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2023-06-02KVM: VMX: Inject #GP, not #UD, if SGX2 ENCLS leafs are unsupportedSean Christopherson1-6/+9
Per Intel's SDM, unsupported ENCLS leafs result in a #GP, not a #UD. SGX1 is a special snowflake as the SGX1 flag is used by the CPU as a "soft" disable, e.g. if software disables machine check reporting, i.e. having SGX but not SGX1 is effectively "SGX completely unsupported" and and thus #UDs. Fixes: 9798adbc04cf ("KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization") Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405234556.696927-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-06-02KVM: VMX: Inject #GP on ENCLS if vCPU has paging disabled (CR0.PG==0)Sean Christopherson1-1/+1
Inject a #GP when emulating/forwarding a valid ENCLS leaf if the vCPU has paging disabled, e.g. if KVM is intercepting ECREATE to enforce additional restrictions. The pseudocode in the SDM lists all #GP triggers, including CR0.PG=0, as being checked after the ENLCS-exiting checks, i.e. the VM-Exit will occur before the CPU performs the CR0.PG check. Fixes: 70210c044b4e ("KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions") Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405234556.696927-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-05-21KVM: VMX: Don't rely _only_ on CPUID to enforce XCR0 restrictions for ECREATESean Christopherson1-2/+9
Explicitly check the vCPU's supported XCR0 when determining whether or not the XFRM for ECREATE is valid. Checking CPUID works because KVM updates guest CPUID.0x12.1 to restrict the leaf to a subset of the guest's allowed XCR0, but that is rather subtle and KVM should not modify guest CPUID except for modeling true runtime behavior (allowed XFRM is most definitely not "runtime" behavior). Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20230503160838.3412617-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2023-04-05KVM: VMX: Use is_64_bit_mode() to check 64-bit mode in SGX handlerBinbin Wu1-2/+2
sgx_get_encls_gva() uses is_long_mode() to check 64-bit mode, however, SGX system leaf instructions are valid in compatibility mode, should use is_64_bit_mode() instead. Fixes: 70210c044b4e ("KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions") Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230404032502.27798-1-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2022-12-29KVM: x86: Unify pr_fmt to use module name for all KVM modulesSean Christopherson1-2/+3
Define pr_fmt using KBUILD_MODNAME for all KVM x86 code so that printks use consistent formatting across common x86, Intel, and AMD code. In addition to providing consistent print formatting, using KBUILD_MODNAME, e.g. kvm_amd and kvm_intel, allows referencing SVM and VMX (and SEV and SGX and ...) as technologies without generating weird messages, and without causing naming conflicts with other kernel code, e.g. "SEV: ", "tdx: ", "sgx: " etc.. are all used by the kernel for non-KVM subsystems. Opportunistically move away from printk() for prints that need to be modified anyways, e.g. to drop a manual "kvm: " prefix. Opportunistically convert a few SGX WARNs that are similarly modified to WARN_ONCE; in the very unlikely event that the WARNs fire, odds are good that they would fire repeatedly and spam the kernel log without providing unique information in each print. Note, defining pr_fmt yields undesirable results for code that uses KVM's printk wrappers, e.g. vcpu_unimpl(). But, that's a pre-existing problem as SVM/kvm_amd already defines a pr_fmt, and thankfully use of KVM's wrappers is relatively limited in KVM x86 code. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org> Message-Id: <20221130230934.1014142-35-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-12-01KVM: VMX: Resume guest immediately when injecting #GP on ECREATESean Christopherson1-1/+3
Resume the guest immediately when injecting a #GP on ECREATE due to an invalid enclave size, i.e. don't attempt ECREATE in the host. The #GP is a terminal fault, e.g. skipping the instruction if ECREATE is successful would result in KVM injecting #GP on the instruction following ECREATE. Fixes: 70210c044b4e ("KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220930233132.1723330-1-seanjc@google.com
2022-09-26KVM: VMX: Inject #PF on ENCLS as "emulated" #PFSean Christopherson1-1/+1
Treat #PFs that occur during emulation of ENCLS as, wait for it, emulated page faults. Practically speaking, this is a glorified nop as the exception is never of the nested flavor, and it's extremely unlikely the guest is relying on the side effect of an implicit INVLPG on the faulting address. Fixes: 70210c044b4e ("KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220830231614.3580124-13-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-07-14KVM: x86: Add dedicated helper to get CPUID entry with significant indexSean Christopherson1-4/+4
Add a second CPUID helper, kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(), to handle KVM queries for CPUID leaves whose index _may_ be significant, and drop the index param from the existing kvm_find_cpuid_entry(). Add a WARN in the inner helper, cpuid_entry2_find(), to detect attempts to retrieve a CPUID entry whose index is significant without explicitly providing an index. Using an explicit magic number and letting callers omit the index avoids confusion by eliminating the myriad cases where KVM specifies '0' as a dummy value. Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-07-13KVM: x86/mmu: Replace UNMAPPED_GVA with INVALID_GPA for gva_to_gpa()Hou Wenlong1-1/+1
The result of gva_to_gpa() is physical address not virtual address, it is odd that UNMAPPED_GVA macro is used as the result for physical address. Replace UNMAPPED_GVA with INVALID_GPA and drop UNMAPPED_GVA macro. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6104978956449467d3c68f1ad7f2c2f6d771d0ee.1656667239.git.houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2021-10-25KVM: x86: SGX must obey the KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION protocolDavid Edmondson1-11/+5
When passing the failing address and size out to user space, SGX must ensure not to trample on the earlier fields of the emulation_failure sub-union of struct kvm_run. Signed-off-by: David Edmondson <david.edmondson@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210920103737.2696756-5-david.edmondson@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-20KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LCSean Christopherson1-1/+79
Enable SGX virtualization now that KVM has the VM-Exit handlers needed to trap-and-execute ENCLS to ensure correctness and/or enforce the CPU model exposed to the guest. Add a KVM module param, "sgx", to allow an admin to disable SGX virtualization independent of the kernel. When supported in hardware and the kernel, advertise SGX1, SGX2 and SGX LC to userspace via CPUID and wire up the ENCLS_EXITING bitmap based on the guest's SGX capabilities, i.e. to allow ENCLS to be executed in an SGX-enabled guest. With the exception of the provision key, all SGX attribute bits may be exposed to the guest. Guest access to the provision key, which is controlled via securityfs, will be added in a future patch. Note, KVM does not yet support exposing ENCLS_C leafs or ENCLV leafs. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Message-Id: <a99e9c23310c79f2f4175c1af4c4cbcef913c3e5.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-20KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC)Sean Christopherson1-0/+64
Add a VM-Exit handler to trap-and-execute EINIT when SGX LC is enabled in the host. When SGX LC is enabled, the host kernel may rewrite the hardware values at will, e.g. to launch enclaves with different signers, thus KVM needs to intercept EINIT to ensure it is executed with the correct LE hash (even if the guest sees a hardwired hash). Switching the LE hash MSRs on VM-Enter/VM-Exit is not a viable option as writing the MSRs is prohibitively expensive, e.g. on SKL hardware each WRMSR is ~400 cycles. And because EINIT takes tens of thousands of cycles to execute, the ~1500 cycle overhead to trap-and-execute EINIT is unlikely to be noticed by the guest, let alone impact its overall SGX performance. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Message-Id: <57c92fa4d2083eb3be9e6355e3882fc90cffea87.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-20KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRsSean Christopherson1-0/+35
Emulate the four Launch Enclave public key hash MSRs (LE hash MSRs) that exist on CPUs that support SGX Launch Control (LC). SGX LC modifies the behavior of ENCLS[EINIT] to use the LE hash MSRs when verifying the key used to sign an enclave. On CPUs without LC support, the LE hash is hardwired into the CPU to an Intel controlled key (the Intel key is also the reset value of the LE hash MSRs). Track the guest's desired hash so that a future patch can stuff the hash into the hardware MSRs when executing EINIT on behalf of the guest, when those MSRs are writable in host. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Message-Id: <c58ef601ddf88f3a113add837969533099b1364a.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com> [Add a comment regarding the MSRs being available until SGX is locked. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-20KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictionsSean Christopherson1-0/+275
Add an ECREATE handler that will be used to intercept ECREATE for the purpose of enforcing and enclave's MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM, i.e. to allow userspace to restrict SGX features via CPUID. ECREATE will be intercepted when any of the aforementioned masks diverges from hardware in order to enforce the desired CPUID model, i.e. inject #GP if the guest attempts to set a bit that hasn't been enumerated as allowed-1 in CPUID. Note, access to the PROVISIONKEY is not yet supported. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Message-Id: <c3a97684f1b71b4f4626a1fc3879472a95651725.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-20KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualizationSean Christopherson1-0/+50
Introduce sgx.c and sgx.h, along with the framework for handling ENCLS VM-Exits. Add a bool, enable_sgx, that will eventually be wired up to a module param to control whether or not SGX virtualization is enabled at runtime. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Message-Id: <1c782269608b2f5e1034be450f375a8432fb705d.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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