results, other GPRs are
preserved.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-16-dbrazdil@google.com
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Registers x0/x1 get repeateadly pushed and poped during a host
HVC call. Instead, leave the registers on the stack, trading
a store instruction on the fast path for an add on the slow path.
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Directly using the kimage_voffset variable is fine for now, but
will become more problematic as we start distrusting EL1.
Instead, patch the kimage_voffset into the HYP text, ensuring
we don't have to load an untrusted value later on.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Setting PSTATE.PAN when entering EL2 on nVHE doesn't make much
sense as this bit only means something for translation regimes
that include EL0. This obviously isn't the case in the nVHE case,
so let's drop this setting.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201026095116.72051-4-maz@kernel.org
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Restore the host context when panicking from hyp to give the best chance
of the panic being clean.
The host requires that registers be preserved such as x18 for the shadow
callstack. If the panic is caused by an exception from EL1, the host
context is still valid so the panic can return straight back to the
host. If the panic comes from EL2 then it's most likely that the hyp
context is active and the host context needs to be restored.
There are windows before and after the host context is saved and
restored that restoration is attempted incorrectly and the panic won't
be clean.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200915104643.2543892-14-ascull@google.com
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Save and restore the host context when switching to and from hyp. This
gives hyp its own context that the host will not see as a step towards a
full trust boundary between the two.
SP_EL0 and pointer authentication keys are currently shared between the
host and hyp so don't need to be switched yet.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200915104643.2543892-13-ascull@google.com
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If the guest context is loaded when a panic is triggered, restore the
hyp context so e.g. the shadow call stack works when hyp_panic() is
called and SP_EL0 is valid when the host's panic() is called.
Use the hyp context's __hyp_running_vcpu field to track when hyp
transitions to and from the guest vcpu so the exception handlers know
whether the context needs to be restored.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200915104643.2543892-11-ascull@google.com
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The ESB at the start of the host vector may cause SErrors to be consumed
to DISR_EL1. However, this is not checked for the host so the SError
could go unhandled.
Remove the ESB so that SErrors are not consumed but are instead left
pending for the host to consume. __guest_enter already defers entry into
a guest if there are any SErrors pending.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200915104643.2543892-8-ascull@google.com
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The host is treated differently from the guests when an exception is
taken so introduce a separate vector that is specialized for the host.
This also allows the nVHE specific code to move out of hyp-entry.S and
into nvhe/host.S.
The host is only expected to make HVC calls and anything else is
considered invalid and results in a panic.
Hyp initialization is now passed the vector that is used for the host
and it is swapped for the guest vector during the context switch.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200915104643.2543892-7-ascull@google.com
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