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commit b7a584598aea7ca73140cb87b40319944dd3393f upstream.
On Xen PV, regs->flags doesn't reliably reflect IOPL and the
exit-to-userspace code doesn't change IOPL. We need to context
switch it manually.
I'm doing this without going through paravirt because this is
specific to Xen PV. After the dust settles, we can merge this with
the 32-bit code, tidy up the iopl syscall implementation, and remove
the set_iopl pvop entirely.
Fixes XSA-171.
Reviewewd-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/693c3bd7aeb4d3c27c92c622b7d0f554a458173c.1458162709.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[ kamal: backport to 4.2-stable: no X86_FEATURE_XENPV so just call
xen_pv_domain() directly ]
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8 ]
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 3d44d51bd339766f0178f0cf2e8d048b4a4872aa ]
This doesn't seem to fix a regression -- I don't think the CLAC was
ever there.
I double-checked in a debugger: entries through the int80 gate do
not automatically clear AC.
Stable maintainers: I can provide a backport to 4.3 and earlier if
needed. This needs to be backported all the way to 3.10.
Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.10 and later
Fixes: 63bcff2a307b ("x86, smap: Add STAC and CLAC instructions to control user space access")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b02b7e71ae54074be01fc171cbd4b72517055c0e.1456345086.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 844a5fe219cf472060315971e15cbf97674a3324 ]
Yes, all of these are needed. :) This is admittedly a bit odd, but
kvm-unit-tests access.flat tests this if you run it with "-cpu host"
and of course ept=0.
KVM runs the guest with CR0.WP=1, so it must handle supervisor writes
specially when pte.u=1/pte.w=0/CR0.WP=0. Such writes cause a fault
when U=1 and W=0 in the SPTE, but they must succeed because CR0.WP=0.
When KVM gets the fault, it sets U=0 and W=1 in the shadow PTE and
restarts execution. This will still cause a user write to fault, while
supervisor writes will succeed. User reads will fault spuriously now,
and KVM will then flip U and W again in the SPTE (U=1, W=0). User reads
will be enabled and supervisor writes disabled, going back to the
originary situation where supervisor writes fault spuriously.
When SMEP is in effect, however, U=0 will enable kernel execution of
this page. To avoid this, KVM also sets NX=1 in the shadow PTE together
with U=0. If the guest has not enabled NX, the result is a continuous
stream of page faults due to the NX bit being reserved.
The fix is to force EFER.NX=1 even if the CPU is taking care of the EFER
switch. (All machines with SMEP have the CPU_LOAD_IA32_EFER vm-entry
control, so they do not use user-return notifiers for EFER---if they did,
EFER.NX would be forced to the same value as the host).
There is another bug in the reserved bit check, which I've split to a
separate patch for easier application to stable kernels.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: f6577a5fa15d82217ca73c74cd2dcbc0f6c781dd
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 7099e2e1f4d9051f31bbfa5803adf954bb5d76ef ]
Linux guests on Haswell (and also SandyBridge and Broadwell, at least)
would crash if you decided to run a host command that uses PEBS, like
perf record -e 'cpu/mem-stores/pp' -a
This happens because KVM is using VMX MSR switching to disable PEBS, but
SDM [2015-12] 18.4.4.4 Re-configuring PEBS Facilities explains why it
isn't safe:
When software needs to reconfigure PEBS facilities, it should allow a
quiescent period between stopping the prior event counting and setting
up a new PEBS event. The quiescent period is to allow any latent
residual PEBS records to complete its capture at their previously
specified buffer address (provided by IA32_DS_AREA).
There might not be a quiescent period after the MSR switch, so a CPU
ends up using host's MSR_IA32_DS_AREA to access an area in guest's
memory. (Or MSR switching is just buggy on some models.)
The guest can learn something about the host this way:
If the guest doesn't map address pointed by MSR_IA32_DS_AREA, it results
in #PF where we leak host's MSR_IA32_DS_AREA through CR2.
After that, a malicious guest can map and configure memory where
MSR_IA32_DS_AREA is pointing and can therefore get an output from
host's tracing.
This is not a critical leak as the host must initiate with PEBS tracing
and I have not been able to get a record from more than one instruction
before vmentry in vmx_vcpu_run() (that place has most registers already
overwritten with guest's).
We could disable PEBS just few instructions before vmentry, but
disabling it earlier shouldn't affect host tracing too much.
We also don't need to switch MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE on VMENTRY, but that
optimization isn't worth its code, IMO.
(If you are implementing PEBS for guests, be sure to handle the case
where both host and guest enable PEBS, because this patch doesn't.)
Fixes: 26a4f3c08de4 ("perf/x86: disable PEBS on a guest entry.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jiří Olša <jolsa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 7cae2bedcbd4680b155999655e49c27b9cf020fa ]
As reported at https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1494350,
it is possible to have vcpu->arch.st.last_steal initialized
from a thread other than vcpu thread, say the iothread, via
KVM_SET_MSRS.
Which can cause an overflow later (when subtracting from vcpu threads
sched_info.run_delay).
To avoid that, move steal time accumulation to vcpu entry time,
before copying steal time data to guest.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 92f9e179a702a6adbc11e2fedc76ecd6ffc9e3f7 ]
Pause/unpause graph tracing around do_suspend_lowlevel as it has
inconsistent call/return info after it jumps to the wakeup vector.
The graph trace buffer will otherwise become misaligned and
may eventually crash and hang on suspend.
To reproduce the issue and test the fix:
Run a function_graph trace over suspend/resume and set the graph
function to suspend_devices_and_enter. This consistently hangs the
system without this fix.
Signed-off-by: Todd Brandt <todd.e.brandt@linux.intel.com>
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 9bf148cb0812595bfdf5100bd2c07e9bec9c6ef5 ]
In the unlikely event that regno == nr_registers then we get an array
overrun on regoff because the invalid register check is currently
off-by-one. Fix this with a check that regno is >= nr_registers instead.
Detected with static analysis using CoverityScan.
Fixes: fcc7ffd67991 "x86, mpx: Decode MPX instruction to get bound violation information"
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1456512931-3388-1-git-send-email-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 70e4da7a8ff62f2775337b705f45c804bb450454 ]
Commit 172b2386ed16 ("KVM: x86: fix missed hardware breakpoints",
2016-02-10) worked around a case where the debug registers are not loaded
correctly on preemption and on the first entry to KVM_RUN.
However, Xiao Guangrong pointed out that the root cause must be that
KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED is not being set correctly. This can indeed
happen due to the lazy debug exit mechanism, which does not call
kvm_update_dr7. Fix it by replacing the existing loop (more or less
equivalent to kvm_update_dr0123) with calls to all the kvm_update_dr*
functions.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+
Fixes: 172b2386ed16a9143d9a456aae5ec87275c61489
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 17e4bce0ae63c7e03f3c7fa8d80890e7af3d4971 ]
Ubsan reports the following warning due to a typo in
update_accessed_dirty_bits template, the patch fixes
the typo:
[ 168.791851] ================================================================================
[ 168.791862] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h:252:15
[ 168.791866] index 4 is out of range for type 'u64 [4]'
[ 168.791871] CPU: 0 PID: 2950 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G O L 4.5.0-rc5-next-20160222 #7
[ 168.791873] Hardware name: LENOVO 23205NG/23205NG, BIOS G2ET95WW (2.55 ) 07/09/2013
[ 168.791876] 0000000000000000 ffff8801cfcaf208 ffffffff81c9f780 0000000041b58ab3
[ 168.791882] ffffffff82eb2cc1 ffffffff81c9f6b4 ffff8801cfcaf230 ffff8801cfcaf1e0
[ 168.791886] 0000000000000004 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffffffffa1981600
[ 168.791891] Call Trace:
[ 168.791899] [<ffffffff81c9f780>] dump_stack+0xcc/0x12c
[ 168.791904] [<ffffffff81c9f6b4>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0xc4/0xc4
[ 168.791910] [<ffffffff81da9e81>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x8a
[ 168.791914] [<ffffffff81daafa2>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x15c/0x1a3
[ 168.791918] [<ffffffff81daae46>] ? __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x2bd/0x2bd
[ 168.791922] [<ffffffff811287ef>] ? get_user_pages_fast+0x2bf/0x360
[ 168.791954] [<ffffffffa1794050>] ? kvm_largepages_enabled+0x30/0x30 [kvm]
[ 168.791958] [<ffffffff81128530>] ? __get_user_pages_fast+0x360/0x360
[ 168.791987] [<ffffffffa181b818>] paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x1b28/0x2600 [kvm]
[ 168.792014] [<ffffffffa1819cf0>] ? init_kvm_mmu+0x1100/0x1100 [kvm]
[ 168.792019] [<ffffffff8129e350>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x350/0x350
[ 168.792044] [<ffffffffa1819cf0>] ? init_kvm_mmu+0x1100/0x1100 [kvm]
[ 168.792076] [<ffffffffa181c36d>] paging64_gva_to_gpa+0x7d/0x110 [kvm]
[ 168.792121] [<ffffffffa181c2f0>] ? paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x2600/0x2600 [kvm]
[ 168.792130] [<ffffffff812e848b>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x7b/0x90
[ 168.792178] [<ffffffffa17d9a4a>] emulator_read_write_onepage+0x27a/0x1150 [kvm]
[ 168.792208] [<ffffffffa1794d44>] ? __kvm_read_guest_page+0x54/0x70 [kvm]
[ 168.792234] [<ffffffffa17d97d0>] ? kvm_task_switch+0x160/0x160 [kvm]
[ 168.792238] [<ffffffff812e848b>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x7b/0x90
[ 168.792263] [<ffffffffa17daa07>] emulator_read_write+0xe7/0x6d0 [kvm]
[ 168.792290] [<ffffffffa183b620>] ? em_cr_write+0x230/0x230 [kvm]
[ 168.792314] [<ffffffffa17db005>] emulator_write_emulated+0x15/0x20 [kvm]
[ 168.792340] [<ffffffffa18465f8>] segmented_write+0xf8/0x130 [kvm]
[ 168.792367] [<ffffffffa1846500>] ? em_lgdt+0x20/0x20 [kvm]
[ 168.792374] [<ffffffffa14db512>] ? vmx_read_guest_seg_ar+0x42/0x1e0 [kvm_intel]
[ 168.792400] [<ffffffffa1846d82>] writeback+0x3f2/0x700 [kvm]
[ 168.792424] [<ffffffffa1846990>] ? em_sidt+0xa0/0xa0 [kvm]
[ 168.792449] [<ffffffffa185554d>] ? x86_decode_insn+0x1b3d/0x4f70 [kvm]
[ 168.792474] [<ffffffffa1859032>] x86_emulate_insn+0x572/0x3010 [kvm]
[ 168.792499] [<ffffffffa17e71dd>] x86_emulate_instruction+0x3bd/0x2110 [kvm]
[ 168.792524] [<ffffffffa17e6e20>] ? reexecute_instruction.part.110+0x2e0/0x2e0 [kvm]
[ 168.792532] [<ffffffffa14e9a81>] handle_ept_misconfig+0x61/0x460 [kvm_intel]
[ 168.792539] [<ffffffffa14e9a20>] ? handle_pause+0x450/0x450 [kvm_intel]
[ 168.792546] [<ffffffffa15130ea>] vmx_handle_exit+0xd6a/0x1ad0 [kvm_intel]
[ 168.792572] [<ffffffffa17f6a6c>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xbdc/0x6090 [kvm]
[ 168.792597] [<ffffffffa17f6bcd>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xd3d/0x6090 [kvm]
[ 168.792621] [<ffffffffa17f6a6c>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xbdc/0x6090 [kvm]
[ 168.792627] [<ffffffff8293b530>] ? __ww_mutex_lock_interruptible+0x1630/0x1630
[ 168.792651] [<ffffffffa17f5e90>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable+0x4f0/0x4f0 [kvm]
[ 168.792656] [<ffffffff811eeb30>] ? preempt_notifier_unregister+0x190/0x190
[ 168.792681] [<ffffffffa17e0447>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x127/0x650 [kvm]
[ 168.792704] [<ffffffffa178e9a3>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x553/0xda0 [kvm]
[ 168.792727] [<ffffffffa178e450>] ? vcpu_put+0x40/0x40 [kvm]
[ 168.792732] [<ffffffff8129e350>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x350/0x350
[ 168.792735] [<ffffffff82946087>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 168.792740] [<ffffffff8163a943>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1673/0x2e40
[ 168.792744] [<ffffffff8129daa8>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x478/0x6c0
[ 168.792747] [<ffffffff8129dcfd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 168.792751] [<ffffffff812e848b>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x7b/0x90
[ 168.792756] [<ffffffff81725a80>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b0/0x12b0
[ 168.792759] [<ffffffff817258d0>] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x210/0x210
[ 168.792763] [<ffffffff8174aef3>] ? __fget+0x273/0x4a0
[ 168.792766] [<ffffffff8174acd0>] ? __fget+0x50/0x4a0
[ 168.792770] [<ffffffff8174b1f6>] ? __fget_light+0x96/0x2b0
[ 168.792773] [<ffffffff81726bf9>] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
[ 168.792777] [<ffffffff82946880>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc1
[ 168.792780] ================================================================================
Signed-off-by: Mike Krinkin <krinkin.m.u@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 172b2386ed16a9143d9a456aae5ec87275c61489 ]
Sometimes when setting a breakpoint a process doesn't stop on it.
This is because the debug registers are not loaded correctly on
VCPU load.
The following simple reproducer from Oleg Nesterov tries using debug
registers in two threads. To see the bug, run a 2-VCPU guest with
"taskset -c 0" and run "./bp 0 1" inside the guest.
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <assert.h>
#define offsetof(TYPE, MEMBER) ((size_t) &((TYPE *)0)->MEMBER)
unsigned long encode_dr7(int drnum, int enable, unsigned int type, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned long dr7;
dr7 = ((len | type) & 0xf)
<< (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + drnum * DR_CONTROL_SIZE);
if (enable)
dr7 |= (DR_GLOBAL_ENABLE << (drnum * DR_ENABLE_SIZE));
return dr7;
}
int write_dr(int pid, int dr, unsigned long val)
{
return ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, pid,
offsetof (struct user, u_debugreg[dr]),
val);
}
void set_bp(pid_t pid, void *addr)
{
unsigned long dr7;
assert(write_dr(pid, 0, (long)addr) == 0);
dr7 = encode_dr7(0, 1, DR_RW_EXECUTE, DR_LEN_1);
assert(write_dr(pid, 7, dr7) == 0);
}
void *get_rip(int pid)
{
return (void*)ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKUSER, pid,
offsetof(struct user, regs.rip), 0);
}
void test(int nr)
{
void *bp_addr = &&label + nr, *bp_hit;
int pid;
printf("test bp %d\n", nr);
assert(nr < 16); // see 16 asm nops below
pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0) == 0);
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
for (;;) {
label: asm (
"nop; nop; nop; nop;"
"nop; nop; nop; nop;"
"nop; nop; nop; nop;"
"nop; nop; nop; nop;"
);
}
}
assert(pid == wait(NULL));
set_bp(pid, bp_addr);
for (;;) {
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0) == 0);
assert(pid == wait(NULL));
bp_hit = get_rip(pid);
if (bp_hit != bp_addr)
fprintf(stderr, "ERR!! hit wrong bp %ld != %d\n",
bp_hit - &&label, nr);
}
}
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
while (--argc) {
int nr = atoi(*++argv);
if (!fork())
test(nr);
}
while (wait(NULL) > 0)
;
return 0;
}
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Reported-by: Andrey Wagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit f4eafd8bcd5229e998aa252627703b8462c3b90f ]
A kernel page fault oops with the callstack below was observed
when a read syscall was made to a pmem device after a huge amount
(>512GB) of vmalloc ranges was allocated by ioremap() on a x86_64
system:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880840000ff8
IP: vmalloc_fault+0x1be/0x300
PGD c7f03a067 PUD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SM
Call Trace:
__do_page_fault+0x285/0x3e0
do_page_fault+0x2f/0x80
? put_prev_entity+0x35/0x7a0
page_fault+0x28/0x30
? memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10
? schedule+0x35/0x80
? pmem_rw_bytes+0x6a/0x190 [nd_pmem]
? schedule_timeout+0x183/0x240
btt_log_read+0x63/0x140 [nd_btt]
:
? __symbol_put+0x60/0x60
? kernel_read+0x50/0x80
SyS_finit_module+0xb9/0xf0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
Since v4.1, ioremap() supports large page (pud/pmd) mappings in
x86_64 and PAE. vmalloc_fault() however assumes that the vmalloc
range is limited to pte mappings.
vmalloc faults do not normally happen in ioremap'd ranges since
ioremap() sets up the kernel page tables, which are shared by
user processes. pgd_ctor() sets the kernel's PGD entries to
user's during fork(). When allocation of the vmalloc ranges
crosses a 512GB boundary, ioremap() allocates a new pud table
and updates the kernel PGD entry to point it. If user process's
PGD entry does not have this update yet, a read/write syscall
to the range will cause a vmalloc fault, which hits the Oops
above as it does not handle a large page properly.
Following changes are made to vmalloc_fault().
64-bit:
- No change for the PGD sync operation as it handles large
pages already.
- Add pud_huge() and pmd_huge() to the validation code to
handle large pages.
- Change pud_page_vaddr() to pud_pfn() since an ioremap range
is not directly mapped (while the if-statement still works
with a bogus addr).
- Change pmd_page() to pmd_pfn() since an ioremap range is not
backed by struct page (while the if-statement still works
with a bogus addr).
32-bit:
- No change for the sync operation since the index3 PGD entry
covers the entire vmalloc range, which is always valid.
(A separate change to sync PGD entry is necessary if this
memory layout is changed regardless of the page size.)
- Add pmd_huge() to the validation code to handle large pages.
This is for completeness since vmalloc_fault() won't happen
in ioremap'd ranges as its PGD entry is always valid.
Reported-by: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.1+
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455758214-24623-1-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 742563777e8da62197d6cb4b99f4027f59454735 ]
There are a couple of nasty truncation bugs lurking in the pageattr
code that can be triggered when mapping EFI regions, e.g. when we pass
a cpa->pgd pointer. Because cpa->numpages is a 32-bit value, shifting
left by PAGE_SHIFT will truncate the resultant address to 32-bits.
Viorel-Cătălin managed to trigger this bug on his Dell machine that
provides a ~5GB EFI region which requires 1236992 pages to be mapped.
When calling populate_pud() the end of the region gets calculated
incorrectly in the following buggy expression,
end = start + (cpa->numpages << PAGE_SHIFT);
And only 188416 pages are mapped. Next, populate_pud() gets invoked
for a second time because of the loop in __change_page_attr_set_clr(),
only this time no pages get mapped because shifting the remaining
number of pages (1048576) by PAGE_SHIFT is zero. At which point the
loop in __change_page_attr_set_clr() spins forever because we fail to
map progress.
Hitting this bug depends very much on the virtual address we pick to
map the large region at and how many pages we map on the initial run
through the loop. This explains why this issue was only recently hit
with the introduction of commit
a5caa209ba9c ("x86/efi: Fix boot crash by mapping EFI memmap
entries bottom-up at runtime, instead of top-down")
It's interesting to note that safe uses of cpa->numpages do exist in
the pageattr code. If instead of shifting ->numpages we multiply by
PAGE_SIZE, no truncation occurs because PAGE_SIZE is a UL value, and
so the result is unsigned long.
To avoid surprises when users try to convert very large cpa->numpages
values to addresses, change the data type from 'int' to 'unsigned
long', thereby making it suitable for shifting by PAGE_SHIFT without
any type casting.
The alternative would be to make liberal use of casting, but that is
far more likely to cause problems in the future when someone adds more
code and fails to cast properly; this bug was difficult enough to
track down in the first place.
Reported-and-tested-by: Viorel-Cătălin Răpițeanu <rapiteanu.catalin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110131
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1454067370-10374-1-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 3625c2c234ef66acf21a72d47a5ffa94f6c5ebf2 ]
For PAE kernels "unsigned long" is not suitable to hold page protection
flags, since _PAGE_NX doesn't fit there. This is the reason for quite a
few W+X pages getting reported as insecure during boot (observed namely
for the entire initrd range).
Fixes: 281d4078be ("x86: Make page cache mode a real type")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <JGross@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/56A7635602000078000CAFF1@prv-mh.provo.novell.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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commit 4eaffdd5a5fe6ff9f95e1ab4de1ac904d5e0fa8b upstream.
My previous comments were still a bit confusing and there was a
typo. Fix it up.
Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 71b3c126e611 ("x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm()-vs-flush synchronization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0a0b43cdcdd241c5faaaecfbcc91a155ddedc9a1.1452631609.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 71b3c126e61177eb693423f2e18a1914205b165e upstream.
When switch_mm() activates a new PGD, it also sets a bit that
tells other CPUs that the PGD is in use so that TLB flush IPIs
will be sent. In order for that to work correctly, the bit
needs to be visible prior to loading the PGD and therefore
starting to fill the local TLB.
Document all the barriers that make this work correctly and add
a couple that were missing.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8c31902cffc4d716450be549c66a67a8a3dd479c upstream.
When decompressing kernel image during x86 bootup, malloc memory
for ELF program headers may run out of heap space, which leads
to system halt. This patch doubles BOOT_HEAP_SIZE to 64KB.
Tested with 32-bit kernel which failed to boot without this patch.
Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2f0c0b2d96b1205efb14347009748d786c2d9ba5 upstream.
Without the reboot=pci method, the iMac 10,1 simply
hangs after printing "Restarting system" at the point
when it should reboot. This fixes it.
Signed-off-by: Mario Kleiner <mario.kleiner.de@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1450466646-26663-1-git-send-email-mario.kleiner.de@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aba2f06c070f604e388cf77b1dcc7f4cf4577eb0 upstream.
Poor #AC was so unimportant until a few days ago that we were
not even tracing its name correctly. But now it's all over
the place.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9dbe6cf941a6fe82933aef565e4095fb10f65023 upstream.
If we do not do this, it is not properly saved and restored across
migration. Windows notices due to its self-protection mechanisms,
and is very upset about it (blue screen of death).
Cc: Radim Krcmar <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cbdb967af3d54993f5814f1cee0ed311a055377d upstream.
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 656ec4a4928a3db7d16e5cb9bce351a478cfd3d5 upstream.
The comment in code had it mostly right, but we enable paging for
emulated real mode regardless of EPT.
Without EPT (which implies emulated real mode), secondary VCPUs won't
start unless we disable SM[AE]P when the guest doesn't use paging.
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6a1f513776b78c994045287073e55bae44ed9f8c upstream.
On a cancelled suspend the vcpu_info location does not change (it's
still in the per-cpu area registered by xen_vcpu_setup()). So do not
call xen_hvm_init_shared_info() which would make the kernel think its
back in the shared info. With the wrong vcpu_info, events cannot be
received and the domain will hang after a cancelled suspend.
Signed-off-by: Charles Ouyang <ouyangzhaowei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 22eab1108781eff09961ae7001704f7bd8fb1dce upstream.
When restarting a syscall with regs->ax == -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK,
regs->ax is assigned to a restart_syscall number. For x32 tasks, this
syscall number must have __X32_SYSCALL_BIT set, otherwise it will be
an x86_64 syscall number instead of a valid x32 syscall number. This
issue has been there since the introduction of x32.
Reported-by: strace/tests/restart_syscall.test
Reported-and-tested-by: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter0@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151130215436.GA25996@altlinux.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8e8efe0379bd93e8219ca0fc6fa80b5dd85b09cb upstream.
MPX decodes instructions in order to tell which bounds register
was violated. Part of this decoding involves looking at the "REX
prefix" which is a special instrucion prefix used to retrofit
support for new registers in to old instructions.
The X86_REX_*() macros are defined to return actual bit values:
#define X86_REX_R(rex) ((rex) & 4)
*not* boolean values. However, the MPX code was checking for
them like they were booleans. This might have led to us
mis-decoding the "REX prefix" and giving false information out to
userspace about bounds violations. X86_REX_B() actually is bit 1,
so this is really only broken for the X86_REX_X() case.
Fix the conditionals up to tolerate the non-boolean values.
Fixes: fcc7ffd67991 "x86, mpx: Decode MPX instruction to get bound violation information"
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151201003113.D800C1E0@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 581b7f158fe0383b492acd1ce3fb4e99d4e57808 upstream.
There appears to be no formal statement of what pv_irq_ops.save_fl() is
supposed to return precisely. Native returns the full flags, while lguest and
Xen only return the Interrupt Flag, and both have comments by the
implementations stating that only the Interrupt Flag is looked at. This may
have been true when initially implemented, but no longer is.
To make matters worse, the Xen PVOP leaves the upper bits undefined, making
the BUG_ON() undefined behaviour. Experimentally, this now trips for 32bit PV
guests on Broadwell hardware. The BUG_ON() is consistent for an individual
build, but not consistent for all builds. It has also been a sitting timebomb
since SMAP support was introduced.
Use native_save_fl() instead, which will obtain an accurate view of the AC
flag.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: <lguest@lists.ozlabs.org>
Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1433323874-6927-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 04633df0c43d710e5f696b06539c100898678235 upstream.
When we get loaded by a 64-bit bootloader, kernel entry point is
startup_64 in head_64.S. We don't trust any and all bootloaders because
some will fiddle with CPU configuration so we go ahead and massage each
CPU into sanity again.
For example, some dell BIOSes have this XD disable feature which set
IA32_MISC_ENABLE[34] and disable NX. This might be some dumb workaround
for other OSes but Linux sure doesn't need it.
A similar thing is present in the Surface 3 firmware - see
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106051 - which sets this bit
only on the BSP:
# rdmsr -a 0x1a0
400850089
850089
850089
850089
I know, right?!
There's not even an off switch in there.
So fix all those cases by sanitizing the 64-bit entry point too. For
that, make verify_cpu() callable in 64-bit mode also.
Requested-and-debugged-by: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Bastien Nocera <bugzilla@hadess.net>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1446739076-21303-1-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 68accac392d859d24adcf1be3a90e41f978bd54c upstream.
The commit f5f3497cad8c extended the low identity mapping. However, if
the kernel uses more than 2 GB (VMSPLIT_2G_OPT or VMSPLIT_1G memory
split), the normal memory mapping is overwritten by the low identity
mapping causing a crash. To avoid overwritting, limit the low identity
map to cover only memory before kernel range (PAGE_OFFSET).
Fixes: f5f3497cad8c "x86/setup: Extend low identity map to cover whole kernel range
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Mazur <krzysiek@podlesie.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1446815916-22105-1-git-send-email-krzysiek@podlesie.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f5f3497cad8c8416a74b9aaceb127908755d020a upstream.
On 32-bit systems, the initial_page_table is reused by
efi_call_phys_prolog as an identity map to call
SetVirtualAddressMap. efi_call_phys_prolog takes care of
converting the current CPU's GDT to a physical address too.
For PAE kernels the identity mapping is achieved by aliasing the
first PDPE for the kernel memory mapping into the first PDPE
of initial_page_table. This makes the EFI stub's trick "just work".
However, for non-PAE kernels there is no guarantee that the identity
mapping in the initial_page_table extends as far as the GDT; in this
case, accesses to the GDT will cause a page fault (which quickly becomes
a triple fault). Fix this by copying the kernel mappings from
swapper_pg_dir to initial_page_table twice, both at PAGE_OFFSET and at
identity mapping.
For some reason, this is only reproducible with QEMU's dynamic translation
mode, and not for example with KVM. However, even under KVM one can clearly
see that the page table is bogus:
$ qemu-system-i386 -pflash OVMF.fd -M q35 vmlinuz0 -s -S -daemonize
$ gdb
(gdb) target remote localhost:1234
(gdb) hb *0x02858f6f
Hardware assisted breakpoint 1 at 0x2858f6f
(gdb) c
Continuing.
Breakpoint 1, 0x02858f6f in ?? ()
(gdb) monitor info registers
...
GDT= 0724e000 000000ff
IDT= fffbb000 000007ff
CR0=0005003b CR2=ff896000 CR3=032b7000 CR4=00000690
...
The page directory is sane:
(gdb) x/4wx 0x32b7000
0x32b7000: 0x03398063 0x03399063 0x0339a063 0x0339b063
(gdb) x/4wx 0x3398000
0x3398000: 0x00000163 0x00001163 0x00002163 0x00003163
(gdb) x/4wx 0x3399000
0x3399000: 0x00400003 0x00401003 0x00402003 0x00403003
but our particular page directory entry is empty:
(gdb) x/1wx 0x32b7000 + (0x724e000 >> 22) * 4
0x32b7070: 0x00000000
[ It appears that you can skate past this issue if you don't receive
any interrupts while the bogus GDT pointer is loaded, or if you avoid
reloading the segment registers in general.
Andy Lutomirski provides some additional insight:
"AFAICT it's entirely permissible for the GDTR and/or LDT
descriptor to point to unmapped memory. Any attempt to use them
(segment loads, interrupts, IRET, etc) will try to access that memory
as if the access came from CPL 0 and, if the access fails, will
generate a valid page fault with CR2 pointing into the GDT or
LDT."
Up until commit 23a0d4e8fa6d ("efi: Disable interrupts around EFI
calls, not in the epilog/prolog calls") interrupts were disabled
around the prolog and epilog calls, and the functional GDT was
re-installed before interrupts were re-enabled.
Which explains why no one has hit this issue until now. ]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
[ Updated changelog. ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed upstream.
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c77f3fab441c3e466b4c3601a475fc31ce156b06 upstream.
After moving PIR to IRR, the interrupt needs to be delivered manually.
Reported-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Fixes the backport of 0b34a166f291d255755be46e43ed5497cdd194f2 upstream
Commit 0b34a166f291d255755be46e43ed5497cdd194f2 "x86/xen: Support
kexec/kdump in HVM guests by doing a soft reset" has been added to the
4.2-stable tree" needed to correct the CONFIG variable, as
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE only showed up in 4.3.
Reported-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reported-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8a53554e12e98d1759205afd7b8e9e2ea0936f48 upstream.
When multiple GOP devices exists, but none of them implements
ConOut, the code should just choose the first GOP (according to
the comments). But currently 'fb_base' will refer to the last GOP,
while other parameters to the first GOP, which will likely
result in a garbled display.
I can reliably reproduce this bug using my ASRock Z87M Extreme4
motherboard with CSM and integrated GPU disabled, and two PCIe
video cards (NVidia GT640 and GTX980), booting from efi-stub
(booting from grub works fine). On the primary display the
ASRock logo remains and on the secondary screen it is garbled
up completely.
Signed-off-by: Kővágó, Zoltán <DirtY.iCE.hu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1444659236-24837-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fe32d3cd5e8eb0f82e459763374aa80797023403 upstream.
These functions check should_resched() before unlocking spinlock/bh-enable:
preempt_count always non-zero => should_resched() always returns false.
cond_resched_lock() worked iff spin_needbreak is set.
This patch adds argument "preempt_offset" to should_resched().
preempt_count offset constants for that:
PREEMPT_DISABLE_OFFSET - offset after preempt_disable()
PREEMPT_LOCK_OFFSET - offset after spin_lock()
SOFTIRQ_DISABLE_OFFSET - offset after local_bh_distable()
SOFTIRQ_LOCK_OFFSET - offset after spin_lock_bh()
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: bdb438065890 ("sched: Extract the basic add/sub preempt_count modifiers")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150715095204.12246.98268.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0b34a166f291d255755be46e43ed5497cdd194f2 upstream.
Currently there is a number of issues preventing PVHVM Xen guests from
doing successful kexec/kdump:
- Bound event channels.
- Registered vcpu_info.
- PIRQ/emuirq mappings.
- shared_info frame after XENMAPSPACE_shared_info operation.
- Active grant mappings.
Basically, newly booted kernel stumbles upon already set up Xen
interfaces and there is no way to reestablish them. In Xen-4.7 a new
feature called 'soft reset' is coming. A guest performing kexec/kdump
operation is supposed to call SCHEDOP_shutdown hypercall with
SHUTDOWN_soft_reset reason before jumping to new kernel. Hypervisor
(with some help from toolstack) will do full domain cleanup (but
keeping its memory and vCPU contexts intact) returning the guest to
the state it had when it was first booted and thus allowing it to
start over.
Doing SHUTDOWN_soft_reset on Xen hypervisors which don't support it is
probably OK as by default all unknown shutdown reasons cause domain
destroy with a message in toolstack log: 'Unknown shutdown reason code
5. Destroying domain.' which gives a clue to what the problem is and
eliminates false expectations.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ab76f7b4ab2397ffdd2f1eb07c55697d19991d10 upstream.
Unused space between the end of __ex_table and the start of
rodata can be left W+x in the kernel page tables. Extend the
setting of the NX bit to cover this gap by starting from
text_end rather than rodata_start.
Before:
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81600000 6M ro PSE GLB x pmd
0xffffffff81600000-0xffffffff81754000 1360K ro GLB x pte
0xffffffff81754000-0xffffffff81800000 688K RW GLB x pte
0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff81a00000 2M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81b3b000 1260K ro GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81b3b000-0xffffffff82000000 4884K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82200000 2M RW PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff82200000-0xffffffffa0000000 478M pmd
After:
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81600000 6M ro PSE GLB x pmd
0xffffffff81600000-0xffffffff81754000 1360K ro GLB x pte
0xffffffff81754000-0xffffffff81800000 688K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff81a00000 2M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81b3b000 1260K ro GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81b3b000-0xffffffff82000000 4884K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82200000 2M RW PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff82200000-0xffffffffa0000000 478M pmd
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443704662-3138-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit eddd3826a1a0190e5235703d1e666affa4d13b96 upstream.
Dmitry Vyukov reported the following using trinity and the memory
error detector AddressSanitizer
(https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel).
[ 124.575597] ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on
address ffff88002e280000
[ 124.576801] ffff88002e280000 is located 131938492886538 bytes to
the left of 28857600-byte region [ffffffff81282e0a, ffffffff82e0830a)
[ 124.578633] Accessed by thread T10915:
[ 124.579295] inlined in describe_heap_address
./arch/x86/mm/asan/report.c:164
[ 124.579295] #0 ffffffff810dd277 in asan_report_error
./arch/x86/mm/asan/report.c:278
[ 124.580137] #1 ffffffff810dc6a0 in asan_check_region
./arch/x86/mm/asan/asan.c:37
[ 124.581050] #2 ffffffff810dd423 in __tsan_read8 ??:0
[ 124.581893] #3 ffffffff8107c093 in get_wchan
./arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c:444
The address checks in the 64bit implementation of get_wchan() are
wrong in several ways:
- The lower bound of the stack is not the start of the stack
page. It's the start of the stack page plus sizeof (struct
thread_info)
- The upper bound must be:
top_of_stack - TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING - 2 * sizeof(unsigned long).
The 2 * sizeof(unsigned long) is required because the stack pointer
points at the frame pointer. The layout on the stack is: ... IP FP
... IP FP. So we need to make sure that both IP and FP are in the
bounds.
Fix the bound checks and get rid of the mix of numeric constants, u64
and unsigned long. Making all unsigned long allows us to use the same
function for 32bit as well.
Use READ_ONCE() when accessing the stack. This does not prevent a
concurrent wakeup of the task and the stack changing, but at least it
avoids TOCTOU.
Also check task state at the end of the loop. Again that does not
prevent concurrent changes, but it avoids walking for nothing.
Add proper comments while at it.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Based-on-patch-from: Wolfram Gloger <wmglo@dent.med.uni-muenchen.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Wolfram Gloger <wmglo@dent.med.uni-muenchen.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150930083302.694788319@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e3c41e37b0f4b18cbd4dac76cbeece5a7558b909 upstream.
The original bug is a page fault crash that sometimes happens
on big machines when preparing ELF headers:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc90613fc9000
IP: [<ffffffff8103d645>] prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback+0x165/0x260
The bug is caused by us under-counting the number of memory ranges
and subsequently not allocating enough ELF header space for them.
The bug is typically masked on smaller systems, because the ELF header
allocation is rounded up to the next page.
This patch modifies the code in fill_up_crash_elf_data() by using
walk_system_ram_res() instead of walk_system_ram_range() to correctly
count the max number of crash memory ranges. That's because the
walk_system_ram_range() filters out small memory regions that
reside in the same page, but walk_system_ram_res() does not.
Here's how I found the bug:
After tracing prepare_elf64_headers() and prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback(),
the code uses walk_system_ram_res() to fill-in crash memory regions information
to the program header, so it counts those small memory regions that
reside in a page area.
But, when the kernel was using walk_system_ram_range() in
fill_up_crash_elf_data() to count the number of crash memory regions,
it filters out small regions.
I printed those small memory regions, for example:
kexec: Get nr_ram ranges. vaddr=0xffff880077592258 paddr=0x77592258, sz=0xdc0
Based on the code in walk_system_ram_range(), this memory region
will be filtered out:
pfn = (0x77592258 + 0x1000 - 1) >> 12 = 0x77593
end_pfn = (0x77592258 + 0xfc0 -1 + 1) >> 12 = 0x77593
end_pfn - pfn = 0x77593 - 0x77593 = 0 <=== if (end_pfn > pfn) is FALSE
So, the max_nr_ranges that's counted by the kernel doesn't include
small memory regions - causing us to under-allocate the required space.
That causes the page fault crash that happens in a later code path
when preparing ELF headers.
This bug is not easy to reproduce on small machines that have few
CPUs, because the allocated page aligned ELF buffer has more free
space to cover those small memory regions' PT_LOAD headers.
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443531537-29436-1-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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instead of top-down
commit a5caa209ba9c29c6421292e7879d2387a2ef39c9 upstream.
Beginning with UEFI v2.5 EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE was introduced
that signals that the firmware PE/COFF loader supports splitting
code and data sections of PE/COFF images into separate EFI
memory map entries. This allows the kernel to map those regions
with strict memory protections, e.g. EFI_MEMORY_RO for code,
EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, etc.
Unfortunately, an unwritten requirement of this new feature is
that the regions need to be mapped with the same offsets
relative to each other as observed in the EFI memory map. If
this is not done crashes like this may occur,
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffefe6086dd
IP: [<fffffffefe6086dd>] 0xfffffffefe6086dd
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8104c90e>] efi_call+0x7e/0x100
[<ffffffff81602091>] ? virt_efi_set_variable+0x61/0x90
[<ffffffff8104c583>] efi_delete_dummy_variable+0x63/0x70
[<ffffffff81f4e4aa>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x383/0x392
[<ffffffff81f37e1b>] start_kernel+0x38a/0x417
[<ffffffff81f37495>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
[<ffffffff81f37582>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xeb/0xef
Here 0xfffffffefe6086dd refers to an address the firmware
expects to be mapped but which the OS never claimed was mapped.
The issue is that included in these regions are relative
addresses to other regions which were emitted by the firmware
toolchain before the "splitting" of sections occurred at
runtime.
Needless to say, we don't satisfy this unwritten requirement on
x86_64 and instead map the EFI memory map entries in reverse
order. The above crash is almost certainly triggerable with any
kernel newer than v3.13 because that's when we rewrote the EFI
runtime region mapping code, in commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi:
Runtime services virtual mapping"). For kernel versions before
v3.13 things may work by pure luck depending on the
fragmentation of the kernel virtual address space at the time we
map the EFI regions.
Instead of mapping the EFI memory map entries in reverse order,
where entry N has a higher virtual address than entry N+1, map
them in the same order as they appear in the EFI memory map to
preserve this relative offset between regions.
This patch has been kept as small as possible with the intention
that it should be applied aggressively to stable and
distribution kernels. It is very much a bugfix rather than
support for a new feature, since when EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE is
enabled we must map things as outlined above to even boot - we
have no way of asking the firmware not to split the code/data
regions.
In fact, this patch doesn't even make use of the more strict
memory protections available in UEFI v2.5. That will come later.
Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com>
Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d2922422c48df93f3edff7d872ee4f3191fefb08 upstream.
The cpu feature flags are not ever going to change, so warning
everytime can cause a lot of kernel log spam
(in our case more than 10GB/hour).
The warning seems to only occur when nested virtualization is
enabled, so it's probably triggered by a KVM bug. This is a
sensible and safe change anyway, and the KVM bug fix might not
be suitable for stable releases anyway.
Signed-off-by: Dirk Mueller <dmueller@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 83c133cf11fb0e68a51681447e372489f052d40e upstream.
The NMI entry code that switches to the normal kernel stack needs to
be very careful not to clobber any extra stack slots on the NMI
stack. The code is fine under the assumption that SWAPGS is just a
normal instruction, but that assumption isn't really true. Use
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK instead.
This is part of a fix for some random crashes that Sasha saw.
Fixes: 9b6e6a8334d5 ("x86/nmi/64: Switch stacks on userspace NMI entry")
Reported-and-tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/974bc40edffdb5c2950a5c4977f821a446b76178.1442791737.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc57a7c68020dcf954428869eafd934c0ab1536f upstream.
PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME generates this code (using nmi as an
example, trimmed for readability):
ff 15 00 00 00 00 callq *0x0(%rip) # 2796 <nmi+0x6>
2792: R_X86_64_PC32 pv_irq_ops+0x2c
That's a call through a function pointer to regular C function that
does nothing on native boots, but that function isn't protected
against kprobes, isn't marked notrace, and is certainly not
guaranteed to preserve any registers if the compiler is feeling
perverse. This is bad news for a CLBR_NONE operation.
Of course, if everything works correctly, once paravirt ops are
patched, it gets nopped out, but what if we hit this code before
paravirt ops are patched in? This can potentially cause breakage
that is very difficult to debug.
A more subtle failure is possible here, too: if _paravirt_nop uses
the stack at all (even just to push RBP), it will overwrite the "NMI
executing" variable if it's called in the NMI prologue.
The Xen case, perhaps surprisingly, is fine, because it's already
written in asm.
Fix all of the cases that default to paravirt_nop (including
adjust_exception_frame) with a big hammer: replace paravirt_nop with
an asm function that is just a ret instruction.
The Xen case may have other problems, so document them.
This is part of a fix for some random crashes that Sasha saw.
Reported-and-tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8f5d2ba295f9d73751c33d97fda03e0495d9ade0.1442791737.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 03da3ff1cfcd7774c8780d2547ba0d995f7dc03d upstream.
In 2007, commit 07190a08eef36 ("Mark TSC on GeodeLX reliable")
bypassed verification of the TSC on Geode LX. However, this code
(now in the check_system_tsc_reliable() function in
arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c) was only present if CONFIG_MGEODE_LX was
set.
OpenWRT has recently started building its generic Geode target
for Geode GX, not LX, to include support for additional
platforms. This broke the timekeeping on LX-based devices,
because the TSC wasn't marked as reliable:
https://dev.openwrt.org/ticket/20531
By adding a runtime check on is_geode_lx(), we can also include
the fix if CONFIG_MGEODEGX1 or CONFIG_X86_GENERIC are set, thus
fixing the problem.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Cc: Andres Salomon <dilinger@queued.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <marcelo@kvack.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1442409003.131189.87.camel@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 66c117d7fa2ae429911e60d84bf31a90b2b96189 upstream.
Richard reported the following crash:
[ 0.036000] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 55501e06
[ 0.036000] IP: [<c0aae48b>] common_interrupt+0xb/0x38
[ 0.036000] Call Trace:
[ 0.036000] [<c0409c80>] ? add_nops+0x90/0xa0
[ 0.036000] [<c040a054>] apply_alternatives+0x274/0x630
Chuck decoded:
" 0: 8d 90 90 83 04 24 lea 0x24048390(%eax),%edx
6: 80 fc 0f cmp $0xf,%ah
9: a8 0f test $0xf,%al
>> b: a0 06 1e 50 55 mov 0x55501e06,%al
10: 57 push %edi
11: 56 push %esi
Interrupt 0x30 occurred while the alternatives code was replacing the
initial 0x90,0x90,0x90 NOPs (from the ASM_CLAC macro) with the
optimized version, 0x8d,0x76,0x00. Only the first byte has been
replaced so far, and it makes a mess out of the insn decoding."
optimize_nops() is buggy in two aspects:
- It's not disabling interrupts across the modification
- It's lacking a sync_core() call
Add both.
Fixes: 4fd4b6e5537c 'x86/alternatives: Use optimized NOPs for padding'
Reported-and-tested-by: "Richard W.M. Jones" <rjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert.lkml@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.11.1509031232340.15006@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5d7c631d926b59aa16f3c56eaeb83f1036c81dc7 upstream.
The APIC LVTT register is MMIO mapped but the TSC_DEADLINE register is an
MSR. The write to the TSC_DEADLINE MSR is not serializing, so it's not
guaranteed that the write to LVTT has reached the APIC before the
TSC_DEADLINE MSR is written. In such a case the write to the MSR is
ignored and as a consequence the local timer interrupt never fires.
The SDM decribes this issue for xAPIC and x2APIC modes. The
serialization methods recommended by the SDM differ.
xAPIC:
"1. Memory-mapped write to LVT Timer Register, setting bits 18:17 to 10b.
2. WRMSR to the IA32_TSC_DEADLINE MSR a value much larger than current time-stamp counter.
3. If RDMSR of the IA32_TSC_DEADLINE MSR returns zero, go to step 2.
4. WRMSR to the IA32_TSC_DEADLINE MSR the desired deadline."
x2APIC:
"To allow for efficient access to the APIC registers in x2APIC mode,
the serializing semantics of WRMSR are relaxed when writing to the
APIC registers. Thus, system software should not use 'WRMSR to APIC
registers in x2APIC mode' as a serializing instruction. Read and write
accesses to the APIC registers will occur in program order. A WRMSR to
an APIC register may complete before all preceding stores are globally
visible; software can prevent this by inserting a serializing
instruction, an SFENCE, or an MFENCE before the WRMSR."
The xAPIC method is to just wait for the memory mapped write to hit
the LVTT by checking whether the MSR write has reached the hardware.
There is no reason why a proper MFENCE after the memory mapped write would
not do the same. Andi Kleen confirmed that MFENCE is sufficient for the
xAPIC case as well.
Issue MFENCE before writing to the TSC_DEADLINE MSR. This can be done
unconditionally as all CPUs which have TSC_DEADLINE also have MFENCE
support.
[ tglx: Massaged the changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: <Kernel-team@fb.com>
Cc: <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150909041352.GA2059853@devbig257.prn2.facebook.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ebfb4988f0378e2ac3b4a0aa1ea20d724293f392 upstream.
Sasha reported that we can get here with .idx==-1, and
cpuc->event_constraints unallocated.
Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: b371b5943178 ("perf/x86: Fix event/group validation")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 04bb92e4b4cf06a66889d37b892b78f926faa9d4 upstream.
Reference SDM 28.1:
The current VPID is 0000H in the following situations:
- Outside VMX operation. (This includes operation in system-management
mode under the default treatment of SMIs and SMM with VMX operation;
see Section 34.14.)
- In VMX root operation.
- In VMX non-root operation when the “enable VPID” VM-execution control
is 0.
The VPID should never be 0000H in non-root operation when "enable VPID"
VM-execution control is 1. However, commit 34a1cd60 ("kvm: x86: vmx:
move some vmx setting from vmx_init() to hardware_setup()") remove the
codes which reserve 0000H for VMX root operation.
This patch fix it by again reserving 0000H for VMX root operation.
Fixes: 34a1cd60d17f62c1f077c1478a6c2ca8c3d17af4
Reported-by: Wincy Van <fanwenyi0529@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2d3862d26e67a59340ba1cf1748196c76c5787de upstream.
When loading x86 64bit kernel above 4GiB with patched grub2, got kernel
gunzip error.
| early console in decompress_kernel
| decompress_kernel:
| input: [0x807f2143b4-0x807ff61aee]
| output: [0x807cc00000-0x807f3ea29b] 0x027ea29c: output_len
| boot via startup_64
| KASLR using RDTSC...
| new output: [0x46fe000000-0x470138cfff] 0x0338d000: output_run_size
| decompress: [0x46fe000000-0x47007ea29b] <=== [0x807f2143b4-0x807ff61aee]
|
| Decompressing Linux... gz...
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| uncompression error
|
| -- System halted
the new buffer is at 0x46fe000000ULL, decompressor_gzip is using
0xffffffb901ffffff as out_len. gunzip in lib/zlib_inflate/inflate.c cap
that len to 0x01ffffff and decompress fails later.
We could hit this problem with crashkernel booting that uses kexec loading
kernel above 4GiB.
We have decompress_* support:
1. inbuf[]/outbuf[] for kernel preboot.
2. inbuf[]/flush() for initramfs
3. fill()/flush() for initrd.
This bug only affect kernel preboot path that use outbuf[].
Add __decompress and take real out_buf_len for gunzip instead of guessing
wrong buf size.
Fixes: 1431574a1c4 (lib/decompressors: fix "no limit" output buffer length)
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jon Medhurst <tixy@linaro.org>
Cc: Stephen Warren <swarren@wwwdotorg.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9962eea9e55f797f05f20ba6448929cab2a9f018 upstream.
The variable pmd_idx is not initialized for the first iteration of the
for loop.
Assign the proper value which indexes the start address.
Fixes: 719272c45b82 'x86, mm: only call early_ioremap_page_table_range_init() once'
Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang <mnfhuang@gmail.com>
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: wangnan0@huawei.com
Cc: david.vrabel@citrix.com
Reviewed-by: yinghai@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1436703522-29552-1-git-send-email-mhuang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5d0ddfebb93069061880fc57ee4ba7246bd1e1ee upstream.
Nick Meier reported a regression with HyperV that "
After rebooting the VM, the following messages are logged in syslog
when trying to load the tulip driver:
tulip: Linux Tulip drivers version 1.1.15 (Feb 27, 2007)
tulip: 0000:00:0a.0: PCI INT A: failed to register GSI
tulip: Cannot enable tulip board #0, aborting
tulip: probe of 0000:00:0a.0 failed with error -16
Errors occur in 3.19.0 kernel
Works in 3.17 kernel.
"
According to the ACPI dump file posted by Nick at
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1440072
The ACPI MADT table includes an interrupt source overridden entry for
ACPI SCI:
[236h 0566 1] Subtable Type : 02 <Interrupt Source Override>
[237h 0567 1] Length : 0A
[238h 0568 1] Bus : 00
[239h 0569 1] Source : 09
[23Ah 0570 4] Interrupt : 00000009
[23Eh 0574 2] Flags (decoded below) : 000D
Polarity : 1
Trigger Mode : 3
And in DSDT table, we have _PRT method to define PCI interrupts, which
eventually goes to:
Name (PRSA, ResourceTemplate ()
{
IRQ (Level, ActiveLow, Shared, )
{3,4,5,7,9,10,11,12,14,15}
})
Name (PRSB, ResourceTemplate ()
{
IRQ (Level, ActiveLow, Shared, )
{3,4,5,7,9,10,11,12,14,15}
})
Name (PRSC, ResourceTemplate ()
{
IRQ (Level, ActiveLow, Shared, )
{3,4,5,7,9,10,11,12,14,15}
})
Name (PRSD, ResourceTemplate ()
{
IRQ (Level, ActiveLow, Shared, )
{3,4,5,7,9,10,11,12,14,15}
})
According to the MADT and DSDT tables, IRQ 9 may be used for:
1) ACPI SCI in level, high mode
2) PCI legacy IRQ in level, low mode
So there's a conflict in polarity setting for IRQ 9.
Prior to commit cd68f6bd53cf ("x86, irq, acpi: Get rid of special
handling of GSI for ACPI SCI"), ACPI SCI is handled specially and
there's no check for conflicts between ACPI SCI and PCI legagy IRQ.
And it seems that the HyperV hypervisor doesn't make use of the
polarity configuration in IOAPIC entry, so it just works.
Commit cd68f6bd53cf gets rid of the specially handling of ACPI SCI,
and then the pin attribute checking code discloses the conflicts
between ACPI SCI and PCI legacy IRQ on HyperV virtual machine,
and rejects the request to assign IRQ9 to PCI devices.
So penalize legacy IRQ used by ACPI SCI and mark it unusable if ACPI
SCI attributes conflict with PCI IRQ attributes.
Please refer to following links for more information:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101301
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1440072
Fixes: cd68f6bd53cf ("x86, irq, acpi: Get rid of special handling of GSI for ACPI SCI")
Reported-and-tested-by: Nick Meier <nmeier@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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