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2019-01-31xen: Fix x86 sched_clock() interface for xenJuergen Gross1-3/+9
commit 867cefb4cb1012f42cada1c7d1f35ac8dd276071 upstream. Commit f94c8d11699759 ("sched/clock, x86/tsc: Rework the x86 'unstable' sched_clock() interface") broke Xen guest time handling across migration: [ 187.249951] Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done. [ 187.251137] OOM killer disabled. [ 187.251137] Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done. [ 187.252299] suspending xenstore... [ 187.266987] xen:grant_table: Grant tables using version 1 layout [18446743811.706476] OOM killer enabled. [18446743811.706478] Restarting tasks ... done. [18446743811.720505] Setting capacity to 16777216 Fix that by setting xen_sched_clock_offset at resume time to ensure a monotonic clock value. [boris: replaced pr_info() with pr_info_once() in xen_callback_vector() to avoid printing with incorrect timestamp during resume (as we haven't re-adjusted the clock yet)] Fixes: f94c8d11699759 ("sched/clock, x86/tsc: Rework the x86 'unstable' sched_clock() interface") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11 Reported-by: Hans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Tested-by: Hans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-31x86/xen/time: Output xen sched_clock time from 0Pavel Tatashin1-1/+10
commit 38669ba205d178d2d38bfd194a196d65a44d5af2 upstream. It is expected for sched_clock() to output data from 0, when system boots. Add an offset xen_sched_clock_offset (similarly how it is done in other hypervisors i.e. kvm_sched_clock_offset) to count sched_clock() from 0, when time is first initialized. Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: steven.sistare@oracle.com Cc: daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org Cc: sboyd@codeaurora.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: prarit@redhat.com Cc: feng.tang@intel.com Cc: pmladek@suse.com Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: jgross@suse.com Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180719205545.16512-14-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-31x86/xen/time: setup vcpu 0 time info pageJoao Martins3-1/+95
commit 2229f70b5bbb025e1394b61007938a68060afbfb upstream. In order to support pvclock vdso on xen we need to setup the time info page for vcpu 0 and register the page with Xen using the VCPUOP_register_vcpu_time_memory_area hypercall. This hypercall will also forcefully update the pvti which will set some of the necessary flags for vdso. Afterwards we check if it supports the PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT flag which is mandatory for having vdso/vsyscall support. And if so, it will set the cpu 0 pvti that will be later on used when mapping the vdso image. The xen headers are also updated to include the new hypercall for registering the secondary vcpu_time_info struct. Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-31x86/xen/time: set pvclock flags on xen_time_init()Joao Martins1-0/+9
commit b888808093113ae7d63d213272d01fea4b8329ed upstream. Specifically check for PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT and if this bit is set, then set it too on pvclock flags. This allows Xen clocksource to use it and thus speeding up xen_clocksource_read() callers (i.e. sched_clock()) Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-13x86/mm: Fix guard hole handlingKirill A. Shutemov1-5/+6
[ Upstream commit 16877a5570e0c5f4270d5b17f9bab427bcae9514 ] There is a guard hole at the beginning of the kernel address space, also used by hypervisors. It occupies 16 PGD entries. This reserved range is not defined explicitely, it is calculated relative to other entities: direct mapping and user space ranges. The calculation got broken by recent changes of the kernel memory layout: LDT remap range is now mapped before direct mapping and makes the calculation invalid. The breakage leads to crash on Xen dom0 boot[1]. Define the reserved range explicitely. It's part of kernel ABI (hypervisors expect it to be stable) and must not depend on changes in the rest of kernel memory layout. [1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-11/msg03313.html Fixes: d52888aa2753 ("x86/mm: Move LDT remap out of KASLR region on 5-level paging") Reported-by: Hans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Hans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: bhe@redhat.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130202328.65359-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-17Revert "xen/balloon: Mark unallocated host memory as UNUSABLE"Igor Druzhinin2-80/+4
[ Upstream commit 123664101aa2156d05251704fc63f9bcbf77741a ] This reverts commit b3cf8528bb21febb650a7ecbf080d0647be40b9f. That commit unintentionally broke Xen balloon memory hotplug with "hotplug_unpopulated" set to 1. As long as "System RAM" resource got assigned under a new "Unusable memory" resource in IO/Mem tree any attempt to online this memory would fail due to general kernel restrictions on having "System RAM" resources as 1st level only. The original issue that commit has tried to workaround fa564ad96366 ("x86/PCI: Enable a 64bit BAR on AMD Family 15h (Models 00-1f, 30-3f, 60-7f)") also got amended by the following 03a551734 ("x86/PCI: Move and shrink AMD 64-bit window to avoid conflict") which made the original fix to Xen ballooning unnecessary. Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-11-27x86/mm: Move LDT remap out of KASLR region on 5-level pagingKirill A. Shutemov1-3/+3
commit d52888aa2753e3063a9d3a0c9f72f94aa9809c15 upstream On 5-level paging the LDT remap area is placed in the middle of the KASLR randomization region and it can overlap with the direct mapping, the vmalloc or the vmap area. The LDT mapping is per mm, so it cannot be moved into the P4D page table next to the CPU_ENTRY_AREA without complicating PGD table allocation for 5-level paging. The 4 PGD slot gap just before the direct mapping is reserved for hypervisors, so it cannot be used. Move the direct mapping one slot deeper and use the resulting gap for the LDT remap area. The resulting layout is the same for 4 and 5 level paging. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Fixes: f55f0501cbf6 ("x86/pti: Put the LDT in its own PGD if PTI is on") Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: jgross@suse.com Cc: bhe@redhat.com Cc: willy@infradead.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181026122856.66224-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-11-13xen: fix xen_qlock_wait()Juergen Gross1-6/+8
commit d3132b3860f6cf35ff7609a76bbcdbb814bd027c upstream. Commit a856531951dc80 ("xen: make xen_qlock_wait() nestable") introduced a regression for Xen guests running fully virtualized (HVM or PVH mode). The Xen hypervisor wouldn't return from the poll hypercall with interrupts disabled in case of an interrupt (for PV guests it does). So instead of disabling interrupts in xen_qlock_wait() use a nesting counter to avoid calling xen_clear_irq_pending() in case xen_qlock_wait() is nested. Fixes: a856531951dc80 ("xen: make xen_qlock_wait() nestable") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Tested-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-11-13xen/pvh: don't try to unplug emulated devicesJuergen Gross1-0/+4
commit e6111161c0a02d58919d776eec94b313bb57911f upstream. A Xen PVH guest has no associated qemu device model, so trying to unplug any emulated devices is making no sense at all. Bail out early from xen_unplug_emulated_devices() when running as PVH guest. This will avoid issuing the boot message: [ 0.000000] Xen Platform PCI: unrecognised magic value Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-11-13xen/pvh: increase early stack sizeRoger Pau Monne1-1/+1
commit 7deecbda3026f5e2a8cc095d7ef7261a920efcf2 upstream. While booting on an AMD EPYC box the stack canary would detect stack overflows when using the current PVH early stack size (256). Switch to using the value defined by BOOT_STACK_SIZE, which prevents the stack overflow. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11 Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-11-13xen: make xen_qlock_wait() nestableJuergen Gross1-14/+10
commit a856531951dc8094359dfdac21d59cee5969c18e upstream. xen_qlock_wait() isn't safe for nested calls due to interrupts. A call of xen_qlock_kick() might be ignored in case a deeper nesting level was active right before the call of xen_poll_irq(): CPU 1: CPU 2: spin_lock(lock1) spin_lock(lock1) -> xen_qlock_wait() -> xen_clear_irq_pending() Interrupt happens spin_unlock(lock1) -> xen_qlock_kick(CPU 2) spin_lock_irqsave(lock2) spin_lock_irqsave(lock2) -> xen_qlock_wait() -> xen_clear_irq_pending() clears kick for lock1 -> xen_poll_irq() spin_unlock_irq_restore(lock2) -> xen_qlock_kick(CPU 2) wakes up spin_unlock_irq_restore(lock2) IRET resumes in xen_qlock_wait() -> xen_poll_irq() never wakes up The solution is to disable interrupts in xen_qlock_wait() and not to poll for the irq in case xen_qlock_wait() is called in nmi context. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Waiman.Long@hp.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-11-13xen: fix race in xen_qlock_wait()Juergen Gross1-10/+5
commit 2ac2a7d4d9ff4e01e36f9c3d116582f6f655ab47 upstream. In the following situation a vcpu waiting for a lock might not be woken up from xen_poll_irq(): CPU 1: CPU 2: CPU 3: takes a spinlock tries to get lock -> xen_qlock_wait() frees the lock -> xen_qlock_kick(cpu2) -> xen_clear_irq_pending() takes lock again tries to get lock -> *lock = _Q_SLOW_VAL -> *lock == _Q_SLOW_VAL ? -> xen_poll_irq() frees the lock -> xen_qlock_kick(cpu3) And cpu 2 will sleep forever. This can be avoided easily by modifying xen_qlock_wait() to call xen_poll_irq() only if the related irq was not pending and to call xen_clear_irq_pending() only if it was pending. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Waiman.Long@hp.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-11-13x86/xen: Fix boot loader version reported for PVH guestsJuergen Gross1-1/+1
commit 357d291ce035d1b757568058f3c9898c60d125b1 upstream. The boot loader version reported via sysfs is wrong in case of the kernel being booted via the Xen PVH boot entry. it should be 2.12 (0x020c), but it is reported to be 2.18 (0x0212). As the current way to set the version is error prone use the more readable variant (2 << 8) | 12. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.12 Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: corbet@lwn.net Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181010061456.22238-2-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-10-04x86/mm: Expand static page table for fixmap spaceFeng Tang1-2/+6
commit 05ab1d8a4b36ee912b7087c6da127439ed0a903e upstream. We met a kernel panic when enabling earlycon, which is due to the fixmap address of earlycon is not statically setup. Currently the static fixmap setup in head_64.S only covers 2M virtual address space, while it actually could be in 4M space with different kernel configurations, e.g. when VSYSCALL emulation is disabled. So increase the static space to 4M for now by defining FIXMAP_PMD_NUM to 2, and add a build time check to ensure that the fixmap is covered by the initial static page tables. Fixes: 1ad83c858c7d ("x86_64,vsyscall: Make vsyscall emulation configurable") Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> (Xen parts) Cc: H Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180920025828.23699-1-feng.tang@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29xen/x86/vpmu: Zero struct pt_regs before calling into sample handling codeBoris Ostrovsky1-1/+1
commit 70513d58751d7c6c1a0133557b13089b9f2e3e66 upstream. Otherwise we may leak kernel stack for events that sample user registers. Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-15x86/xen: don't write ptes directly in 32-bit PV guestsJuergen Gross1-4/+3
commit f7c90c2aa4004808dff777ba6ae2c7294dd06851 upstream. In some cases 32-bit PAE PV guests still write PTEs directly instead of using hypercalls. This is especially bad when clearing a PTE as this is done via 32-bit writes which will produce intermediate L1TF attackable PTEs. Change the code to use hypercalls instead. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-08-15x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.hNicolai Stange1-0/+1
commit 447ae316670230d7d29430e2cbf1f5db4f49d14c upstream The next patch in this series will have to make the definition of irq_cpustat_t available to entering_irq(). Inclusion of asm/hardirq.h into asm/apic.h would cause circular header dependencies like asm/smp.h asm/apic.h asm/hardirq.h linux/irq.h linux/topology.h linux/smp.h asm/smp.h or linux/gfp.h linux/mmzone.h asm/mmzone.h asm/mmzone_64.h asm/smp.h asm/apic.h asm/hardirq.h linux/irq.h linux/irqdesc.h linux/kobject.h linux/sysfs.h linux/kernfs.h linux/idr.h linux/gfp.h and others. This causes compilation errors because of the header guards becoming effective in the second inclusion: symbols/macros that had been defined before wouldn't be available to intermediate headers in the #include chain anymore. A possible workaround would be to move the definition of irq_cpustat_t into its own header and include that from both, asm/hardirq.h and asm/apic.h. However, this wouldn't solve the real problem, namely asm/harirq.h unnecessarily pulling in all the linux/irq.h cruft: nothing in asm/hardirq.h itself requires it. Also, note that there are some other archs, like e.g. arm64, which don't have that #include in their asm/hardirq.h. Remove the linux/irq.h #include from x86' asm/hardirq.h. Fix resulting compilation errors by adding appropriate #includes to *.c files as needed. Note that some of these *.c files could be cleaned up a bit wrt. to their set of #includes, but that should better be done from separate patches, if at all. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-28xen/PVH: Set up GS segment for stack canaryBoris Ostrovsky1-1/+25
commit 98014068328c5574de9a4a30b604111fd9d8f901 upstream. We are making calls to C code (e.g. xen_prepare_pvh()) which may use stack canary (stored in GS segment). Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-17xen: setup pv irq ops vector earlierJuergen Gross2-16/+12
commit 0ce0bba4e5e0eb9b753bb821785de5d23c494392 upstream. Setting pv_irq_ops for Xen PV domains should be done as early as possible in order to support e.g. very early printk() usage. The same applies to xen_vcpu_info_reset(0), as it is needed for the pv irq ops. Move the call of xen_setup_machphys_mapping() after initializing the pv functions as it contains a WARN_ON(), too. Remove the no longer necessary conditional in xen_init_irq_ops() from PVH V1 times to make clear this is a PV only function. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-03x86/xen: Add call of speculative_store_bypass_ht_init() to PV pathsJuergen Gross1-0/+5
commit 74899d92e66663dc7671a8017b3146dcd4735f3b upstream. Commit: 1f50ddb4f418 ("x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD") ... added speculative_store_bypass_ht_init() to the per-CPU initialization sequence. speculative_store_bypass_ht_init() needs to be called on each CPU for PV guests, too. Reported-by: Brian Woods <brian.woods@amd.com> Tested-by: Brian Woods <brian.woods@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Fixes: 1f50ddb4f4189243c05926b842dc1a0332195f31 ("x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180621084331.21228-1-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-20x86/xen: Reset VCPU0 info pointer after shared_info remapvan der Linden, Frank1-0/+13
[ Upstream commit d1ecfa9d1f402366b1776fbf84e635678a51414f ] This patch fixes crashes during boot for HVM guests on older (pre HVM vector callback) Xen versions. Without this, current kernels will always fail to boot on those Xen versions. Sample stack trace: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffff200000 IP: __xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x1e/0x80 PGD 1e0e067 P4D 1e0e067 PUD 1e10067 PMD 235c067 PTE 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 512 Comm: kworker/u2:0 Not tainted 4.14.33-52.13.amzn1.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 3.4.3.amazon 11/11/2016 task: ffff88002531d700 task.stack: ffffc90000480000 RIP: 0010:__xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x1e/0x80 RSP: 0000:ffff880025403ef0 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: ffffffff813cc760 RBX: ffffffffff200000 RCX: ffffc90000483ef0 RDX: ffff880020540a00 RSI: ffff880023c78000 RDI: 000000000000001c RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff880025403f5c R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880025400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffff200000 CR3: 0000000001e0a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <IRQ> do_hvm_evtchn_intr+0xa/0x10 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x43/0x1a0 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x20/0x50 handle_irq_event+0x39/0x60 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x80/0x140 handle_irq+0xaf/0x120 do_IRQ+0x41/0xd0 common_interrupt+0x7d/0x7d </IRQ> During boot, the HYPERVISOR_shared_info page gets remapped to make it work with KASLR. This means that any pointer derived from it needs to be adjusted. The only value that this applies to is the vcpu_info pointer for VCPU 0. For PV and HVM with the callback vector feature, this gets done via the smp_ops prepare_boot_cpu callback. Older Xen versions do not support the HVM callback vector, so there is no Xen-specific smp_ops set up in that scenario. So, the vcpu_info pointer for VCPU 0 never gets set to the proper value, and the first reference of it will be bad. Fix this by resetting it immediately after the remap. Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Alakesh Haloi <alakeshh@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Vallish Vaidyeshwara <vallish@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-05-22tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events ↵Steven Rostedt (VMware)2-6/+2
trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all} commit 45dd9b0666a162f8e4be76096716670cf1741f0e upstream. Doing an audit of trace events, I discovered two trace events in the xen subsystem that use a hack to create zero data size trace events. This is not what trace events are for. Trace events add memory footprint overhead, and if all you need to do is see if a function is hit or not, simply make that function noinline and use function tracer filtering. Worse yet, the hack used was: __array(char, x, 0) Which creates a static string of zero in length. There's assumptions about such constructs in ftrace that this is a dynamic string that is nul terminated. This is not the case with these tracepoints and can cause problems in various parts of ftrace. Nuke the trace events! Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509144605.5a220327@gandalf.local.home Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 95a7d76897c1e ("xen/mmu: Use Xen specific TLB flush instead of the generic one.") Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-24x86/xen: Delay get_cpu_cap until stack canary is establishedJason Andryuk1-4/+4
commit 36104cb9012a82e73c32a3b709257766b16bcd1d upstream. Commit 2cc42bac1c79 ("x86-64/Xen: eliminate W+X mappings") introduced a call to get_cpu_cap, which is fstack-protected. This is works on x86-64 as commit 4f277295e54c ("x86/xen: init %gs very early to avoid page faults with stack protector") ensures the stack protector is configured, but it it did not cover x86-32. Delay calling get_cpu_cap until after xen_setup_gdt has initialized the stack canary. Without this, a 32bit PV machine crashes early in boot. (XEN) Domain 0 (vcpu#0) crashed on cpu#0: (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6.6-xc x86_64 debug=n Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) CPU: 0 (XEN) RIP: e019:[<00000000c10362f8>] And the PV kernel IP corresponds to init_scattered_cpuid_features 0xc10362f8 <+24>: mov %gs:0x14,%eax Fixes 2cc42bac1c79 ("x86-64/Xen: eliminate W+X mappings") Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12x86/gart: Exclude GART aperture from vmcoreJiri Bohac1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 2a3e83c6f96c513f43ce5a8c9034608ea584a255 ] On machines where the GART aperture is mapped over physical RAM /proc/vmcore contains the remapped range and reading it may cause hangs or reboots. In the past, the GART region was added into the resource map, implemented by commit 56dd669a138c ("[PATCH] Insert GART region into resource map") However, inserting the iomem_resource from the early GART code caused resource conflicts with some AGP drivers (bko#72201), which got avoided by reverting the patch in commit 707d4eefbdb3 ("Revert [PATCH] Insert GART region into resource map"). This revert introduced the /proc/vmcore bug. The vmcore ELF header is either prepared by the kernel (when using the kexec_file_load syscall) or by the kexec userspace (when using the kexec_load syscall). Since we no longer have the GART iomem resource, the userspace kexec has no way of knowing which region to exclude from the ELF header. Changes from v1 of this patch: Instead of excluding the aperture from the ELF header, this patch makes /proc/vmcore return zeroes in the second kernel when attempting to read the aperture region. This is done by reusing the gart_oldmem_pfn_is_ram infrastructure originally intended to exclude XEN balooned memory. This works for both, the kexec_file_load and kexec_load syscalls. [Note that the GART region is the same in the first and second kernels: regardless whether the first kernel fixed up the northbridge/bios setting and mapped the aperture over physical memory, the second kernel finds the northbridge properly configured by the first kernel and the aperture never overlaps with e820 memory because the second kernel has a fake e820 map created from the crashkernel memory regions. Thus, the second kernel keeps the aperture address/size as configured by the first kernel.] register_oldmem_pfn_is_ram can only register one callback and returns an error if the callback has been registered already. Since XEN used to be the only user of this function, it never checks the return value. Now that we have more than one user, I added a WARN_ON just in case agp, XEN, or any other future user of register_oldmem_pfn_is_ram were to step on each other's toes. Fixes: 707d4eefbdb3 ("Revert [PATCH] Insert GART region into resource map") Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: yinghai@kernel.org Cc: joro@8bytes.org Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180106010013.73suskgxm7lox7g6@dwarf.suse.cz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-09x86/xen: Zero MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL before suspendJuergen Gross1-0/+16
commit 71c208dd54ab971036d83ff6d9837bae4976e623 upstream. Older Xen versions (4.5 and before) might have problems migrating pv guests with MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL having a non-zero value. So before suspending zero that MSR and restore it after being resumed. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180226140818.4849-1-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-03xen/balloon: Mark unallocated host memory as UNUSABLEBoris Ostrovsky2-4/+83
[ Upstream commit b3cf8528bb21febb650a7ecbf080d0647be40b9f ] Commit f5775e0b6116 ("x86/xen: discard RAM regions above the maximum reservation") left host memory not assigned to dom0 as available for memory hotplug. Unfortunately this also meant that those regions could be used by others. Specifically, commit fa564ad96366 ("x86/PCI: Enable a 64bit BAR on AMD Family 15h (Models 00-1f, 30-3f, 60-7f)") may try to map those addresses as MMIO. To prevent this mark unallocated host memory as E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE (thus effectively reverting f5775e0b6116) and keep track of that region as a hostmem resource that can be used for the hotplug. Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-03x86-64/Xen: eliminate W+X mappingsJan Beulich2-0/+15
[ Upstream commit 2cc42bac1c795f75fcc062b95c6ca7ac1b84d5d8 ] A few thousand such pages are usually left around due to the re-use of L1 tables having been provided by the hypervisor (Dom0) or tool stack (DomU). Set NX in the direct map variant, which needs to be done in L2 due to the dual use of the re-used L1s. For x86_configure_nx() to actually do what it is supposed to do, call get_cpu_cap() first. This was broken by commit 4763ed4d45 ("x86, mm: Clean up and simplify NX enablement") when switching away from the direct EFER read. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22xen: Fix {set,clear}_foreign_p2m_mapping on autotranslating guestsSimon Gaiser1-0/+6
commit 781198f1f373c3e350dbeb3af04a7d4c81c1b8d7 upstream. Commit 82616f9599a7 ("xen: remove tests for pvh mode in pure pv paths") removed the check for autotranslation from {set,clear}_foreign_p2m_mapping but those are called by grant-table.c also on PVH/HVM guests. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14 Fixes: 82616f9599a7 ("xen: remove tests for pvh mode in pure pv paths") Signed-off-by: Simon Gaiser <simon@invisiblethingslab.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/mm: Rename flush_tlb_single() and flush_tlb_one() to ↵Andy Lutomirski1-3/+3
__flush_tlb_one_[user|kernel]() commit 1299ef1d8870d2d9f09a5aadf2f8b2c887c2d033 upstream. flush_tlb_single() and flush_tlb_one() sound almost identical, but they really mean "flush one user translation" and "flush one kernel translation". Rename them to flush_tlb_one_user() and flush_tlb_one_kernel() to make the semantics more obvious. [ I was looking at some PTI-related code, and the flush-one-address code is unnecessarily hard to understand because the names of the helpers are uninformative. This came up during PTI review, but no one got around to doing it. ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3303b02e3c3d049dc5235d5651e0ae6d29a34354.1517414378.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/xen: init %gs very early to avoid page faults with stack protectorJuergen Gross1-0/+16
commit 4f277295e54c5b7340e48efea3fc5cc21a2872b7 upstream. When running as Xen pv guest %gs is initialized some time after C code is started. Depending on stack protector usage this might be too late, resulting in page faults. So setup %gs and MSR_GS_BASE in assembly code already. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Tested-by: Chris Patterson <cjp256@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-03x86/xen: Support early interrupts in xen pv guestsJuergen Gross2-13/+38
[ Upstream commit 42b3a4cb5609de757f5445fcad18945ba9239a07 ] Add early interrupt handlers activated by idt_setup_early_handler() to the handlers supported by Xen pv guests. This will allow for early WARN() calls not crashing the guest. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171124084221.30172-1-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-29x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmapThomas Gleixner1-2/+0
commit 92a0f81d89571e3e8759366e050ee05cc545ef99 upstream. Put the cpu_entry_area into a separate P4D entry. The fixmap gets too big and 0-day already hit a case where the fixmap PTEs were cleared by cleanup_highmap(). Aside of that the fixmap API is a pain as it's all backwards. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-onlyAndy Lutomirski1-1/+1
commit c482feefe1aeb150156248ba0fd3e029bc886605 upstream. The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it read-only on x86_64. On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations without double fault handling. [ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for confirmation. ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct ↵Andy Lutomirski1-1/+1
cpu_entry_area commit ef8813ab280507972bb57e4b1b502811ad4411e9 upstream. Currently, the GDT is an ad-hoc array of pages, one per CPU, in the fixmap. Generalize it to be an array of a new 'struct cpu_entry_area' so that we can cleanly add new things to it. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.563271721@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25x86/virt: Add enum for hypervisors to replace x86_hyperJuergen Gross2-4/+4
commit 03b2a320b19f1424e9ac9c21696be9c60b6d0d93 upstream. The x86_hyper pointer is only used for checking whether a virtual device is supporting the hypervisor the system is running on. Use an enum for that purpose instead and drop the x86_hyper pointer. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Xavier Deguillard <xdeguillard@vmware.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: akataria@vmware.com Cc: arnd@arndb.de Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org Cc: dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: haiyangz@microsoft.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: kys@microsoft.com Cc: linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org Cc: moltmann@vmware.com Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: pv-drivers@vmware.com Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com Cc: sthemmin@microsoft.com Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171109132739.23465-3-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25x86/virt, x86/platform: Merge 'struct x86_hyper' into 'struct x86_platform' ↵Juergen Gross2-5/+5
and 'struct x86_init' commit f72e38e8ec8869ac0ba5a75d7d2f897d98a1454e upstream. Instead of x86_hyper being either NULL on bare metal or a pointer to a struct hypervisor_x86 in case of the kernel running as a guest merge the struct into x86_platform and x86_init. This will remove the need for wrappers making it hard to find out what is being called. With dummy functions added for all callbacks testing for a NULL function pointer can be removed, too. Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: akataria@vmware.com Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org Cc: haiyangz@microsoft.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: kys@microsoft.com Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com Cc: rusty@rustcorp.com.au Cc: sthemmin@microsoft.com Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171109132739.23465-2-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25x86/xen/64, x86/entry/64: Clean up SP code in cpu_initialize_context()Andy Lutomirski1-3/+14
commit f16b3da1dc936c0f8121741d0a1731bf242f2f56 upstream. I'm removing thread_struct::sp0, and Xen's usage of it is slightly dubious and unnecessary. Use appropriate helpers instead. While we're at at, reorder the code slightly to make it more obvious what's going on. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d5b9a3da2b47c68325bd2bbe8f82d9554dee0d0f.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25x86/entry/64: Pass SP0 directly to load_sp0()Andy Lutomirski1-4/+3
commit da51da189a24bb9b7e2d5a123be096e51a4695a5 upstream. load_sp0() had an odd signature: void load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss, struct thread_struct *thread); Simplify it to: void load_sp0(unsigned long sp0); Also simplify a few get_cpu()/put_cpu() sequences to preempt_disable()/preempt_enable(). Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2655d8b42ed940aa384fe18ee1129bbbcf730a08.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25xen, x86/entry/64: Add xen NMI trap entryJuergen Gross2-2/+2
commit 43e4111086a70c78bedb6ad990bee97f17b27a6e upstream. Instead of trying to execute any NMI via the bare metal's NMI trap handler use a Xen specific one for PV domains, like we do for e.g. debug traps. As in a PV domain the NMI is handled via the normal kernel stack this is the correct thing to do. This will enable us to get rid of the very fragile and questionable dependencies between the bare metal NMI handler and Xen assumptions believed to be broken anyway. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5baf5c0528d58402441550c5770b98e7961e7680.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25x86/xen: Drop 5-level paging support code from the XEN_PV codeKirill A. Shutemov1-99/+60
commit 773dd2fca581b0a80e5a33332cc8ee67e5a79cba upstream. It was decided 5-level paging is not going to be supported in XEN_PV. Let's drop the dead code from the XEN_PV code. Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170929140821.37654-6-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25x86/xen: Add unwind hint annotationsJosh Poimboeuf1-1/+6
commit abbe1cac6214d81d2f4e149aba64a8760703144e upstream. Add unwind hint annotations to the xen head code so the ORC unwinder can read head_64.o. hypercall_page needs empty annotations at 32-byte intervals to match the 'xen_hypercall_*' ELF functions at those locations. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/70ed2eb516fe9266be766d953f93c2571bca88cc.1505764066.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25x86/xen: Fix xen head ELF annotationsJosh Poimboeuf1-2/+2
commit 2582d3df95c76d3b686453baf90b64d57e87d1e8 upstream. Mark the ends of the startup_xen and hypercall_page code sections. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3a80a394d30af43d9cefa1a29628c45ed8420c97.1505764066.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman31-0/+31
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-10-13Merge tag 'for-linus-4.14c-rc5-tag' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip Pull xen fixlet from Juergen Gross: "A minor fix correcting the cpu hotplug name for Xen guests" * tag 'for-linus-4.14c-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: xen/vcpu: Use a unified name about cpu hotplug state for pv and pvhvm
2017-10-10xen/vcpu: Use a unified name about cpu hotplug state for pv and pvhvmZhenzhong Duan1-2/+2
As xen_cpuhp_setup is called by PV and PVHVM, the name of "x86/xen/hvm_guest" is confusing. Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
2017-09-29Merge tag 'for-linus-4.14c-rc3-tag' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-9/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross: - avoid a warning when compiling with clang - consider read-only bits in xen-pciback when writing to a BAR - fix a boot crash of pv-domains * tag 'for-linus-4.14c-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: xen/mmu: Call xen_cleanhighmap() with 4MB aligned for page tables mapping xen-pciback: relax BAR sizing write value check x86/xen: clean up clang build warning
2017-09-28xen/mmu: Call xen_cleanhighmap() with 4MB aligned for page tables mappingZhenzhong Duan1-9/+4
When bootup a PVM guest with large memory(Ex.240GB), XEN provided initial mapping overlaps with kernel module virtual space. When mapping in this space is cleared by xen_cleanhighmap(), in certain case there could be an 2MB mapping left. This is due to XEN initialize 4MB aligned mapping but xen_cleanhighmap() finish at 2MB boundary. When module loading is just on top of the 2MB space, got below warning: WARNING: at mm/vmalloc.c:106 vmap_pte_range+0x14e/0x190() Call Trace: [<ffffffff81117083>] warn_alloc_failed+0xf3/0x160 [<ffffffff81146022>] __vmalloc_area_node+0x182/0x1c0 [<ffffffff810ac91e>] ? module_alloc_update_bounds+0x1e/0x80 [<ffffffff81145df7>] __vmalloc_node_range+0xa7/0x110 [<ffffffff810ac91e>] ? module_alloc_update_bounds+0x1e/0x80 [<ffffffff8103ca54>] module_alloc+0x64/0x70 [<ffffffff810ac91e>] ? module_alloc_update_bounds+0x1e/0x80 [<ffffffff810ac91e>] module_alloc_update_bounds+0x1e/0x80 [<ffffffff810ac9a7>] move_module+0x27/0x150 [<ffffffff810aefa0>] layout_and_allocate+0x120/0x1b0 [<ffffffff810af0a8>] load_module+0x78/0x640 [<ffffffff811ff90b>] ? security_file_permission+0x8b/0x90 [<ffffffff810af6d2>] sys_init_module+0x62/0x1e0 [<ffffffff815154c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Then the mapping of 2MB is cleared, finally oops when the page in that space is accessed. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880022600000 IP: [<ffffffff81260877>] clear_page_c_e+0x7/0x10 PGD 1788067 PUD 178c067 PMD 22434067 PTE 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Call Trace: [<ffffffff81116ef7>] ? prep_new_page+0x127/0x1c0 [<ffffffff81117d42>] get_page_from_freelist+0x1e2/0x550 [<ffffffff81133010>] ? ii_iovec_copy_to_user+0x90/0x140 [<ffffffff81119c9d>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x12d/0x230 [<ffffffff81155516>] alloc_pages_vma+0xc6/0x1a0 [<ffffffff81006ffd>] ? pte_mfn_to_pfn+0x7d/0x100 [<ffffffff81134cfb>] do_anonymous_page+0x16b/0x350 [<ffffffff81139c34>] handle_pte_fault+0x1e4/0x200 [<ffffffff8100712e>] ? xen_pmd_val+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff810052c9>] ? __raw_callee_save_xen_pmd_val+0x11/0x1e [<ffffffff81139dab>] handle_mm_fault+0x15b/0x270 [<ffffffff81510c10>] do_page_fault+0x140/0x470 [<ffffffff8150d7d5>] page_fault+0x25/0x30 Call xen_cleanhighmap() with 4MB aligned for page tables mapping to fix it. The unnecessory call of xen_cleanhighmap() in DEBUG mode is also removed. -v2: add comment about XEN alignment from Juergen. References: https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2012-07/msg01562.html Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> [boris: added 'xen/mmu' tag to commit subject] Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
2017-09-22Merge tag 'for-linus-4.14b-rc2-tag' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross: "A fix for a missing __init annotation and two cleanup patches" * tag 'for-linus-4.14b-rc2-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: xen, arm64: drop dummy lookup_address() xen: don't compile pv-specific parts if XEN_PV isn't configured xen: x86: mark xen_find_pt_base as __init
2017-09-15xen: x86: mark xen_find_pt_base as __initArnd Bergmann1-1/+1
gcc-4.6 causes a harmless link-time warning: WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text.unlikely+0x48e): Section mismatch in reference from the function xen_find_pt_base() to the function .init.text:m2p() The function xen_find_pt_base() references the function __init m2p(). This is often because xen_find_pt_base lacks a __init annotation or the annotation of m2p is wrong. Newer compilers inline this function, so it never shows up, but marking it __init is the right way to avoid the warning. Fixes: 70e61199559a ("xen: move p2m list if conflicting with e820 map") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
2017-09-13x86/paravirt: Remove no longer used paravirt functionsJuergen Gross2-4/+0
With removal of lguest some of the paravirt functions are no longer needed: ->read_cr4() ->store_idt() ->set_pmd_at() ->set_pud_at() ->pte_update() Remove them. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akataria@vmware.com Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: chrisw@sous-sol.org Cc: jeremy@goop.org Cc: rusty@rustcorp.com.au Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170904102527.25409-1-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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