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commit 9c55461040a9264b7e44444c53d26480b438eda6 upstream.
Currently, the EFI stub invokes the EFI memory attributes protocol to
strip any NX restrictions from the entire loaded kernel, resulting in
all code and data being mapped read-write-execute.
The point of the EFI memory attributes protocol is to remove the need
for all memory allocations to be mapped with both write and execute
permissions by default, and make it the OS loader's responsibility to
transition data mappings to code mappings where appropriate.
Even though the UEFI specification does not appear to leave room for
denying memory attribute changes based on security policy, let's be
cautious and avoid relying on the ability to create read-write-execute
mappings. This is trivially achievable, given that the amount of kernel
code executing via the firmware's 1:1 mapping is rather small and
limited to the .head.text region. So let's drop the NX restrictions only
on that subregion, but not before remapping it as read-only first.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 428080c9b19bfda37c478cd626dbd3851db1aff9 upstream.
In preparation for implementing rigorous build time checks to enforce
that only code that can support it will be called from the early 1:1
mapping of memory, move SEV init code that is called in this manner to
the .head.text section.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227151907.387873-19-ardb+git@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 48204aba801f1b512b3abed10b8e1a63e03f3dd1 upstream.
The .head.text section is the initial primary entrypoint of the core
kernel, and is entered with the CPU executing from a 1:1 mapping of
memory. Such code must never access global variables using absolute
references, as these are based on the kernel virtual mapping which is
not active yet at this point.
Given that the SME startup code is also called from this early execution
context, move it into .head.text as well. This will allow more thorough
build time checks in the future to ensure that early startup code only
uses RIP-relative references to global variables.
Also replace some occurrences of __pa_symbol() [which relies on the
compiler generating an absolute reference, which is not guaranteed] and
an open coded RIP-relative access with RIP_REL_REF().
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227151907.387873-18-ardb+git@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cd0d9d92c8bb46e77de62efd7df13069ddd61e7d upstream.
The early SME/SEV code parses the command line very early, in order to
decide whether or not memory encryption should be enabled, which needs
to occur even before the initial page tables are created.
This is problematic for a number of reasons:
- this early code runs from the 1:1 mapping provided by the decompressor
or firmware, which uses a different translation than the one assumed by
the linker, and so the code needs to be built in a special way;
- parsing external input while the entire kernel image is still mapped
writable is a bad idea in general, and really does not belong in
security minded code;
- the current code ignores the built-in command line entirely (although
this appears to be the case for the entire decompressor)
Given that the decompressor/EFI stub is an intrinsic part of the x86
bootable kernel image, move the command line parsing there and out of
the core kernel. This removes the need to build lib/cmdline.o in a
special way, or to use RIP-relative LEA instructions in inline asm
blocks.
This involves a new xloadflag in the setup header to indicate
that mem_encrypt=on appeared on the kernel command line.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227151907.387873-17-ardb+git@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This reverts commit 3428faa0d675f6a6284331731b762dc041011b3c which is
commit f2208aa12c27bfada3c15c550c03ca81d42dcac2 upstream.
It is reported to cause problems in the stable branches, so revert it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/899b7c1419a064a2b721b78eade06659@stwm.de
Reported-by: Wolfgang Walter <linux@stwm.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d14fa1fcf69db9d070e75f1c4425211fa619dfc8 upstream.
childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.
[From the email thread]
The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.
childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:
1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.
This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only
way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.
2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
happen at user/kernel boundaries.
3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for
user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the
registers it returns.
4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel
addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses
are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under
LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.
5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have
not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user
registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
Fixes: 7db91e57a0ac ("RISC-V: Task implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan O'Rear <sorear@fastmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327061258.2370291-1-sorear@fastmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d080a08b06b6266cc3e0e86c5acfd80db937cb6b upstream.
These macros did not initialize __kr_err, so they could fail even if
the access did not fault.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d464118cdc41 ("riscv: implement __get_kernel_nofault and __put_user_nofault")
Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240312022030.320789-1-samuel.holland@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 378ca2d2ad410a1cd5690d06b46c5e2297f4c8c0 upstream.
Align system call table on 8 bytes. With sys_call_table entry size
of 8 bytes that eliminates the possibility of a system call pointer
crossing cache line boundary.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Suggested-by: Ulrich Weigand <ulrich.weigand@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b017a0cea627fcbe158fc2c214fe893e18c4d0c4 upstream.
The SVE register sets have two different formats, one of which is a wrapped
version of the standard FPSIMD register set and another with actual SVE
register data. At present we check TIF_SVE to see if full SVE register
state should be provided when reading the SVE regset but if we were in a
syscall we may have saved only floating point registers even though that is
set.
Fix this and simplify the logic by checking and using the format which we
recorded when deciding if we should use FPSIMD or SVE format.
Fixes: 8c845e273104 ("arm64/sve: Leave SVE enabled on syscall if we don't context switch")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.2.x
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325-arm64-ptrace-fp-type-v1-1-8dc846caf11f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c27fa53b858b4ee6552a719aa599c250cf98a586 upstream.
The RISC-V Vector specification states in "Appendix D: Calling
Convention for Vector State" [1] that "Executing a system call causes
all caller-saved vector registers (v0-v31, vl, vtype) and vstart to
become unspecified.". In the RISC-V kernel this is called "discarding
the vstate".
Returning from a signal handler via the rt_sigreturn() syscall, vector
discard is also performed. However, this is not an issue since the
vector state should be restored from the sigcontext, and therefore not
care about the vector discard.
The "live state" is the actual vector register in the running context,
and the "vstate" is the vector state of the task. A dirty live state,
means that the vstate and live state are not in synch.
When vectorized user_from_copy() was introduced, an bug sneaked in at
the restoration code, related to the discard of the live state.
An example when this go wrong:
1. A userland application is executing vector code
2. The application receives a signal, and the signal handler is
entered.
3. The application returns from the signal handler, using the
rt_sigreturn() syscall.
4. The live vector state is discarded upon entering the
rt_sigreturn(), and the live state is marked as "dirty", indicating
that the live state need to be synchronized with the current
vstate.
5. rt_sigreturn() restores the vstate, except the Vector registers,
from the sigcontext
6. rt_sigreturn() restores the Vector registers, from the sigcontext,
and now the vectorized user_from_copy() is used. The dirty live
state from the discard is saved to the vstate, making the vstate
corrupt.
7. rt_sigreturn() returns to the application, which crashes due to
corrupted vstate.
Note that the vectorized user_from_copy() is invoked depending on the
value of CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_V_UCOPY_THRESHOLD. Default is 768, which
means that vlen has to be larger than 128b for this bug to trigger.
The fix is simply to mark the live state as non-dirty/clean prior
performing the vstate restore.
Link: https://github.com/riscv/riscv-isa-manual/releases/download/riscv-isa-release-8abdb41-2024-03-26/unpriv-isa-asciidoc.pdf # [1]
Reported-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Reported-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org>
Fixes: c2a658d41924 ("riscv: lib: vectorize copy_to_user/copy_from_user")
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Tested-by: Vineet Gupta <vineetg@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403072638.567446-1-bjorn@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 312be9fc2234c8acfb8148a9f4c358b70d358dee upstream.
The MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG MSR register is used to configure which data groups
should be generated into a PEBS record, and it's shared among all counters.
If there are different configurations among counters, perf combines all the
configurations.
The first perf command as below requires a complete PEBS record
(including memory info, GPRs, XMMs, and LBRs). The second perf command
only requires a basic group. However, after the second perf command is
running, the MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG register is cleared. Only a basic group is
generated in a PEBS record, which is wrong. The required information
for the first perf command is missed.
$ perf record --intr-regs=AX,SP,XMM0 -a -C 8 -b -W -d -c 100000003 -o /dev/null -e cpu/event=0xd0,umask=0x81/upp &
$ sleep 5
$ perf record --per-thread -c 1 -e cycles:pp --no-timestamp --no-tid taskset -c 8 ./noploop 1000
The first PEBS event is a system-wide PEBS event. The second PEBS event
is a per-thread event. When the thread is scheduled out, the
intel_pmu_pebs_del() function is invoked to update the PEBS state.
Since the system-wide event is still available, the cpuc->n_pebs is 1.
The cpuc->pebs_data_cfg is cleared. The data configuration for the
system-wide PEBS event is lost.
The (cpuc->n_pebs == 1) check was introduced in commit:
b6a32f023fcc ("perf/x86: Fix PEBS threshold initialization")
At that time, it indeed didn't hurt whether the state was updated
during the removal, because only the threshold is updated.
The calculation of the threshold takes the last PEBS event into
account.
However, since commit:
b752ea0c28e3 ("perf/x86/intel/ds: Flush PEBS DS when changing PEBS_DATA_CFG")
we delay the threshold update, and clear the PEBS data config, which triggers
the bug.
The PEBS data config update scope should not be shrunk during removal.
[ mingo: Improved the changelog & comments. ]
Fixes: b752ea0c28e3 ("perf/x86/intel/ds: Flush PEBS DS when changing PEBS_DATA_CFG")
Reported-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401133320.703971-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 99485c4c026f024e7cb82da84c7951dbe3deb584 upstream.
There are few uses of CoCo that don't rely on working cryptography and
hence a working RNG. Unfortunately, the CoCo threat model means that the
VM host cannot be trusted and may actively work against guests to
extract secrets or manipulate computation. Since a malicious host can
modify or observe nearly all inputs to guests, the only remaining source
of entropy for CoCo guests is RDRAND.
If RDRAND is broken -- due to CPU hardware fault -- the RNG as a whole
is meant to gracefully continue on gathering entropy from other sources,
but since there aren't other sources on CoCo, this is catastrophic.
This is mostly a concern at boot time when initially seeding the RNG, as
after that the consequences of a broken RDRAND are much more
theoretical.
So, try at boot to seed the RNG using 256 bits of RDRAND output. If this
fails, panic(). This will also trigger if the system is booted without
RDRAND, as RDRAND is essential for a safe CoCo boot.
Add this deliberately to be "just a CoCo x86 driver feature" and not
part of the RNG itself. Many device drivers and platforms have some
desire to contribute something to the RNG, and add_device_randomness()
is specifically meant for this purpose.
Any driver can call it with seed data of any quality, or even garbage
quality, and it can only possibly make the quality of the RNG better or
have no effect, but can never make it worse.
Rather than trying to build something into the core of the RNG, consider
the particular CoCo issue just a CoCo issue, and therefore separate it
all out into driver (well, arch/platform) code.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326160735.73531-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3ddf944b32f88741c303f0b21459dbb3872b8bc5 upstream.
Modifying a MCA bank's MCA_CTL bits which control which error types to
be reported is done over
/sys/devices/system/machinecheck/
├── machinecheck0
│ ├── bank0
│ ├── bank1
│ ├── bank10
│ ├── bank11
...
sysfs nodes by writing the new bit mask of events to enable.
When the write is accepted, the kernel deletes all current timers and
reinits all banks.
Doing that in parallel can lead to initializing a timer which is already
armed and in the timer wheel, i.e., in use already:
ODEBUG: init active (active state 0) object: ffff888063a28000 object
type: timer_list hint: mce_timer_fn+0x0/0x240 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c:2642
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8120 at lib/debugobjects.c:514
debug_print_object+0x1a0/0x2a0 lib/debugobjects.c:514
Fix that by grabbing the sysfs mutex as the rest of the MCA sysfs code
does.
Reported by: Yue Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Reported by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAEkJfYNiENwQY8yV1LYJ9LjJs%2Bx_-PqMv98gKig55=2vbzffRw@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 04c35ab3bdae7fefbd7c7a7355f29fa03a035221 upstream.
PAT handling won't do the right thing in COW mappings: the first PTE (or,
in fact, all PTEs) can be replaced during write faults to point at anon
folios. Reliably recovering the correct PFN and cachemode using
follow_phys() from PTEs will not work in COW mappings.
Using follow_phys(), we might just get the address+protection of the anon
folio (which is very wrong), or fail on swap/nonswap entries, failing
follow_phys() and triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn() and
track_pfn_copy(), not properly calling free_pfn_range().
In free_pfn_range(), we either wouldn't call memtype_free() or would call
it with the wrong range, possibly leaking memory.
To fix that, let's update follow_phys() to refuse returning anon folios,
and fallback to using the stored PFN inside vma->vm_pgoff for COW mappings
if we run into that.
We will now properly handle untrack_pfn() with COW mappings, where we
don't need the cachemode. We'll have to fail fork()->track_pfn_copy() if
the first page was replaced by an anon folio, though: we'd have to store
the cachemode in the VMA to make this work, likely growing the VMA size.
For now, lets keep it simple and let track_pfn_copy() just fail in that
case: it would have failed in the past with swap/nonswap entries already,
and it would have done the wrong thing with anon folios.
Simple reproducer to trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn():
<--- C reproducer --->
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <liburing.h>
int main(void)
{
struct io_uring_params p = {};
int ring_fd;
size_t size;
char *map;
ring_fd = io_uring_setup(1, &p);
if (ring_fd < 0) {
perror("io_uring_setup");
return 1;
}
size = p.sq_off.array + p.sq_entries * sizeof(unsigned);
/* Map the submission queue ring MAP_PRIVATE */
map = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE,
ring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
/* We have at least one page. Let's COW it. */
*map = 0;
pause();
return 0;
}
<--- C reproducer --->
On a system with 16 GiB RAM and swap configured:
# ./iouring &
# memhog 16G
# killall iouring
[ 301.552930] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 301.553285] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1402 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:1060 untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.553989] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_g
[ 301.558232] CPU: 7 PID: 1402 Comm: iouring Not tainted 6.7.5-100.fc38.x86_64 #1
[ 301.558772] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebu4
[ 301.559569] RIP: 0010:untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.559893] Code: 75 c4 eb cf 48 8b 43 10 8b a8 e8 00 00 00 3b 6b 28 74 b8 48 8b 7b 30 e8 ea 1a f7 000
[ 301.561189] RSP: 0018:ffffba2c0377fab8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 301.561590] RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: ffff9208c8ce9cc0 RCX: 000000010455e047
[ 301.562105] RDX: 07fffffff0eb1e0a RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9208c391d200
[ 301.562628] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffba2c0377fab8 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 301.563145] R10: ffff9208d2292d50 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 00007fea890e0000
[ 301.563669] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba2c0377fc08 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 301.564186] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff920c2fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 301.564773] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 301.565197] CR2: 00007fea88ee8a20 CR3: 00000001033a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[ 301.565725] PKRU: 55555554
[ 301.565944] Call Trace:
[ 301.566148] <TASK>
[ 301.566325] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.566618] ? __warn+0x81/0x130
[ 301.566876] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.567163] ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0
[ 301.567466] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
[ 301.567743] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ 301.568038] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 301.568363] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.568660] ? untrack_pfn+0x65/0x100
[ 301.568947] unmap_single_vma+0xa6/0xe0
[ 301.569247] unmap_vmas+0xb5/0x190
[ 301.569532] exit_mmap+0xec/0x340
[ 301.569801] __mmput+0x3e/0x130
[ 301.570051] do_exit+0x305/0xaf0
...
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240403212131.929421-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@huawei.com>
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240227122814.3781907-1-mawupeng1@huawei.com
Fixes: b1a86e15dc03 ("x86, pat: remove the dependency on 'vm_pgoff' in track/untrack pfn vma routines")
Fixes: 5899329b1910 ("x86: PAT: implement track/untrack of pfnmap regions for x86 - v3")
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b377c66ae3509ccea596512d6afb4777711c4870 upstream.
srso_alias_untrain_ret() is special code, even if it is a dummy
which is called in the !SRSO case, so annotate it like its real
counterpart, to address the following objtool splat:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .export_symbol+0x2b290: data relocation to !ENDBR: srso_alias_untrain_ret+0x0
Fixes: 4535e1a4174c ("x86/bugs: Fix the SRSO mitigation on Zen3/4")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240405144637.17908-1-bp@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a370c2419e4680a27382d9231edcf739d5d74efc ]
patch_map() uses fixmap mappings to circumvent the non-writability of
the kernel text mapping.
The __set_fixmap() function only flushes the current cpu tlb, it does
not emit an IPI so we must make sure that while we use a fixmap mapping,
the current task is not migrated on another cpu which could miss the
newly introduced fixmap mapping.
So in order to avoid any task migration, disable the preemption.
Reported-by: Andrea Parri <andrea@rivosinc.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZcS+GAaM25LXsBOl@andrea/
Reported-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/CABgGipUMz3Sffu-CkmeUB1dKVwVQ73+7=sgC45-m0AE9RCjOZg@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: cad539baa48f ("riscv: implement a memset like function for text")
Fixes: 0ff7c3b33127 ("riscv: Use text_mutex instead of patch_lock")
Co-developed-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Acked-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326203017.310422-3-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8a48ea87ce89fb701624f4b9e82556c81f30c7dc ]
The following warning appears when using ftrace:
[89855.443413] RCU not on for: arch_cpu_idle+0x0/0x1c
[89855.445640] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 0 at include/linux/trace_recursion.h:162 arch_ftrace_ops_list_func+0x208/0x228
[89855.445824] Modules linked in: xt_conntrack(E) nft_chain_nat(E) xt_MASQUERADE(E) nf_conntrack_netlink(E) xt_addrtype(E) nft_compat(E) nf_tables(E) nfnetlink(E) br_netfilter(E) cfg80211(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) ofpart(E) redboot(E) cmdlinepart(E) cfi_cmdset_0001(E) virtio_net(E) cfi_probe(E) cfi_util(E) 9pnet_virtio(E) gen_probe(E) net_failover(E) virtio_rng(E) failover(E) 9pnet(E) physmap(E) map_funcs(E) chipreg(E) mtd(E) uio_pdrv_genirq(E) uio(E) dm_multipath(E) scsi_dh_rdac(E) scsi_dh_emc(E) scsi_dh_alua(E) drm(E) efi_pstore(E) backlight(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) raid10(E) raid456(E) async_raid6_recov(E) async_memcpy(E) async_pq(E) async_xor(E) xor(E) async_tx(E) raid6_pq(E) raid1(E) raid0(E) virtio_blk(E)
[89855.451563] CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Tainted: G E 6.8.0-rc6ubuntu-defconfig #2
[89855.451726] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[89855.451899] epc : arch_ftrace_ops_list_func+0x208/0x228
[89855.452016] ra : arch_ftrace_ops_list_func+0x208/0x228
[89855.452119] epc : ffffffff8016b216 ra : ffffffff8016b216 sp : ffffaf808090fdb0
[89855.452171] gp : ffffffff827c7680 tp : ffffaf808089ad40 t0 : ffffffff800c0dd8
[89855.452216] t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffaf808090fe30
[89855.452306] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : 0000000000000026 a1 : ffffffff82cd6ac8
[89855.452423] a2 : ffffffff800458c8 a3 : ffffaf80b1870640 a4 : 0000000000000000
[89855.452646] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 00000000ffffffff a7 : ffffffffffffffff
[89855.452698] s2 : ffffffff82766872 s3 : ffffffff80004caa s4 : ffffffff80ebea90
[89855.452743] s5 : ffffaf808089bd40 s6 : 8000000a00006e00 s7 : 0000000000000008
[89855.452787] s8 : 0000000000002000 s9 : 0000000080043700 s10: 0000000000000000
[89855.452831] s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : 0000000000100000 t4 : 0000000000000064
[89855.452874] t5 : 000000000000000c t6 : ffffaf80b182dbfc
[89855.452929] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003
[89855.453053] [<ffffffff8016b216>] arch_ftrace_ops_list_func+0x208/0x228
[89855.453191] [<ffffffff8000e082>] ftrace_call+0x8/0x22
[89855.453265] [<ffffffff800a149c>] do_idle+0x24c/0x2ca
[89855.453357] [<ffffffff8000da54>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x26
[89855.453429] [<ffffffff8000b716>] smp_callin+0x92/0xb6
[89855.453785] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
To fix this, mark arch_cpu_idle() as noinstr, like it is done in commit
a9cbc1b471d2 ("s390/idle: mark arch_cpu_idle() noinstr").
Reported-by: Evgenii Shatokhin <e.shatokhin@yadro.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/51f21b87-ebed-4411-afbc-c00d3dea2bab@yadro.com/
Fixes: cfbc4f81c9d0 ("riscv: Select ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Tested-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Acked-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326203017.310422-2-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit dd33e5dc7247041b565014f66286c9566b0e32b6 ]
Print the instruction dump with info instead of emergency level. The
unhandled signal message is only for informational purpose.
Fixes: b8a03a634129 ("riscv: add userland instruction dump to RISC-V splats")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Yunhui Cui <cuiyunhui@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/mvmy1aegrhm.fsf@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e9f3af02f63909f41b43c28330434cc437639c5c ]
In case of a sampling event, the PAI PMU device drivers need a
reference to this event. Currently to PMU device driver reference
is removed when a sampling event is destroyed. This may lead to
situations where the reference of the PMU device driver is removed
while being used by a different sampling event.
Reset the event reference pointer of the PMU device driver when
a sampling event is deleted and before the next one might be added.
Fixes: 39d62336f5c1 ("s390/pai: add support for cryptography counters")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 13dddf9319808badd2c1f5d7007b4e82838a648e ]
"riscv: signal: Report signal frame size to userspace via auxv" (e92f469)
has added new constant AT_MINSIGSTKSZ but failed to increment the size of
auxv, keeping AT_VECTOR_SIZE_ARCH at 9.
This fix correctly increments AT_VECTOR_SIZE_ARCH to 10, following the
approach in the commit 94b07c1 ("arm64: signal: Report signal frame size
to userspace via auxv").
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/73883406.20231215232720@torrio.net
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240102133617.3649-1-victor@torrio.net/
Reported-by: Ivan Komarov <ivan.komarov@dfyz.info>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/CY3Z02NYV1C4.11BLB9PLVW9G1@fedora/
Fixes: e92f469b0771 ("riscv: signal: Report signal frame size to userspace via auxv")
Signed-off-by: Victor Isaev <isv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ad14f7ca9f0d9fdf73d1fd61aaf8248d46ffc849 ]
Such relocation causes crash of android linker similar to one
described in commit e05d57dcb8c7
("riscv: Fixup __vdso_gettimeofday broke dynamic ftrace").
Looks like this relocation is added by CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE which is
disabled in the default android kernel.
Before:
readelf -rW arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vdso.so:
Relocation section '.rela.dyn' at offset 0xd00 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type
0000000000000d20 0000000000000003 R_RISCV_RELATIVE
objdump:
0000000000000c86 <__vdso_riscv_hwprobe@@LINUX_4.15>:
c86: 0001 nop
c88: 0001 nop
c8a: 0001 nop
c8c: 0001 nop
c8e: e211 bnez a2,c92 <__vdso_riscv_hwprobe...
After:
readelf -rW arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vdso.so:
There are no relocations in this file.
objdump:
0000000000000c86 <__vdso_riscv_hwprobe@@LINUX_4.15>:
c86: e211 bnez a2,c8a <__vdso_riscv_hwprobe...
c88: c6b9 beqz a3,cd6 <__vdso_riscv_hwprobe...
c8a: e739 bnez a4,cd8 <__vdso_riscv_hwprobe...
c8c: ffffd797 auipc a5,0xffffd
Also disable SCS since it also should not be available in vdso.
Fixes: aa5af0aa90ba ("RISC-V: Add hwprobe vDSO function and data")
Signed-off-by: Roman Artemev <roman.artemev@syntacore.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Isaev <vladimir.isaev@syntacore.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313085843.17661-1-vladimir.isaev@syntacore.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 674bc0168e6b68070c75df22e97ab63b6eb60d89 ]
__flush_tlb_range() does not modify the provided cpumask, so its cmask
parameter can be pointer-to-const. This avoids the unsafe cast of
cpu_online_mask.
Fixes: 54d7431af73e ("riscv: Add support for BATCHED_UNMAP_TLB_FLUSH")
Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240301201837.2826172-1-samuel.holland@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0aa6b90ef9d75b4bd7b6d106d85f2a3437697f91 ]
Some BIOSes allow the end user to set the minimum SEV ASID value
(CPUID 0x8000001F_EDX) to be greater than the maximum number of
encrypted guests, or maximum SEV ASID value (CPUID 0x8000001F_ECX)
in order to dedicate all the SEV ASIDs to SEV-ES or SEV-SNP.
The SEV support, as coded, does not handle the case where the minimum
SEV ASID value can be greater than the maximum SEV ASID value.
As a result, the following confusing message is issued:
[ 30.715724] kvm_amd: SEV enabled (ASIDs 1007 - 1006)
Fix the support to properly handle this case.
Fixes: 916391a2d1dc ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES capability in KVM")
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104190520.62510-1-Ashish.Kalra@amd.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131235609.4161407-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 466eec4a22a76c462781bf6d45cb02cbedf21a61 ]
Convert all local ASID variables and parameters throughout the SEV code
from signed integers to unsigned integers. As ASIDs are fundamentally
unsigned values, and the global min/max variables are appropriately
unsigned integers, too.
Functionally, this is a glorified nop as KVM guarantees min_sev_asid is
non-zero, and no CPU supports -1u as the _only_ asid, i.e. the signed vs.
unsigned goof won't cause problems in practice.
Opportunistically use sev_get_asid() in sev_flush_encrypted_page() instead
of open coding an equivalent.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131235609.4161407-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Stable-dep-of: 0aa6b90ef9d7 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for allowing zero SEV ASIDs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 4c36a156738887c1edd78589fe192d757989bcde upstream.
When zapping a table entry in stage2_try_break_pte(), we issue range
TLB invalidation for the region that was mapped by the table. However,
we neglect to align the base address down to the granule size and so
if we ended up reaching the table entry via a misaligned address then
we will accidentally skip invalidation for some prefix of the affected
address range.
Align 'ctx->addr' down to the granule size when performing TLB
invalidation for an unmapped table in stage2_try_break_pte().
Cc: Raghavendra Rao Ananta <rananta@google.com>
Cc: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: Shaoqin Huang <shahuang@redhat.com>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Fixes: defc8cc7abf0 ("KVM: arm64: Invalidate the table entries upon a range")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shaoqin Huang <shahuang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327124853.11206-5-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0f0ff097bf77663b8d2692e33d56119947611bb0 upstream.
Commit c910f2b65518 ("arm64/mm: Update tlb invalidation routines for
FEAT_LPA2") updated the __tlbi_level() macro to take the target level
as an argument, with TLBI_TTL_UNKNOWN (rather than 0) indicating that
the caller cannot provide level information. Unfortunately, the two
implementations of __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range() were not updated and so
now ask for an level 0 invalidation if FEAT_LPA2 is implemented.
Fix the problem by passing TLBI_TTL_UNKNOWN instead of 0 as the level
argument to __flush_s2_tlb_range_op() in __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range().
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Fixes: c910f2b65518 ("arm64/mm: Update tlb invalidation routines for FEAT_LPA2")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shaoqin Huang <shahuang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327124853.11206-4-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0e110732473e14d6520e49d75d2c88ef7d46fe67 upstream.
The srso_alias_untrain_ret() dummy thunk in the !CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
case is there only for the altenative in CALL_UNTRAIN_RET to have
a symbol to resolve.
However, testing with kernels which don't have CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
enabled, leads to the warning in patch_return() to fire:
missing return thunk: srso_alias_untrain_ret+0x0/0x10-0x0: eb 0e 66 66 2e
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:826 apply_returns (arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:826
Put in a plain "ret" there so that gcc doesn't put a return thunk in
in its place which special and gets checked.
In addition:
ERROR: modpost: "srso_alias_untrain_ret" [arch/x86/kvm/kvm-amd.ko] undefined!
make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.modpost:145: Module.symvers] Chyba 1
make[1]: *** [/usr/src/linux-6.8.3/Makefile:1873: modpost] Chyba 2
make: *** [Makefile:240: __sub-make] Chyba 2
since !SRSO builds would use the dummy return thunk as reported by
petr.pisar@atlas.cz, https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218679.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202404020901.da75a60f-oliver.sang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202404020901.da75a60f-oliver.sang@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e12e28009e584c8f8363439f6a928ec86278a106 upstream.
Several Qualcomm Bluetooth controllers lack persistent storage for the
device address and instead one can be provided by the boot firmware
using the 'local-bd-address' devicetree property.
The Bluetooth bindings clearly states that the address should be
specified in little-endian order, but due to a long-standing bug in the
Qualcomm driver which reversed the address some boot firmware has been
providing the address in big-endian order instead.
The boot firmware in SC7180 Trogdor Chromebooks is known to be affected
so mark the 'local-bd-address' property as broken to maintain backwards
compatibility with older firmware when fixing the underlying driver bug.
Note that ChromeOS always updates the kernel and devicetree in lockstep
so that there is no need to handle backwards compatibility with older
devicetrees.
Fixes: 7ec3e67307f8 ("arm64: dts: qcom: sc7180-trogdor: add initial trogdor and lazor dt")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10
Cc: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9d98aa088386aee3db1b7b60b800c0fde0654a4a upstream.
Adjust the IP passed to `emit_patch` so it calculates the correct offset
for the CALL instruction if `x86_call_depth_emit_accounting` emits code.
Otherwise we will skip some instructions and most likely crash.
Fixes: b2e9dfe54be4 ("x86/bpf: Emit call depth accounting if required")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230105214922.250473-1-joanbrugueram@gmail.com/
Co-developed-by: Joan Bruguera Micó <joanbrugueram@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Joan Bruguera Micó <joanbrugueram@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401185821.224068-2-ubizjak@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8cb4a9a82b21623dbb4b3051dd30d98356cf95bc upstream.
Add CPUID_LNX_5 to track cpufeatures' word 21, and add the appropriate
compile-time assert in KVM to prevent direct lookups on the features in
CPUID_LNX_5. KVM uses X86_FEATURE_* flags to manage guest CPUID, and so
must translate features that are scattered by Linux from the Linux-defined
bit to the hardware-defined bit, i.e. should never try to directly access
scattered features in guest CPUID.
Opportunistically add NR_CPUID_WORDS to enum cpuid_leafs, along with a
compile-time assert in KVM's CPUID infrastructure to ensure that future
additions update cpuid_leafs along with NCAPINTS.
No functional change intended.
Fixes: 7f274e609f3d ("x86/cpufeatures: Add new word for scattered features")
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7f274e609f3d5f45c22b1dd59053f6764458b492 upstream.
Add a new word for scattered features because all free bits among the
existing Linux-defined auxiliary flags have been exhausted.
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8380d2a0da469a1f0ad75b8954a79fb689599ff6.1711091584.git.sandipan.das@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f5fe0adeed6019df495497a64cb57d563ead2296 upstream.
Commit 11e5ea5242e3 ("KVM: arm64: Use helpers to classify exception
types reported via ESR") tried to abstract the translation fault
check when handling an out-of IPA space condition, but incorrectly
replaced it with a permission fault check.
Restore the previous translation fault check.
Fixes: 11e5ea5242e3 ("KVM: arm64: Use helpers to classify exception types reported via ESR")
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wujie Duan <wjduan@linx-info.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/864jd3269g.wl-maz@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8e936e98718f005c986be0bfa1ee6b355acf96be upstream.
The reads to APLIC in_clrip[x] registers returns rectified input values
of the interrupt sources.
A rectified input value of an interrupt source is defined by the section
"4.5.2 Source configurations (sourcecfg[1]–sourcecfg[1023])" of the
RISC-V AIA specification as:
rectified input value = (incoming wire value) XOR (source is inverted)
Update the riscv_aplic_input() implementation to match the above.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 74967aa208e2 ("RISC-V: KVM: Add in-kernel emulation of AIA APLIC")
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240321085041.1955293-3-apatel@ventanamicro.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d8dd9f113e16bef3b29c9dcceb584a6f144f55e4 upstream.
The writes to setipnum_le/be register for APLIC in MSI-mode have special
consideration for level-triggered interrupts as-per the section "4.9.2
Special consideration for level-sensitive interrupt sources" of the RISC-V
AIA specification.
Particularly, the below text from the RISC-V AIA specification defines
the behaviour of writes to setipnum_le/be register for level-triggered
interrupts:
"A second option is for the interrupt service routine to write the
APLIC’s source identity number for the interrupt to the domain’s
setipnum register just before exiting. This will cause the interrupt’s
pending bit to be set to one again if the source is still asserting
an interrupt, but not if the source is not asserting an interrupt."
Fix setipnum_le/be write emulation for in-kernel APLIC by implementing
the above behaviour in aplic_write_pending() function.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 74967aa208e2 ("RISC-V: KVM: Add in-kernel emulation of AIA APLIC")
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240321085041.1955293-2-apatel@ventanamicro.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c567f2948f57bdc03ed03403ae0234085f376b7d ]
This reverts commit d794734c9bbfe22f86686dc2909c25f5ffe1a572.
While the original change tries to fix a bug, it also unintentionally broke
existing systems, see the regressions reported at:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/3a1b9909-45ac-4f97-ad68-d16ef1ce99db@pavinjoseph.com/
Since d794734c9bbf was also marked for -stable, let's back it out before
causing more damage.
Note that due to another upstream change the revert was not 100% automatic:
0a845e0f6348 mm/treewide: replace pud_large() with pud_leaf()
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@hpe.com>
Cc: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/3a1b9909-45ac-4f97-ad68-d16ef1ce99db@pavinjoseph.com/
Fixes: d794734c9bbf ("x86/mm/ident_map: Use gbpages only where full GB page should be mapped.")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0a845e0f6348ccfa2dcc8c450ffd1c9ffe8c4add ]
pud_large() is always defined as pud_leaf(). Merge their usages. Chose
pud_leaf() because pud_leaf() is a global API, while pud_large() is not.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240305043750.93762-9-peterx@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: c567f2948f57 ("Revert "x86/mm/ident_map: Use gbpages only where full GB page should be mapped."")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a51cd6bf8e10793103c5870ff9e4db295a843604 ]
In case when is64 == 1 in emit(A64_REV32(is64, dst, dst), ctx) the
generated insn reverses byte order for both high and low 32-bit words,
resuling in an incorrect swap as indicated by the jit test:
[ 9757.262607] test_bpf: #312 BSWAP 16: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0xefcd jited:1 8 PASS
[ 9757.264435] test_bpf: #313 BSWAP 32: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0xefcdab89 jited:1 ret 1460850314 != -271733879 (0x5712ce8a != 0xefcdab89)FAIL (1 times)
[ 9757.266260] test_bpf: #314 BSWAP 64: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0x67452301 jited:1 8 PASS
[ 9757.268000] test_bpf: #315 BSWAP 64: 0x0123456789abcdef >> 32 -> 0xefcdab89 jited:1 8 PASS
[ 9757.269686] test_bpf: #316 BSWAP 16: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x1032 jited:1 8 PASS
[ 9757.271380] test_bpf: #317 BSWAP 32: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x10325476 jited:1 ret -1460850316 != 271733878 (0xa8ed3174 != 0x10325476)FAIL (1 times)
[ 9757.273022] test_bpf: #318 BSWAP 64: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x98badcfe jited:1 7 PASS
[ 9757.274721] test_bpf: #319 BSWAP 64: 0xfedcba9876543210 >> 32 -> 0x10325476 jited:1 9 PASS
Fix this by forcing 32bit variant of rev32.
Fixes: 1104247f3f979 ("bpf, arm64: Support unconditional bswap")
Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Message-ID: <20240321081809.158803-1-asavkov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 114b5b3b4bde7358624437be2f12cde1b265224e ]
A64_LDRSW() takes three registers: Xt, Xn, Xm as arguments and it loads
and sign extends the value at address Xn + Xm into register Xt.
Currently, the offset is being directly used in place of the tmp
register which has the offset already loaded by the last emitted
instruction.
This will cause JIT failures. The easiest way to reproduce this is to
test the following code through test_bpf module:
{
"BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_W",
.u.insns_int = {
BPF_LD_IMM64(R1, 0x00000000deadbeefULL),
BPF_LD_IMM64(R2, 0xffffffffdeadbeefULL),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, R10, R1, -7),
BPF_LDX_MEMSX(BPF_W, R0, R10, -7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JNE, R0, R2, 1),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, R0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
INTERNAL,
{ },
{ { 0, 0 } },
.stack_depth = 7,
},
We need to use the offset as -7 to trigger this code path, there could
be other valid ways to trigger this from proper BPF programs as well.
This code is rejected by the JIT because -7 is passed to A64_LDRSW() but
it expects a valid register (0 - 31).
roott@pjy:~# modprobe test_bpf test_name="BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_W"
[11300.490371] test_bpf: test_bpf: set 'test_bpf' as the default test_suite.
[11300.491750] test_bpf: #345 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_W
[11300.493179] aarch64_insn_encode_register: unknown register encoding -7
[11300.494133] aarch64_insn_encode_register: unknown register encoding -7
[11300.495292] FAIL to select_runtime err=-524
[11300.496804] test_bpf: Summary: 0 PASSED, 1 FAILED, [0/0 JIT'ed]
modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'test_bpf': Invalid argument
Applying this patch fixes the issue.
root@pjy:~# modprobe test_bpf test_name="BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_W"
[ 292.837436] test_bpf: test_bpf: set 'test_bpf' as the default test_suite.
[ 292.839416] test_bpf: #345 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_W jited:1 156 PASS
[ 292.844794] test_bpf: Summary: 1 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [1/1 JIT'ed]
Fixes: cc88f540da52 ("bpf, arm64: Support sign-extension load instructions")
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20240312235917.103626-1-puranjay12@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7ded842b356d151ece8ac4985940438e6d3998bb ]
Kui-Feng Lee reported a crash on s390x triggered by the
dummy_st_ops/dummy_init_ptr_arg test [1]:
[<0000000000000002>] 0x2
[<00000000009d5cde>] bpf_struct_ops_test_run+0x156/0x250
[<000000000033145a>] __sys_bpf+0xa1a/0xd00
[<00000000003319dc>] __s390x_sys_bpf+0x44/0x50
[<0000000000c4382c>] __do_syscall+0x244/0x300
[<0000000000c59a40>] system_call+0x70/0x98
This is caused by GCC moving memcpy() after assignments in
bpf_jit_plt(), resulting in NULL pointers being written instead of
the return and the target addresses.
Looking at the GCC internals, the reordering is allowed because the
alias analysis thinks that the memcpy() destination and the assignments'
left-hand-sides are based on different objects: new_plt and
bpf_plt_ret/bpf_plt_target respectively, and therefore they cannot
alias.
This is in turn due to a violation of the C standard:
When two pointers are subtracted, both shall point to elements of the
same array object, or one past the last element of the array object
...
From the C's perspective, bpf_plt_ret and bpf_plt are distinct objects
and cannot be subtracted. In the practical terms, doing so confuses the
GCC's alias analysis.
The code was written this way in order to let the C side know a few
offsets defined in the assembly. While nice, this is by no means
necessary. Fix the noncompliance by hardcoding these offsets.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/c9923c1d-971d-4022-8dc8-1364e929d34c@gmail.com/
Fixes: f1d5df84cd8c ("s390/bpf: Implement bpf_arch_text_poke()")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <20240320015515.11883-1-iii@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 0f4a1e80989aca185d955fcd791d7750082044a2 upstream.
SEV-SNP requires encrypted memory to be validated before access.
Because the ROM memory range is not part of the e820 table, it is not
pre-validated by the BIOS. Therefore, if a SEV-SNP guest kernel wishes
to access this range, the guest must first validate the range.
The current SEV-SNP code does indeed scan the ROM range during early
boot and thus attempts to validate the ROM range in probe_roms().
However, this behavior is neither sufficient nor necessary for the
following reasons:
* With regards to sufficiency, if EFI_CONFIG_TABLES are not enabled and
CONFIG_DMI_SCAN_MACHINE_NON_EFI_FALLBACK is set, the kernel will
attempt to access the memory at SMBIOS_ENTRY_POINT_SCAN_START (which
falls in the ROM range) prior to validation.
For example, Project Oak Stage 0 provides a minimal guest firmware
that currently meets these configuration conditions, meaning guests
booting atop Oak Stage 0 firmware encounter a problematic call chain
during dmi_setup() -> dmi_scan_machine() that results in a crash
during boot if SEV-SNP is enabled.
* With regards to necessity, SEV-SNP guests generally read garbage
(which changes across boots) from the ROM range, meaning these scans
are unnecessary. The guest reads garbage because the legacy ROM range
is unencrypted data but is accessed via an encrypted PMD during early
boot (where the PMD is marked as encrypted due to potentially mapping
actually-encrypted data in other PMD-contained ranges).
In one exceptional case, EISA probing treats the ROM range as
unencrypted data, which is inconsistent with other probing.
Continuing to allow SEV-SNP guests to use garbage and to inconsistently
classify ROM range encryption status can trigger undesirable behavior.
For instance, if garbage bytes appear to be a valid signature, memory
may be unnecessarily reserved for the ROM range. Future code or other
use cases may result in more problematic (arbitrary) behavior that
should be avoided.
While one solution would be to overhaul the early PMD mapping to always
treat the ROM region of the PMD as unencrypted, SEV-SNP guests do not
currently rely on data from the ROM region during early boot (and even
if they did, they would be mostly relying on garbage data anyways).
As a simpler solution, skip the ROM range scans (and the otherwise-
necessary range validation) during SEV-SNP guest early boot. The
potential SEV-SNP guest crash due to lack of ROM range validation is
thus avoided by simply not accessing the ROM range.
In most cases, skip the scans by overriding problematic x86_init
functions during sme_early_init() to SNP-safe variants, which can be
likened to x86_init overrides done for other platforms (ex: Xen); such
overrides also avoid the spread of cc_platform_has() checks throughout
the tree.
In the exceptional EISA case, still use cc_platform_has() for the
simplest change, given (1) checks for guest type (ex: Xen domain status)
are already performed here, and (2) these checks occur in a subsys
initcall instead of an x86_init function.
[ bp: Massage commit message, remove "we"s. ]
Fixes: 9704c07bf9f7 ("x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active")
Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313121546.2964854-1-kevinloughlin@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c7b2edd8377be983442c1344cb940cd2ac21b601 upstream.
AMD processors based on Zen 2 and later microarchitectures do not
support PMCx087 (instruction pipe stalls) which is used as the backing
event for "stalled-cycles-frontend" and "stalled-cycles-backend".
Use PMCx0A9 (cycles where micro-op queue is empty) instead to count
frontend stalls and remove the entry for backend stalls since there
is no direct replacement.
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Fixes: 3fe3331bb285 ("perf/x86/amd: Add event map for AMD Family 17h")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/03d7fc8fa2a28f9be732116009025bdec1b3ec97.1711352180.git.sandipan.das@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 532a0c57d7ff75e8f07d4e25cba4184989e2a241 upstream.
This was reverts commit 8009479ee919b9a91674f48050ccbff64eafedaa.
It was originally in x86/urgent, but was deemed wrong so got zapped.
But in the meantime, x86/urgent had been merged into x86/apic to
resolve a conflict. I didn't notice the merge so didn't zap it
from x86/apic and it managed to make it up with the x86/apic
material.
The reverted commit is known to cause some KASAN problems.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8009479ee919b9a91674f48050ccbff64eafedaa upstream.
The macro used for MDS mitigation executes VERW with relative
addressing for the operand. This was necessary in earlier versions of
the series. Now it is unnecessary and creates a problem for backports
on older kernels that don't support relocations in alternatives.
Relocation support was added by commit 270a69c4485d ("x86/alternative:
Support relocations in alternatives"). Also asm for fixed addressing
is much cleaner than relative RIP addressing.
Simplify the asm by using fixed addressing for VERW operand.
[ dhansen: tweak changelog ]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20558f89-299b-472e-9a96-171403a83bd6@suse.com/
Fixes: baf8361e5455 ("x86/bugs: Add asm helpers for executing VERW")
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240226-verw-arg-fix-v1-1-7b37ee6fd57d%40linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 32fbe5246582af4f611ccccee33fd6e559087252 upstream.
There are regression reports[1][2] that crashkernel region on x86_64 can't
be added into iomem tree sometime. This causes the later failure of kdump
loading.
This happened after commit 4a693ce65b18 ("kdump: defer the insertion of
crashkernel resources") was merged.
Even though, these reported issues are proved to be related to other
component, they are just exposed after above commmit applied, I still
would like to keep crashk_res and crashk_low_res being added into iomem
early as before because the early adding has been always there on x86_64
and working very well. For safety of kdump, Let's change it back.
Here, add a macro HAVE_ARCH_ADD_CRASH_RES_TO_IOMEM_EARLY to limit that
only ARCH defining the macro can have the early adding
crashk_res/_low_res into iomem. Then define
HAVE_ARCH_ADD_CRASH_RES_TO_IOMEM_EARLY on x86 to enable it.
Note: In reserve_crashkernel_low(), there's a remnant of crashk_low_res
handling which was mistakenly added back in commit 85fcde402db1 ("kexec:
split crashkernel reservation code out from crash_core.c").
[1]
[PATCH V2] x86/kexec: do not update E820 kexec table for setup_data
https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zfv8iCL6CT2JqLIC@darkstar.users.ipa.redhat.com/T/#u
[2]
Question about Address Range Validation in Crash Kernel Allocation
https://lore.kernel.org/all/4eeac1f733584855965a2ea62fa4da58@huawei.com/T/#u
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZgDYemRQ2jxjLkq+@MiWiFi-R3L-srv
Fixes: 4a693ce65b18 ("kdump: defer the insertion of crashkernel resources")
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Cc: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4535e1a4174c4111d92c5a9a21e542d232e0fcaa upstream.
The original version of the mitigation would patch in the calls to the
untraining routines directly. That is, the alternative() in UNTRAIN_RET
will patch in the CALL to srso_alias_untrain_ret() directly.
However, even if commit e7c25c441e9e ("x86/cpu: Cleanup the untrain
mess") meant well in trying to clean up the situation, due to micro-
architectural reasons, the untraining routine srso_alias_untrain_ret()
must be the target of a CALL instruction and not of a JMP instruction as
it is done now.
Reshuffle the alternative macros to accomplish that.
Fixes: e7c25c441e9e ("x86/cpu: Cleanup the untrain mess")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 549aa9678a0b3981d4821bf244579d9937650562 upstream.
After the linked LLVM change, the build fails with
CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN_LEVEL="error", which happens with allmodconfig:
ld.lld: error: vmlinux.a(init/main.o):(.hexagon.attributes) is being placed in '.hexagon.attributes'
Handle the attributes section in a similar manner as arm and riscv by
adding it after the primary ELF_DETAILS grouping in vmlinux.lds.S, which
fixes the error.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240319-hexagon-handle-attributes-section-vmlinux-lds-s-v1-1-59855dab8872@kernel.org
Fixes: 113616ec5b64 ("hexagon: select ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN")
Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/31f4b329c8234fab9afa59494d7f8bdaeaefeaad
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com>
Cc: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Cc: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 166ce846dc5974a266f6c2a2896dbef5425a6f21 upstream.
On v5 and lower CPUs we can't provide MDWE protection, so ensure we fail
any attempt to enable it via prctl(PR_SET_MDWE).
Previously such an attempt would misleadingly succeed, leading to any
subsequent mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE) or execve() failing unconditionally
(the latter somewhat violently via force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV) due to
READ_IMPLIES_EXEC).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240227013546.15769-6-zev@bewilderbeest.net
Signed-off-by: Zev Weiss <zev@bewilderbeest.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [6.3+]
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Russell King (Oracle) <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Cc: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Cc: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Cc: Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d5aad4c2ca057e760a92a9a7d65bd38d72963f27 upstream.
Patch series "ARM: prctl: Reject PR_SET_MDWE where not supported".
I noticed after a recent kernel update that my ARM926 system started
segfaulting on any execve() after calling prctl(PR_SET_MDWE). After some
investigation it appears that ARMv5 is incapable of providing the
appropriate protections for MDWE, since any readable memory is also
implicitly executable.
The prctl_set_mdwe() function already had some special-case logic added
disabling it on PARISC (commit 793838138c15, "prctl: Disable
prctl(PR_SET_MDWE) on parisc"); this patch series (1) generalizes that
check to use an arch_*() function, and (2) adds a corresponding override
for ARM to disable MDWE on pre-ARMv6 CPUs.
With the series applied, prctl(PR_SET_MDWE) is rejected on ARMv5 and
subsequent execve() calls (as well as mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE)) can
succeed instead of unconditionally failing; on ARMv6 the prctl works as it
did previously.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/2023112456-linked-nape-bf19@gregkh/
This patch (of 2):
There exist systems other than PARISC where MDWE may not be feasible to
support; rather than cluttering up the generic code with additional
arch-specific logic let's add a generic function for checking MDWE support
and allow each arch to override it as needed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240227013546.15769-4-zev@bewilderbeest.net
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240227013546.15769-5-zev@bewilderbeest.net
Signed-off-by: Zev Weiss <zev@bewilderbeest.net>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> [parisc]
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Russell King (Oracle) <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Cc: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Cc: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Cc: Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [6.3+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d21f5a59ea773826cc489acb287811d690b703cc upstream.
The pure EFI stub entry point does not take a struct boot_params from
the boot loader, but creates it from scratch, and populates only the
fields that still have meaning in this context (command line, initrd
base and size, etc)
The original mixed mode implementation used the EFI handover protocol
instead, where the boot loader (i.e., GRUB) populates a boot_params
struct and passes it to a special Linux specific EFI entry point that
takes the boot_params pointer as its third argument.
When the new mixed mode implementation was introduced, using a special
32-bit PE entrypoint in the 64-bit kernel, it adopted the pure approach,
and relied on the EFI stub to create the struct boot_params. This is
preferred because it makes the bootloader side much easier to implement,
as it does not need any x86-specific knowledge on how struct boot_params
and struct setup_header are put together. This mixed mode implementation
was adopted by systemd-boot version 252 and later.
When commit
e2ab9eab324c ("x86/boot/compressed: Move 32-bit entrypoint code into .text section")
refactored this code and moved it out of head_64.S, the fact that ESI
was populated with the address of the base of the image was overlooked,
and to simplify the code flow, ESI is now zeroed and stored to memory
unconditionally in shared code, so that the NULL-ness of that variable
can still be used later to determine which mixed mode boot protocol is
in use.
With ESI pointing to the base of the image, it can serve as a struct
boot_params pointer for startup_32(), which only accesses the init_data
and kernel_alignment fields (and the scratch field as a temporary
stack). Zeroing ESI means that those accesses produce garbage now, even
though things appear to work if the first page of memory happens to be
zeroed, and the region right before LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR (== 16 MiB)
happens to be free.
The solution is to pass a special, temporary struct boot_params to
startup_32() via ESI, one that is sufficient for getting it to create
the page tables correctly and is discarded right after. This involves
setting a minimal alignment of 4k, only to get the statically allocated
page tables line up correctly, and setting init_size to the executable
image size (_end - startup_32). This ensures that the page tables are
covered by the static footprint of the PE image.
Given that EFI boot no longer calls the decompressor and no longer pads
the image to permit the decompressor to execute in place, the same
temporary struct boot_params should be used in the EFI handover protocol
based mixed mode implementation as well, to prevent the page tables from
being placed outside of allocated memory.
Fixes: e2ab9eab324c ("x86/boot/compressed: Move 32-bit entrypoint code into .text section")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # v6.1+
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240321150510.GI8211@craftyguy.net/
Reported-by: Clayton Craft <clayton@craftyguy.net>
Tested-by: Clayton Craft <clayton@craftyguy.net>
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 10e4b5166df9ff7a2d5316138ca668b42d004422 ]
Commit 672365477ae8 ("x86/fpu: Update XFD state where required") and
commit 8bf26758ca96 ("x86/fpu: Add XFD state to fpstate") introduced a
per CPU variable xfd_state to keep the MSR_IA32_XFD value cached, in
order to avoid unnecessary writes to the MSR.
On CPU hotplug MSR_IA32_XFD is reset to the init_fpstate.xfd, which
wipes out any stale state. But the per CPU cached xfd value is not
reset, which brings them out of sync.
As a consequence a subsequent xfd_update_state() might fail to update
the MSR which in turn can result in XRSTOR raising a #NM in kernel
space, which crashes the kernel.
To fix this, introduce xfd_set_state() to write xfd_state together
with MSR_IA32_XFD, and use it in all places that set MSR_IA32_XFD.
Fixes: 672365477ae8 ("x86/fpu: Update XFD state where required")
Signed-off-by: Adamos Ttofari <attofari@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322230439.456571-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230511152818.13839-1-attofari@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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