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2019-05-30treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152Thomas Gleixner1-5/+1
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-18crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithmsVitaly Chikunov1-10/+19
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected hash value, which itself was never passed into verify(). This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms, because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves `r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient. Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce complete signature check without any output besides status. Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs to be called and its return value inspected. Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in {public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will be changed in the following commit. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-18crypto: rsa - unimplement sign/verify for raw RSA backendsVitaly Chikunov1-2/+2
In preparation for new akcipher verify call remove sign/verify callbacks from RSA backends and make PKCS1 driver call encrypt/decrypt instead. This also complies with the well-known idea that raw RSA should never be used for sign/verify. It only should be used with proper padding scheme such as PKCS1 driver provides. Cc: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com> Cc: qat-linux@intel.com Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-01-18crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>Eric Biggers1-0/+1
Include internal/rsa.h in rsa-pkcs1pad.c to get the declaration of rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl. This fixes the following sparse warning: crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:698:24: warning: symbol 'rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl' was not declared. Should it be static? Cc: Andrzej Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-10-26crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be optional [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-18/+41
The original pkcs1pad implementation allowed to pad/unpad raw RSA output. However, this has been taken out in commit: commit c0d20d22e0ad ("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Require hash to be present") This patch restored this ability as it is needed by the asymmetric key implementation. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-09-28crypto: fix a memory leak in rsa-kcs1pad's encryption modeDan Aloni1-9/+0
The encryption mode of pkcs1pad never uses out_sg and out_buf, so there's no need to allocate the buffer, which presently is not even being freed. CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-02-15crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Replace GFP_ATOMIC with GFP_KERNEL in ↵Jia-Ju Bai1-1/+1
pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete After checking all possible call chains to kzalloc here, my tool finds that this kzalloc is never called in atomic context. Thus GFP_ATOMIC is not necessary, and it can be replaced with GFP_KERNEL. This is found by a static analysis tool named DCNS written by myself. Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: remove redundant backlog checks on EBUSYGilad Ben-Yossef1-12/+4
Now that -EBUSY return code only indicates backlog queueing we can safely remove the now redundant check for the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG flag when -EBUSY is returned. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-06-20crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - use constant time memory comparison for MACsJason A. Donenfeld1-1/+1
Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Suggested-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-06-10crypto: pkcs1pad - comply with crypto_akcipher_maxsize()Tudor-Dan Ambarus1-8/+2
crypto_akcipher_maxsize() asks for the output buffer size without caring for errors. It allways assume that will be called after a valid setkey. Comply with it and return what he wants. crypto_akcipher_maxsize() now returns an unsigned int. Remove the unnecessary check. Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-09-22crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Handle leading zero for decryptionHerbert Xu1-17/+24
As the software RSA implementation now produces fixed-length output, we need to eliminate leading zeros in the calling code instead. This patch does just that for pkcs1pad decryption while signature verification was fixed in an earlier patch. Fixes: 9b45b7bba3d2 ("crypto: rsa - Generate fixed-length output") Reported-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-19crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix rsa-pkcs1pad request structTadeusz Struk1-2/+1
To allow for child request context the struct akcipher_request child_req needs to be at the end of the structure. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-03crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Fix regression from leading zerosHerbert Xu1-16/+22
As the software RSA implementation now produces fixed-length output, we need to eliminate leading zeros in the calling code instead. This patch does just that for pkcs1pad signature verification. Fixes: 9b45b7bba3d2 ("crypto: rsa - Generate fixed-length output") Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-01crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Avoid copying output when possibleHerbert Xu1-67/+45
In the vast majority of cases (2^-32 on 32-bit and 2^-64 on 64-bit) cases, the result from encryption/signing will require no padding. This patch makes these two operations write their output directly to the final destination. Only in the exceedingly rare cases where fixup is needed to we copy it out and back to add the leading zeroes. This patch also makes use of the crypto_akcipher_set_crypt API instead of writing the akcipher request directly. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-01crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Move key size check to setkeyHerbert Xu1-30/+26
Rather than repeatedly checking the key size on each operation, we should be checking it once when the key is set. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-01crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Always use GFP_KERNELHerbert Xu1-16/+6
We don't currently support using akcipher in atomic contexts, so GFP_KERNEL should always be used. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-01crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Remove bogus page splittingHerbert Xu1-14/+5
The helper pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf tries to split a buffer that crosses a page boundary into two SG entries. This is unnecessary. This patch removes that. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-01crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Require hash to be presentHerbert Xu1-53/+30
The only user of rsa-pkcs1pad always uses the hash so there is no reason to support the case of not having a hash. This patch also changes the digest info lookup so that it is only done once during template instantiation rather than on each operation. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-04-15crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix dst lenTadeusz Struk1-6/+6
The output buffer length has to be at least as big as the key_size. It is then updated to the actual output size by the implementation. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-03-04crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1padTadeusz Struk1-26/+156
This adds hash param to pkcs1pad. The pkcs1pad template can work with or without the hash. When hash param is provided then the verify operation will also verify the output against the known digest. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-12-22crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - don't allocate buffer on stackAndrzej Zaborowski1-8/+19
Avoid the s390 compile "warning: 'pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete' uses dynamic stack allocation" reported by kbuild test robot. Don't use a flat zero-filled buffer, instead zero the contents of the SGL. Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-12-09crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithmAndrzej Zaborowski1-0/+617
This patch adds PKCS#1 v1.5 standard RSA padding as a separate template. This way an RSA cipher with padding can be obtained by instantiating "pkcs1pad(rsa)". The reason for adding this is that RSA is almost never used without this padding (or OAEP) so it will be needed for either certificate work in the kernel or the userspace, and I also hear that it is likely implemented by hardware RSA in which case hardware implementations of the whole of pkcs1pad(rsa) can be provided. Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>