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2020-04-26x86/tlb: Restrict access to tlbstateThomas Gleixner1-47/+49
Hide tlbstate, flush_tlb_info and related helpers when tlbflush.h is included from a module. Modules have absolutely no business with these internals. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092600.328438734@linutronix.de
2020-04-26x86/tlb: Move PCID helpers where they are usedThomas Gleixner1-127/+6
Aside of the fact that they are used only in the TLB code, especially having the comment close to the actual implementation makes a lot of sense. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092600.145772183@linutronix.de
2020-04-26x86/tlb: Uninline nmi_uaccess_okay()Thomas Gleixner1-32/+1
cpu_tlbstate is exported because various TLB-related functions need access to it, but cpu_tlbstate is sensitive information which should only be accessed by well-contained kernel functions and not be directly exposed to modules. nmi_access_ok() is the last inline function which requires access to cpu_tlbstate. Move it into the TLB code. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092600.052543007@linutronix.de
2020-04-26x86/tlb: Move cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot() to the usage siteThomas Gleixner1-14/+0
No point in having this exposed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092559.940978251@linutronix.de
2020-04-26x86/tlb: Move paravirt_tlb_remove_table() to the usage siteThomas Gleixner1-5/+0
Move it where the only user is. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092559.849801011@linutronix.de
2020-04-26x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_all() out of lineThomas Gleixner1-22/+1
Reduce the number of required exports to one and make flush_tlb_global() static to the TLB code. flush_tlb_local() cannot be confined to the TLB code as the MTRR handling requires a PGE-less flush. Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092559.740388137@linutronix.de
2020-04-26x86/tlb: Move flush_tlb_others() out of lineThomas Gleixner1-6/+4
cpu_tlbstate is exported because various TLB-related functions need access to it, but cpu_tlbstate is sensitive information which should only be accessed by well-contained kernel functions and not be directly exposed to modules. As a last step, move __flush_tlb_others() out of line and hide the native function. The latter can be static when CONFIG_PARAVIRT is disabled. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092559.641957686@linutronix.de
2020-04-26x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_one_kernel() out of lineThomas Gleixner1-40/+1
cpu_tlbstate is exported because various TLB-related functions need access to it, but cpu_tlbstate is sensitive information which should only be accessed by well-contained kernel functions and not be directly exposed to modules. As a fourth step, move __flush_tlb_one_kernel() out of line and hide the native function. The latter can be static when CONFIG_PARAVIRT is disabled. Consolidate the name space while at it and remove the pointless extra wrapper in the paravirt code. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092559.535159540@linutronix.de
2020-04-26x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_one_user() out of lineThomas Gleixner1-51/+2
cpu_tlbstate is exported because various TLB-related functions need access to it, but cpu_tlbstate is sensitive information which should only be accessed by well-contained kernel functions and not be directly exposed to modules. As a third step, move _flush_tlb_one_user() out of line and hide the native function. The latter can be static when CONFIG_PARAVIRT is disabled. Consolidate the name space while at it and remove the pointless extra wrapper in the paravirt code. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092559.428213098@linutronix.de
2020-04-26x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_global() out of lineThomas Gleixner1-36/+2
cpu_tlbstate is exported because various TLB-related functions need access to it, but cpu_tlbstate is sensitive information which should only be accessed by well-contained kernel functions and not be directly exposed to modules. As a second step, move __flush_tlb_global() out of line and hide the native function. The latter can be static when CONFIG_PARAVIRT is disabled. Consolidate the namespace while at it and remove the pointless extra wrapper in the paravirt code. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092559.336916818@linutronix.de
2020-04-26x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb() out of lineThomas Gleixner1-24/+5
cpu_tlbstate is exported because various TLB-related functions need access to it, but cpu_tlbstate is sensitive information which should only be accessed by well-contained kernel functions and not be directly exposed to modules. As a first step, move __flush_tlb() out of line and hide the native function. The latter can be static when CONFIG_PARAVIRT is disabled. Consolidate the namespace while at it and remove the pointless extra wrapper in the paravirt code. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092559.246130908@linutronix.de
2020-04-24x86/cpu: Uninline CR4 accessorsThomas Gleixner1-31/+5
cpu_tlbstate is exported because various TLB-related functions need access to it, but cpu_tlbstate is sensitive information which should only be accessed by well-contained kernel functions and not be directly exposed to modules. The various CR4 accessors require cpu_tlbstate as the CR4 shadow cache is located there. In preparation for unexporting cpu_tlbstate, create a builtin function for manipulating CR4 and rework the various helpers to use it. No functional change. [ bp: push the export of native_write_cr4() only when CONFIG_LKTDM=m to the last patch in the series. ] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092558.939985695@linutronix.de
2019-07-24x86/mm: Avoid redundant interrupt disable in load_mm_cr4()Jan Kiszka1-7/+23
load_mm_cr4() is always called with interrupts disabled from: - switch_mm_irqs_off() - refresh_pce(), which is a on_each_cpu() callback Thus, disabling interrupts in cr4_set/clear_bits() is redundant. Implement cr4_set/clear_bits_irqsoff() helpers, rename load_mm_cr4() to load_mm_cr4_irqsoff() and use the new helpers. The new helpers do not need a lockdep assert as __cr4_set() has one already. The renaming in combination with the checks in __cr4_set() ensure that any changes in the boundary conditions at the call sites will be detected. [ tglx: Massaged change log ] Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0fbbcb64-5f26-4ffb-1bb9-4f5f48426893@siemens.com
2019-05-07Merge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar: "The changes in here are: - text_poke() fixes and an extensive set of executability lockdowns, to (hopefully) eliminate the last residual circumstances under which we are using W|X mappings even temporarily on x86 kernels. This required a broad range of surgery in text patching facilities, module loading, trampoline handling and other bits. - tweak page fault messages to be more informative and more structured. - remove DISCONTIGMEM support on x86-32 and make SPARSEMEM the default. - reduce KASLR granularity on 5-level paging kernels from 512 GB to 1 GB. - misc other changes and updates" * 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits) x86/mm: Initialize PGD cache during mm initialization x86/alternatives: Add comment about module removal races x86/kprobes: Use vmalloc special flag x86/ftrace: Use vmalloc special flag bpf: Use vmalloc special flag modules: Use vmalloc special flag mm/vmalloc: Add flag for freeing of special permsissions mm/hibernation: Make hibernation handle unmapped pages x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_*() functions x86/alternatives: Remove the return value of text_poke_*() x86/jump-label: Remove support for custom text poker x86/modules: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules x86/kprobes: Set instruction page as executable x86/ftrace: Set trampoline pages as executable x86/kgdb: Avoid redundant comparison of patched code x86/alternatives: Use temporary mm for text poking x86/alternatives: Initialize temporary mm for patching fork: Provide a function for copying init_mm uprobes: Initialize uprobes earlier x86/mm: Save debug registers when loading a temporary mm ...
2019-04-30mm/tlb: Provide default nmi_uaccess_okay()Nadav Amit1-0/+2
x86 has an nmi_uaccess_okay(), but other architectures do not. Arch-independent code might need to know whether access to user addresses is ok in an NMI context or in other code whose execution context is unknown. Specifically, this function is needed for bpf_probe_write_user(). Add a default implementation of nmi_uaccess_okay() for architectures that do not have such a function. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-23-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-03-29x86/mm/tlb: Define LOADED_MM_SWITCHING with pointer-sized numberJann Horn1-1/+1
sparse complains that LOADED_MM_SWITCHING's definition casts an int to a pointer: arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:409:17: warning: non size-preserving integer to pointer cast Use a pointer-sized integer constant instead. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Sai Praneeth <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190328230939.15711-1-jannh@google.com
2018-11-28x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm()Thomas Gleixner1-2/+6
The IBPB speculation barrier is issued from switch_mm() when the kernel switches to a user space task with a different mm than the user space task which ran last on the same CPU. An additional optimization is to avoid IBPB when the incoming task can be ptraced by the outgoing task. This optimization only works when switching directly between two user space tasks. When switching from a kernel task to a user space task the optimization fails because the previous task cannot be accessed anymore. So for quite some scenarios the optimization is just adding overhead. The upcoming conditional IBPB support will issue IBPB only for user space tasks which have the TIF_SPEC_IB bit set. This requires to handle the following cases: 1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set. 2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set. This needs to be optimized for the case where the IBPB can be avoided when only kernel threads ran in between user space tasks which belong to the same process. The current check whether two tasks belong to the same context is using the tasks context id. While correct, it's simpler to use the mm pointer because it allows to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into it. The context id based mechanism requires extra storage, which creates worse code. When a task is scheduled out its TIF_SPEC_IB bit is mangled as bit 0 into the per CPU storage which is used to track the last user space mm which was running on a CPU. This bit can be used together with the TIF_SPEC_IB bit of the incoming task to make the decision whether IBPB needs to be issued or not to cover the two cases above. As conditional IBPB is going to be the default, remove the dubious ptrace check for the IBPB always case and simply issue IBPB always when the process changes. Move the storage to a different place in the struct as the original one created a hole. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.466447057@linutronix.de
2018-10-29x86/mm/pat: Disable preemption around __flush_tlb_all()Sebastian Andrzej Siewior1-0/+6
The WARN_ON_ONCE(__read_cr3() != build_cr3()) in switch_mm_irqs_off() triggers every once in a while during a snapshotted system upgrade. The warning triggers since commit decab0888e6e ("x86/mm: Remove preempt_disable/enable() from __native_flush_tlb()"). The callchain is: get_page_from_freelist() -> post_alloc_hook() -> __kernel_map_pages() with CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC enabled. Disable preemption during CR3 reset / __flush_tlb_all() and add a comment why preemption has to be disabled so it won't be removed accidentaly. Add another preemptible() check in __flush_tlb_all() to catch callers with enabled preemption when PGE is enabled, because PGE enabled does not trigger the warning in __native_flush_tlb(). Suggested by Andy Lutomirski. Fixes: decab0888e6e ("x86/mm: Remove preempt_disable/enable() from __native_flush_tlb()") Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181017103432.zgv46nlu3hc7k4rq@linutronix.de
2018-10-09x86/mm/tlb: Add freed_tables element to flush_tlb_infoRik van Riel1-0/+1
Pass the information on to native_flush_tlb_others. No functional changes. Cc: npiggin@gmail.com Cc: mingo@kernel.org Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: songliubraving@fb.com Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180926035844.1420-7-riel@surriel.com
2018-10-09x86/mm/tlb: Add freed_tables argument to flush_tlb_mm_rangeRik van Riel1-4/+6
Add an argument to flush_tlb_mm_range to indicate whether page tables are about to be freed after this TLB flush. This allows for an optimization of flush_tlb_mm_range to skip CPUs in lazy TLB mode. No functional changes. Cc: npiggin@gmail.com Cc: mingo@kernel.org Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: songliubraving@fb.com Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180926035844.1420-6-riel@surriel.com
2018-10-09x86/mm/tlb: Always use lazy TLB modeRik van Riel1-16/+0
On most workloads, the number of context switches far exceeds the number of TLB flushes sent. Optimizing the context switches, by always using lazy TLB mode, speeds up those workloads. This patch results in about a 1% reduction in CPU use on a two socket Broadwell system running a memcache like workload. Cc: npiggin@gmail.com Cc: efault@gmx.de Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> (cherry picked from commit 95b0e6357d3e4e05349668940d7ff8f3b7e7e11e) Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-7-riel@surriel.com
2018-10-09x86/mm: Page size aware flush_tlb_mm_range()Peter Zijlstra1-4/+8
Use the new tlb_get_unmap_shift() to determine the stride of the INVLPG loop. Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
2018-08-31x86/nmi: Fix NMI uaccess race against CR3 switchingAndy Lutomirski1-0/+40
A NMI can hit in the middle of context switching or in the middle of switch_mm_irqs_off(). In either case, CR3 might not match current->mm, which could cause copy_from_user_nmi() and friends to read the wrong memory. Fix it by adding a new nmi_uaccess_okay() helper and checking it in copy_from_user_nmi() and in __copy_from_user_nmi()'s callers. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/dd956eba16646fd0b15c3c0741269dfd84452dac.1535557289.git.luto@kernel.org
2018-08-23x86/mm: Only use tlb_remove_table() for paravirtPeter Zijlstra1-0/+3
If we don't use paravirt; don't play unnecessary and complicated games to free page-tables. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-23x86/mm/tlb: Revert the recent lazy TLB patchesPeter Zijlstra1-5/+16
Revert commits: 95b0e6357d3e x86/mm/tlb: Always use lazy TLB mode 64482aafe55f x86/mm/tlb: Only send page table free TLB flush to lazy TLB CPUs ac0315896970 x86/mm/tlb: Make lazy TLB mode lazier 61d0beb5796a x86/mm/tlb: Restructure switch_mm_irqs_off() 2ff6ddf19c0e x86/mm/tlb: Leave lazy TLB mode at page table free time In order to simplify the TLB invalidate fixes for x86 and unify the parts that need backporting. We'll try again later. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-07-17x86/mm/tlb: Always use lazy TLB modeRik van Riel1-16/+0
Now that CPUs in lazy TLB mode no longer receive TLB shootdown IPIs, except at page table freeing time, and idle CPUs will no longer get shootdown IPIs for things like mprotect and madvise, we can always use lazy TLB mode. Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: efault@gmx.de Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-7-riel@surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-17x86/mm/tlb: Leave lazy TLB mode at page table free timeRik van Riel1-0/+5
Andy discovered that speculative memory accesses while in lazy TLB mode can crash a system, when a CPU tries to dereference a speculative access using memory contents that used to be valid page table memory, but have since been reused for something else and point into la-la land. The latter problem can be prevented in two ways. The first is to always send a TLB shootdown IPI to CPUs in lazy TLB mode, while the second one is to only send the TLB shootdown at page table freeing time. The second should result in fewer IPIs, since operationgs like mprotect and madvise are very common with some workloads, but do not involve page table freeing. Also, on munmap, batching of page table freeing covers much larger ranges of virtual memory than the batching of unmapped user pages. Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: efault@gmx.de Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-3-riel@surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-04-05x86/mm: Fix bogus warning during EFI bootup, use boot_cpu_has() instead of ↵Sai Praneeth1-1/+6
this_cpu_has() in build_cr3_noflush() Linus reported the following boot warning: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h:134 load_new_mm_cr3+0x114/0x170 [...] Call Trace: switch_mm_irqs_off+0x267/0x590 switch_mm+0xe/0x20 efi_switch_mm+0x3e/0x50 efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x43f/0x4da start_kernel+0x3bf/0x458 secondary_startup_64+0xa5/0xb0 ... after merging: 03781e40890c: x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with %cr3 When the platform supports PCID and if CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y is enabled, build_cr3_noflush() (called via switch_mm()) does a sanity check to see if X86_FEATURE_PCID is set. Presently, build_cr3_noflush() uses "this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)" to perform the check but this_cpu_has() works only after SMP is initialized (i.e. per cpu cpu_info's should be populated) and this happens to be very late in the boot process (during rest_init()). As efi_runtime_services() are called during (early) kernel boot time and run time, modify build_cr3_noflush() to use boot_cpu_has() all the time. As suggested by Dave Hansen, this should be OK because all CPU's have same capabilities on x86. With this change the warning is fixed. ( Dave also suggested that we put a warning in this_cpu_has() if it's used early in the boot process. This is still work in progress as it affects MCE. ) Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Lee Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1522870459-7432-1-git-send-email-sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-02-15x86/mm: Rename flush_tlb_single() and flush_tlb_one() to ↵Andy Lutomirski1-7/+20
__flush_tlb_one_[user|kernel]() flush_tlb_single() and flush_tlb_one() sound almost identical, but they really mean "flush one user translation" and "flush one kernel translation". Rename them to flush_tlb_one_user() and flush_tlb_one_kernel() to make the semantics more obvious. [ I was looking at some PTI-related code, and the flush-one-address code is unnecessarily hard to understand because the names of the helpers are uninformative. This came up during PTI review, but no one got around to doing it. ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3303b02e3c3d049dc5235d5651e0ae6d29a34354.1517414378.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-01-31x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switchTim Chen1-0/+2
Flush indirect branches when switching into a process that marked itself non dumpable. This protects high value processes like gpg better, without having too high performance overhead. If done naïvely, we could switch to a kernel idle thread and then back to the original process, such as: process A -> idle -> process A In such scenario, we do not have to do IBPB here even though the process is non-dumpable, as we are switching back to the same process after a hiatus. To avoid the redundant IBPB, which is expensive, we track the last mm user context ID. The cost is to have an extra u64 mm context id to track the last mm we were using before switching to the init_mm used by idle. Avoiding the extra IBPB is probably worth the extra memory for this common scenario. For those cases where tlb_defer_switch_to_init_mm() returns true (non PCID), lazy tlb will defer switch to init_mm, so we will not be changing the mm for the process A -> idle -> process A switch. So IBPB will be skipped for this case. Thanks to the reviewers and Andy Lutomirski for the suggestion of using ctx_id which got rid of the problem of mm pointer recycling. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: karahmed@amazon.de Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: linux@dominikbrodowski.net Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517263487-3708-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-14Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner: "This contains: - a PTI bugfix to avoid setting reserved CR3 bits when PCID is disabled. This seems to cause issues on a virtual machine at least and is incorrect according to the AMD manual. - a PTI bugfix which disables the perf BTS facility if PTI is enabled. The BTS AUX buffer is not globally visible and causes the CPU to fault when the mapping disappears on switching CR3 to user space. A full fix which restores BTS on PTI is non trivial and will be worked on. - PTI bugfixes for EFI and trusted boot which make sure that the user space visible page table entries have the NX bit cleared - removal of dead code in the PTI pagetable setup functions - add PTI documentation - add a selftest for vsyscall to verify that the kernel actually implements what it advertises. - a sysfs interface to expose vulnerability and mitigation information so there is a coherent way for users to retrieve the status. - the initial spectre_v2 mitigations, aka retpoline: + The necessary ASM thunk and compiler support + The ASM variants of retpoline and the conversion of affected ASM code + Make LFENCE serializing on AMD so it can be used as speculation trap + The RSB fill after vmexit - initial objtool support for retpoline As I said in the status mail this is the most of the set of patches which should go into 4.15 except two straight forward patches still on hold: - the retpoline add on of LFENCE which waits for ACKs - the RSB fill after context switch Both should be ready to go early next week and with that we'll have covered the major holes of spectre_v2 and go back to normality" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (28 commits) x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC ...
2018-01-14x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize definesThomas Gleixner1-3/+3
The switch to the user space page tables in the low level ASM code sets unconditionally bit 12 and bit 11 of CR3. Bit 12 is switching the base address of the page directory to the user part, bit 11 is switching the PCID to the PCID associated with the user page tables. This fails on a machine which lacks PCID support because bit 11 is set in CR3. Bit 11 is reserved when PCID is inactive. While the Intel SDM claims that the reserved bits are ignored when PCID is disabled, the AMD APM states that they should be cleared. This went unnoticed as the AMD APM was not checked when the code was developed and reviewed and test systems with Intel CPUs never failed to boot. The report is against a Centos 6 host where the guest fails to boot, so it's not yet clear whether this is a virt issue or can happen on real hardware too, but thats irrelevant as the AMD APM clearly ask for clearing the reserved bits. Make sure that on non PCID machines bit 11 is not set by the page table switching code. Andy suggested to rename the related bits and masks so they are clearly describing what they should be used for, which is done as well for clarity. That split could have been done with alternatives but the macro hell is horrible and ugly. This can be done on top if someone cares to remove the extra orq. For now it's a straight forward fix. Fixes: 6fd166aae78c ("x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches") Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801140009150.2371@nanos
2018-01-01Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-6/+8
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 page table isolation fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "Four patches addressing the PTI fallout as discussed and debugged yesterday: - Remove stale and pointless TLB flush invocations from the hotplug code - Remove stale preempt_disable/enable from __native_flush_tlb() - Plug the memory leak in the write_ldt() error path" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/ldt: Make LDT pgtable free conditional x86/ldt: Plug memory leak in error path x86/mm: Remove preempt_disable/enable() from __native_flush_tlb() x86/smpboot: Remove stale TLB flush invocations
2017-12-31x86/mm: Remove preempt_disable/enable() from __native_flush_tlb()Thomas Gleixner1-6/+8
The preempt_disable/enable() pair in __native_flush_tlb() was added in commit: 5cf0791da5c1 ("x86/mm: Disable preemption during CR3 read+write") ... to protect the UP variant of flush_tlb_mm_range(). That preempt_disable/enable() pair should have been added to the UP variant of flush_tlb_mm_range() instead. The UP variant was removed with commit: ce4a4e565f52 ("x86/mm: Remove the UP asm/tlbflush.h code, always use the (formerly) SMP code") ... but the preempt_disable/enable() pair stayed around. The latest change to __native_flush_tlb() in commit: 6fd166aae78c ("x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches") ... added an access to a per CPU variable outside the preempt disabled regions, which makes no sense at all. __native_flush_tlb() must always be called with at least preemption disabled. Remove the preempt_disable/enable() pair and add a WARN_ON_ONCE() to catch bad callers independent of the smp_processor_id() debugging. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171230211829.679325424@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-30Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-31/+171
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 page table isolation updates from Thomas Gleixner: "This is the final set of enabling page table isolation on x86: - Infrastructure patches for handling the extra page tables. - Patches which map the various bits and pieces which are required to get in and out of user space into the user space visible page tables. - The required changes to have CR3 switching in the entry/exit code. - Optimizations for the CR3 switching along with documentation how the ASID/PCID mechanism works. - Updates to dump pagetables to cover the user space page tables for W+X scans and extra debugfs files to analyze both the kernel and the user space visible page tables The whole functionality is compile time controlled via a config switch and can be turned on/off on the command line as well" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (32 commits) x86/ldt: Make the LDT mapping RO x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Allow dumping current pagetables x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Check user space page table for WX pages x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Add page table directory to the debugfs VFS hierarchy x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig x86/dumpstack: Indicate in Oops whether PTI is configured and enabled x86/mm: Clarify the whole ASID/kernel PCID/user PCID naming x86/mm: Use INVPCID for __native_flush_tlb_single() x86/mm: Optimize RESTORE_CR3 x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches x86/mm: Abstract switching CR3 x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switches x86/pti: Map the vsyscall page if needed x86/pti: Put the LDT in its own PGD if PTI is on x86/mm/64: Make a full PGD-entry size hole in the memory map x86/events/intel/ds: Map debug buffers in cpu_entry_area x86/cpu_entry_area: Add debugstore entries to cpu_entry_area x86/mm/pti: Map ESPFIX into user space x86/mm/pti: Share entry text PMD x86/entry: Align entry text section to PMD boundary ...
2017-12-23x86/mm: Clarify the whole ASID/kernel PCID/user PCID namingPeter Zijlstra1-12/+43
Ideally we'd also use sparse to enforce this separation so it becomes much more difficult to mess up. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-23x86/mm: Use INVPCID for __native_flush_tlb_single()Dave Hansen1-1/+22
This uses INVPCID to shoot down individual lines of the user mapping instead of marking the entire user map as invalid. This could/might/possibly be faster. This for sure needs tlb_single_page_flush_ceiling to be redetermined; esp. since INVPCID is _slow_. A detailed performance analysis is available here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3062e486-3539-8a1f-5724-16199420be71@intel.com [ Peterz: Split out from big combo patch ] Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-23x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switchesPeter Zijlstra1-12/+79
We can use PCID to retain the TLBs across CR3 switches; including those now part of the user/kernel switch. This increases performance of kernel entry/exit at the cost of more expensive/complicated TLB flushing. Now that we have two address spaces, one for kernel and one for user space, we need two PCIDs per mm. We use the top PCID bit to indicate a user PCID (just like we use the PFN LSB for the PGD). Since we do TLB invalidation from kernel space, the existing code will only invalidate the kernel PCID, we augment that by marking the corresponding user PCID invalid, and upon switching back to userspace, use a flushing CR3 write for the switch. In order to access the user_pcid_flush_mask we use PER_CPU storage, which means the previously established SWAPGS vs CR3 ordering is now mandatory and required. Having to do this memory access does require additional registers, most sites have a functioning stack and we can spill one (RAX), sites without functional stack need to otherwise provide the second scratch register. Note: PCID is generally available on Intel Sandybridge and later CPUs. Note: Up until this point TLB flushing was broken in this series. Based-on-code-from: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-23x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switchesDave Hansen1-8/+29
If changing the page tables in such a way that an invalidation of all contexts (aka. PCIDs / ASIDs) is required, they can be actively invalidated by: 1. INVPCID for each PCID (works for single pages too). 2. Load CR3 with each PCID without the NOFLUSH bit set 3. Load CR3 with the NOFLUSH bit set for each and do INVLPG for each address. But, none of these are really feasible since there are ~6 ASIDs (12 with PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) at the time that invalidation is required. Instead of actively invalidating them, invalidate the *current* context and also mark the cpu_tlbstate _quickly_ to indicate future invalidation to be required. At the next context-switch, look for this indicator ('invalidate_other' being set) invalidate all of the cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[] entries. This ensures that any future context switches will do a full flush of the TLB, picking up the previous changes. [ tglx: Folded more fixups from Peter ] Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-23Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-64/+72
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 PTI preparatory patches from Thomas Gleixner: "Todays Advent calendar window contains twentyfour easy to digest patches. The original plan was to have twenty three matching the date, but a late fixup made that moot. - Move the cpu_entry_area mapping out of the fixmap into a separate address space. That's necessary because the fixmap becomes too big with NRCPUS=8192 and this caused already subtle and hard to diagnose failures. The top most patch is fresh from today and cures a brain slip of that tall grumpy german greybeard, who ignored the intricacies of 32bit wraparounds. - Limit the number of CPUs on 32bit to 64. That's insane big already, but at least it's small enough to prevent address space issues with the cpu_entry_area map, which have been observed and debugged with the fixmap code - A few TLB flush fixes in various places plus documentation which of the TLB functions should be used for what. - Rename the SYSENTER stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA stack as it is used for more than sysenter now and keeping the name makes backtraces confusing. - Prevent LDT inheritance on exec() by moving it to arch_dup_mmap(), which is only invoked on fork(). - Make vysycall more robust. - A few fixes and cleanups of the debug_pagetables code. Check PAGE_PRESENT instead of checking the PTE for 0 and a cleanup of the C89 initialization of the address hint array which already was out of sync with the index enums. - Move the ESPFIX init to a different place to prepare for PTI. - Several code moves with no functional change to make PTI integration simpler and header files less convoluted. - Documentation fixes and clarifications" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (24 commits) x86/cpu_entry_area: Prevent wraparound in setup_cpu_entry_area_ptes() on 32bit init: Invoke init_espfix_bsp() from mm_init() x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it to a separate unit x86/mm: Create asm/invpcid.h x86/mm: Put MMU to hardware ASID translation in one place x86/mm: Remove hard-coded ASID limit checks x86/mm: Move the CR3 construction functions to tlbflush.h x86/mm: Add comments to clarify which TLB-flush functions are supposed to flush what x86/mm: Remove superfluous barriers x86/mm: Use __flush_tlb_one() for kernel memory x86/microcode: Dont abuse the TLB-flush interface x86/uv: Use the right TLB-flush API x86/entry: Rename SYSENTER_stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack x86/doc: Remove obvious weirdnesses from the x86 MM layout documentation x86/mm/64: Improve the memory map documentation x86/ldt: Prevent LDT inheritance on exec x86/ldt: Rework locking arch, mm: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail x86/vsyscall/64: Warn and fail vsyscall emulation in NATIVE mode ...
2017-12-22x86/mm: Create asm/invpcid.hPeter Zijlstra1-48/+1
Unclutter tlbflush.h a little. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-22x86/mm: Put MMU to hardware ASID translation in one placeDave Hansen1-11/+18
There are effectively two ASID types: 1. The one stored in the mmu_context that goes from 0..5 2. The one programmed into the hardware that goes from 1..6 This consolidates the locations where converting between the two (by doing a +1) to a single place which gives us a nice place to comment. PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION will also need to, given an ASID, know which hardware ASID to flush for the userspace mapping. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-22x86/mm: Remove hard-coded ASID limit checksDave Hansen1-2/+18
First, it's nice to remove the magic numbers. Second, PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is going to consume half of the available ASID space. The space is currently unused, but add a comment to spell out this new restriction. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-22x86/mm: Move the CR3 construction functions to tlbflush.hDave Hansen1-0/+26
For flushing the TLB, the ASID which has been programmed into the hardware must be known. That differs from what is in 'cpu_tlbstate'. Add functions to transform the 'cpu_tlbstate' values into to the one programmed into the hardware (CR3). It's not easy to include mmu_context.h into tlbflush.h, so just move the CR3 building over to tlbflush.h. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-22x86/mm: Add comments to clarify which TLB-flush functions are supposed to ↵Peter Zijlstra1-2/+21
flush what Per popular request.. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-22x86/mm: Remove superfluous barriersPeter Zijlstra1-7/+1
atomic64_inc_return() already implies smp_mb() before and after. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-22x86/microcode: Dont abuse the TLB-flush interfacePeter Zijlstra1-13/+6
Commit: ec400ddeff20 ("x86/microcode_intel_early.c: Early update ucode on Intel's CPU") ... grubbed into tlbflush internals without coherent explanation. Since it says its a precaution and the SDM doesn't mention anything like this, take it out back. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-25x86/tlb: Disable interrupts when changing CR4Nadav Amit1-3/+8
CR4 modifications are implemented as RMW operations which update a shadow variable and write the result to CR4. The RMW operation is protected by preemption disable, but there is no enforcement or debugging mechanism. CR4 modifications happen also in interrupt context via __native_flush_tlb_global(). This implementation does not affect a interrupted thread context CR4 operation, because the CR4 toggle restores the original content and does not modify the shadow variable. So the current situation seems to be safe, but a recent patch tried to add an actual RMW operation in interrupt context, which will cause subtle corruptions. To prevent that and make the CR4 handling future proof: - Add a lockdep assertion to __cr4_set() which will catch interrupt enabled invocations - Disable interrupts in the cr4 manipulator inlines - Rename cr4_toggle_bits() to cr4_toggle_bits_irqsoff(). This is called from __switch_to_xtra() where interrupts are already disabled and performance matters. All other call sites are not performance critical, so the extra overhead of an additional local_irq_save/restore() pair is not a problem. If new call sites care about performance then the necessary _irqsoff() variants can be added. [ tglx: Condensed the patch by moving the irq protection inside the manipulator functions. Updated changelog ] Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: nadav.amit@gmail.com Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171125032907.2241-3-namit@vmware.com
2017-11-25x86/tlb: Refactor CR4 setting and shadow writeNadav Amit1-13/+11
Refactor the write to CR4 and its shadow value. This is done in preparation for the addition of an assertion to check that IRQs are disabled during CR4 update. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: nadav.amit@gmail.com Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171125032907.2241-2-namit@vmware.com
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman1-0/+1
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>